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ABSTRACT
The thesis has two principal objectives: firstly, to 
provide a systematic account of the evolution of the 
Sinarquista Movement in Mexico from 1934 to 1944 and, 
secondly, to evaluate the extent to which the Movement was 
instrumental in the shift to the right of the Mexican 
Revolution.
The first part of the thesis outlines the historical 
and political context in which the Sinarquista Movement 
appeared. It argues that the modus vivendi that came out 
of the 1929 agreements between the Church and the State, 
which brought to an end the Cristero rebellion, was broken 
by the left-oriented government of Lazaro Cardenas, which 
alienated the Catholics and exasperated the propertied 
classes. Against this background took place the 
consolidation of Catholic organizations.
The following three chapters then trace the evolution 
of the Sinarquista Movement from its inception in the 
Mexican political scene, to its apogee after the 1941 
presidential elections and, to its collapse and 
fragmentation in 1945. Each chapter considers the 
relations and the perceptions of the Church, the 
Government and the United States. In each case, the 
analysis is organized around two critical developments: 
the changing character of the Mexican regime and, the 
growing concern of the Catholic conservative sector, the 
power behind the Sinarquista Movement, about the 
radicalization of the Movement, which threatened to 
compromise the Church. Part three seeks to evaluate
Synarchist organization and ideology. It argues that the 
failures of the Mexican Revolution in agriculture and in 
education provided the conditions for the success of 
Synarchism among the poorest Mexican masses. It 
nevertheless also argues that because of the lack of 
alliances with other nationalist groups and of a precise 
programme of action, the fate of the Movement ultimately 
rested with the actors that manipulated it.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine the politics 
of Mexico over a ten year period, during which emerged a 
political phenomenon that in the first half of the 
twentieth century was common to all the Western World. 
This phenomenon was the rapid expansion, after the First 
World War, of popular, nationalist movements, which were 
authoritarian and without ideology, which can be 
collectively classified under right-wing radical 
movements.
Until recently, historians of modern Mexico tended 
to neglect the years 1920 to 1940 and concentrate upon the 
first phase of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) or upon 
the deeds of Lazaro Cdrdenas (1934-1940). During the last 
ten years, however, an attempt has been made to rectify 
this imbalance. The most important contribution has been 
the remarkable account of Jean Meyer of the Cristero 
rebellion. Other examples are the Colegio de Mexico's 
Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, especially volumes VII 
to XIX, and Campbell's study of the Mexican radical Right.1
Hence, understanding of the subject is still 
rudimentary and incomplete, and the knowledge that has 
been assembled in this regard is not sufficient to 
formulate more than a few tentative conclusions as to its 
true nature. Besides, its novelty suggests that an 
attempt to situate it in an historical perspective must, 
by necessity be tentative. In spite of this, it is hoped 
that this thesis will contribute towards a better 
understanding of the phenomenon.
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Despite the assertions of those who saw Synarchism 
as a peripheral phenomenon in the contemporary history of 
Mexico, the history of the Synarchist Movement from 1934 
to 1944 gives prominence to the significance of the role 
played by this movement in the political swing to the 
right of the Mexican Revolution since 1940.
Very few studies have been dedicated to the Mexican 
Right, and even less to individual organizations. In 
Mexico, as in most other countries, the right had a 
negative appearance; more specifically, it emerged as a 
reaction to the Mexican Revolution and to the social
changes that it promised, especially against the Marxist
turn that the Revolution adopted in the thirties. On the 
other hand, the Mexican Right was characterized by its 
xenophobia and an exacerbated hatred of the United States. 
Another element was its contempt of democracy and the 
reluctance to submit to the normal process of decision 
making to achieve the changes desired. Thus, the Mexican
Right can be defined as ultranationalist, anti­
parliamentarian and anti-marxist.
However, the Right in Mexico was not a monolithic 
movement. On the contrary, a brief glance reveals that 
one of its main characteristics was its fragmentary nature 
and its incapacity to achieve cohesion, which would have 
provided it with the necessary means to pose a viable 
threat to the government. It was only the Synarchist 
Movement which succeeded in attracting a large number of 
followers; yet, as we shall see, Synarchism was unable to 
forge a sufficient basis of support to seize power. The
11
fact that it had a religious foundation was a fundamental 
factor that contributed to its failure. Above all, at the 
time when it was at the peak of its strength, Synarchism 
was an organization directed towards promoting the 
interests of the Church, devised and upheld with the aim 
of recovering and retaining her privileges and her 
position in Mexican society, as a response to the threat 
that the Mexican Revolution presented her.
We chose the Synarchist Movement as the organization 
in which to analyse the conflict of interests - religious, 
political and social - that shaped the opposition of the 
Revolution, since this was the group that caused the most 
concern, at home and abroad. Synarchist dominance of the 
opposition after 1940 was so dramatic that we were drawn 
to find out how it rose to that position and why it 
collapsed so swiftly. In so doing we became aware of the 
ignorance and misconception that has surrounded, and still 
continues to surround, the subject.
It is impossible to understand the growth of 
Synarchism without reference to the political and social 
conditions that prevailed in Mexico after the Cristero 
revolt, during the presidency of Cardenas, and the 
development of the Regime from 1929 onwards which was 
inextricably linked to the advancement of the Right.
An additional benefit to be derived from studying the 
life of an important movement such as the Synarchist 
movement is that it allows the analyst to address one of 
the cardinal problems of the Revolution: the role of the 
peasantry. Contrary to the traditional view that the
12
Mexican Revolution was a successful peasant revolt, which 
through subsequent agrarian reform provided the rural 
masses with substantial material rewards? more recent 
accounts, such as Meyer and Alvear Acevedo, have suggested 
that the masses were simply mobilized by the national 
bourgeoisie to overthrow the Ancien Regime only to be 
brought under the tight control of the ruling class once 
they aspired to goals of their own. They have emphasized 
the manipulation of the rural masses in the Revolutionary 
period and popular resistance to the regime which was 
manifested in the Cristiada and the Synarchist Movement.
We do not pretend that our study even begins to 
settle that issue, but we hope that it sheds some light 
upon it in the context of the Synarchist Movement.
This thesis is not methodological or conceptual. It 
is, however, above all, a political history of a unique 
phenomenon in contemporary Mexican politics, which has not 
been told sufficiently. The objective is to attempt to 
bridge this vacuum in the History of Mexico.
ENDNOTES
1. For the works by these and other authors mentioned 
in the introduction, see the bibliography at the end 
of the thesis.
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PART ONE
THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
14
CHAPTER I
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1928-1934)
The years 1929 to 1935 correspond to the emergence 
of an important political phenomenon: the consolidation 
of the Mexican political system.
The Cristero rebellion (1926-1929) was the last drama 
of the Mexican Revolution and, also, the last violent act 
in the tense and usually misunderstood Church-State 
relations.
The Church never forgot the lessons of the Cristero 
revolt. It distanced Catholics, even more, from the 
Government? but most significantly, it created division, 
first among laymen, then among the clergy and, finally, 
between the two.
As the conflict evolved, the Church moved from a 
position of tacit approval of the rebellion, to one of 
moderation that made possible, in 1929, an eventual 
agreement with the Government to end the conflict. After 
1929, the upper hierarchy of the Church, obeying papal 
orders, did not wish to unleash another costly and 
unpredictable open war, nor did it wish to let down the 
many Catholics who demanded violent action to recover the 
rights of the Church. The next step in the policy of 
moderation was the organization of the Catholic laity for 
positive social action.
Calles was the dominant figure in Mexican politics 
for almost ten years. After he left the Presidency in 
1928, he pursued his idea of the Revolution from behind
15
the scenes by manipulating, controlling and even replacing 
the President.
The relative peace in Church-State relations came to 
an abrupt end in 1931. The resurgence of the conflict was 
originally confined to a regional level and did not 
immediately seem to threaten the basic state of relations. 
But, after the persecution spread to the rest of the 
country and, finally, to the capital, the situation of the 
Church had worsened so much that in the opinion of the 
Apostolic Delegate the Church had ceased to exist in 
Mexico.
Calles was challenged by revolutionary radicals who 
demanded fulfilment of the social reforms contained in the 
Constitution. He had to listen to them in order to 
preserve his power and unite the Party. The concessions 
he granted were essentially anticlerical? the most 
important of which were legislation limiting the number 
of priests and reforms in education.
We analyse, here, the series of events that led, from 
the signing of the agreements of 1929, which established 
a modus vivendi between Church and State, to the renewal 
of persecution in 1931 and the way in which Catholic 
opposition was organized.
We begin by giving an interpretation of the nature 
of the modus vivendi, underlining the divisions and 
pressures that threatened its existence. We then proceed 
to describe the way in which religious persecution was 
renewed. We conclude this chapter with an exposition of 
the organizing process of Catholic reaction.
16
The historical study of these events is fundamental 
to the understanding of the evolution and the nature of 
Catholic political opposition, in that it provides its 
ideological background and conforms its framework. 
Synarchism was not the product of spontaneous generation, 
but the result of a long and exacting process that made 
possible its sudden appearance.
I. The End of the Cristero Revolt
After 1921, the Obregon and Calles governments became 
increasingly involved in frequent and serious conflicts 
with the Church hierarchy and lay leadership.
When, in 1925, the Episcopacy reacted to President 
Calles1 covert support of an Orthodox Catholic Apostolic 
Mexican Church with a Mexican patriarch linked to Mexican 
nationalism,1 and when in 1926 Archbishop Jose Mora y del 
Rio reaffirmed the hierarchy's refusal to accept Articles 
3, 5, 27, and 130 of the 1917 Constitution, Calles acted 
to implement the Constitution. He began the deportation 
of foreign-born priests, closed convents, secularized 
education, and demanded the registration of all priests 
with the Government in order to regulate their 
"professional conduct".2
Lay Catholic leaders organized the National League 
for the Defence of Religious Freedom (LNDLR), to 
"reconquer religious liberty" by all means possible, 
including armed force. An estimated 20,000 rebels, known 
as "cristeros", were mobilized between 1926 and 1929, in 
order to fight in the name of "Christ the King".3
17
As spontaneous armed movements spread in various 
states, the League mobilized its organization to unite 
these small movements into unified struggle for the 
recovery of religious liberty.
The objective of the movement which was centred in 
the western states was not to overthrow the Government, 
but to win recognition for "essential religious 
liberties".4 Once religious liberty was won, the war could 
be over.5 But it soon became obvious that religious 
liberty could not be sufficiently ensured if the 
Government was not defeated.6
The League was neither dependent on, nor the 
responsibility of the prelates or the Church in general. 
It asserted its Catholicity and its submission to the 
teachings of the Encyclicals in relation to the exercise 
of social action. In this respect, it was compelled not 
to exceed Catholic doctrine and Catholic principles.7 It 
was a novel institution? representatives of other Catholic 
institutions were invited to form the League. It was not, 
however, a confederation of Catholic organizations.
Hence, the League presented a petition to the Mexican 
hierarchy on 26 November 1926, asking for the Episcopacy's 
approval of armed defence and to enable priests to serve 
canonically as military men.8
The League has always argued that the Episcopal 
Committee9 approved the petition with the reservation that 
it could not authorize priests to function as military men 
but would give permission for the clergy to minister to 
military forces.10
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According to the public declaration of the episcopal 
authorities and with the attitude they adopted from the 
outset to the religious conflict, that is, extreme 
tactfulness with respect to anything that might suggest 
their participation in it, it could be said that if they 
were always cautious never to appear as promoters or 
instigators of armed rebellion, they did give their 
support to it the moment they saw in it the possibility of 
obtaining the establishment of a social order in line with 
their ideology. An argument in favour of this would be 
that they did not oppose, in principle, Catholics "making 
use of their civil rights", or organizing themselves to 
defend what they considered their "essential rights", even 
by means of armed force.11 Besides, church authorities had 
participated, more or less actively, in the development of 
the conflict - not always complying with Rome's 
instructions - until it ended in armed struggle.
Not only were the bishops consulted when the 
organization of the armed movement began, but being aware 
that a rebellion against the Government was in process, 
they did not do anything to stop it, once it had broken 
out. Yet, there is a logic behind this attitude: Pope 
Pius IX's apostolic letter PATERNA SANE SOLLICITUDO, of 2 
February 192612 which instructed them to hold themselves 
entirely aloof from every kind of political party, came 
out at the very same time that they were considering an 
obligation to repudiate the rigorous application of the 
articles of the Constitution.
The position of the Episcopacy was clear. Initially,
19
it gave its support, though not openly, to the League in 
the organization of the armed rebellion, as long as it saw 
in it the possibility of success, and even backed its 
leader,18 who was instructed to go to the United States to 
obtain economic aid and moral support for the struggle; 
but when the movement declined14 and it became obvious that 
it would fail, it withdrew that support leaving it to its 
fate, and, what is more, later on, without consulting the 
League, negotiated with the Government, through its 
representatives, a "modus vivendi", seizing the 
opportunity that the new Government of Portes Gil 
represented.
Archbishop Pascual Diaz later declared that the 
League had solicited hierarchical support; but affirmed 
that although the Episcopacy did not stop the movement, 
neither did it give its approval to the armed conflict. 
The hierarchy, he said, had no reason to interfere in the 
League's affairs, since it was at liberty to conduct 
itself and defend its rights in its own way.
A partial settlement of the religious difficulty and 
the resumption of services in the Catholic churches of 
Mexico followed soon after the inauguration of President
Emilio Portes Gil. The new president declared on 1 May,
1929:
"No religion will be persecuted, nor 
is the Government guilty of any 
persecution of any sect. Liberty of 
conscience will be respected as 
heretofore. The Catholic clergy, when 
they wish, may renew the exercise of 
their rites with only one obligation, 
that they respect the laws of the land 
as the ministers of other 
denominations are doing."15
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On 9th June, 1929, having received approval from the 
Pope to undertake negotiations, Archbishop Ruiz Flores and 
Bishop Pascual Diaz y Barreto returned to Mexico from 
exile in the United States.16 During the next couple of 
weeks, intense diplomatic negotiations took place, with 
peace looking nearer every day. The prelates had two 
meetings with Portes Gil, a friendly one on 12th June, and 
a tense, disconcerting one the following day.17 Like the 
bishops, the President faced strong opposition from his 
own camp. He received messages from the most intransigent 
anticlericals, labour and Masonic groups urging him to 
continue his hard line on the clergy.18
Had it not been for the efforts of influential 
foreigners, American Ambassador Morrow19 in particular, an 
agreement would perhaps have been more difficult to arrive 
at. He manipulated his contacts with the Mexican 
hierarchy, the Vatican, Portes Gil, and the American State 
Department.
To avoid further friction between president and 
prelates, he himself prepared drafts for both sides and 
delivered them personally, suggesting that parties refrain 
from meeting again until they had read and approved each 
other's statements. On 17 June, the basis for a 
settlement was approved, and on 21 June the Pope signified 
his acceptance.
The President declared that neither the Constitution 
nor the Law nor the Government wished to destroy the 
identity of the Catholic Church, or of any cult, or to 
intervene in any way in its spiritual functions; he
21
emphasized, however, that he had a responsibility to see
that the laws were upheld and to hear complaints based on
• • • 20 "improper application of the laws".
With reference to certain articles of the law which
had been "poorly understood", he explained:
(1) the Government was not to register ministers who had 
not been named "by a hierarchical superior of the 
respective religious creed",
(2) religious instruction was prohibited in public or 
private primary or higher schools, but it could be 
imparted within the church precincts,
(3) all residents of the Republic, and therefore the 
members of any church, "may apply to the appropriate 
authorities for reform, repeal or issuance of any 
law".
Archbishop Ruiz y Flores issued a statement 
declaring:
"the conversations have been marked 
by a spirit of mutual good will and 
respect and that as a consequence of 
President Portes Gil's statement "the 
Mexican clergy will resume religious 
services pursuant to the laws in 
force. "21
These statements brought to an end three years of 
bloody war. In the words of an analyst:
"[The Cristiada] terminated with 
neither a bang or a whimper, it simply 
melted away in the wake of the 
arreglos."22
But the arreglos did not end the divisions inside
22
both camps; on the contrary, they were exacerbated. And 
the evolution of those divisions determined attitudes and 
the course of events.
The Cristero revolt was decisive in establishing the 
official position of the Church in Mexico. Before 1926, 
the traditionally oriented conservative segment headed by 
Archbishop Leopoldo Mora Y del Rio, dominated the Church 
Synods. Under his leadership, the hierarchy which 
supported militant action was in control of Church policy
• • 23and a truce with the Government was not feasible.
There was a change in the Church's official stand 
after the death of Mora y del Rio which allowed Church 
moderates under Bishops Pascual Diaz Barreto and Leopoldo 
Ruiz y Flores to come to power.
Monsignor Diaz had been working on a settlement with 
the Government long before 1929.24 His opposition to the 
armed movement was known. He felt that the suspension of 
cults had failed, and that a continuation of it could lose 
forever its position among the people and only a truce 
could restore to the clergy some leadership in Mexican 
society.
There was a lack of unity of action in the Episcopacy 
itself, in the sense that very early in the conflict, 
there were a division of tendencies: one, represented by 
Archbishop Ruiz y Flores and by Archbishop Diaz y Barreto, 
favoured peace? the other was completely opposed, 
favouring continued war, and included Archbishop Jose 
Maria Gonzalez y Valencia; Archbishop Francisco Orozco y 
Jimenez, and bishops Leopoldo Lara y Torres and Jesus
23
Manrlquez y Zarate.25 In general, the tendency was not to 
give in until the laws were reformed. However, it was 
felt that although the aim of the Cristero movement was to 
obtain religious liberty, it could not be sufficiently 
ensured if the Government was not overthrown.26 Yet, 
because of the strong support the government was getting 
from the Americans (evident during the Escobar rebellion) 
it was impossible to bring that action.27
The "conciliatory" faction, with the Apostolic 
Delegation in Washington, convinced the Pope that the war 
could bring no practical good for the Church. The 
"intransigent" faction, especially the League, believed 
that even if the overthrow of the government was not 
achieved, they would win freedom, freedom of the Church, 
and of all the essential human rights. According to them, 
the change in the Episcopacy's attitude was the result of
American pressure: when armed resistance erupted, the
• • • 28 White House decided to back Calles and his Government.
To the League and its supporters, the agreements were
ill-timed because
(1) the Guardia Nacional (the Cristero army) could
successfully continue waging a guerrilla war, their 
forces were not strong enough to confront the
Government in open combat?
(2) the economic situation was weakening the Government?
Wall Street banking circles told the Mexican
Government that the rebellion should be finished 
because the country was no longer able to service its 
foreign debt?
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(3) the army itself had been tragically divided by the
Escobar rebellion.29
In relation to the third point, the evidence seems 
to suggest the contrary. The swift and crushing defeat 
of the military rebellion30 not only struck a final blow to 
the Obregonist opposition, but it also ended the 
expectations of elements opposed to the federal government 
and to "callismo.1,31 General Gorostieta, Commander-in- 
Chief of the Cristero forces, assessing the situation 
thought that theirs had worsened rather than improved with 
the uprising. This was not immediately apparent, he
observed, but after closer examination, that was the 
likely conclusion: this uprising was bound to fail, like 
the previous one in Veracruz in 1927,32 because they lacked 
in ideals and the leaders and officers lacked integrity 
and commitment. Once defeated, Calles would return to 
face the Cristeros with a strong and disciplined army, 
proud of its victories? while they would still be in the 
same precarious position.33
Although the Government could not definitively defeat 
the Cristeros in the western states, neither could the 
League's forces gain further momentum or material support 
from other regions of the country.34 Of the estimated 
twenty five thousand men in rebellion against the
Government in 1927, only eighteen thousand were well armed
• • • 35while the rest had virtually no equipment.
It would appear, therefore, that by 1929 the
situation was blocked, with no side able to win. The
central government finally understood that by re­
25
establishing liberty of worship, it could disarm the 
Cristeros, which it did. Gorostieta knew this when he 
said: "the moment they open the churches, you will abandon
36me".
1. The Modus vivendi
Though the contentions of the Church and the State 
had seemed irreconcilable, at least in theory, the 
moderates from both sides agreed on a truce, a modus 
vivendi, that temporarily brought the conflict to an end.
The agreement was, as one writer put it:
"simply an understanding that 
depend(ed) upon the state of mind of 
relatively few men."37
As there was no treaty or concordat, and as the 
fundamental issues had not been solved, the future 
relations of the State and the Church rested on the 
attitudes of the parties concerned.
The result of what the League branded as merely "a 
sort of armistice",38 meant that the division among lay 
Catholics and the Clergy was to be damaging for decades. 
The thrust of union, remarked Wilkie, was shattered by 
surrender of goals.39 The State, on the other hand, had 
conceded little and gained time to consolidate its 
position in a difficult period.
This becomes more obvious if we understand the 
conflict not so much as a religious-anti-religious debate, 
the climatic outcome of the long-standing conflict between 
church and state in Mexico, but as a political issue.
The major works have viewed the rebellion as an
26
outcome of the Church-State conflict, and have imputed 
responsibility for the violent struggle to one or more of 
the rival groups. Quirk and Bailey, for instance, both 
concluded that the conflict was the result of a century- 
old struggle, an inevitable confrontation because:
"both showed an equal lack of 
tolerance for the ideas of others.
It was impossible to reconcile the 
extreme claims made for the rival 
ideologies. [It was] a clash of 
incompatible and mutually exclusive 
ideologies, not of politicians, the 
result was a total test of where the 
grater power lay, and the greater 
power lay with the Government."40
By concentrating his study on the ideological nature 
of the conflict, Quirk confined it to the highest levels 
of both hierarchies. He viewed the Cristero rebellion as 
a by-product of the ideological conflict and thus the 
study of the rebellion itself is eluded because of its 
insignificance.
Bailey, on the other hand, centred his study on the 
actions of the elites, both Catholic and revolutionary, to 
account for the outbreak, development and consequences of 
the rebellion. He focused on two related conflicts: 
first, the perennial enmity between the Catholic Church in 
Mexico and the Mexican revolutionary state which reached 
its climax in 1926 and led to the Cristiada; and second, 
the internal division of the Mexican Catholic Church 
caused by the determination of Catholic militants to 
destroy the regime created by the 1910 revolution.41 But, 
by focusing on these conflicts which he argued "help 
explain the cause and significance of the Cristero
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rebellion", he relegated the Cristero phenomenon to a 
secondary plan.
Jean Meyer focused for the first time on the 
Cristeros. For him, the Cristeros were the victims of the 
Church-State conflict, in that the two powers sought to 
obtain the maximum advantage from the Cristero 
insurrection, and thus played with the fate of the rebels. 
In 1929, when the agreements were reached "the only 
vanquished were the cultivators".42 Meyer's conclusions 
are in total contradiction to those of Bailey and Quirk. 
For him, the motivation behind the insurrection was 
religious? the massive support of the movement 
demonstrated the allegiance of the peasants to the Church.
Conversely, Quirk attributed the insignificance of
the revolt to the failure of the Church to achieve the
spiritual conversion of the countryside. And again,
contrary to Bailey, Meyer characterizes the rebellion as
"an exclusively rural event."43 The League was never able
to impose its leadership over the movement, and he sees as
damaging and harmful to the Cristeros the instances when
it attempted to interfere.44 The Cristeros were on their
own? they developed their own leadership and programmes.
They did not lose the war, but were abandoned by the 
Vatican and the hierarchy:
"They were essentially peasants
fighting a peasant war for their faith 
and in opposition to the domination of 
the middle and upper classes,
regardless of their geographical 
location or religious attitudes.1,45
However his concern for the Cristeros biased his
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opinion towards the hierarchy and the Vatican, He may 
disagree with their decisions, or their specific actions 
and judgements, but he should not accuse them of 
incompetence, opportunism and self-interest.
2• Calles and the persecution of the Church
What made the Government persecute the Catholic 
Church so relentlessly?
The policy that Calles followed was an attempt to 
integrate the Church into the Mexican political system. 
He solved the universal problem of how to keep control 
over the country after a revolution, by creating a 
monolithic political party, the National Revolutionary 
Party, or PNR, identified with the administration and 
charged with preventing any man or group becoming strong 
enough to challenge him, thus suppressing any alternative 
to his power.
The process of restructuring the nation and of 
forming a modern national identity were still incomplete. 
Consequently, the attack on the Church had to match the 
level of her social influence, which was great.46 The 
fundamental problem was one of power and it was during 
this period that the contemporary political system, its 
institutions and its ideology, was settled. The three 
years of the Cristiada constitute a dividing line between 
the period and the emerging middle classes struggled to 
assert their dominance and the period when they firmly 
consolidated their power.
Between 1929 and 1935, the modern state was growing.
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Any compromise with the Church would have seemed dangerous 
to it while the Mexican people remained attached to their 
traditional attitude towards the Church and the State, as 
well as to the notions of legitimate power, honour and 
justice. The Mexican State attacked the Catholic Church 
not because the latter was counter-revolutionary, but 
because the revolutionary leaders aimed to establish a 
strong nationalist state.
It could not tolerate any rivals, whether political 
parties, foreign economic interests or an independent 
institution which claimed the allegiance of the majority 
of the Mexican people.
With the absence of political parties during the 
twenties, the Catholic Church, her organization and social 
Catholic ideology, was perceived as the most pressing 
internal threat.47
3. The political nature of the Cristiada
The political nature of the Cristiada stands out when 
studying the political background, the rise and the apogee 
of Calles.
The conflict was an international affair in two ways: 
in the technical sense, insofar as the Catholic Church was 
an international institution under the authority of the 
Vatican which even after the loss of its temporal power 
had not ceased to maintain diplomatic relations with 
governments, and also because of the practical effect it 
had on the United States-Mexico relations. The American 
Catholic community was sympathetic to the cause of the
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Mexican Church and pressed the American government to 
intervene in the conflict on behalf of Mexican Catholics.
Moreover, the United States government was 
complaining about the provisions of the Constitution that 
jeopardized American financial and business interests, 
particularly those in the oil industry. Furthermore, 
there was still the unsettled question of compensation for 
the land expropriation and damage incurred by American 
citizens during the Revolution.
Interventionist propaganda was active in Washington 
and Calles was aware that domestic insurrection could lead 
to foreign intervention. To prevent that from happening, 
he had to show a firm hand, that he had power and that the 
laws would be vigorously enforced.48
Calles, no doubt, must have been tempted to pursue 
the Cristero war to a successful conclusion, once it 
started. But there were several serious problems that 
threatened to undermine his position and his plans for the 
future of the revolution and the country.
In 1928, Calles became aware of the problems that a 
peaceful transition of power to Obregon would encounter.
• • 49Obregon was favourable to negotiations and peace. He 
worked to make peace coincide with his return to the 
presidency. He had a very strong rural base of support, 
and he counted with important bankers who would act as 
good officers between the Government and the oil 
companies.
The radical block, most notably Tejeda and Morones, 
was totally opposed to any compromise? it had practically
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managed, in 1926-1927, to control President Calles and 
forced him to adopt an even greater antagonistic attitude 
towards the Church. Hence, the problem for Calles was 
Obregon, who wanted to appear as the peacemaker.50 
Consequently, Obregon*s peace efforts were disrupted by 
the radicals, with Calles* support, and thus, had to be 
postponed.
On 1 July 1928, Obregon was re-elected President? on 
17, he was assassinated by a young Catholic. Though he 
had acted of his own accord, there were strong suspicions 
that Morones and his group had been involved.51
Peace had to| be put off until a better time. Calles* 
uppermost preoccupation was to survive the terrible crisis 
that the disappearance of Obregon implied, bringing as it 
did, to an abrupt end, the plans for an alternating 
dyarchy, which was expected to provide political stability 
to the country.
The assassination of Obregon accentuated the division 
between the Obregonista faction, deprived of its triumph, 
and the Callista faction, kept in place, against all odds 
by the political genius of its leader.
It is not our aim to provide a detailed account of 
the intricacies of the political manoeuvres of Calles; of 
his recognition as the Supreme chief of the revolution; of 
the elimination of Morones; or the creation of the PNR. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider in broad terms 
those that affected and influenced the development of 
church-state relations. Hence, we will see how the 
religious conflict served on different occasions to seek
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the consolidation for the political system and, at the 
same time, brought about new forms of Catholic resistance 
and peaceful confrontation.
The political vacuum left by Obregon meant that 
Calles had to solve many problems before he could assert 
his power, and thus the religious problem was somewhat 
relegated. Meanwhile, Rome waited for the power struggle 
between the factions to settle and for the regime to be 
firmly established, before it could negotiate.
Calles and Portes Gil, the interim President, did 
everything to delay the inevitable confrontation with the 
Obregonista faction, which was planning a military 
rebellion. They tried to suppress the Cristeros to avoid 
having to fight two wars. But as the situation there had 
reached a stalemate,52 they decided to fight the rebellion 
headed by General Escobar.
Calles knew of the campaign, both of the plans and 
of the identity of the rebels. Following the example of 
Obregbn, who, in 1923, had known of the De La Huerta 
uprising but decided not to open the attack, so as not to 
make martyrs of the rebels; Calles did not move. He was 
waiting for a moral justification to eliminate, once and 
for all, the obregonist elements. The rebellion provided 
it. He had already divided them, now he would suppress 
their military base.
With the attention of the nation centred on the 
political battle taking place in the PNR convention, the 
rebellion broke out. The victorious government hurried 
to restore the peace process with the Church to prevent a
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relapse of the civil war if the Cristeros were still 
fighting by the time of the presidential election. 
Ambassador Morrow was also of the opinion that the State 
was unlikely to restore peace, despite the efforts of the 
President and the military, if the religious question was 
not settled.53
General Gorostieta saw in the forthcoming elections 
a possible way out from the stalemate. In January 1929, 
he had got in contact with Jose Vasconcelos, the popular 
independent candidate. Vasconcelos told him that they 
should join forces the day after the elections: by so
doing, he intended to demonstrate the dishonesty of the 
Government at the ballot box, before any uprising.64
Certainly, it was not the first time that the 
elections would be rigged? but the presence of armed 
Cristeros changed the whole situation, since the 
Vasconcelos movement, if it obtained their support, would 
cease to be the peaceful, vulnerable, popular movement it 
was, to become a fearsome insurrection.
The Government realised the seriousness of the 
situation and resorted to the only possible solution; the 
resumption of the cult, which would disarm the Cristeros 
and thus, Vasconcelos.
Vasconcelos was very conscious of the military- 
political reality of Mexico? he did not build up false 
hopes about the democratic game. Instead, he saw himself 
as a new Madero destined to restore democracy by means of 
a popular revolt that would put an end to corruption and 
absolutism. Hence, the importance of the Cristeros for
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Vasconcelos.
It was not, therefore, surprising that he had felt 
seriously hurt when, in July 1929, President Portes Gil 
was able to announce a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict, that stemmed from the negotiations that had 
taken place between the Government and the Catholic 
Church.55
There is no doubt that the solution of the conflict 
was of great political significance. Portes Gil was aware 
that the conflict transcended more politically than 
religiously. If the assassination of Obregon had made it 
imperative to find a solution, in order to survive? now, 
Calles was at liberty to devote himself to shape the 
political scene according to his wishes: the "m&xim&to" as 
a political system was born.
4. Modus vivendi vs. Modus moriendi56
The agreements pleased the extremists of neither 
side. While a group of "irreconcilable" bishops, led by 
Bishop Miguel de la Mora, of San Luis Potosi, opposed the 
Primate's position, ardent radicals, headed by Governor 
Tejeda of Veracruz, took exception to the attitude of the 
President. The League complained that the Government did 
not live up to its amnesty, and claimed that from the 
return of the peace, in order to prevent the Cristeros 
from ever rising again, a campaign of systematic 
assassinations of the leaders was undertaken.57
The League appealed directly to the Pope to nullify 
the agreements.58 The opponents became so menacing that
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Apostolic Delegate Ruiz y Flores, and Archbishop Diaz 
issued a public letter condemning dissident elements. It 
read:
”In any such situation as this it is 
most unwise for either party to the 
agreement to boast of victory? the 
arrangement attempts to conciliate 
both parties, the only possible way 
of forming a truly national 
Government. Not only is it essential 
to avoid aggressive statements, it is 
also important to cooperate in all 
government activities as far as one's 
conscience as a Catholic permits. The 
Church does not want a change of 
government or any part in the 
government; it is trying by purely 
legal means so to change the laws that 
they enjoy in other countries.1,59
As the protest continued, Archbishop Diaz declared, 
in September 1929, that the modus vivendi was not an issue 
for debate. From the moment the Pope had made his 
decision, every Catholic priest and bishop was forbidden 
to criticise publicly the accord, or to disparage those 
who in any way represented him.60
After 1929, the leaders of the Mexican Church 
followed an attitude of moderation and reserve, with full 
papal approval. It involved a double policy. On the one 
hand, it was necessary to put an end to the activities of 
the most extreme and intransigent Catholic elements, so as 
to avoid government reprisals against the whole Church. 
On the other hand, it was urgent to find new ways of 
channelling that militancy to work in an acceptable manner 
for the establishment of the rights and privileges of the 
Church. Any new religious organization should stay out of 
politics and armed resistance, and be limited to religious
matters, only. Therefrom was created Mexican Catholic 
Action (A.C.M.). The main objective of Catholic Action 
was to bring under the control of the Church authorities 
the organized activities of Catholic laymen.
Nevertheless, not all bishops agreed with this idea; 
Bishop Lara y Torres, fierce opponent of the agreements, 
wrote, in 1930, numerous and bitter letters criticizing 
the plans of the Apostolic Delegate to make of Catholic 
Action a purely religious association. He was convinced 
that its role should be political as well as social.62 He 
argued that these activities could not be confined to the 
layman, because it was impossible to form the conscience 
of citizens without moral laws? the Church, sole 
interpreter and judge, should have them under its 
control.63
In the end, Catholic Action remained within the 
limits set by the Pope and the bishops, and was at the 
forefront of cooperation with the hierarchy in the 
programme of re-evangelization.64
The activities of Catholic Action are not the subject 
of this study and are only mentioned in relation to those 
events that determined, later on, the development of 
Synarchism. Despite the discontentment of the radicals of 
both sides, the truce established by the agreements of 
1929 lasted two years.
During this time, relations between Government 
officials and the Church hierarchy were cordial. The 
conciliatory attitude of the Church was shown when the 
Apostolic Delegate condemned the assassination attempt on
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the newly elected President Ortiz Rubio, as "an immoral
• • •deed which dishonours the nation".
From 1929 to 1935, Calles, acknowledged as the 
supreme Chief of the Revolution, was the strong man behind 
the presidency. This was a period of economic 
difficulties and opposing factions at the top. It was an 
era of popular disdain for the leaders, their corruption 
and scandalous life. The religious problem was in 
abeyance and the Government could renew it at any time. 
With the Callista army in power, the anticlerical pressure 
group was at its peak and it put pressure on the 
Government to break the truce. There were violent attacks 
on the Church in the press controlled by the army.66
From 1929 to 1931, the modus vivendi seemed viable 
but the Callistas incessantly hindered the President’s 
programmes in various states, especially in Veracruz and 
Tabasco.
The era of relative peace in Church-State relations 
came to an end in June 1931. The resurgence of the 
conflict was originally a regional affair that did not 
seem to threaten the national status quo. Governor 
Adalberto Tejeda of Veracruz, Minister of the Interior 
under Calles in 1927 when the Cristero rebellion started, 
and a staunch anticlerical, signed a law setting the 
number of priests in the state at a ratio of one per one 
hundred thousand inhabitants. That permitted only eleven 
priests for the whole territory of the state.67
Tejeda declared that the clergy had only pretended 
to submit to the government with the object of regaining
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the opportunity to subvert the institutions of the nation. 
He claimed that the Mexican people had no need for the 
clergy, and added that Veracruz would be governed 
according to a "revolutionary” criterion, and would enact 
a law that replaced the "lenient" provisions of 1926 (i.e. 
the famous "Calles Law" which regulated certain Articles 
of the Constitution? in this case Article 3 and 130, which 
dealt with the Church). Tejeda accused the President of 
tending towards increasingly more conciliatory and 
conservative policies and hence, departing from a "true 
revolutionary spirit" - in other words, the extreme 
anticlerical radicalism of Calles.
President Ortiz Rubio's administration was astonished 
by governor Tejeda's move? the President, like his 
predecessor, Portes Gil, had tried to maintain national 
equilibrium in religious affairs. They had sought to 
dissuade governors from sponsoring any type of law likely 
to cause disturbances. But, as Brandenburg clearly noted:
"The last word in law enforcement 
resides in the head of the 
Revolutionary Family [... ] Calles 
exercised his Family authority by
viciously turning upon the Church 
while president and then, out of 
public view in 1929-35 condoning state 
governors who all but eliminated
Catholic institutions and influence in 
many provinces of Mexico [... ] "69
Therefore, no definite solution could be found if 
Calles did not recognize religiously motivated strife as
detrimental to internal coexistence? or obviously, if
Calles lost his political influence.
Illustrative of this, is the fact that Tejeda
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justified his policy to Calles, not to the President. He 
explained that the new law would make possible the fast 
elimination of fanaticism.
He charged Catholic groups with disobeying the laws
• • • • 70by their involvement in agrarian and labour matters. The 
people were terrorized by the series of actions against 
them: Catholics and their priests were shot; their
churches were bombed, burned and ransacked by policemen 
and anticlerical mobs.71
The seriousness of the conflict affected the already 
strained relations between the authorities of Veracruz and 
the Federal Government. Through Manuel Padilla, Supreme 
Court Justice and close to Tejeda, the President suggested 
that the law limiting the number of priests could provoke 
further unrest in other parts of the country, because it 
would be perceived as an attempt by the Government to 
exacerbate religious passions and establish a state of 
unrest.72 Padilla added:
"The President wishes, through me, to 
request in cordial and friendly manner 
that you display good will and 
cooperate effectively with the Federal 
Administration, by the slight 
modification of the law [... ]"73
Neither the clergy nor the Catholics remained passive 
at the new provocation. They protested to the President? 
appealed to the Minister of the Interior and presented 
their disapproval to Congress. The decision of the lower 
courts said that there was "no direct injury" that implied 
violation of the guarantees offered by the constitution.74 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that, contrary to that
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decision, the severe restrictions implemented impaired the 
liberty of Catholics in the exercise of their faith. 
Still, President Ortiz Rubio, in the short time he had 
been in office, failed to build a basis of support of his 
own in Congress, and in the PNR. The Callistas dominated 
both the cabinet and the government. Consequently, he 
found no possible strategy, and in early July, he had to 
recant and announce:
"The federal executive power in my 
charge has absolute respect for the 
sovereignty of the states and the 
exercise of the faculties that our 
Constitution concedes to them"75
Soon after, other states began to limit the number 
of priests or to prohibit them altogether. Between 1931
9ja
and 1934, most states enacted limitations on clergymen, 
so that by the end of 1934, less than five hundred priests 
were allowed. This meant, concluded an historian:
"For the first time in Mexican history 
the Church could legitimately complain 
of religious persecution.11
On 12 December 1931, the elaborate celebrations of 
the four hundredth anniversary of the Virgin of Guadalupe 
took place in Mexico City. Twenty seven archbishops and 
bishops and nearly two hundred priests officiated at the 
services; at least half a million people attended the 
celebrations. Many members of the cabinet participated in 
the organization of the event.
Two days later, Congress, on a PNR motion, protested 
against these demonstrations and condemned the presence
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and participation of government officials. Calles 
enjoined the president to abandon his conciliatory 
policies; and in the next cabinet meeting he reprimanded 
them and eventually forced them to resign.78
At the end of the month, Congress decreed that only 
one priest for fifty thousand inhabitants could officiate 
in the capital? that was equal to a total of twenty four
• • • 79 • • • •priests for the entire city. This was very significant 
because, for the first time, the decree associated the 
Government with the anticlerical trend that so far was 
present only in the radical states.
The church vehemently protested; Archbishop Diaz y 
Barreto appealed to the President, but he was disavowed 
and the cult was suspended in Mexico City.80 Yet, in 
February 1932, seeing that events were turning in the 
direction of 1926, Archbishop Diaz announced that he would 
comply with the law, and instructed his priests to return 
to the churches.81
The Church had changed tactics: instead of bitter
opposition to the oppressive legislation, she would comply 
with the law in the hope of eventually finding an 
alternative. Apostolic Delegate Ruiz y Flores condemned 
resorting to violence in his pastoral letter of February 
1932. This was followed, in the ensuing months, by 
pastoral letters from the bishops banning priests and 
Catholics from helping any rebel force.82 Some went as 
far as excommunicating the rebels and those who might 
collaborate with them. In July, the Apostolic Delegate 
declared that the Pope formally condemned armed
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resistance, as well as any written or oral propaganda
• t 83advocating it.
On 29 September, 1932, Pope Pius XI promulgated his 
encyclical ACERBA AKIMI, denouncing the violation of the 
agreements and ordered observance of them again. The Pope 
analysed the development of the religious persecution 
since his encyclical INIQUIS AFFLICTISQUE, OF 18 November 
1926, and the reasons had led him to accept the 1929 
agreements. He criticized the Government for violating 
the modus vivendi, particularly in its attempts to destroy 
the Church in the renewed wave of persecution which began 
in December 1931.84 The Pope made a distinction between 
illicit cooperation with the laws and forced submission to 
them. He indicated that temporarily, the clergy would 
have to yield protest, for it was better to have some 
churches open and some priests ministering to the people, 
than none at all. He showed how the legislation had 
worsened since 1929 and reaffirmed the banning of armed 
resistance, which on no account would be undertaken in the 
name of the Church.85 He concluded by exhorting Catholics 
to remain close to the hierarchy and work within Catholic 
Action.86
The encyclical infuriated the Government. On 2 
October, 1932, Congress demanded the deportation of the 
Apostolic Delegate, on the grounds that he was an 
"undesirable alien", because he owed his allegiance to a 
foreign sovereign: the Pope. Two days later, he was
arrested and banished.87 The Government intended by this 
action to show clearly to the Vatican, that the contents
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of the encyclical were unacceptable and provocative, and 
as it had been done in the past, made an example of the 
Apostolic Delegate.
Renewed repression of the Church in 1931 and 1932 
gave an impetus to those who had always rejected the modus 
vivendi. It vindicated the cause of those cristeros who 
had never surrendered. After 1932, their activities had 
increased so much that there was talk of a "second
• • fift v t
cristiada". The League continued to plead with the 
episcopacy for a harsher stand. It requested that
Catholic Action be put under its control, so as to 
organize more efficiently the opposition to the 
Government. Although the Pope had banned discussion and 
criticism of the agreements, the League continued its 
campaign of agitation. Moreover, some prelates did not 
stop accusing the episcopacy? Bishop Lara y Torres wrote, 
on 25 March 1932, a long protest to the Pope, criticizing 
the Apostolic Delegate and the Archbishop of Mexico, for 
having approved the agreements, which, in his mind, had 
not benefited the Church, and pleaded for the resurgence 
of armed resistance. He was aware of the limited 
possibilities of overthrowing the Government, but he 
argued that it could be weakened and its position 
undermined? therefore, the Church would be in a better 
position to negotiate. The Pope was not impressed and, 
some time later, Bishop Lara y Torres was removed and 
later resigned.89
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II. The "Legion”
With the outburst of renewed persecution in 1931, 
moderate Catholic leaders found themselves in a dilemma: 
on the one hand, armed opposition had no chance of success 
while the army remained loyal to the Government - and 
there was no indication that this would change, 
particularly after the introduction of reforms to make it 
more professional?90 on the other hand, due to the 
restrictive laws in place that excluded Catholics from 
active political participation in the established system 
of decision-making, they were unable to work openly for 
the amelioration of the fate of the Church.
Despite the promises Calles had made in his last 
address to Congress, in September 1928, concerning the 
acceptance of opposition parties in the political system, 
he would not yield ground to the Church.91 Thus grew the 
conviction to organize political pressure secretly. The 
structure of Catholic Action was unsuited to undertake 
that enterprise, because of its close links with the 
Church. What was needed was an organization which, while 
working for the interests of the Church, could not be 
directly identified with her in any way. The relationship 
between the leadership and the hierarchy would remain 
secret. The idea had already been hinted at by the Pope 
in a letter to the bishops in early 1932. On that 
occasion he advised the episcopacy to encourage the laity, 
wisely and with no commitment of its own, to form a 
political group which, without bearing the epithet of 
Catholic, would be ruled by Christian principles and
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assured the defence of God and the Church.92
Archbishop Ruiz y Flores had envisaged the formation 
in each diocese of highly disciplined and dedicated action 
groups, which would pursue the said objectives. These 
groups would exert pressure at the local level on 
political officials, by means of protests, petitions and 
legal resources, with the aim of relieving the Church of 
her difficult situation. Their task was to teach social 
action, propagate ideas and educate in the exercise of 
civil rights.93
There was the conviction that, given the 
impossibility of creating a Catholic political party, help 
would essentially have to be found at the local level and 
hope that local changes would gradually build up into 
national changes.
The Pope expressed his concern about the possibility 
that certain Catholic elements could take advantage of the 
absence of the Apostolic Delegate to provoke violent 
confrontation,94 and that this type of organization could 
be useful in channelling the grievances of militant 
Catholics.
Opposition to the creation of a new organization came 
from bishop Lara y Torres, in particular. He argued that 
the need for it did not arise, because there was already 
the League, which could carry the desired function.95 The 
League, he maintained, was the only organization of social 
action that, for its strength and its reliability, was 
widely known and covered the entire country. Monsignor 
Lara y Torres pointed out that another organization
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besides the League and Catholic Action, would increase 
division and confusion among Catholics.
However, the opinion of the Apostolic Delegate and 
of the majority of the bishops with regard to the League 
was of distrust, and they thus believed that it could not 
possibly operate effectively in various dioceses.96 What 
is more, the Holy See was of the opinion that the League 
ought to change its title and its leaders before it could 
take care of public action,
"for it would be natural for the 
Government to distrust and persecute 
any activity that involved the name 
of the League, and, consequently, 
persecute the Church, whom the 
Government suspects to agree with or 
be committed to the League."97
Thus, the need to find an alternative outlet for the 
grievances of discontent Catholics, became an urgent 
matter at the end of 1932. It was at this time, that the 
bishops took an important and transcendental decision: 
they installed in the minds of Catholics the idea that 
they were entrusting the Church to them. They were to 
take on the responsibility to defend the Church on the 
only ground still available to them: the social and civic. 
The hierarchy, however, made it clear that they (Catholic 
laymen) should not count on the clergy to direct or 
approve of any social organization.
A secret organization, the "Legion", appeared at the 
end of 1934. It rapidly spread throughout the country. 
Its creation and growth were surrounded by mystery. But 
its legacy was very important for what was to follow at
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the end of the thirties: Synarchism. It is, therefore,
necessary that we should spend some time considering the 
development of the Legion.
The Legion was made up of young and devout catholics; 
trained in the Congregations of the Holy Virgin, under the 
direction of Antonio Santacruz.98 They vowed loyalty to 
the organization and the Church. Those who belonged to it 
had to take a formal oath of secrecy, to defend Mexico 
against its main enemies (Freemasonry and international 
Judaism) , and to obey the orders of their superiors, 
provided they were not contrary to morality and justice.99 
The survival of the Legion rested on secrecy, to prevent 
the possibility of repression. Hence, the structure 
adopted had the "cell” as its key composing factor.100 
This meant that each local group remained secret to all 
others, thus, reducing the risk that if one were 
uncovered, the entire organization would be imperiled.
The overall direction of the Legion rested with a 
Supreme Council integrated by devout laymen, well disposed 
to observe the instructions of the church hierarchy, to 
whom the organization owed its existence. The Supreme 
Council made the decisions, but these were subject to the 
veto of the Church authorities (the apostolic delegate and 
the archbishop of Mexico.)
The Apostolic Delegate and the Episcopacy (except the 
bishop of Durango, Jose Maria Gonzalez y Valencia) gave 
their blessing to the Legion, once the question of secrecy 
was clarified, since secret societies were forbidden by 
the Catholic Church.101 For one could not definitely vow
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absolute obedience to unknown leaders, nor pledge to 
maintain secrecy in all circumstances, without committing 
a grave sin, because that pledge and that secrecy could 
conceal a crime. Hence, the oath of obedience would hold 
whenever that which was commanded, was licit in itself, 
and did not infringe the legitimate rights of others. As 
for secrecy, it was not binding when the church 
authorities inquired about the activities of Catholics, as
long as they were related to matters of the faith or of
• 102 • • morality. A secret society understood in these terms
did not fall into the ban of the Catholic doctrine.
Therefore, the hierarchy had no further objection.
Obviously, the clergy and the members of Catholic Action
could not belong to it.
The structure of the Legion was the following: a
leader, or jefe, at the top, with nine subordinates under 
him? meeting in council every week. Each one of the nine 
could recruit up to ten officers, who did not know each 
other, since they only met individually with their 
superior, once a week. Each of these ninety could 
recruit, in turn, up to ten soldiers who did not know each 
other and, followed the same procedure to receive orders.
This made a total of one thousand legionnaires. Yet, 
none of the three divisions needed to be filled? what 
mattered was to bring in "good, sincere and responsible 
people” and to conduct, through this elite, the social 
life of the population.103
In theory, a legion comprised ten sections, 
corresponding to an equal number of activities? so that
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each legionnaire was classed according to his occupation. 
The first four were socio-professional (owners, workers, 
artisans, peasants)? the others were technical 
(propaganda, etc.) However, most of these never 
materialized. Subsequently, an eleventh section was 
created; the National Synarchist Union (U.N.S.).104
The first three years were devoted to attracting as 
many people as possible, from factories, universities, 
offices and villages. When the legions passed to Mexico 
City, in 1935, many members of the liberal professions 
joined, especially doctors and lawyers (like Manuel Gomez 
Morfin, later leader of PAN) . This was a result of the 
vacuum left by the League in the field of social and 
political action, when it became apparent that the League 
would never reappear in its former shape.105 Salvador 
Abascal, future leader of the Synarchist Movement, 
operated in one of the ten legions of Morelia, where he 
made a name as an excellent organizer and propagandist.106
Recruitment was done with as much care as daring, and 
secrecy seemed to have effectively preserved. The Legion 
was involved in some direct action of limited scope; like 
disrupting public and political gatherings, and exploding 
stinking-gas bombs in public places.107
The Legion also participated in public opinion. 
Articles were written giving guidance about social 
Catholic doctrine under the Legion*s assumed name: Oscar
Calderon Alvarez; the initials of which, O.C.A., stood for
• • • • 108 Organization, Cooperation, Action.
After a certain time, the ranks were disillusioned,
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and frequent defections followed. The motive was that 
legionnaires got tired of doing unadventurous things. 
Orders were seldom dangerous and often naive.109
Penetration proved to be difficult for various 
reasons. Most legions never effectively got filled. In 
general, they were only formed among friends and 
trustworthy neighbours, so that it was impossible to 
exchange lower ranks between them.110
Besides, few members had any charge of responsibility 
in the government. There never was an official corps of 
teachers? nor was it possible to penetrate the army. 
Therefore, the activities they could engage in were too 
vague and simple to interest the majority much longer.111
The leaders did not take long to realize the futility 
of their actions. They soon became better organized and 
developed an ideology based on the principles of social 
Catholicism outlined in Pius XI's encyclical QUADRA6ESIM0 
ANNO, Of 15 May, 1931.
Before we can continue with the evolution of the 
Legion and its subsequent activities, we must stop to 
consider the events that were taking place in the overall 
national scene. Important transformations were taking 
place at the heart of the Revolutionary Family. 
Ideological confrontation threatened to undermine the 
position of Calles and his followers. The challenge was 
coming from the left: eventually from a man identified 
with it: Lazaro Cardenas. The differences and the
background to the inevitable confrontation between the two 
men and the two camps, emerged at the Second National
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Convention of the ruling party, in December 1933. To 
these events we now turn.
II. The Presidential Elections of 1934
The presidency of Ortiz Rubio came to an abrupt end 
in September 1932. He had removed certain officials 
closely affiliated with Calles, the Supreme Chief, who
immediately withdrew his political support and abandoned
• • • • • • 112him until he was engulfed by political crisis. On 3
September, Congress designated an interim president: 
General Abelardo Rodriguez.
President Rodriguez declared that he would devote his 
efforts to unifying the Revolutionary Party, as well as 
the army.118 He resolved to collaborate with Calles, or at 
least, not hinder his plans for consolidating and 
strengthening the political forces that had rallied in the 
PNR; an area where the party had not achieved great 
success. This objective grew in importance as the PNR 
Convention neared, for the new presidential candidate 
would be designated there; and lay out the political 
principles that guided his future activities.
Rodriguez' interim presidency was, in fact, brief: on the 
one hand, he owed his nomination to Calles and, on the 
other, barely a year after this, he faced not only the 
authority of the Supreme Chief, but also the presence of 
the PNR candidate (the future president). Therefore, his 
mission was to prepare and make possible a peaceful 
transfer of power to the new president. The way he chose 
to do this was by not interfering in the political
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problem; he left Calles to deal with it, and simply 
followed his instructions.114
President Rodriguez saw himself as an administrator 
and tried to make a practical distinction between the 
political and the administrative, leaving the former to 
the politicians.115 Nevertheless, most members of his 
Government still consulted Calles on matters related to 
the running of the administration and on questions that 
were more the province of the executive.116 In other 
words, despite his attempts to distance himself from 
political matters, the mere presence of Calles raised many 
a problem and rendered his endeavours impossible. Nowhere 
was this more clear than in the question of education.
Application of the educational philosophy of the 
Constitution of 1917 had been the second most important 
source of conflict between Church and State which 
disrupted the modus vivendi of 1929. Both parties held 
permanently pronounced opposing views. The Government had 
introduced a programme of sexual education as a forerunner 
to socialist education. Narciso Bassols, Minister of 
Education under Rodriguez, implemented it in 1933; while 
Calles, and later Cardenas, personally called for the 
radical enforcement of the latter in 1934.117
Bassols set about reforming the educational system,
with some emphasis of the economic aspect of rural
education. His policy provoked bitter and serious
opposition, particularly in his attempts to impose sexual 
• 118 •education. Resistance came from several quarters:
parents' associations, teachers, the education bureaucracy
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opposed to reorganization, the Church and the press. The 
extent of the protest was such that Bassols had to resign 
- despite having the support of the President. He was 
appointed Minister of the Interior, but after a short 
while, he resigned and withdrew from the Government.119
According to Francisco Gaxiola, personal secretary 
to President Rodriguez, his resignation followed a 
disagreement with the President regarding the 
intensification of religious persecution. Bassols went to 
see the President, after conferring with Calles and 
Cardenas, to advice him of the need to act anew on the 
religious question, this time with more extreme measures 
against the clergy, urging local governments to limit, 
even more, the number of priests allowed in each state. 
The President, however, did not accept the radicalization 
of anticlericalism,120 since he believed that his 
government had been acting in “revolutionary” manner and
clerical action was nullified in accordance to the
• • 121 existing law.
"Significantly, as he withdrew,
Bassols pointed out that sex education 
was only the whipping boy. The real 
issue was socialism in education and 
clerical agitation for nullification 
of the newly proposed reform of 
Article 3 of the Constitution."122
In reaction to agitation by the Catholic hierarchy 
against the reform of Article 3, President-elect Cardenas 
and the PNR leader were instructed by Calles to ask the 
President to expel the Archbishop of Mexico, Pascual Diaz. 
Rodriguez refused; yet, by the end of October, Portes Gil,
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the Prosecutor General, was instructed to investigate the 
conduct of the clergy. No action was taken against Diaz, 
but on 7 November, orders were issued for the arrest of 
the Apostolic Delegate, Ruiz y Flores, and bishop 
Manriquez y Zarate, on the grounds that they had incited 
rebellion against the Government.123 Portes Gil was to 
write some years later that Calles had intended, by 
exerting pressure on President Rodriguez - precisely 
through Cardenas - to deport Archbishop Ruiz y Flores and 
Pascual Diaz, as well as other prelates, to stir up a new 
revolt, so that he could appear as the only saviour of the 
regime which was due to start in December 1934.124
However, Calles had other reasons besides embroiling 
Cardenas in an unsolvable problem: he knew that he had to 
lead to keep control over Cardenas. The anti-Catholic 
attack might not only serve to forestall the proletarian 
revolution advocated by the radical element of the Party, 
including Cdrdenas, but to unify the Party and gain
control of its alienated factions, by resorting to the
• • • • 125only deep conviction common to all the revolutionaries.
On 21 July 1934, Calles raised the issue of
education, personally, in a speech he gave at
Guadalajara.126 He called upon the people to begin a new 
period of the Revolution, which he described as the 
"psychological revolution.” He said that the Revolution 
should take possession of the minds of children because 
youth belonged to the community and to the Revolution, he 
demanded that the clergy be driven out of education. 
Hence, the conflict was transferred to a field where it
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was probably more inevitable: education.
From 1924 to 1934 Calles kept Mexico in agitation? 
he succeeded in placing himself as the Supreme Chief of 
the Revolution, but failed in his attempt to implant the 
"maximato" as a viable political mechanism for restoring 
stability - as president Ortiz Rubio's resignation 
illustrated - and therefore, failed to re-establish 
social equilibrium (which had been disturbed by 
resignation, modernization and his encouragement for 
violent anticlericalism).m  Calles had become, in fact, 
the grand elector and, hence, the most important figure 
for the presidenciables (i.e. those cabinet ministers who 
had strong possibilities of becoming presidential 
candidates). During the course of the "maximato", it soon 
became obvious that against the background of the non­
enforcement of the principle of effective suffrage, if the 
president did not determine his successor he lost not only 
that prerogative, but also the faculty to rule during his 
own term of office. Important politicians were 
"presidenciables" and when their future was being decided 
by political elements and groups alien to the president's 
will - as during the "maximato" - their political 
interests did not necessarily lead them to accept the 
designs and policies of the president. Consequently, a 
president that did not decide who was to succeed him lost 
the fundamental political instrument to impose his 
authority and, at the same time, the possibility to 
govern.
In his last address to Congress, Calles had called
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for an end to experimentation and for the need to redress 
the economy.128 He warned that thereafter he would not 
tolerate any condition that imperiled the
• • • • • • • 1 9 Qinstitutionalization of the Mexican Revolution.
It is in this light that the persecution of the 
Church must be seen. By 1933, Calles had successfully 
dealt with all political opposition from within the 
Revolutionary Family (the Escobar, Portes Gil and Ortiz 
Rubio faction). Moreover, he knew that state governors 
who persisted in challenging the central authority, even 
over religious affairs, would soon dispute the PNR's 
policies on economic and social issues. Therefore, he 
focused his attention on solving the ideological problem.
1. Socialist Education
The Second National Convention of the PNR took place 
in the city of Queretaro, in December 1933. The 
Convention clearly revealed the existence of two 
ideological tendencies and two different political 
conceptions that were brought together under the same 
political framework, which they both accepted as the only 
one of significance to attain and preserve power. On the 
one hand, there was what was often referred to as "callist 
economicism". This was a conservative socioeconomic 
stand, based on the assumption that progress was a 
function of the national budget, and which tried to put 
an end to radicalism in the social and economic fields, 
which it saw as an obstacle to the creation of an 
environment of security and confidence, necessary to 
foster an increase in national income. On the other hand,
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there was social radicalism which claimed to be socialist 
and aimed at a policy of social defence, increasing rather 
than checking national expenditure, particularly in 
agrarian reform, and which demanded the introduction of 
socialist education by the State.130
In the Convention, a six-year plan was drafted in 
very ambiguous and general terms whereby definite 
confrontation between the two groups was avoided; though 
there was little doubt that in some of the basic issues 
the strength of the PNR radicals became more apparent.
In education, in particular, the radicals succeeded 
in including in the plan a demand for revision of Article 
3 of the Constitution, so as to specify that primary and 
secondary education should be based on the principles of 
the "socialist doctrine that the Mexican Revolution 
supports,"131 thus changing what the original project 
proposed, namely, secular education, with a rationalist 
and anti-religious interpretation but excluding an 
ideological stand.
Calles and President Rodriguez strongly opposed the 
inclusion of socialist education in the convention. 
Rodriguez even went as far as asking the PNR directorate 
not to support the resolution at the convention.132 The 
"callistas” were immediately aware of the social, 
political and economic connotations of establishing 
socialist education. No less significant than their 
opposition to socialist education was the antireligious 
impetus they suggested, which Calles himself had bluntly 
raised in his Guadalajara speech - though he neglected to
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specify whether education had anything to do with 
progressive labour legislation or agrarian reform.133 
Thus, Calles intended to establish a new education, 
secular and anticlerical, but, at the same time, because 
of his conservative socioeconomic views, he necessarily 
opposed socialist education. His speech was nothing less 
than a confession of his "£tatiste" doctrine.134
Consequently, the Six-Year Plan adopted by the 
Convention was more radical than Calles would have liked, 
but he was forced to accept it or face hostility and 
dissidence inside the Party. The Plan tended to formulate 
the socialist ideals of the Revolution; it embraced strong 
elements of nationalism, "indigenismo", anti-capitalism, 
xenophobia, anticlericalism and authoritarianism.135
Beyond the ideological differences, all the 
participants in the convention were united in the belief 
that whatever course was set, the PNR was the sole 
instrument through which it could be achieved.
Three major elements came out of the Convention; 
deference to Calles' supreme leadership: a six-year
programme that after the amendments introduced by the 
radicals could become the basis for a real revolutionary 
adjustment against the background of callist reaction and, 
a presidential candidate, Lazaro Cardenas, who both 
callistas and radicals - especially "agraristas" 
trusted.
The Plan reiterated the concept that;
"The fostering of public instruction 
must be one of the essential functions 
of the State [... ] the genuine and
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direct representative of the 
collectivity [... ] for the State 
cannot admit [that through] a false 
and exaggerated concept of individual 
liberty [private individuals be
allowed to establish and direct] 
educational institutions outside the 
control of the State."136
State control over primary, secondary and private 
education encompassed such matters as the "scientific and 
pedagogic orientation" of school work, the "social 
orientation" and the "non-religious and socialistic" 
requirements of State education.
The theoretical position of the State and the Church 
regarding education appeared to be irreconcilable on three 
main issues:
(1) the State was definitely moving towards a government 
monopoly in education, which the church viewed as 
tyrannical usurpation, since she had the right to 
teach religion to Catholic children?
(2) the Government's intention was to bring up the child 
as an entity of a social and economic, but not of a 
religious community. In contrast, for the Church, 
the object of education was to preserve the Catholic 
faith of the children and the salvation of their 
souls;
(3) with regard to the content, the State excluded 
religious teaching and sought to "instil in Mexican 
youth a rational concept of the world and of social 
life". For the Church, religion was an essential 
part of education and, together with moral education, 
it could not be separated from intellectual
education.
Futhermore, the Church believed that when the State 
declared that education "shall combat fanaticism and 
prejudice," it was anti-religious and, more specifically, 
anti-Catholic, because "fanaticism" to most Mexican 
radicals was synonymous with Catholicism. Therefore, 
eradication of fanaticism was another way of destroying 
the Catholic Church.137
2. Catholic Reaction
Since January 1934, Catholics had been aware of the 
imminence of the law on education. Long before this was 
ratified (13 December 1934) the Apostolic Delegate, then 
living in exile in the United States, sent instructions 
to the Mexican Episcopacy recommending that the hierarchy 
follow a course of concerted action, in dealing with the 
mena ce?138 whereupon, the Archbishop of Mexico, Pascual 
Diaz, addressed a circular to all the prelates of the 
country wherein he summarised the implications of the 
project of reform of Article 3, contained in the Six-Year 
Plan.139 Mgr Diaz alluded to the Apostolic Delegate's 
instructions and asked the bishops for their opinion on 
five specific points:
(1) what attitudes should the Prelates assume in respect 
of the reform of Article 3?
(2) what general orientations should be given to the 
faithful and by what means?
(3) what special instructions should be given to parents
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and guardians?
(4) what special instructions should be given to school 
principals and teachers? and
(5) what means should be used to intensify religious 
education and counteract the effects of government 
propaganda?140
In a letter to Bishop Lara y Torres (10 February, 
1934) Mgr Diaz outlined the conclusions of his request to 
the Episcopacy. He hoped that bishops would adopt his 
instructions of 5 February - or issue similar ones in the 
sense that priests should intensify religious instruction 
and admonish parents that they would be considered 
unworthy of receiving the sacraments should they fail to 
give their children Catholic education, or fail to remove 
them from schools where the "danger of perversion" 
existed. He added:
"The majority of the Venerable 
Episcopacy is of the opinion that, for 
the time being, pastoral letters 
should not be issued; and it seems to 
be the opinion of His Holiness, 
according to the Bishop of Tulancingo, 
in view of the fact that the Holy 
Father clearly told him that 1parents 
are the ones who should speak out* and 
adduced as reason for this to avoid 
exacting the wrath and reprisals of 
the enemy".
He went on to say:
"it is understood that the parents 
will say that which they have learned 
from the Bishops and Priests."141
Bishop Lara y Torres disagreed that the Bishops
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should be silent, because it was for them to set an 
example and speak out, publicly, against the Governments 
plans for education, which was what the faithful expected 
them to do. Failing this, he observed, priests and 
faithful would continue to be divided about the 
interpretation of their orders.142
After the resignation of the Minister of Education, 
Narciso Bassols, in May 1934, and the withdrawal of his 
programme of sexual education, the controversy between 
Church and State centred on the broader issue of socialist 
education. Archbishop Diaz denounced, in his Pastoral 
Instructions of 30 April, the dangers of openly 
establishing anti-Catholic teaching. He said that the 
amendment ended the neutrality towards religious matters 
inherent in laicized education and imposed a doctrinal 
bias on public instruction. Archbishop Diaz condemned 
Socialism as the enemy of religion and urged Catholics to 
make use of all legal means to prevent the implementation 
of socialist education? he reminded parents and teachers 
of the risk of excommunication? he warned school 
principals that if they tolerated socialist teaching, they 
would be deemed guilty of abetting heresy.143 Furthermore, 
he stated:
"no Catholic can be a Socialist 
without gravely falling short of his 
duties? nor can he belong to the PNR, 
since it had declared itself to be 
openly socialist and, what is more, 
atheistic.11144
Calles was infuriated by the Archbishopfs pastoral 
message. He attacked the Church | h i s  Guadalajara
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speech of 20 July, declaring that the future of the 
Revolution could not be turned over to enemy hands, in 
other words, to the Church:
"With all perfidy the reactionaries 
say, and the clergy affirms, that the 
child belongs to the home and the 
youth belongs to the family. That is 
an egoistic doctrine because the child 
and the youth belong to the community, 
they belong to the masses? it is the 
Revolution that has the imperative 
obligation to attack this sector, to 
take possession of consciences, to 
destroy all prejudice and to form a 
new national soul."145
In reply to this speech, Bishop Manriquez y Zarate, 
the most outspoken critic of the revolutionary regime, 
issued his "Third Message to the Civilised World" from his 
exile in the United States, where he had been living since 
1927. He exhorted all Catholics to take up the challenge 
and oppose, with all their strength, the realization of 
the "judaic-masonic plan of which Mr Calles is the worthy 
bearer". He urged parents to save their children from 
falling prey to the revolution, and to pick up the 
challenge launched by their enemy.146
On the impending threat of socialist education, the 
Apostolic Delegate sent a message of protest to all 
Catholics insisting that they should be united in the 
defence of the rights of the Church, which were theirs 
too. Catholic opposition should be the work of the laymen 
themselves. With reference to the freedom of religion 
guaranteed in Article 24 of the Constitution, Mgr Ruiz y 
Flores complained that all the federal laws since 1926 had 
made the exercise of that freedom impossible, by
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despoiling and expropriating churches and limiting the 
number of priest allowed to officiate.147 In the opinion 
of the Apostolic Delegate this was not surprising 
considering what Cardenas was saying in his election
campaign: he declared that Mexican people were no longer 
misled by empty phrases such as "freedom of conscience", 
"freedom of education", and "economic freedom", because 
they understood the first to stand for clerical
dictatorship? the second, for reactionary dictatorship 
and? the third, for capitalist dictatorship.148
Mgr Ruiz y Flores was concerned about the type of 
tyranny that the repudiation of religious freedom would 
lead to, and he reminded Catholics:
"There are rights prior to and 
superior to any constitution, rights 
which the latter should respect and 
defend: religious rights, the right
to educate one's children, the right 
to life, the right to private property 
and all other natural rights. Any law 
impairing these rights is unjust and 
void."149
Mgr Ruiz y Flores concluded his message by telling 
Catholics that it was their duty to organise themselves 
as a disciplined body, so that they could assert those 
rights, independently of the Church authorities.
The response of the Government consisted of issuing 
an arrest warrant for the Apostolic Delegate, and of 
printing six hundred thousand copies of a study prepared 
by Emilio Portes Gil, Andres Serpa Rojas and Jose 
Ceniceros, entitled "The Conflict Between the Civil Power 
and the C l e r g y w h e r e i n  an attempt was made, on legal and
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moral grounds, to defend the opposition of the Mexican 
State to the Church.
When Cardenas assumed office, he declared his 
intention to encourage socialist education by 
Revolutionary teachers, who would take an active part in 
promoting the interest of peasants and workers.
The new President had always been anticlerical. For 
his first cabinet, he appointed such well-known enemies of 
the church as General Mujica, Rodolfo Elias Calles and 
Tomas Garrido Canabal. His views on the Church and 
religion had been laid out during his campaign. He 
stated:
"I will not permit the clergy to 
intervene in popular education in any 
way, for this is the exclusive faculty 
of the State. The Revolution cannot 
tolerate the clergy's continuing to 
utilise the youth of the country as 
instrument with which to divide the 
Mexican nation. Nor can it tolerate 
their converting the rising generation 
into enemies of the working classes. 
The clergy asks for liberty of 
conscience merely to make for itself 
a new instrument of oppression and to 
keep down and to subdue the just 
desires of the people for liberty.1,150
He increased his attacks on the Church during his 
first year in the Presidency. While previous governments 
had expropriated 117 churches and buildings belonging to 
the Church, between 1931 and 1934? in his first eighteen 
months alone, he seized 350.151
In February 1935, his Government passed a law 
prohibiting the sending of religious material through the 
post. The law proclaimed a policy of combating fanaticism
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by all legitimate means, so as to achieve the spiritual 
liberation of the people. Moreover, restrictions on the 
number of priests reached a peak in 1935: in September of 
that year, a total of two hundred priests was allowed for 
the entire country and, in at least half of the states, no 
priests were allowed at all.
It was evident that the increased persecution of the 
Church in 1934 and 1935 had a profound effect among 
militant Catholics and favoured the development of a 
radical right. There were a great many people who 
demanded a more radical response to the Government's 
behaviour. At the end of 1932, the League had broken off. 
Hence, the Legion seemingly provided an outlet for 
militant Catholics. Yet, in 1934, the hierarchy became 
aware of the shortcomings of the organization as it stood, 
to represent the position of the Church and, thus, to 
prevent the resumption of hostilities. This conclusion 
was drawn from the recent outbreaks of armed resistance 
during 1933 and 1934, by various Catholic groups, as well 
as the renewal of propaganda activities by members of the 
old League and cristero elements.
Indeed, since the beginning of the conflict in 1932, 
there had been an increase of Catholic guerrilla bands. 
Several rebel groups, claiming to be the revival of the 
cristero national guard, carried out sporadic guerrilla 
activities in the province.152
The PNR* s project of reform of Article 3 and Calles* 
speech at Guadalajara, in July 1934, in particular, 
increased the pressure for armed resistance, so much so,
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that in November several ex-cristeros and league members 
announced the formation of an army of popular liberation 
which, notwithstanding the disapproval of the majority of 
the clergy, obtained many followers. The rebels claimed 
to be fighting for family and property; the preservation 
of which, they maintained, was essential to Mexico. Their 
principal objective was to overthrow the regime dominated 
by Calles.153 The revolt never posed a serious threat to 
the Government and, in 1937, the movement was finally 
suppressed.154
The hierarchy then realised that it had to take the 
initiative if it was to prevent the mass of irate 
Catholics from taking over its lead. The Legion had been 
in existence for two years and had proved an inadequate 
instrument for the hierarchy to control discontentment. 
It had been useful, however, in channelling the grievances 
of a group of young Catholics who needed a way to express 
their feelings? but it, certainly, was not an organization 
able to contain the force of the majority of the Catholic 
population upset by the threat to its religion and 
expecting an immediate change.
It thus became necessary to adapt the organization 
so that it could be become useful in alleviating the 
immediate difficult situation of the Church, in relation 
to socialist education, and to find a solution to the 
aggregate problem that the revolution posed? as well as, 
eventually, providing a way to reassert religious rights 
in the social and political spheres. To this end, the 
organization would have to follow some of the ideas
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contained in QUADRAGE SIHO ANNO: adopt a corporative
structure, in order to penetrate all levels of society? 
pursue the establishment of social justice, not only for 
the proletariat, but for all the other sectors of society, 
too. It would be secret for two reasons: first, to
prevent the danger of suppression and, second, to conceal 
its links with the clergy. Thorough discussion and 
planning were made difficult by constant government 
surveillance and the fact that most major prelates were in 
exile.
The characteristics of the new organization stand out 
from the correspondence of the Apostolic Delegate with 
Archbishop Diaz y Barrueto and others. In a letter to the 
Bishop of Tabasco, Mgr Ruiz y Flores noted down that what 
would be required was f,an imposing organization composed 
of all Catholics" that should make its power felt in the 
Government.155 He stressed that much more would be 
attained by means of "a compact, numerous and disciplined 
organization.1,156 Leadership was of paramount importance 
so that the organization could be effected and discipline 
preserved.157 Moreover, once the various groups of 
parents, students, teachers, children, workers, etc., were 
organised, they would need a real chief, a leader,
"because without leadership time is 
lost, energy wasted and there is the 
danger of discord."158
Mgr Ruiz y Flores believed, however, that it was 
equally important to have a council that could pull the 
strings from behind the scenes. This council would be
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integrated by laymen and perhaps have a priest as its 
ecclesiastical adviser. In his relations with the Church, 
the leader should allow himself to be guided with regard 
to the principles that he should uphold and defend.159 The 
council would be responsible for the collection and 
administration of funds, and it would be sufficient that 
it reported "with prudence to the prelates the work it was 
doing. ,|16°
The organization should have as wide a base as 
possible. Nevertheless, vigilance was of the utmost 
importance to ensure that the organization did not incur 
physical reprisals from the government and did not injure 
the Church by revealing its links with the hierarchy.161
While Ruiz y Flores did not advocate armed 
insurrection, he did say that the hierarchy should neither 
encourage nor prohibit such eventuality:
111 think it would be highly 
inadvisable to talk of this and I do 
not venture to say a single word.
Your Grace might perhaps say something 
to the effect that it is not our task 
either to approve or to disapprove.
That belongs to politicians,1,1 2
and insisted that those who favoured the resort to force 
were free to do so, so long as they did not drag in the 
clergy or the Church and that they should not take a step 
of that kind unless they felt very sure of their 
ground.168
Mgr Ruiz y Flores also suggested that the Jesuits be 
entrusted with the setting up of the organization along 
the lines expounded and, to keep it under control, they
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should assist with all discretion not only as advisers but 
also as organizers and counsellors.164 In his letter to 
the Father Provincial of Mexico, the Apostolic Delegate 
made clear this intention:
"I take the liberty of stating, 
beloved father that your body more 
than anyone else must help us to 
defend the sacred rights of the 
Church, more persecuted now than ever 
in our country. Hence, I sincerely 
believed that the fathers of the 
Society should advise, organise and 
assist in every way they can, either 
by sitting on the boards of 
established associations, either as 
advisers, assistants, counsellors, 
etc., on those established or on new 
ones as they are created, by which 
they will render a great service to 
the Church [...]"165
The excellent preparation and strict discipline of 
the Jesuit priest made the Society the best Order to 
supervise the new organization. Moreover, their loyalty 
to the Episcopacy and to the Pope guaranteed their 
obedience, minimising the risk of it turning into another 
League.
Thus, at the end of 1934, the organization known as 
"The Base" appeared. The Base was set under the direction 
of a secret council of distinguished Catholic laymen. 
This council was called alto mando (supreme council), and 
its president the Jefe Nacional (National Leader, or 
Chief).
The Legion functioned as the core of the Base and its 
members continued to travel the country to recruit new 
followers. The cellular structure of the legions was 
retained, as were the socio-economic divisions and the
geographical distribution. The Base was, in fact, a 
restructured Legion, but with a tighter grip by the 
supreme council, in close collaboration with the 
Episcopacy.
Because of its secret nature and of the constant 
threat of government reprisals, its activities were 
limited to gradual and partial changes; instead of 
tackling all obstacles at once, it concentrated on those 
liable to be removed, recognising the inevitability of 
others.166 Thus, the idea was to accept society as it was 
and hope to change it step by step.
The Base was the instrument devised by the religious 
leadership to confront the political problems of its 
group. It was a positive endeavour to provide lay 
Catholics with the means to fight for the amelioration of 
the difficult religious situation and, at the same time, 
replace the League whose tendency towards armed revolt and 
its disobedience of the hierarchy, threatened the 
interests of the Church.
The evolution of Catholic opposition between 1929 and 
1935 resulted from the way in which the Mexican Revolution 
was progressing. With the end of the Cristero rebellion 
came the break up of radical Catholic strength? the 
hierarchy of the Church adopted a more moderate and 
conciliatory policy towards the Government.
During the period of conciliation, 1929-1931, there 
was virtually no radical religious activity? but the 
following four years of friction and challenge intensified 
its sturdiness. It was then that the church hierarchy
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devoted its efforts to contain this increase, within the 
limits of political feasibility. An important phenomenon 
was taking place, the strengthening of Catholic 
opposition. All the groups that had emerged to oppose the 
attitude of the State towards the Church, from the liberal 
legislation of the nineteenth century, to the Constitution 
of 1917 and the collision of the 1920s, were converging to 
organise themselves. To this end, the Church hierarchy 
first set up the Legion and, subsequently, the Base, 
which, as we shall see, had a determining role in the 
formation of the Synarchist movement, in its development 
and, indeed in its collapse.
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CHAPTER II 
THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT CARDENAS
The presidential campaign of Lazaro Cardenas clearly 
reflected, from the start, his intention to form his own 
basis of political power at the national level, by 
attracting the support of peasants and workers. Cardenas 
came into close contact with the masses, expressing in his 
speeches and conversations his desire to elevate them to 
a level of decisive action in the formulation of national 
policy.
His accession to the presidential candidacy had been 
the result, to some extent, of his political tact and 
judgement of the oligarchical struggle; the possibility of 
confronting Calles, the Supreme Chief, also implied the 
need for labour mobilization. The choice of Lazaro 
Cardenas as presidential candidate has been explained by 
Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl in the following terms:
"As the party convention neared, the 
victory of Cardenas appeared to be a 
foregone conclusion. The army backed 
him on the assumption that anyone with 
such a long and distinguished service 
would represent the view of the 
officer group. His military
activities in about a dozen states 
gave him national political strength. 
His uncompromising stand in favour of 
land distribution had won him the 
support of the radical agrarians and 
the bulk of the peasantry. The 
growing left wing, hailed him as its 
choice. Cardenas* signed services on 
behalf of labour organizations won him 
the friendship of the trade unions. 
If pro-Catholic leaders, such as 
Cedillo, favoured Cardenas, Tomas 
Garrido Canabal, chief of the 
anticlerical and professedly socialist
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Red Shirts movement of Tabasco also 
attached himself to the Michoacan 
generalfs camp. Cardenas undeviating 
opposition to the political activities 
of the Catholic Church was a source of 
s u p p o r t  f r om  a n t i c l e r i c a l  
revolutionary groups.1
The President-elect proclaimed that the system of 
collective labour contracts should be strengthened until 
it became exclusive and he urged the adoption of a closed 
shop ("clausula de exclusion) which would eliminate the 
actions of unorganized labour, and the abolition of 
company unions. He gave his interpretation of the 
mandates of the Six-Year Plan and promised that he would 
give all aid to co-operative organization in the republic, 
which would enable the workers progressively to control 
the sources of wealth and productive instruments and which 
he saw as the ideal of the socialist doctrine of the 
Revolution.2
Ramon Beteta observed that the Six-Year Plan had one 
especial aim: to change the economic conditions of the 
country for the benefit of its labouring classes, so that 
they might live in dignity and comfort, a fuller life. He 
affirmed that the Plan was more than a political platform 
used to attract votes, it rather implied self-criticism 
and was a revision of the revolutionary proposals, ideals 
and principles.3
Future events were to demonstrate that Cardenas took 
the Six-Year Plan seriously; in fact, the major share of 
his economic policy was simply to put into effect the 
dictates of the Plan.
The new administration harboured most of the sincere
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and staunch anticlericals in the country. President 
Cardenas himself had followed a radical anti-church policy 
when Governor of the state of Michoacan? Portes Gil, the 
new Foreign Minister, as Governor of Tamaulipas, as 
interim President and as Attorney General in the previous 
administration, had a long anticlerical record; Narciso 
Bassols head of the Treasury, was the leader of the 
anticlerical campaign in education? Rodolfo Elias Calles, 
Minister of Communications, closed all the churches in his 
native state of Sonora? General Mujica, Minister of 
National Economy, conducted anticlerical campaigns in 
Michoacan and Tabasco, and was seen as Cardenas1 
ideological mentor? Garrido Canabal, Minister of 
Agriculture descended on the capital for the inauguration 
with thousands of his "Red Shirts" who had practically 
wiped out the Church in the state of Tabasco.
Carlton Beals reflected on the new government:
"the Church has less to hope for from 
the new administration than from any 
previous one. The Cardenas government 
is moving left."4
Indeed, those Mexicans who had found the P.N.R. state 
under Calles oppressively burdensome could not have felt 
at all relieved with Cardenas* Presidential campaign. In 
May 1934 he made clear that he intended his administration 
to intervene in all aspects of production, consumption, 
culture and education.5 He believed that arbitrary 
exercise of power on behalf of the working class 
constituted democracy*s purest form. When he became 
President he declared that with a more equitable
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distribution of wealth, a rise in living standards, a 
provision of equal cultural opportunities and the access 
to power for "the working majorities", he would be 
underscoring the basic principles of "true democracy."
Although Cardenas is better known for his efforts in 
agrarian reform, to consider the effects of his government 
on the middle-class and on the radical Right, it is more 
appropriate to examine his role in the organization of 
labour and the evolution of the urban proletariat.
I. The Organization of the Masses
1. The Workers
Under Obregon and Calles, the revolutionaries became 
more aware of what it meant to govern a [ mass society, 
the product of a revolution of the kind Mexico had 
experienced. They were more conscious of the implications 
and, above all, of the perspectives that lay ahead. Their
will to remain in power was unquestioned; such
determination held them together. However, the effects of 
their policies would eventually divide the two strong men.
The revolutionaries had succeeded in establishing 
themselves as the undisputed hegemonic force in Mexican
politics, keeping a firm grip on society. Their
predominance after the Revolution was evident from the 
fact that all the major conflicts that the country 
experienced after 1917 were between members of the 
"revolutionary family", with the sole important exception 
of the Cristero Rebellion (1926-1929).
Despite their hegemonic power, they failed to fulfil
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the aims raised by the Revolution. The Revolution had 
involved a gigantic mass mobilization which they had used 
to take power. But gaining power was no guarantee for 
retaining it and for changing the State? what was needed 
was to maintain the continuous support of the masses, so 
as to justify the policies followed and confront the 
forces of the opposition.6
If it is true that this support was never absent, it
assumed "gratuitous" character: that is, the masses got
very little in return. This negative trade-off concealed 
extremely serious dangers to the revolutionary state, 
making essential the recovery of a mass policy if the 
revolutionary processes was to continue.
The Revolution had advanced the defence of the rights 
of the workers and had given them a political guarantee by 
inserting them in the Constitution of 1917, under Article 
123. The aim was to extend the benefits of economic 
progress to the large urban population, so as to ensure 
the future industrial development of the country. 
Constitutional guarantees plus the possibility to improve 
their lot sufficed to ensure labour's support of the new 
regime.
Under Calles, the workers enjoyed better economic
conditions than ever before; though, this was only
relative and had been achieved through strict subjection 
of the labour movement to the designs of the political 
groups that sustained the leaders, and through the 
shameless manipulation of the workers' demands to preserve 
their unrestricted allegiance to the same groups.7 The
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Revolution had intended to take advantage of that 
allegiance and use it as a driving force for economic 
change. The State was the only actor capable of ensuring 
the disappearance of the old privileges and only the State 
could recover for the nation the resources still in 
foreign hands. However, no change could be dictated nor 
be justifiably pursued if the working masses were not 
behind the regime.
In the opinion of some of the "revolutionary family", 
like Cdrdenas and Tejeda, that driving force had ceased to 
be operative when the manipulation of the workers had 
departed from, or had postponed the original objectives of 
social change. Hence, they argued, that while on the one 
hand, the possibility was lost to turn the State into a 
true agent of social and economic reform, on the other 
hand, new demands were adopted before the initial 
objectives had been attained, in an attempt, they claimed, 
to find an agreement with the old enemies. In other 
words, they considered that the State had not been able to 
fulfil its role as agent of economic and "spiritual" 
development of the country, because the revolutionary 
groups continued to be unable to implement the mass 
policies of the Revolution.8
Cardenas, for the first time in post-revolutionary 
Mexico, though at the local level, as Governor of 
Michoacan, had made the State a real mass leader; he 
sought to organize the working masses and fuse their 
interests with those more general interests of the State? 
this was the most effective way, in his view, of attaining
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the objectives of state-managed development as proposed by 
the drafters of the 1917 Constitution.9
With Cardenas as President, the masses would re-adopt 
the role of "driving force". All revolutionaries had been 
aware of this since 1913, but Cardenas intended, as he 
incessantly repeated during his Presidential campaign, to 
change them from being a passive and defenseless element, 
that politicians could dispose of at will, into a powerful 
force to be reckoned with.10 The programme of social 
reforms that Cardenas envisaged not only attempted to 
satisfy the interests of the masses, but above all, to 
make it into a social force, organized under the aegis of 
the State, the future of which depended on this. For 
Cdrdenas, there was only one way to achieve this 
objective: labour should constitute a rightful subject of 
Mexican politics. For him, there was no other way to 
ensure the institutionalization of the Revolution.11
Cardenas* six year administration drastically changed 
the country’s existing social and political structures. 
To achieve all his political plans, the President needed 
a strong labour movement. When he came to power, the 
workers were disorganized in a multitude of federations, 
confederations, independent unions, etc. The big unions 
were either discredited (CROM, Confederacion Regional 
Obrera Mexicana), weak (CGT, Confederacion General del 
Trabajo) or just did not have sufficient political force 
to aspire to dominate the labour scene (CGOCM, 
Confederacion General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico). 
Only by forming a single labour union that comprised all
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the unions in the country would political-interest 
divisions among local organizations be avoided:
"the government has the revolutionary 
and moral obligation to support and 
stimulate the information of such a 
front, so that it enjoys positive 
autonomy and be free from all 
political fluctuations. The
organization of the workers will bring 
about the development of the national 
economy when labour obtains its due 
share in production".12
The labour movement did not rush to support C&rdenas; 
instead, the CGOCM continued to organize warily and to 
wait for results. With Cardenas barely in office, a rash 
of strikes broke out.13
Calles waited for President Cardenas to take some 
action that would indicate that the President was still 
of the same opinion as the Supreme Chief. But Cardenas 
bided his time. He invited Calles to come to the capital 
to discuss the current labour agitation. They met on 8 
June 1935, and apparently, the President told Calles that 
in response to the attitude adopted by the workers and the 
division that had emerged in the Chambers (a radical, 
socialist and cardenist "left-wing" that ignored the rule 
of the official party, the PRM, directed by Calles) he 
would make a declaration to bring them under control.14 
But Calles told the President that it would be better if 
he made the call to stop the agitation and the attempts to 
divide the two men, because, Calles argued, Cardenas had 
hoisted the labour flag during his Presidential campaign.15
On 11 June 1935, a group of senators led by Ezequiel
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Padilla met with Calles. The Supreme Chief condemned the 
divisions and accused those who stirred up discord, 
especially between him and Cardenas. He condemned labour 
leaders for the recent strikes, which he said were 
unjustifiable and detrimental to the prosperity of the 
Nation and to the stability of the Government itself. "We 
are going backwards", he said, and added, menacingly, that 
events were taking a turn reminiscent of the period of 
President Ortiz Rubio.16 Because the statement was to 
trigger a break between Cardenas and Calles, it is quoted, 
together with the President's reply, at some length:
"For six months the country has been 
shaken by strikes, many of them 
entirely unjustified. The workers' 
organizations in many cases are making 
themselves examples of ingratitude, 
for strikes hurt capital much less 
than they hurt the Government, because 
they cut off from the State its means 
of prosperity. Thus the good
intentions and the tireless work of 
the President are constantly 
obstructed [. .. ] it is unfair of the 
workers to cause this damage to a 
Government headed by such an honest 
and sincere friend of labour as is 
General C&rdenas [... ] I know the 
history of these organizations since 
they were created; I know their 
leaders, both old and new. I know 
that they do not agree among 
themselves and that they are torn in 
opposite directions by Navarrete [of 
the Labour Chamber] and Lombardo 
Toledano [head of CGOCM], who are 
responsible for this confusion. I 
know of what they are capable, and I 
can state that in all this agitation 
there are lively ambitions involved, 
very dangerous in people and 
organizations without adequate 
preparations. They are risking the 
economic life of the nation, without 
responding to the President's 
generosity and definite pro-labour 
inclinations [... ] Strikes are
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declared against a State which 
oppresses workers and denies their 
rights ? but in a country where the 
Government protects them, aids them, 
and surrounds them with guarantees, 
then, to disturb the economic progress 
of the nation is not merely 
ingratitude; it is treason."17
President Cardenas instructed Luis L. Leon not to 
publish the declarations in El Nacional,18 the semi­
official government paper? but other dailies did. El 
Universal headlined the event with the title "Calles Makes 
Sensational Declaration". Another wrote: "Patriotic
Declarations of General Plutarco Elias Calles". At the 
end of the text, Padilla wrote: "We have had the rare
opportunity to hear the voice of a great statesman". Some 
might have thought that the word of the "great statesman" 
would be enough to settle the matter. His word had been 
the norm and his directions were, for many years, 
virtually orders. However, Calles was no longer the 
strong man he was thought to be, and the colour of the 
country's political landscape had changed.19
The new energy that cardenist radicalism represented 
had been taking shape, and though not moving away from the 
principal ideas, the socialistic accent had been stressed 
and sought, above all, to eliminate the tutelage of the 
Supreme Chief. Cardenas believed that there could be no 
efficient government if the President was constrained by, 
or impotent before an individual or a group. In May 1940 
he wrote:
"In the government only one political 
force must excel: that of the
President of the Republic, who must be
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the only voice of the democratic 
• • 20 aspirations of the people.”
Cardenas did not respond immediately to Calles1 
declarations. He waited to see how much sympathy Calles 
still commanded. On the very same day that these appeared 
in the press, 12 June 1935, the officers of the Mexican 
Electricians* Union called all the other local branches 
and independent unions to an emergency meeting.21 From the 
meeting came the unanimous resolution to condemn Calles, 
accusing him of being a traitor to the Revolution and an 
enemy of the Mexican working class.
On 14 June 1935 came the President's reply:
"With regard to the labour 
difficulties which have risen during 
the past few months, which have 
resulted in several strikes, I 
consider that they are the result of 
the adjustment of the interests 
represented by the two factors of 
production. If they cause some 
uneasiness, and even temporarily 
injure the economy of the country, 
when settled reasonably and with a 
spirit of equanimity and social 
justice, they contribute, with time, 
to making the economic situation more 
stable, since their rightful solution 
brings about better conditions for the 
workers, obtained within the economic 
possibilities of the capitalist 
sector.
[T]he Federal Executive is resolved 
to fulfil the programme of the 
Revolution and carry out the dictates 
of the Six-Year Plan without regard 
for the alarm expressed by 
representatives of the capitalist 
class. At the same time, it is my 
duty to say to workers and employers 
that both will enjoy all guarantees 
within the law or unnecessary 
agitations. In the working out of 
such programme, I have full confidence 
in the labour and peasant 
organizations of the country, and I
96
expect that they will know how to act 
in good will and the patriotism which 
the legitimate interest they represent 
demand of them [... ]1,22
Within the next few hours, the working masses took 
their protests to the streets, pledging support to 
Cardenas and demanding the departure of Calles and the 
callistas. Overnight, Calles was out and Cardenas in. 
The majority of the Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously 
to support Cardenas. It took him only one year to 
overthrow an apparently firmly entrenched conservative 
political machine without resorting to military rebellion 
or political assassination.23 Yet, the fact was that 
callism had been slowly wearing itself away, and by 1935 
it was more of a weak structure than a dynamic action, a 
force more apparent than real, an impressive decor, more 
than a deep rooted experience.24 Cardenas, who had been 
working to build his own basis of support, through 
agitation especially, could collect the fruits of the 
Maximato, both the positive and the negative, in order to 
create his own personality and his own directives. The 
next day the composition of the new cabinet was announced. 
Garrido Canabal and other callistas were thrust out of 
public life.25 General Cedillo was called to replace 
Garrido at the Ministry of Agriculture.
Instrumental in the fall of callismo had been General 
Saturino Cedillo, who had bitterly opposed Calles" efforts 
to enforce the anticlerical laws and to introduce secular 
education in his state of San Luis Potosi. He became 
identified as the defender of culture, of religious
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freedom, and of youth.26 He had been the first important 
army leader to come out openly for Cardenas during the
• • • • 271933 manoeuvres for the PNR Presidential nomination.
Undoubtedly, the most significant consequence of the 
Calles-Cardenas break was the united front of the labour 
movement. The threat that Calles would oust Cardenas from 
power if the latter did not alter his conduct and reduce 
the working class to impotence, which occurred in June 
1935, simply accelerated the unification of the working 
class.28 Calles' declarations led the larger unions to 
sign a long-pursued joint pact, called temporarily the 
National Committee for Proletariat Defence. The Committee 
openly stated:
"The contracting parties declare that 
they are against collaboration with 
the capitalist class and that they 
will act in accordance with a 
revolutionary policy and with the 
principle of the class struggle."29
CROM, opposed to Vicente Lombardo Toledano, made 
common cause with Calles. But the days of the CROM as the 
government's labour pillar had passed. The struggle 
against Calles served, to a large extent, to weaken the 
CROM and to unify the labour movement around Lombardo 
Toledano. Other groups besides CROM devoted themselves 
to attacking the policies of Cardenas and the Committee 
for Proletarian Defence. The "Accion Revolucionaria 
Mexicanista" of General Nicol&s Rodriguez, also known as 
the "Gold shirts", created disturbances that were used to 
expose the "communist" threat of cardenism.
Cardenas and organized labour were now partners. The
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binding link between the two seemed to be the desire to 
fulfil the promises of the Revolution. The immediate 
benefit that the workers got from their bond with the 
State was a new and lasting modus vivendi with the 
employers. This became apparent when, in February 1936, 
the President travelled to Monterrey to give his personal 
support to a strike against a Iglass factory; his ultimate 
aim was to define the rules of the game between the 
factors of production and between these and the
on c
government. Cardenas introduced, on 11 February 1936, 
what became known as "the Fourteen Points", defining his 
position with regard to labour, industry, and employer- 
worker relations. The President stated, emphatically, 
that the organization of the workers, like that of the 
peasants, was indispensable for the enforcement of the 
laws of Mexico. The fourteen points were;
"1. The government will cooperate
with labour and capital in the 
solution of their problems.
2. A united labour front should be 
organized, since strife between 
rival labour organizations . 
themselves is detrimental to the 
government as well as to the 
workers and employers.
3. The government is arbiter and 
regulator of social problems.
4. The demands of labour will be 
taken into consideration only as 
they come within the limits of 
the ability of the various 
industries to pay.
5. When labour's united front is 
organized, the government will 
deal with it to the exclusion of 
minority groups which might 
choose to continue.
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6. Employers shall have no right to 
intervene in the affairs of 
labour organizations.
7. Employers shall have the same 
right as the workers have to 
associate themselves into a 
united front.
8. The government desires the 
further development of industries 
with the nation, since it depends 
upon their prosperity for its 
income through taxation.
9. Current labour agitation is not 
due to the existence of 
communistic groups, since they 
are so small they have no real 
influence in the affairs of the 
nation. The real cause of labour 
agitation is the fact that the 
just needs of the labouring 
masses have not been met, and the 
labour laws have not been carried 
out faithfully.
10. Small groups of communists do 
exist within the country - as 
they do in Europe and the United 
States - but their activities in 
Mexico do not endanger the 
stability of our institutions nor 
they alarm the government, and 
they need not alarm the 
industrialists.
11. More harm than the communist has 
been inflicted by the fanatics 
that assassinate teachers, 
fanatics that are opposed to the 
observance of the laws and of the 
revolutionary programme and, 
however, we must tolerate them.
12. The attitude of the employers of 
Monterrey is duplicated in 
centres such as La Laguna, Leon, 
the Federal District, and 
Yucatan.
13. Capital should be very careful 
not to continue provoking 
agitations because these would 
come to constitute a rallying 
point for political interests, 
and this would bring on civil 
warfare.
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14. The industrialists who do not 
wish to continue to operate 
because of the demands of the 
unions can turn over their 
industries to their labourers or 
to the government, for it to 
operate. This would be a 
patriotic step, but simply to 
close down the factories would 
not be."31
Thereafter, the labour movement was thus definitely 
wedded to politics, that is, to the state, and vice versa:
"In bolstering the position of labour, 
the government had strengthened itself 
against the influence of foreign 
interests in the economy, projected a 
powerful instrumentality in the form 
of the trade union to offset the 
emerging strength of locally 
controlled industry, but at the same 
time it had maintained its control 
over the instrumentality. The union 
was another vehicle of growing control 
of the economy, to be used as the 
government saw fit".32
Though the President continuously denied that his
• • S3 • •programme had any relation to Communism, his public 
statements glorified the class struggle, and Marx, Lenin 
and Stalin were praised as apostles of a modern religion 
for the salvation of mankind.34 Yet, his expropriations 
in the Laguna District and in Yucatan were not part of a 
communistic movement aimed at overthrowing the social 
order guaranteed by Mexican institutions, but the 
realizations already embodied in Mexican legislation and 
pursued by all the governments of the Revolution.35
Cardenas believed in the rights of the workers to 
organize and strike to obtain their share of the social 
product; he was prepared to utilize the power of the state
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t:o assist the workers in their demands. He maintained 
that the modern concept of the nation and function of the 
state and labour legislation required universal extension 
of the principle that in cases of doubt the state should 
intervene on the side of the weaker party, because to give 
equal treatment to unequal parties was not to impart 
justice nor to give equity; the role of the state was "to 
achieve balance among the factors of production.1,36
Besides, he told employers that if they were unable 
to readjust their policies to assist the workers, they 
could expect their businesses to be nationalized.
The Cardenas government recognized the existence of 
a proletarian class whose interests were opposed to those 
of the employers and the President proposed the 
intervention of the state on behalf of the workers.
The role of the state was one of intervention in 
economic production as an element of control, supervision, 
and balance, and the formation of the government with 
participation of all the social classes in a functional, 
democratic system. This is a popular front state attitude 
with elements of corporatism. The Cdrdenas "socialistic" 
state consisted of government regulation of privately 
owned productive property for the good of all the classes 
in a mixed ownership society.
Cardenas realized the political importance of the 
labour movement when, at the time of the break with 
Calles, it lent its support and endorsement. Thenceforth, 
he pursued his efforts to create a united labour front. 
The Six-Year Plan set out the outline: it sustained the
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class struggle and sought the collaboration of the working 
class to achieve its ends. At the same time, the state 
should intervene when required "to prevent the oppression
• • 37of the class aided by the union."
Cardenas strove to create a popular front: to this 
end he modified the structure of the official party, the 
PNR, and called it the party of the Mexican Revolution, 
or PRM.
The main task of new party was:
"the preparation of the people for the 
establishment of a workers' democracy 
as a step towards Socialism."38
The new party appeared on 11 December 1937? it was 
made up of four sectors: military, labour, peasant, and 
popular. The military sector was transitory. The popular 
sector included all who did not belong to any of the other 
sectors, and was intended to be the voice of the middle 
class which Cardenas hoped to sever from its attachments 
to Capitalism.
Cardenas knew that the revolutionary programme could 
not be carried out by decree? he needed the support of a 
powerful labour movement to eliminate conservative 
opposition:
"If the theory of government as the 
arbiter of class conflict was 
appropriate to a society in 
equilibrium, that of a conscious 
alliance between the state and the 
working-class organizations applied 
to a society in transition towards
• • 39collectivist forms."
In early 1936, Cdrdenas bluntly told labour that he
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wanted it united. A congress was held and a new labour 
confederation, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) , 
was formed. Under the leadership of Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, the CTM had a Marxist orientation, but 
nevertheless represented urban workers in the nationalist 
revolution. The CTM was government controlled and, along 
with CNC, the National Confederation of Peasants, 
represented the organized base of the revolution's popular 
urban sector. Consequently, the new workers' organization 
became one of the main components of Cardenas' political 
power structure and of the PRM, in which it was known as 
the "labour sector".
The object of the CTM was stated by Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, its leader and most influential thinker, to be 
as follows:
"The CTM is a national labour front 
for the struggle between the classes 
at the service of the Mexican 
workers. "40
The attitude of the CTM became one of collaboration 
with the government, and, in particular, with the 
President. Labour was going to create a popular alliance 
to defend the interests of the Mexican Revolution. This 
policy of government intervention on behalf of the workers 
was reiterated by the CTM in April 1937:
"The proletariat knows well that under 
the capitalistic system it is 
impossible for it to receive all it 
produces, but there is the possibility 
of utilizing the Government to enforce 
the articles of the Constitution, 
which would alleviate the situation of 
the masses of workers."41
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Thus, the CTM and the administration were tied 
together and were dependent on each other.
Lombardo Toledano claimed that the programme of the 
confederation had not been, from the beginning, solely 
confined to the interests of the proletariat but to the 
interests of all the people. For this reason, the CTM
carried out alliances with groups other than the
proletariat.42
President C&rdenas told the CTM at its first 
congress, on 24 February 1938, that the collaboration of 
labour, stimulated by government actions, required that 
the efforts of the proletariat be developed in a
consistent and unified form to end internal controversies 
that had led to exhaustion of its forces, to the great 
detriment of proletarian unity and national production.43
In the same way that the CROM had served the
interests of Callismo, so did the CTM with regard to 
Cardenas. The regime put all its means at the disposal of 
the confederation - guarantees for union activity, money 
grants and persecution of the "enemies” of the CTM. Lopez 
Aparicio pointed out that, at times, the entire force of 
the government seemed to be put at the service of the 
CTM.44
The Lombardo-Cardenas parallelism was translated, at 
the same time, into political action. Lombardo Toledano 
and the other CTM leaders had declared, in their manifesto 
of 12 March 1936, that the Confederation did not intend to 
assume public office. Yet, the truth of the matter was
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that many public positions were filled by leading members 
of the CTM. The directorate of the Confederation was, 
perhaps, not entirely sincere when it claimed the 
contrary, or did not keep its commitment, because the 
labour leaders of the CTM did obtain seats in the Senate 
or the Deputies, and the weight of the Lombardo 
organization, together with the CNC was a decisive factor 
in elections for governors, mayors, municipal governments, 
Congress or state representatives and, chiefly, in the 
political campaigns for Presidential elections.45
The CTM was characterized as a national labour front 
within the class struggle, at the service of Mexican 
workers, pledged to fight at the time, not for the 
transformation of the system of private property and the 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but 
simply for the fulfilment of the provisions of the laws 
resulting from the Mexican Revolution.46
This new partnership between labour and government 
worried the middle-classes and was reflected in some of 
the most important written works of the period. It was 
clear that they feared social upheaval as well as 
excessive state power. Samuel Ramos observed in "El 
Perfil del Hombre y la Cultura en Mexico":
"The dominant tone in Mexican politics 
in recent years had been radicalism. 
Demagoguery has taken upon itself the 
propagation among the masses of
extremist social doctrines that lack 
roots in Mexico, and which, given our 
national circumstances, are simply
utopian. "47
In 1936, Luis Cabrera, a traditional liberal,
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published a summary of his reflections on the course that 
the Revolution was taking under Cardenas. In 1930, he had 
been exiled when he openly criticized the Obregon-Calles 
system, in a famous conference, at the National Library, 
on the Twentieth anniversary of the Revolution.48 Liberals 
saw in Cardenas the " soviet izat ion" of the country. 
Cabrera wrote that Mexican society and its constitutional 
government were disintegrating under the onslaught of 
Cardenas and his supporters:
"They want to revoke the 1917 
Constitution, which they call 
antiquated and useless, in order to 
establish a dictatorship of the 
proletariat based on a classless 
society”49
Impressive as the organization of the nationalist 
revolution was, during the Cardenas era, significant 
opposition to it arose among nationalists of other types. 
As Victor Alba has suggested, some of their attacks 
reflected middle-class hostility to the economic direction 
of the revolution.50
The government was attacked because of its anti­
capitalist tendencies and its excessive economic 
isolation. Some, like Gdmez Morin, argued that without 
economic development, the revolution would ultimately 
fail. In 1939, he organized the National Action Party, 
or PAN, which represented Catholic nationalism, and 
favoured private enterprise and the Church.51 Mexican 
conservatives were equally anxious; they blamed the 
"extremist" policies and the "irresponsible" labour 
movement, for disrupting the nation*s economy, oppressing
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the middle and upper classes, and generally implanting 
bolshevism.
The Mexican Right contrasted its own fervent 
nationalism with the PNR's alleged internationalism. In 
their view, Cardenas threatened to destroy the countryfs 
sovereignty by subjecting it to foreign, namely, Soviet 
domination.
For the traditional Catholic Rightist, the only way 
Mexico could survive as a nation was if it turned to its 
historic traditions, based on, and intimately connected 
to, the Catholic faith, and thus prevent a communist 
takeover:
"Only paranoid, traitors, or other 
irresponsible people, [...], attack 
the concepts which sustain Mexican 
nationality: family, religion,
property, patriotism. Wicked are the 
clenched fists that prepare to strike 
the Fatherland. Wicked are the arms 
that raise the red and black flag, for 
rather than being a symbol of 
proletarian redemption as claimed, it 
is really the symbol of Jewish 
imperialist penetration throughout the 
world. Wicked are the voices that 
sing the internationale as a 
substitute for our national anthem. 
It is not necessary to be a Rightist 
to curse these abominable attacks. It 
is only necessary to be Mexican".62
2. The Peasants
A very odd and very significant aspect of the labour 
movement during the Cardenas administration was the fact 
that the peasants, who made up the largest, and perhaps 
the most important, economic sector of the country, were 
not at liberty to join with industrial labour because the
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major peasant organizations were controlled by the 
official party.
As early as 1936, Cardenas had attempted to create a
co
counterbalance to the CTM. He prevented any merger of 
peasants and industrial labour groups, thus assuring that 
Lombardo Toledano and the CTM under his leadership, never 
became strong enough to escape government tutelage:
"Cardenas' handling of the problem of 
p e a s a n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w a s 
characteristic of his method of 
statecraft: never to put all his eggs 
in one basket. While strengthening 
the unions through the establishment 
of the CTM, he kept the peasants' and 
civil servants' unions out of the CTM 
and directly under the sponsorship of 
the official government party."
The President maintained that the CTM should refrain 
from calling a peasant congress because:
"Due to the special situation of the 
peasants, the Government that sprung 
from the Revolution has always looked 
upon itself and still does so, as 
o b l i g e d  to s po ns or  t he i r 
organization. "55
He added that:
"[...] should the Confederation of 
Mexican Workers or any other similar 
organization, in competition with the 
Government action, attempt to organize 
rural workers for its own account, far 
from succeeding in this, it would only 
incubate the germs of dissolution, by 
introducing among the peasantry 
internal conflicts, which have been 
given such fatal results in the case 
of the industrial proletariat."56
The President wanted to form a national peasant
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league without direct reference to any existing 
federation. He intended to tie the organized peasantry 
to the central bureaucracy. On 9 July 1935, Cardenas 
instructed the National Executive Committee of the PNR to 
formulate a plan of action for organization of the peasant 
upon being given land by the government. He pointed out 
that the lack of organization in most units of the country 
had led to conflicts and to delays in the distribution of 
land. The President was convinced that the PNR was the 
proper agency for the unification of the peasantry: it
would aid in implementing the agrarian legislation and, in 
conjunction with the government, help to raise living 
standards.57
The plan should be drawn up according to the 
following bases:
a) The Committee should call conventions in every State 
of the Union for the purpose of having but one Legion 
of Agrarian Communities in each unit of the nation, 
each ejido to have two elected delegates to the 
convention of unification.
b) After the League of Agrarian Communities had been 
organized in all the States, the National Executive 
Committee of the PNR was to call a Great Convention 
to form the Peasant Confederation, which would be the 
central organ of the scheme.
c) The National Executive Committee should proceed to 
formulate drafts for laws on peasant life insurance, 
insurance against agriculture sickness and accidents,
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insurance against loss of crops, and all other laws 
tending to insure the social and economic well-being 
of the members of the Peasant Confederation.
The conference confirmed that the new confederation 
would be set up by the government and would function in 
an "open spirit of class struggle". By using the PNR 
apparatus in this manner, C&rdenas secured the support of 
the movement for himself and prevented any politician from 
exploiting it for his own political designs.58
There had been continuous division within the 
Revolutionary family as to what course agrarian reform 
should take. By the end of the Second PNR Convention in 
1933, two distinct groups had emerged: the "veterans” and 
the "agraristas”.59
The veterans, led by Calles, believed that the 
distribution of ejido land should be determined and that 
efforts should be made to create a large number of small 
holdings for middle-class independent farmers. The 
agraristas, on the other hand, intended to make the ejido 
not a transitory, but a permanent, feature of the Mexican 
agricultural system. They demanded the complete 
socialization of the land.
Cardenas seemed to advocate a "middle-of-the-road- 
course" as could be inferred from his programme, which 
favoured both small, privately owned plots and collective 
farms. In reality, however, he was more of an agrarista 
as was revealed by his actions in the Laguna region, and 
later in other regions.
In a speech he gave at Torreon, the capital of the
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northern State of Coahuila, on 30 November 1936, he
explained collectivist agriculture:
"In the early stages of the Revolution 
there may possibly have been some 
people in whose mind the ejido was but 
a mere supplement to the wage-earning 
system and insufficient in itself to 
guarantee the land labourer the 
economic independence that is the 
foundation of every civil liberty. 
But this view exerts no influence 
whatsoever on the fulfilment of the 
duties of the Government today. In 
the past, groups of peasants were 
given worthless parcels of land 
without tools, equipment, credit or 
organization. This was indeed meagre 
fruit after the great sacrifices made. 
The ejido, so conceived, would have 
resulted in disillusionment and in 
giving the landlords yet another 
excuse to reduce to a still more 
wretched level wages that are already 
wretched enough [..] But the nation's 
concept of the ejido has been entirely 
different [...] The ejido shoulders a 
double responsibility: as a social
system, it must free the peasant from 
the exploitation to which he was 
subject under both the feudal and the 
individualistic regimes? and as a mode 
of agricultural production, it must 
yield enough to furnish the nation 
with its food requirements.1,60
With the arrival of Cardenas to the presidency, the 
whole idea of agrarian reform and agricultural 
organization changed.61 During his term of office, he 
distributed almost twice the amount of land given to 
peasants prior to his administration. He presided over 
the distribution of 17,906,429 hectares, almost all in the 
form of ejidos, to 811,105 recipients. By the end of his 
term, in 1940, ejidos accounted for one-half of the 
country's total farmland and over one-half of the arable 
land under cultivation. Arnaldo Cdrdova reckoned that,
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during this period, land distribution affected 18.4 
million hectares and benefited more than a million peasant 
families, who received credit, arable lands and were 
politically and economically organized, culminating, in 
1938, in the creation of the National Peasant 
Confederation, or CNC, the object of which was to serve as 
an instrument of peasant defence and a means of peasant 
political participation.62 The CNC was successful because 
it worked with the total support of the State, and 
accomplished real reforms.63
Land distribution under Cardenas meant the end of the 
hacienda system as the dominant economic and political 
institution of the country. Arthur Whitaker commented 
that his rule marked the high point of the agrarian
• • • 6Remphasis of the Mexican Revolution.
In November 1935, about a year after becoming 
President, Cardenas gave agrarian reform the green light, 
affirming that the ejido would be the base of it, while at 
the same time he publicly condemned the callista 
approach.65 The Cardenas concept of the ejido was bold and 
unprecedented. For the first time, the predominant 
agrarian structure, the hacienda, was declared illegal and 
the decision was taken to hand them over to the poorest 
peasants.
In order to create a powerful and permanent social 
group, peasants would be backed with credit institutions 
and adequate political and agricultural organizations. 
To achieve this aim, the first step was to expropriate the 
most productive zones; thus breaking the prevailing
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agrarian structure. There were many areas affected: at 
the top of the list were the Laguna region in Durango and 
Coahuila, Valle de Mexicali in Baja California, Los Mochis 
in Sinaloa, El Mate in Tamaulipas, Valle del Yaqui in 
Sonora, the sisal haciendas of Yucatan, the coffee 
plantations of Chiapas, and the rice and citrus properties 
of Lombardia and Nueva Italia in Michoacan.
The process of expropriation and confiscation turned 
the State into the owner of the lands, and the peasant 
(ejidatario) its beneficiary.
The ejido had, for Cardenas, several implications: 
the peasant, by demanding, and obtaining, ejidos, broke 
off with the economic tie that bound him to the master. 
Consequently, the role of the ejido was not as an economic 
complement of the salary? instead, because of its 
extension, quality and system of exploitation it should be 
sufficient for the absolute economic liberation of the 
worker? creating, thus, a new agro-economic system.66 This 
idea involved not only the concept of "revolutionary" 
justice, but also an economic one, that of production. 
Cardenas sincerely believed that the creation of a large 
ejidal sector would be economically beneficial, since it 
would lead to an increase in production, and would be more 
responsive to government economic policy than the private
67sector would.
The project of agrarian reform was marked by its 
magnitude of scope (it affected not only the crop areas, 
but the entire national territory)? of method (besides 
distribution and restoration, internal colonization would
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also be used and new centres of agrarian production would 
be opened. Cardenas also introduced a new way of 
organizing the ejidos: as collective production units)? of 
legal coverage (recognising that "peones acasillados” 
could request land.68 Besides, a new expropriation law, 
subordinated to reasons of public interest, was enacted); 
of resources (creation of the Bank of Ejidal Credit? 
increase of resources to the Agrarian Department, etc.); 
but especially, of conception (the State would provide 
everything: planning, organization, research, instruction, 
communications, services, etc.)
At the end of the Cardenas administration, the policy 
of ejido distribution, through the institutions created ex 
profeso, effectively gave the government control over 
areas of commercial agriculture and, because of the 
magnitude of the distribution, it enjoyed a very 
significant basis of support.
From an economic point of view, the experiment of 
land distribution had surpassed the presidents 
expectations. The sudden increase in public expenditure, 
the constant deficit of over 40% of the budget for the 
years 1936 and 1937, plus a debt of 87.6 million pesos to 
the Banco de Mexico sustained a price rise already swollen 
by a fall in agricultural output and productivity. The 
country was living beyond its means; no relation was kept 
between the state of the economy and the need to build up 
the capital requirement for economic growth.69
The British minister in Mexico summarized the initial 
effects of the administration's incentives on land
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distribution:
"Whereas he used to have his regular 
wage, small though it may have been, 
his house and a piece of ground to 
cultivate for his own use, the peasant 
whose demand for a smallholding has 
been satisfied is now thrown on his 
own resources. Hampered by lack of 
capital for purchase of seeds, farm 
implements, etc., he becomes 
disillusioned, and many have abandoned 
their holding to seek work elsewhere.
Whatever justification there may be 
for the slogan that 'the land is for 
the tiller of the soil', the general 
effect of the policy appears to be 
that no one, with the possible 
exception of some local political 
bosses, has benefited. Not only are 
the landlords impoverished, but the 
working of the system is uneconomic, 
both for the smallholders and the 
community in general [... ] The net 
result appears to be that production 
has gone down, with the consequent 
increase in prices for the town 
dweller. Futhermore, crops such as 
henequen, sugar cane etc., can only 
be economically grown on large 
estates, and are definitely unsuitable 
for cultivation on smallholdings"70
In political terms, however, the reform was very 
successful. The hacendado class - or more accurately, the 
ex-revolutionaries turned land owners - was almost 
eliminated and the hacendado became a thing of the past. 
Furthermore, the cardenist agrarian reform strengthened 
the State, politically. The "master" disappeared, but was 
replaced by a burdensome bureaucracy that stretched from 
the executive chief ("comisario ejidal") to the offices of 
the Ministry of Agriculture. According to Tannenbaum, a 
friend and admirer of Cardenas, the president never 
intended this outcome. His ideal, he wrote, was a
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different one: a Mexican nation based on the autonomous 
and independent government of the people, where each 
individual could possess an ejido, could be free from 
exploitation and could actively participate in the affairs 
of the community.71
However, there was a serious flaw in Cardenas' 
scheme: the honesty of the authorities. The truth of the 
matter was that the ejido bound the peasant to the State 
rather than to the land, an argument later raised by 
Synarchism. State paternalism entailed, in general, 
subjection. Instead of becoming a freer man, the peasant 
became political capital:
"The tendency becomes increasingly 
evident to give the e j ido the 
character of a cooperative farm, and 
to make the state in practice, if not 
in theory, a vast monopolistic
landowner"
The government of Cardenas knew that it needed proletarian 
unity to pursue its programme of social reform. 
Furthermore, it understood that it should solve the 
religious problem if the rural masses, which the church 
still influenced, were to be brought firmly behind the 
government. The break with Calles also increased the 
exigency for a religious peace as it forced Cardenas to 
look for support outside the revolutionary family.
II. Relations with the Church
The PNR "socialist" education programme of 1933-1934, 
along with President Cardenas' anticlericalism in 1935,
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produced new militancy among lay Catholics. This 
encouraged the hierarchy to reject compromise with the 
government despite more religious persecution. Cardenas, 
as early as 15 January 1935, hinted that his government 
was only concerned with the observance of the law and had 
no ulterior motive to attack the religious sentiment and 
creed of the nation. He declared, somewhat ambiguously, 
that the Catholic problem was not the preeminent problem 
of the country? the enemy, he said, was fanaticism, not
• • 73religion.
He distinguished between honest religious beliefs and 
religious fanaticism. He defined fanaticism as prejudices 
which keep the youth in ignorance and impede the progress 
and prosperity of the country. He denied the existence of 
religious persecution in Mexico? and stressed that the 
government was only interested in respect of the laws.74 
The inference was clear: if the clergy stayed out of
politics and did not attack the social reforms of the 
Revolution, then he would allow religion a place in 
Mexico.
In June, in a collective pastoral instruction 
addressed to "the workers and peasants throughout the 
Republic", the bishops advised Mexican labourers:
"to proceed decisively to the great 
work of organizing our country on the 
basis of the Corporation [... ] The 
world is presently disenchanted with 
liberalism? it will soon grow weary of 
Communism? the Catholic idea begins to 
give life and strength to social and 
economic organization which recognizes 
corporatism as its basis."75
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At the same time, the government continued to convert 
church properties all over Mexico to official use. On 4 
September 1935, the Diario Oficial published the "Ley de 
Nacionalizacion de Bienes", which comprised all decrees, 
laws, and agreements published by the previous governments 
defining which goods of the clergy belonged to the nation. 
It clearly established the principle that goods used for 
religious purposes were the property, not of the Church, 
but of the nation. The law defined as possessions of the 
nation all the goods destined for use in churches for a 
public cult, including buildings and seminaries involved
• • • • • • • 76in religious propaganda, administration or education.
Despite the prevailing tense situation, in September, 
the entire Mexican hierarchy petitioned the president to 
bring about the reform of the Constitution so as to 
guarantee the right of religious instruction in private 
schools, to prohibit schools from imparting anti-religious 
instruction, to authorize religious associations to own 
property, and to abolish all provisions contrary to the 
principle of religious freedom.77 And again, on 18 
October, fourteen archbishops and bishops signed a 
petition on behalf of the entire clergy asking for the 
abrogation of the MLey de Nacionalizacion de Bienes" and 
the modification of the anticlerical aspects of Articles 
3, 24, 27 and 130 of the Constitution. They particularly 
asked that private schools be allowed to teach religion, 
that religious liberty be restored, by abolishing 
penalties against the Church, and that religious 
associations be allowed to own the real and personal
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property necessary for their sustenance and the public 
worship.78
The reply of the government came on 5 November. The 
Minister of the Interior, Silvano Barba Gonzalez, issued 
a decree whereby the government once more blamed the 
Church for extorting the goods of the nation in return for 
promises of happiness after death. It charged the Church 
with denying religious liberty to others and of treachery 
to the fatherland. The decree proclaimed the desire of 
the government to free the youth from all dogma, and 
restated, unequivocally, that all the laws would be
79enforced as they stood.
The Church reacted to this rebuff by the President, 
by issuing two pastoral letters, in both of which she 
stigmatized Socialism as well as Communism as being a 
"dissolving doctrine"80 In the first one, she condemned 
Socialism in education:
"No Catholic can be a socialist; 
Socialism being understood to mean any 
system, economic, philosophical, or 
social, which in one form or another 
does not recognize the rights of God 
and the Church, nor the natural rights 
of all men to possess the goods which 
they have acquired through work or 
have inherited legitimately? or which 
foments hatred and unjust strife 
amongst classes.
No Catholic can learn or teach 
Socialism, nor cooperate directly in 
the learning or teaching of it since 
it contains many errors condemned by 
the Church.
Parents are forbidden to put their 
children in any college or school 
which teaches Socialism".81
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A few days after the publication of this pastoral 
letter, the hierarchy published another open letter 
addressed to president Cardenas. This communication made 
reference to the government's rejection of its earlier 
request for constitutional reforms, and made several 
demands:
"(1) restoration of churches seized or 
closed since 1914?
(2) a u t h o r i z a t i o n  for the 
construction of new church 
buildings?
(3) abolition of state legislation 
limiting the number of clergy 
allowed to function?
(4) authorization to open seminaries?
(5) restoration of church annexes for 
use as homes and offices for 
priests?
(6) termination of anti-religious 
instruction in schools and
removal of all anti-religious
p r o p a g a n d a  f r o m  t h e s e  
institutions.,|82
In January 1936, the hierarchy addressed a letter to 
the clergy and laity reminding Catholics to repudiate 
secularism and to avoid socialist education under pain of 
mortal sin.
1. Religious persecution
At the head of the government's anticlerical campaign 
was Tomas Garrido Canabal, former governor of the state of 
Tabasco and leader of a leftist militant group, founded in 
1932, the Bloque de Jovenes Revolucionarios, better known 
as "Red shirts11, which had been instrumental in the
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virtual eradication of the Catholic Church in that State.84
While the Mexican Government was interested in 
destroying the economic and political power of the Church, 
the militant Red Shirt movement was determinately 
atheistic and bent on extirpating all religious beliefs. 
This was a movement which Cardenas described as:
"truly idealistic because they think 
in a collective manner and because 
they advocate the common good and 
happiness of everyone. The Mexican 
Revolution, [he added], has had a 
profound social interpretation in 
Tabasco, which we should imitate with 
valour and sincerity.”85
During his campaign tours, Cardenas visited Tabasco 
where, after reviewing thousands of parading Red Shirts, 
he called the state a "laboratory of the Revolution".86 He 
vehemently praised the youth of Tabasco, for it was:
"[C]onscious of its duties and more 
ready to carry them out than to demand 
its rights. A youth, healthy, 
industrious, forged in the shop-floor 
and fields, is the element which 
should replace the old revolutionary 
generation in the public life of the 
country. The youth of Tabasco is 
truly idealistic, because it has 
collective thought and achieves the 
well-being and happiness of all.
A youth that has unified its 
aspirations and even its external 
appearance, in the crimson blouses and 
black trousers that it wears, so as to 
provide a more perfect keynote of 
organization and of discipline,1,87
Cardenas wished that other States of the Republic 
would emulate the existing organizations of Tabasco, 
because "Tabasco is the bastion of the Revolution", and
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added that it would not be long before similar 
organizations sprung up throughout the country, if Tabasco 
provided its help and assistance.88 He expressed his 
admiration for the work of Garrido Canabal in the 
organization of workers and peasants:
"In Tabasco, [he declared] one could 
breathe an air of enthusiasm, of 
discipline and of openness [because 
the Governor had undertaken the great 
social task of eliminating fanaticism] 
which blinds the spirit of the people 
[... ] "89
For over a decade, Garrido had been the 
dictator of the destinies of Tabasco. Yet, 
proudly and publicly admired him, because:
"men like Garrido [he said] had known 
how to respond to the trust and 
responsibility that the Revolution had 
confided them."90
When Cardenas became President, he gave Garrido the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Garrido descended on the capital 
with a contingent of his dreaded Red Shirts;91 thus 
turning the worst fears of Mexico City's Catholic middle 
class into chilling reality.92 They took posts at the 
Ministry of Agriculture and carried on anticlerical 
agitation which soon resulted in bloody clashes.
Townsend once asserted that "there was a certain 
soulagement among upper and middle class circles" with the 
incumbent cabinet; in fact, however, there was terrible 
apprehension as to how far the "leftist" policies of the 
new administration would go.93 With the rapid growth of 
Garrido Canabal's organization in Mexico City, clerical
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Cardenas
and conservative opposition hardened.
On 30 December 1934, heavily armed Red Shirts held 
an antireligious meeting in the atrium of the Church of 
San Juan Bautista in Coyoacan, one of the Capital* s 
boroughs.94 They fired on Catholics as they were leaving 
mass, killing several and wounding many.95 One Red Shirt 
was lynched in the ensuing riot. The president sent a 
wreath to his funeral96 and in his New Year's message to 
the nation, repeated his determination to enforce strictly 
all anticlerical legislation. Six months later, the 
president pardoned all Red Shirts arrested in connection
• • • 07with Coyoacan killings.
On 8 January 1935, a group of university students 
demonstrated outside the National Palace demanding the 
resignation of Garrido Canabal and the dissolution of his 
militant organization.98 After the rally, they gathered 
outside the organization's headquarters where a violent 
confrontation was unleashed, leaving ten students hurt.99 
The following day, Cardenas condemned "clerical 
agitation", accusing the Church of exploiting any action 
of the "revolutionary" groups to turn it into violent 
confrontation. He proceeded to ban all public
demonstrations of protest against groups of different 
ideology or "confessional" ideas.100 Furthermore, the 
president instructed the Minister of the Interior to 
ensure:
"[that] only the PNR could engage in 
political and social activities aimed 
at strengthening the ideals that 
constitute the bulwark of the 
Revolution and that are norms to all 
the revolutionaries".
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This point illustrates the close relationship that 
existed between government and party and is an indication 
of Cardenas* open attempt at controlling and checking 
garridista militancy.101 Some Red Shirts left the Capital 
for Tabasco. Cardenas had changed his mind about the 
desirability of spreading their action throughout the 
Republic.
Nevertheless, despite curbing anticlerical excesses 
in Mexico City, neither Cardenas nor the PNR backed away 
from their harassment of the Catholic Church.102 Throughout 
1935, church desecrations and anti-Catholic violence 
continued in earnest. State governments confiscated 
religious buildings and used them for secular purposes:
"Throughout the year 1935, hardly a 
week passed when a church or religious 
building was not being expropriated by 
the government."103
During that same year, nineteen of the thirty-two 
Mexican bishops continued to be in exile; and the Red 
Shirts were allowed by federal authorities to continue 
attacking religion in the provinces.104
On 3 March 1935, some five thousand Catholics 
demonstrated against the government in Guadalajara; when 
they reached the City Sguare they were shot at by the 
police, the Red Shirts and others from the buildings 
surrounding the square. Six Catholics were killed and 
many arrests were made. The Interior Minister justified 
the killings of "fanatics"and "cristeros" on the grounds 
that they had joined forces to protest against the
125
Executive Power of the State of Jalisco.105
Many were the means employed to "defanatize"? but 
they all shared a common denominator; the attack and 
destruction of the Catholic Church. El Nacional, the 
semi-official government paper, was relentless in its 
condemnation of the Church and the clergy: it featured
anti-religious propaganda, as did the radio broadcasts of 
the PNR in this respect, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, the
Minister of Education, declared that he would make every 
effort to destroy the Catholic Church? and emphasized that 
socialist education meant:
"[that] youth should fight the 
capitalist regime to establish the
proletarian dictatorship.1,106
Renewed protest led to more violent clashes and more 
arrests.107 However, Catholics refused to give up their 
cause.
In Tabasco the regime of Garrido Canabal was
overthrown by violence. A group of young Tabascan exiles, 
led by Rodulfo Brito Foucher, returned to the state to 
organize an opposition party for the local election. It 
seems that they had the blessing of two cabinet ministers, 
General Francisco Mujica and Luis Rodriguez, but no patent 
official support.108 After a violent clash, in 
Villahermosa, between the exiles (Comite Liberador del
# 109Estado de Tabasco) and some of Garrido*s followers, 
popular support for the expedition increased throughout 
the country. Within days, Congress withdrew recognition 
of the state government, and the governor, a Garrido
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nominee, resigned. Shortly after, Garrido Canabal went 
into exile.110
III. The Rise of a Secular Radical Right
Catholics were not the only group disenchanted with 
the policies of Cardenas; those most upset were the small 
.and medium industrialists, the middle classes, a large 
number of older army officers, the remaining hacendados, 
and those other members of the rural community who were 
disillusioned with the way in which the President carried 
out agrarian reform.
Industrialists were concerned that, with the support 
of the CTM, Cardenas decided to expropriate their 
companies. They organized a national structure of 
employers' associations, the Confederacxon Patronal de la 
Republica Mexicans, (CPRM), which was formally constituted 
in 1936.111 The middle classes also dreaded the growth of 
a workers' state, and those on fixed incomes suffered from 
the acute inflation of the years 1936 and 1937. In the 
Army, many senior officers were worried about the power of
the CTM, and suspicious that Cardenas might eventually
• • • • 112replace the army with worker and peasant militias.
Their fears were fuelled by the CTM and the Communist 
Party, both of which pressed for the creation of such 
militias and whose propaganda gave the impression that 
they exercised more influence than was in fact the case.
In the rural sectors the hacendados were not alone 
in their hostility to President Cardenas' commitment to
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generalize land distribution. Their views were shared by 
certain members of the landowning community: the
administrators and foremen who stood to lose their 
privileged position, those "peones acasillados" who felt 
more secure as wage earners than as responsible 
ejidatarios, and the tenants and sharecroppers for whom 
their landlords had been a significant source of credit 
and who had come to regard the governments agricultural 
credit banks as inadequate substitutes. Agrarian 
dissatisfaction was heightened by the continuing friction 
between the Church and the State and by the government's 
insistent support for the implementation of socialist 
education, which together caused a resurgence of Cristero 
upheaval.113
Disenchantment with the administration on the part of 
all these groups, both rural and urban, did not, however, 
lead to the growth of important opposition political 
parties. The nature and the strength of the regime made 
any attempt in this direction futile. There were, 
however, small right-wing organizations and pressure 
groups which took advantage of the fears of the middle 
class of the CTM and of Communism. Their financial 
backing came for the most part from industrialists, 
merchants and small businessmen, and a few politicians who 
had a personal interest in supporting them (Cedillo, for 
example). The most important organizations were: the
Accion Revolucionaria Mexicanista (Mexican Revolutionary 
Action), or ARM, founded in 1934 by Nicolas Rodriguez, a 
former general in Francisco Villa's army; the Union
128
Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolucldn (the National Union 
of Revolutionary Veterans), or UNVR, established in 1935, 
whose strength was in the army; and the Confederacion de 
la Clase media (Confederation of the Middle Class), formed 
in 1936.114
Although the largest of these organizations had 
branches in several state capitals, often in association 
with the local office of the CPRM, they were numerically 
and financially weak. The most important was the ARM, 
which at its height, in 1936, had several hundred members 
and drew up to five thousand sympathizers to its [parades*. 
But the following year, Nicolas Rodriguez, was sent into 
exile after being involved in political violence and his 
organization was officially banned.
1. The Accion Revolucionaria Mexicanista
The ARM, or "gold shirt", was found in March 1934 by 
General Nicolas Rodriguez, as a paramilitary organization 
inspired by Mussolini's black shirts, allegedly prompted 
by former President Abelardo Rodriguez with the support of 
Calles,115 in order to keep the workers under control, 
particularly after Calles had become more conservative and 
more distrustful of Lombardo Toledano and the trades union 
movement.
General Rodriguez had fought with Villa in the early 
stages of the revolution and maintained that his 
organization directly descended from Villa's elite cavalry 
units known as "dorados". By identifying his men with 
Villa's units, Rodriguez sought to obtain recognition as 
an authentic revolutionary group, and to attract the young
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and adventurous to his ranks.
The ideology of the ARM was ultranat] tonalist and 
anti-communist with hues of anti-Semitism. Its main 
activity consisted in breaking up strikes.116
From the start, the ARM was branded fascist, an 
accusation that the organization vehemently denied; on the 
contrary, they argued, the dictatorship of the proletariat 
was but a fascist dictatorship with another name;
"The rule of a master who does with 
the proletariat what he wants".
"Fascism and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat resemble each other, [...], 
because they both attack the very 
foundations of human liberty; they both 
turn man into a pariah, into a worthless 
thing."117
General Rodriguez asserted that they were the foes of the
leaders that brought disorder to the country; and that
• • 118 they condemned false revolutionaries.
The gold shirts were the natural beneficiaries of the 
large labour unrest that the government encountered during 
the years of the depression. The funds for the ARM came 
from capitalists, industrialists and big business.119 
Writers on the left and those closely associated with 
cardenism, have always maintained that the true and sole 
source of funds was the Nazi party, acting through a 
complicated network of underground organizations, directed 
from the German legation.120 However, no evidence has yet 
emerged to confirm this assertion.
The ARM represented the reaction of the Mexican 
middle-class to the threat of a rising urban proletariat.
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Its motto was: "Mexico for the Mexicans"? the middle-
class, the chief beneficiary of its nationalism. It 
claimed that this class had been historically responsible 
for progress and social change, constituting the most 
advanced sector of the population.121
The gold shirts epitomized the reaction against the 
threat of a socialo-communist revolution in the country. 
They feared a judeo-communist plot to undermine the 
Mexican nation and her traditions. The ARM*s nationalism 
and its opposition to the labour demands, exemplified by 
the series of strikes that characterized Mexico in 1935, 
sprang from the adoption by the government of an alien 
ideology: Russian Socialism.122 It averred that, in
Mexico, the basic struggle was between nationalism and 
Communism.
The gold shirts did not survive long enough to 
seriously challenge the government of Cardenas, but they 
did manage to gain much more notoriety than their numbers 
warranted. The main feature of their nationalism was a 
vociferous hatred of the Jews and of the communists. In 
their speeches and manifestoes, they condemned 
"International Judaism", and pledged that they would go to 
any length to combat Jewish activities in Mexico. They 
demanded that the President limit the number of Jews 
living in Mexico, deprive them of Mexican citizenship? and 
to ban them from participating in politics. He also 
promised to present a petition to the President asking 
that all factories under Jewish control be turned over to 
Mexican labour.123
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Though anti-semitic in appearance, mention of the Jew 
and of Jewish interference was, for the most part, equated 
with the peril of Communism. Statements like:
"The only thing that stands out 
against this chaos [the social 
situation in the country] is the 
corrupt leaders's communistic desire 
to submit [the Mexican people] to the 
enslaving yoke of Jewish Russia”
and:
"The dictatorship of the proletariat 
has never existed and cannot possible 
exist. What there is, is Jewish 
revenge against a past of proscription 
and ostracism which deceives the 
masses and, on the pretext of the 
class struggle and of the 
socialization of the means of 
production launches them against the 
highest moral values and against 
property";124
were intended more to arouse attention to the communist 
tendencies of the regime and the labour leadership, than 
to a real Jewish problem.125
The gold shirts differed from the more religious oriented 
Right, in that as representatives of the middle-class, 
exposed to the economic and political values of classical 
liberalism and disquieted by the perceived imminence of a 
socialist takeover, they found the Constitution of 1917 at 
the root of their misfortunes. In their Manifesto of 4 
March 1936, they declared:
"Politically, our Constitution is a 
carbon copy of the Constitution of 
1857, and in this respect, it lags one 
hundred years behind, and has only
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served to foster dictatorships and 
revolutions [... ] We accept in its 
integrity, together with the chapter 
on individual rights, the law of 6 
January 1915 and Articles 27 and 123 
of the Constitution, but we ask that 
all the others be urgently revised 
[... ] The Constitution is not in 
force, and except for Articles 27 and 
123, the rest is, or almost, 
worthless. It is no exaggeration to 
affirm that we find ourselves at 
present at the same juncture where the 
Revolution encountered the government 
of General Porfirio Diaz? people do 
not vote because they are not allowed 
to.”126
The religious Right, on the other hand, considered the 
Reform movement of the Nineteenth century, and indeed the 
events that followed Independence, as the cause of the 
inevitable doom of the nation. Contrary to the religious 
Right, the ARM affirmed that they intended to continue the 
work of Hidalgo, Morelos and the founders of the Reform 
and the Revolution: Juarez, Madero and Carranza. What is
more, the ARM made no reference in its programme to the 
Catholic Church; nor did it allude to religion, except 
when it demanded freedom of worship:
"The Revolution did not include in its 
programme a religious problem. The 
problem that eventually emerged as 
religious has been artificial and set 
up for purely political purposes [... ] 
We do not take the defence of any 
religion? but we think that belief in 
a superior world should not be the 
subject of persecution. Religion, 
whichever it is, is a moral 
prerogative, that the assaults of the 
authorities cannot reach. We reject 
religious fanaticism? but we also 
reject political fanaticism and 
revolutionary fanaticism which have 
produced so many blatant lies and 
deceits to mislead our people. The 
religious problem is as big a lie as
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the communist lie. Relatives of the 
top leaders of Mexico, have always 
been religious, and with few 
exceptions, capitalists.”127
The history of the ARM during the thirties can be divided 
in two periods: during the first, from its foundation to
November 1935, it operated mainly in the Capital and 
received some official support - at least tacit - but this 
decreased gradually. As part of Cardenas' battle for
supremacy against Calles, in 1935, the President looked
for ways to suppress the ARM; the opportunity came on 20 
November 1935, when a "gold shirt" rally ended in violent 
confrontation with left-wing opponents. There were six 
deaths and fifty injured? this event caused so much public 
indignation that the government opted to suppress the
• • 198 •organization. Cardenas accused the ARM of concealing
the true nature of its tendencies behind a mask of
nationalism:
"The activities of these groups only
serve to create divisions amongst the
workers and to raise obstacles to the 
development of the social programme of 
the Revolution. There is no need for 
a nationalist campaign in a country 
such as Mexico where all the citizens 
fulfil their duty to the country [... ]
In all cases, it is the work of the 
government to coordinate the common 
force in order to create new sources 
of production to establish just 
division of wealth. For these 
reasons, the government has the best 
claim to guarantee a sentiment of 
nationalism".
The second period began in November 1935 and ended with 
the pronunciamiento of General Cedillo in May 1938; during 
this period, it operated in the provinces, particularly in 
the North.
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2. The CPRM
The difference with the religious Right lay in the 
fact that the secular Right lacked a previously 
established structure and the hierarchic system of the 
Church, which made it a fragmented movement with no 
coordination.
Nevertheless, despite being more fragmented and 
lacking in central direction, the secular Right found some 
cohesion in the Confederacion Patronal de la Repiiblica 
Mexicana. As an organization, it was similar to the
associations of chambers of commerce and industry, but its 
nature was different. While the latter were more 
technical, the CPRM was more concerned with looking after 
the interests of its members in relation to the workers. 
The CPRM became really active in 1936, after the 
introduction of Cardenas' reform in 1935; and, in
particular, when it became apparent that the CTM counted
on the support of the government to intensify its 
activities in Monterrey.
The CPRM was essentially set to make propaganda in 
favour of the employers and to finance various other 
organizations of the Right. Besides these activities, it 
worked as intermediary between the financial interests of 
the secular Right and the various organizations that acted 
as the backbone of the movement. The revenues came from 
various sources; especially from Mexican firms, and in 
particular the industrial groups of Monterrey; and
American oil companies. It appears that the sums provided 
were considerable.130 At the beginning of 1935, the ARM,
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subsidized by the CPRM, had proliferated to the extent 
that, in 1937, the CPRM could push it to rise up in arms 
against the government? a campaign that culminated, in 
1938, in the Cedillo rebellion.
The support that the CPRM gave to the ARM was, 
primarily, to help an already established organization. 
However, the subsidies provided were perhaps more destined 
to create and foment new ones.
Since the CPRM was composed of business and 
professional men, it did not take care of agitation 
campaigns and political activism? its role was one of 
propaganda and finance. It functioned as an intermediary 
between Mexican business and foreign sources and the 
secular Right movement. A great deal of its financial 
assistance went to another organization founded in 1936, 
the Confederation of the Middle Class, the CCM.
3. The CCM and the UNVR
While the CCM was mainly concerned with the 
organization of the secular Right in the cities, another 
group, the National Union of Revolutionary Veterans, or 
UNVR, was charged with the rallying of peasants and other 
rural groups, ideologically set on parallel lines.
The manifesto of the CCM provides a coherent expression 
of the indignation and the objectives of these groups:
Ha) The aim of the Confederation of 
the Middle Class is the
improvement of the moral and 
economic conditions of the
workers of that class, and of all 
the other workers in Mexico.
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b) Communism - or Scientific 
Socialism - is an unrealizable 
utopia and a divisive force among 
the Mexican people.
c) The working conditions of civil 
servants are intolerable. They 
can be dismissed at the time, and 
are forced to make "voluntary 
donations" and ascribe to certain 
social and political views.
e) Cottage industries no longer 
complement larger industries or 
supplement family incomes. 
Instead they are exploited by a 
small number of middlemen to the 
detriment of both larger 
industrialists and the working 
class.
f) The army still lives like a 
nomadic tribe and the middle 
ranking officers are underpaid.
The confederation of the Middle Class 
therefore recommends:
a) the organization of middle sector 
pressure groups?
b) the creation of "white collar" 
unions
c) the full implementation of 
Article 123 of the Constitution?
d) an end to the use of the unions 
for political purposes?
e) that capital be protected from 
unjustified attack, and that the 
legitimate demands of labour be 
met?
f) respect for both the gains 
already made under the agrarian 
law and for small property? the 
creation of agricultural colonies 
for those villages lacking land? 
and the immunity from further 
loss of properties already 
affected by the agrarian laws?
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g) respect for seniority within the 
army and a salary increase for 
middle ranking officers financed 
by eliminating wasteful 
expenditure;
h) the promulgation of a Civil 
Service law requiring that civil 
servants be sentenced by a court 
of law before they can be 
dismissed;
i) the organization of consumers* 
cooperatives among cottage 
industrialists in order to reduce 
the cost of their raw materials, 
and also of credit unions among 
them, so that they do not fall 
into the hands of money lenders, 
and mutual insurance schemes”.
The aim of the Union Nacional de Veteranos de la 
Revolucion, formed in 1935, was originally to procure land 
concessions for its members. As time passed, it slurred 
over the requirement, for potential members, to be 
revolutionary veterans, and directed its effort to combat 
Communism and defend "the right to private property.” In 
1936, President Cardenas granted them land; but, 
apparently, that only encouraged them to cause more 
agitation and to increase the number of members.
The UNVR, like the CCM, received most of its
• • 132_____________________financial support from the CPRM. The CCM, shortly after 
its creation, contacted the UNVR and from then onwards, 
made common front. Apart from its relationship with the 
CCM, and through it with the CPRM, the UNVR worked with 
the gold shirts until its dissolution in 1936. They both 
took part in the violent events of 20 November 1935, which 
led to the banning of the ARM. When Congress and various 
other groups accused the ARM, the UNVR vociferously
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demanded that no judgement should be made before a trial 
to establish the validity of their accusations.
The Left condemned all these organizations and 
demanded their dissolution? the Communist party and the 
Mexican Popular Front, among others, argued that their 
elimination would be "for the protection of the general 
public.”133 The Left invariably labelled them fascists, 
falangists, and enemies of the Revolution and of the 
people of Mexico. Nowhere was this accusation made more 
clear than in the context of the Cedillo revolt. The 
study of this revolt exceeds the object of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the role of 
Cedillo as a point of convergence for the radical, non­
religious Right.134
4. Cedillo
General Saturnino Cedillo was the last "caudillo” in 
Mexico. After the Revolution he built an impressive power 
based in the state of San Luis Potosi, that made him an 
important political figurehead at the national level.135
Although he was considered a "conservative", in 1933 
he backed the candidacy of Cardenas to the Presidency, 
advanced by the Left. He apparently felt that in so doing 
he would be serving his own ambition? which proved to be 
correct at the time of the Calles-Cardenas crisis, during 
1936, when he put the strength of his several thousand 
soldiers behind the President.
Once Calles had been ousted, Cedillo could set about 
establishing a position from where he could lead the 
opposition against the left-wing extremism fostered by
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Cardenas and his administration. To achieve this, he 
realized that he needed to attract the various right-wing 
groups. Eventually, from 1935 to 1938, he succeeded in 
being their exponent.
Given the inherent "personalistic" nature of Mexican 
politics, it was not surprising that, as the radical Right 
evolved, it looked for an individual on whom to place its 
hopes. When Cedillo was called to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, in June 1935, he became the link for all 
Mexican rightists. He already had a reputation of 
moderation towards the Church and trusted that he could 
count on its support in a crisis? however, he concentrated 
his efforts rather more to consolidate and manipulate the 
secular Right. His close relationship with the secular 
Right was overt with respect to the gold shirts and the 
UNVR, and secret with the CPRM and the CCM.
In terms of numbers, the ARM, at its peak in 1935, 
had several hundred members; the CCM and the UNVR, 
probably counted upon only a few hundred paid-up members 
each. But, in the absence of any alternative, Cedillo 
felt that these and other minor right-wing groups offered 
a core for a potential opposition coalition to the 
"official" party, the PNR, in the 1940 elections, and 
cultivated their leaders from 1936 onwards.
Because of his links with these organizations, the 
Left accused Cedillo of fascist leanings. It claimed that 
Cedillo was actively supporting "reactionary" elements who 
were plotting to establish a fascist dictatorship in 
Mexico. Vincente Lombardo Toledano accused the CCM and
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the UNVR of involvement in it. As a result of these 
allegations, proceedings were taken against the two 
organizations. On instructions from the President, 
however, the two organizations were allowed to resume 
their activities.136
Furthermore, the UNVR could hardly be described as 
fascist; it lacked a logical ideology, and its numbers did 
not pose a serious threat to national security.
As for Cedillo*s meetings with the German and the 
Italian embassies, nothing substantial came out of
137 • • • • •them; and there is no indication that they came to his 
assistance when he finally rose in arms.
Cedillo maintained good relations with the gold 
shirts. When the President disbanded the ARM, in 1936, 
and forced them to seek refuge in the northern provinces, 
Cedillo was able to help them, by allowing them to operate 
from his state. He allowed them to print much of their 
propaganda in San Luis Potosi; yet, Nicolas Rodriguez 
refused to offer him his support on collaboration in his 
schemes.138
Relations between Cedillo and the religious Right 
were never as strong and as open as those he held with the 
secular Right. Supporters of the latter, unlike the 
religious Right, did not oppose all aspects of the 
Revolution. Consequently, since Cedillo was a
revolutionary, the religious Right did not entirely trust 
him.
Cedillo had taken some steps, since 1932, to win the 
support of the Church. At the peak of religious
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persecution, San Luis Potosi was a haven for Catholics. 
At the time when most states were limiting the number of 
priests, a quarter of the priests in the whole country 
were harbored there. He was also opposed to socialist 
education and continued to prevent its introduction in the 
state, in spite of Cardenas* personal commitment to the 
policy. In fact, in an attempt to appeal to the hierarchy 
and to certain Catholics, he invited Catholic schools to 
settle in San Luis Potosi, in violation of Article 130 of 
the Constitution.139 However, the official policy of the 
Church was still conducted by a moderate hierarchy. After 
1936, the government of Cardenas began to loosen the 
restrictions on the Church, with the important exception 
of eduction, so that, by 1938, when Cedillo was forced 
into an uprising, the current was against him, in respect 
of massive support by the Catholic Church. Its leaders 
were not prepared to compromise the achievements they had 
reached since 1935, in exchange for the doubtful promises 
of a local caudillo.
IV Church-State Detente
In February 1936, the President began to change course 
vis-a-vis the Church. He denounced the errors of those 
who emphasized:
'*[...] the religious problem above all 
the problems of the national programme 
[...] Anti-religious campaigns will 
only provoke a prolonged resistance, 
and will definitely retard economic 
growth. ,,14°
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A month later the President declared that it was the duty 
of his adminstration to further the social and economic 
programme of the Revolution and not to promote anti- 
religious campaigns. Mecham noted that this was the 
reason for the President's decision to temper the severity 
of the anticlerical, and even anti-religious assaults.141 
Moreover, according to the British minister in Mexico, 
there was little doubt that:
"[...] while no pressure is put upon 
him by the United States Government, 
the importance of not unduly 
antagonising American Roman Catholic 
opinion, as exemplified by the Knights 
of Columbus, must have been brought
tactfully to his attention on more
than one occasion.”142
The President's pronouncements were followed by a 
statement from the Minister of the Interior, Barba 
Gonzalez, explaining that the policy of the administration 
was to respect freedom of conscience, so long as the 
practice of religion did not violate federal and state 
laws in effect.
In the next few days, governors of several states 
issued decrees permitting the reopening of churches. The 
massacre in March 1936 of a "cultural brigade" by the
exasperated populace of San Felipe Torres Mochas seems to
have precipitated this decision.148 In April, churches 
were opened in Mexico City and Veracruz, in May the 
American Embassy persuaded the authorities to allow a 
public funeral for Archbishop Pascual Diaz, and in the 
course of the summer, churches were opened in Nayarit and 
Jalisco.
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The trend of the government towards a more conciliatory 
policy was met by a personnel change in the Church 
hierarchy that contributed significantly towards modifying 
the opposition of the church vis-a-vis the Cardenas 
administration. Following the death of Archbishop Diaz 
and the resignation of Archbishop Ruiz y Flores as 
Apostolic Delegate, Luis Martinez was appointed Archbishop 
of Mexico (20 February 1937) and acting representative of 
the Vatican (9 August 1937) . This allowed him to give 
unified guidance to the national hierarchy. He believed 
in moderation in the defence of the Church*s rights and 
interests. He offered no criticism of governmental policy 
and no condemnation of constitutional provisions.144
Pope Pius XI then decided to soothe the difference 
with the Mexican Government? on 28 March 1937, he issued 
the encyclical FIRMISSIMAM CONSTANTIAM [On the Religious 
Situation in Mexico]. He suggested that cooperation might 
be possible. All Mexican priests were urged to assume 
responsibilities in the field of social service and to 
concern themselves with the conditions of the poor:
"who too easily become prey of de- 
Christ ianizing propaganda, with the 
mirage of economic advantages 
presented to them as a reward for 
their apostasy from God and from His 
Church. *'145
The Pope emphasized, in particular, the advantage of 
a Catholic Action programme over the use of violence as a 
means of defending the rights of the Church in Mexico. 
The encyclical stressed the social function of private
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property as well as the positive efforts of Catholic 
Action to solve agrarian and labour difficulties. At the 
same time, it advisedly refrained from attacking the 
Mexican Revolution. The Pope only admonished Catholics 
not to sacrifice their religious principles for temporal 
advancement. Lyle C. Brown commented:
"Thus Mexican priests were instructed 
to evidence concern for the 
socioeconomic welfare of the masses 
and to develop Christian laymen who 
would protect the interest of the 
Church in the political field. As a 
general guideline, it appeared that 
Rome was calling for a policy of 
flexibility instead of the 
traditional, doctrinaire rigidity with 
which Mexico*s clergy previously had 
approached the problem of Church-State 
relations.”146
Hence, relations between the Church and the State 
were at a turning point, although many contradictions 
throughout the country still remained.147
A new crisis in Revolutionary unity was generated by 
problems arising from Cardenas' rapid redistribution of 
land to the peasantry and stimulation of organized labour 
to strike for its rights, especially in the foreign-owned 
oil industry which was finally expropriated by the 
government on 18 March 1938. The religious issue receded 
as the government faced these new problems in the late 
1930s.
The "Base" organization had little political 
participation between the years of 1934 and 1937, because 
the anticlerical measures of the Cardenas administration, 
gradually became less radical and attempts were made to
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prevent confrontation. It was not until 1937 that, within 
the dynamics of a profound and renewed awareness of the 
faith and as a reaction to the effects of Cardenas' social 
and economic policies, Synarchism emerged. It soon became 
apparent that Synarchism was the fiercest nationalist 
attack that the revolutionary regime had yet to face.
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CHAPTER III
PRE-SYNARCHISM
The Synarchist movement, born in 1937 as a reaction 
to the "communistic" and anticlerical programme of the 
revolution, did not constitute the only force of internal 
resistance confronting Cardenas. Yet, the strength of its 
organization, the size of the masses it controlled and 
mobilized, the success of its newspaper, and the 
nationalist, authoritarian and religious nature of its 
ideology, made it the principal adversary of cardenism.
The system of socialist education instituted by 
Cardenas had a profound effect on the religious Right in 
Mexico. The "Base" organization, which comprised the 
faction controlled by the Church hierarchy, had been 
established at the end of 1934 to meet the then potential 
threat of the new regime; and when socialist education was 
introduced, it grew enormously.1
One of the first steps taken by Cardenas' Minister 
of Education was to change textbooks to adapt them to the 
socialist code.2 A group of inspectors was set to check 
ideological conformity. At the beginning of 1935, the new 
Minister of Education, Ignacio Garcia Tellez, famous for 
his statement that he would go to any lengths to destroy 
the Church, inaugurated the First Congress of the 
Proletarian Child, and declared that in government centres 
of education, the word "ADIOS" should be replaced by 
"SALUD, CAMARADA."3
By attacking the educational system, Cardenas was
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intent on rooting out completely what he called the 
Church's method of self-preservation: evangelization. The 
President decreed in early 1935, that if private schools 
did not impart socialist education they would be closed 
down. Some time later, he declared that only the State 
could give primary, secondary and normal education.4
Although the President had made, since 1935, some 
concessions to appease the Church, in the form of allowing 
the reopening of some churches and lifting the 
restrictions on the number of priests, on the question of 
education he remained unyielding. His attitude in this 
respect was evident when, on 29 March 1935, a riot took 
place in the village of San Felipe Torres Mochas, 
Guanajuato. Apparently, the local clergy incited the 
people to attack members of a federal cultural mission 
which was carrying out educational activities. Eighteen 
were killed. Cardenas rushed to the scene, and after a 
hasty inquiry, he entered the church, mounted the pulpit, 
and harangued the audience, defending the programme of 
socialist education and vilifying clerical opposition. His 
intentions, he stressed, were to take the programme to 
every corner of the country.5
The systematic opposition of the Church to the reform 
of Article 3, can be illustrated by a pastoral letter 
signed by Archbishop Ruiz y Flores and thirty four other 
prelates which was released in December 1936. The letter 
followed previous papal instructions strictly prohibiting 
Catholics all contacts with socialist schools, either as 
employees or as parents. Although stressing that Catholic
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opposition should be limited to passive resistance, the 
letter warned:
"Socialism as well as communism whose 
fatal consequences we are witnessing 
in other countries, are irreconcilable 
enemies of the Church".
Cardenas' answer to the pastoral letter was to submit 
to Congress a request for an unprecedented subsidy for 
educational purposes, which included plans for the 
creation of two thousand primary schools within the next 
year.6
The rapid advancement of Cardenas' plan to establish 
a socialistic educational system in Mexico, led to an 
upsurge of Right wing opposition. During 1935 and 1936, 
the "Base" recruited thousands of members. However, 
consternation heightened among these and other militant 
Catholics, as repression of their activities intensified, 
in a way that reminded them of the early thirties when the 
government had reneged upon some of the promises of the 
1929 agreements. This growing anxiety was later described 
by Juan Ignacio Padilla, a legionnaire and future leader 
of the Synarchists. He was introduced to the "Base" in 
March 1935, by a former leader of the League, who, like 
many other of its members, decided to submit to the Church 
hierarchy. Padilla joined the Organization because he saw 
in it the means to express his total dissatisfaction with 
the course Mexican society and politics were taking under 
the rule of C&rdenas.7 What was this organization? What 
was its structure? Who made it? How did it operate? We 
must analyse this organization which lay at the core of
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the Synarchist Movement.
I. "La Base"
The Union Nacional Sinarquista was born in 1937 in 
the city of Leon, in Guanajuato, but it was the secret 
organization known as "Legion" or "la Base", which gave 
birth to it.
It is difficult to penetrate the mystery of the 
foundation of this famous organization, because although 
we have the testimonies of many a participant, we do not 
possess sufficient information about the founders. Indeed, 
those who subsequently rose to become leaders of the 
Synarchist movement (Jose Trueba Olivares, Manuel Zermeno 
y Perez, Salvador Abascal and Juan Ignacio Padilla) 
affirmed that they joined the legions in 1935, but 
admitted that it had been in existence for a year.
Calles1 MGrito de Guadalajara”, of July 1935, in the 
heart of the Cristero region, stirred up Catholic 
indignation. Catholics decided to respond vigorously. 
Encouraged by the hierarchy to fight on their own 
initiative for the freedom of the Church and against 
Communism, they set | to found a new organization 
adapted to the new political and religious situation.8 A 
certain Manuel Romo, a teacher at Guadalajara, founded the 
legions in 1934. He lay down the bases, but the aims and 
means took some years to be defined. Only the fixed idea 
of resuming the struggle for religious liberty drove the 
first group, which included some former cristeros, who 
expected a revival of armed revolt.9 However,
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disagreement about the means of action soon emerged. The 
leadership of the organization, the Supreme Council, was 
divided into two camps: on the one hand, there was the 
group headed by the creator and founder. It sustained 
that the legions were technically conceived to establish 
a Christian Social Order in Mexico, from above; power 
would be attained according to the path marked by the 
circumstances. It would not tolerate its achievements 
being undermined by devoting the organization to 
activities incongruous with its nature. On the other hand 
was the second camp, headed by Antonio Santacruz, who won 
over the intellectuals of the Secret Council to approve of 
his plan to turn the new organization into a socio- 
mystical association aimed at developing a plan of 
religious apostolate and of social deeds.10
The leadership of the Base rejected, outright, the 
eventuality of resuming armed struggle? whether because 
it was following the advice of the hierarchy or, because 
the memories of the failure of the Cristiada were still 
fresh. The result was that those interested in the 
resurgence of an armed revolt withdrew to pursue it on 
their own.
From Guadalajara, the organization spread rapidly to 
other states: first to Mexico City and Queretaro, and
later to Michoacan, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Puebla, 
Aguascalientes, Coahuila, Oaxaca and Colima.11
The fast expansion of the legions throughout the 
Republic was facilitated by the sense of frustration that 
invaded Catholics, in view of the wave of government
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anticlerical policy, and by the generation that came out 
of a reorganized Catholic Association of Young Mexicans 
(ACJM) .12
The "Base” was developed in Queretaro; several of its 
more active leaders came from there, like Gonzalo Campos 
and Jose Antonio Urquiza. Though the idea of the legions 
originated in Jalisco, the birthplace of the Cristiada, it 
was in Queretaro that the organization defined its 
principal characteristics. The city of Queretaro had not 
been seriously affected by the previous anticlerical 
legislation. The suspension of the cult did not bring out 
the upheaval experienced in other places, because the 
governor had tolerated, throughout the hostilities, 
priests continuing to officiate privately, a fact openly 
and publicly known. Indeed, Catholic organizations had 
escaped’complete disruption and, from the end of the war, 
the ACJM resumed its activities under the energetic 
direction of Gonzalo Campos, who succeeded in implanting 
it in the middle-bourgeoisie (professionals), and the 
middle-classes.
It was not until 1932 that, with the arrival of a new 
governor, real religious persecution began in Queretaro. 
In 1934, the State Congress limited the number of priests 
to one for two thousand inhabitants.13 This measure deeply 
upset Catholics, but all tendency to react violently was 
absorbed by the ACJM which was the only one ready to 
reply. However, since its new statutes prevented it from 
getting involved in political action, it greeted more 
favourably the idea of participating in a new organization
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for the defence of religious liberty.14 Just as it did in 
1926 with respect to the League, it provided, in 1934, the 
men that swelled the numbers of the legions, many of whom 
became officers in the new association.
1. Objectives and tactics
The adherents of the organization were obliged to 
take an oath on the Bible, to defend Church and homeland,
to combat atheistic Communism, to work for the
establishment of a Christian Social Order, according to 
the orders of the Church, as stated in the encyclical 
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, of 1931, to obey without question the 
orders of the leaders - except if they defied Christian 
morality - and to maintain absolute secrecy about the 
activities of the legions.15
The new organization adopted the communist tactic of 
working in secret cells. The intention was to penetrate 
all sectors of the country's economic life, and gain
control from the inside. The mission of the legionnaires 
required total devotion. It was not a question of 
preaching revolution, nor of destroying unjust 
structures, but rather of building the social awareness of 
the Mexican people, based on the assumption that a people 
conscious of their rights and duties, produced a just 
government working for the common good. The new movement, 
contrary to political parties, did not seek power to 
impose the structural changes deemed necessary? instead, 
it believed that individual conversion would inescapably 
bring about the essential transformations. Consequently,
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participation in the electoral process and the resort to 
violence were ruled out. The exclusive choice of social 
and political action did not constitute the main feature 
of the Base, however. Many legionnaires accepted non­
violence only as a temporary means to recruit the maximum 
number of people, with the view of eventually embarking, 
when conditions would be more favourable, upon seizing 
power. The fact that the Base was structured under 
somewhat militaristic lines, and that it was devoted to 
the establishment of a Christian Social Order, appealed to 
many, who, like Padilla, were of the opinion that the end 
would ultimately justify the means:
"The path chosen was that of public­
spiritedness (patriotism) , peaceful 
or violent, according to the 
exigencies of the struggle. If it was 
necessary to kill, one would do it, 
provided that the maxima of 
tyrannicide were fulfilled. Mexico 
was overrun with petty tyrants that 
should be toppled down by the resolute 
will of a people on the move".16
This idea was, in fact, close to the one held by the 
League and, it would not be unwise to think that many more 
Catholics were attracted by it, rather than theory of 
"spiritual conversion", which helps to account for the 
immediate success of the legions.
2. Relations between the"Base" and the League
All testimonies agree that the organization 
experienced an immediate success. Padilla talked of ten 
thousand members in the city of Le6n?17 in Queretaro, all 
levels of society were involved? in Mexico City, there
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were around one hundred thousand members, in Puebla, 
Guadalajara and in other cities of the central states, the 
organization was established in a very short time, less 
than a year. Nevertheless, because of the secrecy, it is 
difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy, the 
strength of the Base? Padilla and Abascal put the numbers 
at several hundred thousand, which seems exaggerated. 
However that might be, it is reasonable to assume that it 
benefited from contributions from other Catholic 
organizations, such as the League and the ACJM.
The League, having lost the war, and disowned by the 
hierarchy, would have seen some of its followers breaking 
away to join the ranks of the legions. However, this is 
a qualified assertion since, as Meyer pointed out:
"Its history is not well known because 
it was defeated; because it fought in 
secrecy, it has remained obscure; 
dissension followed defeat? the
leaders dispersed; the Church was 
determined to let fall into oblivion 
and silence an organization that had 
r e s i s t e d  h e r  p o l i c y  of
conciliation”.18
The works of Palomar y Vizcarra illustrate, to a 
certain extent, the activities and policies of the League, 
as well as its relations with the hierarchy.19 
Unfortunately, they do not give any indication of the 
contacts and exchanges between the League and the Base. 
However, a circular dated 30 July 1936, addressed to 
League members, forbade them to participate in the new 
organization. The document is important because it sheds 
some light on the attempts to find a common ground between
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the two associations:
"Never has the pressing need for a 
thorough integration of all the 
Catholic forces been so felt. 
Therefore, it is imperative that such 
union, such integration be secured so 
as to regain liberty. To that effect, 
approaches have been made with 
official elements of the legions.
There is, however, one apparently 
insurmountable obstacle to reach an 
agreement: mutual trust; essential if 
we are to work together to regain our 
liberty. Because of the secret nature 
of the legions, their members are 
bound - even before they become so - 
by institutional secrets and oaths 
that make it impossible to establish 
that understanding, and puts the 
League, which is not secret, at an 
inferior level that, were we to accept 
it, it would mean suicide.
Indeed, in these circumstances, the 
legions are in a position to learn 
about all the plans and designs of the 
League or of any other non-secret 
organization? the contrary not being 
the case. Hence, if the same 
individual belongs to both 
Institutions, in the event of a 
possible clash over contradictory 
orders issued by both the 
organizations, the one given by the 
legions would prevail, or at least, 
irreparably upset the organization and 
functioning of the League.
Consequently, we wait to find a 
solution to this delicate point; but, 
in the meantime, we remind all members 
of the League that [... ] they should 
not join the legions [...] those 
individuals who wish to continue in 
the League should withdraw from the 
legions, keeping, as it is due, the 
oath of secrecy that they have 
sworn. "20
Whereas in 1926 the League had obtained a pontifical 
ban on the secret organization "Union Popular11, also known 
as ”U” ;21 ten years later, it had to protect its own
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integrity against infiltration from the legions. As it 
transpires from the circular, the situation was different 
in that attempts were made to prevent defections to the 
Base. Furthermore, even some of the staunchest supporters 
of the League, like Mgr Lara y Torres, realized, after 
1934, that it was no longer capable of continuing the 
struggle.22
There was also the concern that the Base recruited 
legionnaire candidates from the same social classes and in 
the same geographical areas as the League: the officers 
belonged to the middle-bourgeoisie (professionals), the 
ranks to the petite-bourgeoisie (tradesmen, craftsmen, 
etc.).
3. Organization
The accounts of the Synarchists who participated in 
the Base and the documents contained in the records of the 
National Synarchist Union, allow us to understand its 
functioning.
1934 was year when Catholic organizations began to 
operate again. The Parents' Union, for example, undertook 
several demonstrations against the promulgation of the 
reformed Article 3, which introduced socialist education. 
At the same time, the legions were created in an attempt 
to penetrate all aspects of social, economic and, indeed, 
political life. Because of the constant menace of 
government reprisals, the organization was set up along 
secret lines.
In the initial stages, the intention was that each
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legion would comprise one thousand men, divided into 
groups of ten. In reality, most legions never reached 
those numbers; there were legions of four or six hundred 
members. Each legionnaire was individually chosen 
according to his activities for the cause of the Church; 
and only when there was certainty that that individual 
could be relied on, would he be asked to take the oath. 
Juan Ignacio Padilla, for instance, seems to have been 
chosen for his active participation in anti-socialist- 
education demonstrations. Abascal had a family history of 
close relations with the Church, or with Catholic 
organizations; he had at one time been a seminarist 
himself; his grandfather was devoted to the work of the 
Saint-Vincent-de-Paul Conferences; his father had been an 
important member of the MU"; and he (Abascal) had worked 
with, and received help from, members of the Council of 
the Michoacan Division of the legions -although he was, 
obviously, not aware of this at the time.24
i) Regional division
As the Organization grew in importance, divisions 
were formed, corresponding to the existing political 
division of the country.
Thus, there was the Division of Jalisco, that of 
Queretaro, of Guanajuato, etc. A National Directorship 
was also set up, in Mexico City, and every year, the 
leaders of all the Divisions met to elect one of them to 
the post of Supreme Leader.
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ii) Sections
The primitive structure became more complex with the 
introduction of sections. It was, probably, at this sage 
that the term ••Legion11 was dropped for that of "la Base*1, 
which soon became the only one to designate the 
Organization. The formation of sections was intended to 
permit infiltration in all sectors of society? labour, in 
particular. Twelve sections were contemplated, following 
socio-professional criteria, though the majority never 
materialized. Several sections dealt with the
transmission and verification of orders, while others were 
solely devoted to propaganda activities and recruitment. 
Salvador Abascal belonged to one such section from 1935 
until 1940, when he took over the National leadership of 
the Synarchist Movement which was, incidentally, section 
eleven of the Base.
When he joined the Michoacdn division, in April 1935, 
he was put in charge of ten secondary councils for their 
promotion. In September, he began work outside Morelia, 
setting out councils among peasants.
The leader of each legion, following his own advice, 
had the authority to carry out defensive or offensive 
measures and activities? but always within the bounds of 
"sound judgement”? thus preventing any legion remaining 
inactive and breaking down.25
At the end of April, 1936, Abascal was sent on a 
special mission by the National Leader, Julian Malo 
Juvera, to convey the news of the existence and the aims 
of the Organization, to Archbishop Ruiz y Flores, 
Apostolic Delegate, exiled in the United States, and to
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ask for his blessing and that of all the other prelates of 
the country. Some time later, he was given the 
responsibility of founding legions where none existed, 
especially along the northern border, and to strengthen 
those in the weakest states. This task would take him 
from one extreme of the country to another. His role was 
that of "fundador y visitador"; he had absolute power to 
establish the structure where it was absent and, where it 
existed, to provide assistance to the corresponding leader 
in order to extend his'sc*** of action inside his state.
It was not until 1937 that it was decided to create 
a visible section destined to make public the doctrine of 
the Organization. This section, section Eleven, eventually 
became the Synarchist Movement, or UNS. The birth of the 
Movement did not signify the end of the Base; it was only 
one of its sections, albeit the most important one, but 
still strictly dependent on the Supreme Council of the 
Base.
iii) The leadership of the Base
Each section had one person in charge, responsible to 
the Division leader, at the State level, or to the 
National leader, at the National level.
A Secret Council was set up comprising nine persons 
"who should be the most senior and worthiest of the 
institution"? who controlled, organized and ruled over the 
entire Organization, and who chose, every year, the Secret 
National Leader, and advised him on the appointment, or 
extension of the appointment, of the National Leader of 
section Eleven.26 On account of the very considerable
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importance that the UNS took within the Base organization, 
special significance was given to the nomimation of its 
leader, since a vote of two thirds plus one of the Supreme 
Council was required to choose a candidate.
For the election of the National Leader of the Base, 
the Division leaders had their say? together with the 
Secret National Secretariat, they made up the Great 
Council which proposed to the Supreme Council the 
candidates from whom it had to make its choice.
iv) The Secret Leaders
Despite the provisions made to settle conflicts of 
authority that might arise between the leaders, the Base 
rapidly became the object of two or three personalities 
who were in command from 1934 to 1944. The reason for 
this was that in a nine-member council, it was not hard 
for a smart individual to impose his views, nay his will, 
and to have appointed at the head of the Divisions and of 
the UNS, the men of his choice. Indeed, the Division 
leaders, gathered in Council, would back, very naturally, 
the candidacy presented by the Secret Leader, who had 
appointed them in the first place? hence, the organization 
favoured, as Abascal and Padilla constantly stressed, the 
individual most talented at manipulation.
In 1934, among the Division chiefs, three stood out: 
Gonzalo Campos, of Queretaro, Jose Antonio Urquiza, of 
Guanajuato, and Antonio \&ni*tYuz.;, of Mexico City. It was 
from this select group that the National Leaders came. 
But most influential of all was Santacruz, not least for 
his favorable position in Mexico City. Manuel Romo the
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founder, was not, probably, a very strong character, 
because he was replaced from the leadership very soon, and 
virtually nothing is known about him. Julian Malo Juvera 
replaced him sometime in early 1935. A man of 55 or 60, he 
had been a maderista and was, in the words of Abascal, 
whom he admired:
”a good-natured person and a real 
gentleman, generous and ready to 
recognize the merits in others. He 
was an intelligent, sensible and 
courageous leader. ” 27
Malo Juvera had a significant influence in the 
conception of the UNS; he was prompt to realize that the 
Base needed some kind of public outlet if it were to 
succeed, as we shall discuss later on in this chapter.
Gonzalo Campos, leader of the Michoacan Division, 
took the leadership from Juvera in September? he was 34. 
His leadership developed during the period of formation of 
the UNS; he resigned in 1939, suffering from cancer. He 
appears to have been a highly praised man. Both Abascal 
and Padilla expressed nothing but admiration and respect 
for him.28 Campos came from a wealthy family of 
hacendados, who had distributed, Abascal tells us, the 
main part of their estate to their labourers before the 
agrarian reform. A convinced Catholic, he joined the ACJM 
to become its diocesan agent. This put him in contact 
with many militant groups of Catholic Action, of different 
social backgrounds, from where he chose officers for the 
Base. He also belonged to the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Queretaro, where he strove to establish a
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Christian labour union, dependent on the Base. The 
assignation of socio-professional sections to divide the 
work of the legions was his idea. He maintained relations 
with American Catholics and was the coordinator of the 
preparatory work for the Synarchist movement. He died in 
1943.29
Jose Antonio Urquiza, of the Guanajuato Division, was 
the son of a wealthy hacendado who had lost a great part 
of his lands during the Revolution. He was in charge of 
reorganizing one of the family properties in Guanajuato, 
where he was assassinated on 11 April 1938. That made him 
the most revered martyr of Synarchism. He was 
particularly concerned with relations with the American 
hierarchy. In September 1937, he had travelled to 
Washington, accompanied by his brother and by Abascal, 
where he met American bishops, especially Monsignor Burke, 
the Secretary of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
to discuss the legions and the future Synarchist movement, 
to ensure that the latter would not encounter any 
encumbrance in the southern American dioceses.
Contrary to what was argued by the detractors of the 
Organization, Urquiza never travelled to Europe, nor did
• • • S Ohe visit Spam.
The early disappearance of Gonzalo Campos (aged 43), 
and of Urquiza (aged 35), no doubt gave Antonio Santacruz 
the possibility to run the Base according to his own 
views, for many years.
Antonio Santacruz belonged to a wealthy porfirian 
family that enjoyed excellent relations with high ranking
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Church officials. He was a chemical engineer, proprietor 
of several pharmaceutical laboratories and other property 
in Mexico City. He dominated the levers of command of the 
Base, and consequently of Synarchism, practically 
throughout 1939 to 1944. He came repeatedly into conflict 
with the leader of the UNS, Abascal, in particular. 
Padilla coined a phrase to describe him and those who 
surrounded him in the Supreme Council; he called them "los 
ratones.”31 This is how Abascal depicted him:
” [He] was undoubtedly a very clever 
man. But with the time I began to 
realize that his principal strength 
did not lie precisely on his 
brightness, but on his social 
position, instead [•••]/ on his 
exhibitionism, and, above all, as the 
essence of his personality, on his 
unlimited capacity for intrigue 
[... ],,S2
Santacruz also had great responsibilities within the 
Church? he became president of the Congregations of the 
Holy Virgin, which endeavoured to Christianize the labour 
sector. He knew several members of the episcopacy well, 
like Mgr Luis Maria Martinez, Archbishop of Mexico? he was 
in constant contact with the Jesuits, especially with 
Father Eduardo Iglesias, who later became the spiritual 
counsellor of the Base.
After the death of Jose Antonio Urquiza, he took on 
the Base's official representation to the American 
hierarchy, and appeared as the true leader of the UNS with 
the American embassy. He became the Secret Supreme Leader 
in 1940, though he was the power behind the previous 
leader, Felipe Coria, who lasted only one year, 1939 to
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1940.
Some important features of the leadership of the Base 
can be inferred from the previous exposition: the leaders 
belonged to the same age group, the same social class, and 
they all had contacts with, and responsibilities in the 
Church.
4. Activities
i) "The spiritual reconquest of Tabasco"
When the Base was consolidated, three years after its 
creation, it divided the country into sectors. Salvador 
Abascal was put in charge of the southern sector that 
comprised the states of Tabasco, Yucatan, Campeche, 
Chiapas and Oaxaca. He set out to organize his territory 
and reported back to the Supreme Council with depressing 
news about Tabasco.
Tomas Garrido Canabal had introduced a law, on 28 
February 1925, that prohibited priests from officiating in 
the State, unless they satisfied certain requirements that 
they:
1) be of Tabascan or Mexican origin by birth, with five 
years residence in the state?
2) be over forty years old;
3) be educated in state schools?
4) have good moral background?
5) be married and;
6) have no previous convictions.
When Garrido was defeated, in 1936, after the
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expedition of Brito Foucher, garridism fell with him, 
except for the restrictions on the Church.33
Destruction and desecration were widespread and only 
very few temples still stood in all the state. There were 
three in the capital, Villahermosa: the Cathedral, turned 
into a "fronton" (pelota court); another, the church of 
the Holy Cross, was in ruins, and the church of the 
Immaculate Conception, turned into a rubbish dump.
The Base wished to spread the newly created 
Synarchism to all parts of the country; to this end, it 
intended to use the legions as the principal nucleus.34 
With this order, Abascal returned to Villahermosa, on 16 
March 1938, to check on the legions he had founded the 
previous year. He discovered that they had been able to 
recruit hardly anybody. The reason he was given was the 
lack of religious freedom and the distrust and fear of 
everybody.35 Whereupon Abascal took on, with the support 
of the Base, the start of a campaign to obtain the 
religious liberation of Tabasco. He had a precedent to 
guide him: in February 1937, at Orizaba and Cordoba, in 
the State of Veracruz, the people had successfully 
reopened the temples and reinstated the priests who had 
been officiating, secretly, in private houses.
His plan was to enter Villahermosa on 12 May, in 
remembrance of the first victims of callismo, in Morelia, 
in 1921 .36 Abascal visited ranches and villages around 
Villahermosa, trying to instil, in a simple and direct 
way, the desire to recover religious freedom and reassured 
the peasants that this could be achieved, if they were
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prepared to fight a non-violent combat. He insisted that 
no weapons should be carried, because "they were not going 
to take the life of anybody, but risk their own for 
religion". He also believed that only by using the 
technique of peaceful mass demonstrations could they 
succeed, because if they were armed and killed someone, 
Cardenas would consider them rebels and their task would 
fail instantly.37
Mobilization was done at the sound of indigenous 
drums. Many peasants had to come from distant places. 
They would walk the whole day under a torrid sun through
oo
rugged roads.
On 10 May, the National Leader, Gonzalo Campos went 
to Villahermosa to discuss with Abascal the plans of the 
operation. Abascal relates how Campos approved of them 
and gave him the liberty to modify them according to the 
circumstances. The concentration of forces began in the 
afternoon of 11 May in the village of Tamulte, twenty 
minutes from the capital? people arrived from various 
directions and in considerable numbers. A first group of 
five hundred marched towards Villahermosa, arriving within 
reach of the centre, at 10.30 A.M. At 11 o'clock, 
Abascal, heading a four-hundred-strong column, made for 
the capital? there they met with another column of some 
one thousand men coming from another direction. They 
shouted "Viva Cristo Rey!" and declared their readiness to 
die rather than abandon the struggle. The mass stopped 
when it reached the city's main square, in front of the 
Governor's palace. Abascal and others harangued the
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crowds and waited for the Vice-Governor to appear, the 
Governor being away at the tine. When he failed to come 
out, Abascal declared that if he had abandoned his post, 
then they did not need him any more. They marched to the 
Church of the Conception, where they set up camp? they 
remained there until 3 June. Of the three temples still 
standing in the capital, they chose this one to show their 
resolution because the cathedral would have been too much 
of an affront and, the other, the Holy Cross, was on the 
outskirts of the city. Two legionnaire women, whom 
Abascal had brought from Cordoba to teach catechism, put 
a flag where the presbitery had once been and began 
reciting the rosary. The flag was the Mexican flag with 
the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe in the centre.
The following morning, another thousand peasants 
arrived, but they were stopped by the army. Abascal went 
to "liberate" them and lead them to the temple, which he 
did? the army did not shoot.39
He sent telegrams to the president explaining the 
reasons for the occupation and of the whole venture, 
saying that the aim was to obtain complete religious 
freedom. He said that all the sites that belonged to the 
temples destroyed by Garrido, would be occupied? and 
warned that the people would never compromise and accept 
the law that required priests to marry.
At the same time, the Base mobilized the entire 
organization throughout Mexico to support the campaign. 
The press and the presidential palace were flooded with 
telegrams at the proper moment.
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On 13 May, the Vice-governor sent orders to disperse 
the crowds and distributed a manifesto to that effect. 
The Minister of the Interior sent the same orders from 
Mexico. The crowd responded by making a silent march 
through the principal streets of Villahermosa. 
Previously, five hundred tracts has been printed and 
distributed, inviting the residents of the city to join 
the peasants in demonstrating to the government that 
Villahermosa was Catholic too? thereby rejecting, 
categorically, the government and the labour movement's 
claim that it was atheistic. When the mass of 
demonstrators reached the church of the Conception, the 
column was of some ten thousand? the silence was broken by 
cheers to Christ the King and the Virgin, and a priest was 
carried to the improvised altar.40 The following day, the 
first Mass was celebrated at Tabasco for more that a 
decade. After the Mass, small groups started to 
reconstruct the temple, and baptisms and catechism were 
given. Supplies were both purchased and obtained through 
contributions.
Meanwhile, threats from the government and the local 
press continued. There were also attempts by the local 
government, apparently on instructions from the President, 
to strike a deal with Abascal: he was to leave
Villahermosa, in exchange for granting freedom to another 
municipality, promising that in the future, religious 
freedom would also be restored in the capital. Abascal 
did not accept this, fearing that away from the capital, 
it would be much easier to crush religious liberty
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altogether. He replied by saying that they would leave 
only when religion were guaranteed in full, and for all 
the territory.
On 30 May, the Governor ordered the army to surround 
the church. From that moment, nobody was to be let out 
and no provisions in. In the afternoon, soldiers opened 
fire, killing four and injuring many. Afterwards, Abascal 
and the priest in charge of the Conception were arrested 
and imprisoned. Later, they were flown out of 
Villahermosa and taken to Ciudad del Carmen, where they 
were released. Immediately, Abascal contacted the secret 
leaders who ordered him to return to Mexico City.41 In 
December, Bishop Vicente Camacho returned to his episcopal 
see. On 1 January 1939, a new Governor had taken office? 
he made an official statement declaring that religious 
persecution was unfair and self-defeating.
A completely different interpretation of the events 
was given by the American journalist Betty Kirk, apologist 
of Cardenas:
"On 2 June, 1938, Cardenas paid his 
debt to the Church for her support (at 
the time of the oil expropriation) , 
when six persons were killed in 
religious riots in the State of 
Tabasco. That State, under Tomas 
Garrido Canabal, had been one of the 
more anti-catholic regions of Mexico, 
and had suffered severe religious 
persecution. When the new riots 
occurred, as a result of Catholics 
trying to reopen a church, Cardenas 
ordered all local authorities to 
remove the anti- religious legislation 
in force and to pass new laws, 
authorising a sufficient number of 
priests to serve the community, 
according to the Constitution. He 
deplored this conflict that he
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declared to be anti-patriotic, and 
reminded Catholics that they could 
apply to the courts if they were 
denied justice or if they were 
persecuted”.42
When we met Abascal at his home in Mexico City, he 
defined his experience in Tabasco thus:
”1 with my hundreds of peasants were 
the lay instrument that served to 
topple over the idols of secularism 
and of respect for conventions? in 
their place, we presented to the 
people the image of the Redeemer and 
of the Virgin. Yet, my efforts would 
have been futile, had I not counted 
with the aid of the cathechists. It 
would only have been a mere civic act, 
with no transcendence, no spiritual 
benefit.1,43
ii) The Base and labour
When Catholics of the Base explored the possibilities 
available to them in the labour front, it was not long 
before they realized how limited these were. It was 
difficult to set in motion a religious organization of the 
type of Catholic Action, since it was compelled to abstain 
from all political, union and economic activity. They 
could not contemplate the creation of confessional unions, 
because the law strictly prohibited it. They therefore 
decided to work with the existing laws. Labour 
legislation, they thought, had some positive points; but, 
in practice, it had only succeeded in submitting labour 
unions to the control of the leaders, who were subservient 
to politics.
Official organisms and arbitration bureaux depended 
on the party in power, where there was a strong left-wing
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tendency. The "closed-shop", clause tied the worker 
completely to the union, and even more so, to the union 
leader.
In the opinion of the Base, many employers, even 
Catholic, were more concerned with earning profits than 
with the social problems raised by modern industry. It 
would be extremely difficult to suggest to them a solution 
that seemed to go against their immediate interests and to 
introduce religious considerations in the management of 
their businesses. Hence, the idea was conceived of 
forming parallel organizations of workers and employers; 
whereby the professional and the religious movement would 
be kept totally separate, at least on the surface. The 
inspiration came from the encyclical QUADRAGESIMO ANNO.
The congregations of the Holy Virgin had dealt with 
teaching the catechism. They had recruited many Catholics 
among the workers, who were rallied in workers' 
congregations.44 After the 1929 church-state agreements, 
they were reorganized on a larger scale.
When the Base was founded, it had been decided to 
secure a strong recruitment in the labour milieu, 
particularly susceptible to "communist" propaganda and 
which had to be stopped. The leadership set two tasks: 
first, it was necessary to assemble the work force? then, 
it would train it for the delicate task it would entrust 
to it. Indeed, the first objective was to penetrate the 
unions by means of secret Catholic cells. Once settled 
in, the workers would extend their influence by forming 
study groups, to gain and train more followers that would
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help them place their men in control, in union meetings. 
The workers that would embark upon this task would need 
excellent religious and social education? it was therefore 
a prerequisite to develop, to the highest degree, their 
adaptability to the environment. The most considerable 
difficulty they would have to face, was the need to work 
in secrecy? the state of affairs being such, at that time, 
that the slightest indiscretion would have serious and 
devastating consequences.
Original attempts at working through study groups did 
not succeed. It was then that the idea of an "internado" 
(boarding school) was adopted. Hence, the House for 
Proletarian Students was established in the Mexico City 
district of Tacubaya. The courses lasted six weeks? at 
the end of which, students went into closed retreat and 
joined the labour sections of the Base. The school 
operated between 1 June 1937 and 10 February 1942. 
Afterwards, it lived out at a slower pace until October 
1944.45 Students came from all corners of the country, 
but, especially, from the central states. The majority 
were members of the CTM? though there were members of CROM 
and of other independent unions, as well.
Soon, the problem of deciding whether to become 
politically active or not, arose. The Base had very firm 
ideas about the matter. It maintained that to follow that 
road would be the ruin of all the effort undertaken, 
because it implied either succumbing to the government 
party or being wasted in a fatal and sterile opposition. 
In fact, the Base argued, those who wanted to join the
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labour sector of the official party because they estimated 
that in so doing they could not come out losing, were 
definitely worse off, because the party dominated those 
who tried to be independent. In the end, the only concern 
of the union was to obtain the largest number of posts in 
the party? but the nominees were selected by the union 
bosses and not by the membership. Besides, labour 
representatives were expected to defend, always, the 
political actions of the Government. Consequently, the 
Base concluded, they had different goals, different means 
and different fields of action. Political action should 
be subject to the realization of more vital objectives, 
before engaging in party politics.
The only assessment we have of the school for labour 
leaders is that of Abascal. Though biased, he was, 
nonetheless, in a position, as leader of the Synarchists 
and as member of the Base, to understand the scope of the 
school. He said that the school had been the idea of 
Santacruz? that it could not have thrived because of its 
clandestine nature? and that although some unions were 
penetrated very positively, particularly in Queretaro, it 
was usually the case of small unions and the result of 
covert operations.46 Most of the leaders who came out of 
the school were destined for the industries of Monterrey 
and acted more against "red” leaders than for the 
establishment of a true social Christian regime. In his 
judgement, Santacruz1 error was to put the school in the 
service of "legitimate but limited and short-sighted 
interests" (i.e. the industrial concerns of Monterrey).
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Besides, he noted, because of the short duration of the 
courses and the size of the groups (twenty workers) , it 
was not possible to teach them very much, let alone shape 
their personalties.47
5. The decline of the legions
At the end of 1934, the leaders of the legions had 
decided to take steps to influence public opinion. Under 
the pseudonym of OSCAR CALDERON ALVAREZ, they published 
articles in El Universal. These appeared weekly, and in 
exchange, the members of the legions would buy the paper 
at least once a week. Yet, after a while, El Universal 
pulled out. The Organization made threats, but to no 
avail. The Base told the main advertisers to withdraw 
their advertisements. But, they did not comply.
The leaders thought that a lesson would have to be 
taught i4f they did not wish to lose stature and discredit 
the Organization in the eyes of their followers. 
Therefore, it was decided to scare the principal 
advertiser, a large department store, in the centre of 
Mexico City. The way in which this was done was by 
exploding stinking-gas bombs, during peak hours. The 
police caught some of those involved. There was anxiety 
and disappointment in the ranks and massive desertion 
ensued.
Many councils completely disappeared? the few that 
remained had very inadequate lives. There was a 
widespread belief that the orders issued did not go far 
enough, that they involved no real danger, and that, in 
general, they were innocent and silly. For instance, all
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legionnaires would be asked to attend High Mass on a 
particular day at the Cathedral? on another occasion they 
would be asked to go on a pilgrimage to the shrine of 
Guadalupe? on one occasion it was ordered that on a 
certain day, every legionnaire should pass behind the 
Cathedral and drop a stone in a precise spot? many passed 
by just to see who actually dropped the stone. Another 
time, in Morelia, the order was that each legionnaire 
should write to a particular teacher, or government 
official, condemning his anti-Catholic conduct and somehow 
scare him. But one teacher warned the police and it was 
not long before some legionnaires were caught when they 
tried to post their letters. They were taken to the 
station and detained. Afterwards, several houses were 
searched without warrant. Those arrested felt abandoned 
because it took three days before they could go free and 
then, only after paying a heavy fine.48
In Guadalajara something more serious happened: on 6 
February 1935, the Commander of the Military Zone made 
declarations in the press about the discovery of an 
alleged conspiracy involving a "ridiculous organization 
established on military lines, from Soldier to Marshal". 
That organization was, of course, the Base. Several 
arrests were made, including some of the leaders.49
As a result, the Base suffered a major setback in 
Jalisco, from which it never entirely recovered. In the 
other legions, vexation, discouragement and fear were 
rife? thereby causing many more legions to disappear due 
to desertion? others were reduced to pitiful numbers,
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dedicated to the simple task of recruitment and of doing 
pious deeds.
Because the legions never managed to hold important 
posts of command, their activities were too general and of 
simple character, incapable of sustaining, after a while, 
the interest and the enthusiasm of the majority. Inaction 
was at the root of the organization's decline. Another 
element, not without relevance, was the growing phenomenon 
of rural migration. The Division Chiefs spoke of the 
frequent number of legionnaires who had gone to the 
Capital? but who, once there, got lost in the enormity of 
the city, and the shortcomings of the local legions failed 
to ensure their loyalty.50
It was, therefore, impossible to continue 
indefinitely in this manner. Abascal summed up the pith 
of the problem:
"A secret organization which wants to 
act in the open and still remain 
secret, most consist of a handful and 
select commandoes. Were it not so, it 
would fall apart on inactivity, or 
would try to occupy its members in 
some activity that, if it were 
innocent, would cause disillusion and 
dismissal? and if it involved some 
danger, it would be inconceivable that 
it was not discovered, with 
catastrophic repercussions."
Was it Catholic morality the main cause of dejection 
and disbandment? What deterred Catholics from making use 
of all the means available to a secret organization to 
defeat its enemy? In any case, assassination and 
tyrannicide had been entirely ruled out, since, as Abascal 
ascertained:
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" [T]he misfortunes of the Nation did 
not depend on a tyrant, or on an 
easily identifiable small group. The 
Revolution has gained a lot of ground 
which has allowed it to penetrate and 
take hold of all social strata? it 
thus has enough leaders and followers, 
and sufficient resources of all kinds? 
plus international support, especially 
from the United States. Executing 
Lazaro Cardenas for his persecution of 
the Church and for the extensive 
destruction he has inflicted on 
material wealth, would have served no 
real purpose, since someone else would 
have stepped in in his place and carry 
on as before, because the orders come 
from across the Northern border. A 
secret organization is condemned to 
die out if it is not devoted to direct 
subversive action, or if it does not 
engage in bellicose action. To follow 
the first - sabotage, kidnapping and 
"exemplary" executions - it would be 
vital to do without most of the 
followers, because they would be more 
of a dead weight than of an asset. 
However, with no, or little 
possibility of seizing power, a purely 
subversive provocation is always 
illicit according to scholastic 
theology and to common sense. In 
Mexico, it would only benefit the 
revolutionary regime, eager to be up 
against a weaker enemy, real or 
fictitious, in order to carry the 
tyranny to extremes and stamp out all 
divergence, even of thought. Militant 
action, on the other hand, because it 
is essentially open, would claim for 
itself, after a while, the public 
leadership, with supremacy over the 
secret authority, arguing that the 
right to command lies with whom 
assumes the responsibility.1,52
At the National Council of the Legions celebrated in 
Mexico City, In January 1937, the National Leader, Julian 
Malo Juvera, summed up the problem facing the 
Organization: he said that if they did not want to fail 
and disappear, a public organism should be created to
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provide legal and open activity for the great majority, 
since it was impossible to envisage a real secret activity 
for the mass. As National Leader, he was in a position to 
know the exact general situation of the Organization: 
desertion and frustration were widespread. The ranks 
failed to understand the need for a secret organization 
and for secret activities. They wanted an open civic 
organization against the government of Cardenas, of the 
type operating in Monterrey, like "Accion Civica".
There was indeed a general desire for something open 
and national. Malo Juvera suggested the foundation of a 
National political party to fight in the electoral field. 
He asked the Council to put the question to every Division 
Leader, to study it and discuss it in the next National 
Meeting, scheduled for March. The situation did not 
change during the two month interval, rather the opposite? 
general disbandment became more acute. Abascal described 
the Meeting of March 1937 as of "historical importance"
The proposal for a National political party was 
opposed by Gonzalo Campos, Leader of the Queretaro 
Legions, who argued that political parties divided, while 
they stood for unity? opposition political parties were 
what the PNR needed to give the impression of not being a 
one-party system.
Campos proposed, instead, a civic organization of all 
"good Mexicans", that transformed the people and 
reconstructed the national economy? that should be its 
initial task, the point of departure. Without it, the 
salvation of the country was inconceivable. He declared
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that they could establish social justice from below, in 
defiance of the government, in worker-employer relations. 
Hard working, responsible peasants could change, to a 
large extent, the internal regime of the ejido, despite 
official control.
The family was the basis of society. To win it back 
from the Revolution, ethics had to be reformed. The most 
pressing problem was that posed by socialist education. 
Hence, it was imperative to seize power; there was however 
a belief that this should be done a step at a time, laying 
the foundations, and not rushing a coup d'Etat, which 
should only come after the effort of social reconstruction 
had attained the level permitted by the revolutionary 
State; consequently, they should not waste time with a 
political party, that would only be playing into the hands 
of the enemy.53
Malo Juvera accepted the proposal. The only thing 
that remained was to consider the name to be given to the 
new association, the place and the date where it should 
first appear, and what initial steps it should follow. 
These matters were to be decided in the following meeting 
in May. In the meantime, Division Leaders were asked to 
discuss them with their respective councils.
Discussion over the nature of the new organization 
proved to be a greatly dividing issue within the 
leadership of the Base, aggravated by Cardenas* continuous 
radical policies, which lay down the conditions for an 
internal crisis, around the strategy to follow. Indeed, 
two tendencies emerged: on the one hand, there were those
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- led by Gonzalo Campos - who wished to fight, by whatever 
means possible, to seize power? on the other hand, there 
were those - led by Antonio Santacruz - who wished to 
preserve the organization as a socio-mystical association, 
reminiscent of Opus Dei, devoted to religion and to the 
formation of a social-religious awareness.54
6. The birth of Synarchism
The secret National Meeting of May 1937 opened with 
the request by Jose Antonio Urquiza, Leader of the 
Guanajuato Division, to select his State as the place for 
the foundation of the new organization. He declared that 
there was already a group, a civic association (commonly 
known as "Group of Leon") which had been publicly active 
for a few weeks, made up of friends and fellow 
legionnaires.55
The name of the new organization was suggested by the 
Leader of the San Luis Potosi Division, Ceferino Sdnchez. 
He argued that since their aim was to fight the anarchy of 
the Cardenas regime, they should call it SYNARCHISM, of 
the greek syn: with? and arje: authority, order? thus, 
with order, the opposite of anarchy. The name of Union 
Nacional Sinarquista, UNS, was proposed by Abascal.56
The term Synarchism was chosen as the antonym of 
anarchism, the anarchy of decadent liberalism and 
atheistic communism against which the Synarchists 
professed to be marshalling the forces of order and 
religion in Mexico.57 The principle of order adopted by 
Synarchism was Christianity in its authentic Catholic 
conception.58 It is an order of Christian democracy, first
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under God, then under a God-fearing state. The members of 
Synarchism were ardent practicing Catholics, disciplined 
soldiers of a theocratic faith. According to the official 
doctrine, the movement was born amid an explosion of 
enthusiasm, faith, and courage.59 The new word startled 
everybody:
"The term seemed to us too learned and 
difficult for the people to 
understand, but after seeing the 
enthusiasm with which Jose Antonio 
defended it and the reasons he 
expounded, we accepted it 
willingly".60
Jose Antonio demanded authorization to hold the first 
meeting for the foundation of the UNS, on 23 May 1937, at 
Le6n, Guanajuato. Abascal claims that Malo Juvera, the 
National Leader of the Base, had chosen him to be the 
first leader of the UNS, and not Jose Antonio Urquiza, 
because, as Jose Antonio himself admitted, he was not the 
right man for the job. He was not a good orator, an 
essential requirement to arouse the masses. He had, in 
fact, a tendency to stammer. The founders of the "Group 
of Leon" (Manuel Zermeno y Perez, Jose Trueba Olivares) 
were expecting that the Base would appoint a renowned 
personality to lead the new movement, thus providing it 
with the prestige that their group had lacked. Therefore, 
when Urquiza told them that the Base had chosen Abascal, 
an unknown personality in political and intellectual 
milieux, though he had proven himself in the Base, they 
were taken aback. They wished to entrust the mission to 
Urquiza, but he belonged to a well known family of
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Queretaro.61
Abascal met with Zermeno, Trueba Olivares and Urquiza 
on the afternoon of the 23, at the Hotel Condesa, in Leon, 
to talk about the new movement. He manifested his desire 
to make of the UNS a ”groupe de choc” ; to make a frontal 
attack on the Revolution, exposing all its crimes, 
spiritual and economic, and to call upon all those 
determined to combat it, to join the movement. Force, he 
sustained, would be repealed with force.62
His three interlocutors were astounded; they thought 
that such an approach was inappropriate for the existing 
juncture, it was too impetuous and would be perceived as 
subversive. They said that they should confine themselves 
to talk only of the unity and harmony of all good 
Mexicans, whatever their ideology, so long as they were 
prepared to work for the sake of the fatherland, 
manifested in works of charity and public utility, without 
the slightest provocation of the Government. Were they to 
adopt an aggressive attitude, the Government would have an 
unsurpassed motive to stifle the movement at the outset.63
Abascal1s idea was, therefore, diametrically opposed 
to that of Trueba Olivares. There was no possibility of 
bringing together the Group of Leon and the leader to be. 
The dilemma was solved when Abascal relinquished control 
of the Movement - either of his own accord, as he claims, 
or convinced by Urquiza - in favour of a member of the 
group whose convictions were more in line with those of 
the Base. Abascal decided not to attend the foundation 
meeting.
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Jose Antonio Urquiza, Jose Trueba Olivares and Manuel 
Zermeno presided over the meeting that evening, 23 May
1937, which took place at 49 calle de la Libertad, in 
Leon, Guanajuato, with some four hundred people attending, 
although half that number seems more likely. An
organizing committee was formed with Trueba Olivares as 
president, Ruben Mendoza as secretary and Francisco 
Ornelas as treasurer. Only the president would have 
powers to make decisions, the other members only acted as
advisers. The committee would be limited to helping in
the formation of Synarchist groups in all the country, and 
would call a national convention that approved the
statutes and principles of the Union and chose the 
permanent officials.
Jose Antonio Urquiza was assassinated on 11 April
1938. It was assumed at the time that he had been 
murdered on the direct orders of Cdrdenas. However, it 
later emerged that he was shot by one of his own peons. 
From that date, Zermeno and Trueba declared him founder, 
protomartyr and backbone of the Movement.64 This version 
was held by the organization until 1944, when the acrid 
differences that foreshowed a schism inside the UNS denied 
it. Still, during 1937-1944, the apparent leaders of the 
UNS argued that the organization was founded by a group of 
young men from Leon, from two existing associations. One, 
called "Nuevo Mexico11, founded in 1935, sympathized with 
the workers? the other was a group of students from 
Morelia, in Michoacan, called "Circulo de Estudios Vasco 
de Quiroga” .65
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When Abascal became the National Leader of the 
Synarchist Movement, in 1940, he did not contradict the 
official version because he was bound by secrecy and 
obliged to keep the secret of the Legions. It was not 
until he broke with the Movement, in 1944, that he felt 
compelled to reveal some of the secrets of the 
Organization. Since then, he has always contended that 
the UNS was the work of the secret leaders of the Legions, 
but especially, of Julian Malo Juvera and Gonzalo Campos.66
However, from the outset, alternative versions about 
the origins of the UNS were advanced. Basically, all 
versions - with different variations - fell within two 
major categories: the first was part of the official
doctrine of UNS; it sustained that a group of young 
Mexican patriots and devout Catholic, disturbed by the 
moral, political and economic disorder that prevailed in 
the country, decided to form a union to fight for the 
establishment of social justice based on Christian 
principles. The other version claimed that UNS has been 
set up by the Nazis as part of a subversive conspiracy.
As soon as Synarchism gained in national importance, 
the Mexican Left rapidly began to spread the version that 
UNS was of Nazi inspiration. The journalist, Mario Gill, 
was the staunchest supporter of this version? he affirmed 
that in its first years, the Synarchist Movement had been
• • • • 67 • •an entirely fascist organization. This was also the view 
held by the Government. El Nacional described it in these 
terms:
"Synarchism represented a regressive 
movement with very clear affinities
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with the foreign interest of the 
expansionist countries under 
totalitarian regimes.68
Similarly, this version was shared abroad, especially 
in the United States, where it was propagated by its 
foreign correspondents stationed in Mexico. They 
maintained that the UNS was not only Nazi inspired, but 
that it formed part of the Axis army, thereby posing a 
serious threat:
[The Axis] has established on the 
borders of the United States one of 
the most dangerous Axis centres in the 
entire world [... ]69
The version supported by Gill and the Left did not 
dispute the time or the place of the official version, nor 
did it question the participation of Jose Antonio Urquiza, 
Manuel Zermeno and Jose Trueba Olivares. It claimed, 
however, that other persons were present, including a 
German professor of languages at the Colegio de 
Guanajuato, Oscar Hellmut Schreiter. It alleged that the 
Synarchist Movement was a by-product of an Anti-Communist 
centre established by Schreiter, in 1936, in Guanajuato. 
Gill adduced that the group was not achieving the success 
that its founder expected, because, at the time, the 
people had strong faith in the Revolution and its leaders, 
but, also because anti-Communism was, in the eyes of the 
masses, synonymous with anti-cardenism and, in 1936, the 
masses had a mystical passion for Cardenas. Therefore, 
Gill noted, the German had, in fact, chosen an ineffective 
name for his group. Consequently, Schreiter met with his
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"disciples” -as Gill called them - Manuel Zermeno, the 
Trueba Olivares brothers and Jose Antonio Urquiza, to 
reorganize along slightly different lines. Gill alleged 
that Jose Antonio had just returned from Spain, where he 
had fought on the Nationalist side against the Republic, 
and was able to furnish information about the organization 
of the Falange and of the Italian Fascist Party. 
Schreiter would have contributed with information on the
• • • 70 •National Socialist Party. It was further affirmed that 
out of these meetings a movement was devised along 
hierarchical and militaristic lines, subject to the will 
of a Caudillo or Jefe, and dubbed with a word never heard 
before in Mexico: Synarchism.71
Mario Gill asserted that all UNS members should 
receive military training, especially those in rural 
areas. He deduced that, given the impossibility of 
founding a Synarchist military school, the leaders would 
have to call upon Falangist instructors and the training 
would be given in cynegetic clubs, following the Gestapo 
method that he said was used in South America. Wealthy 
Synarchist hacendados would provide the grounds where the 
training could be practiced, and only their children would
• • • • • • 72be given special military instruction.
In 1945, Richard Pattee wrote that an odd confusion 
had served to discredit Synarchism and to relate it 
somehow to totalitarianism: the activities of Schreiter in 
Guanajuato. This obscure German had founded, in 1936, a 
small anti-communist group, in which a government official 
of some importance participated.73 The only link between
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the Synarchist movement and Schreiter was Manuel Torres 
Bueno [future National Leader of the UNS]. He was a 
professor of philosophy at a school where Schreiter gave 
German lessons. Later on, Torres Bueno, having become a 
lawyer, acted as his lawyer in a non-political action. 
This fortuitous and casual contact between the two men did 
not represent an ideological affinity; there was no 
evidence that Schreiter had any influence on the early 
stages of Synarchism.74 Torres Buenos responded to this 
inference:
"Regarding the proofs mentioned [a 
legal document, dated 25 September, 
1938, in Guanajuato, signed by 
Schreiter and Torres Bueno, as his 
lawyer] to show the connection of 
Schreiter with Synarchism, [...], in 
1938, the war had not yet started nor 
were there any United Nations, and our 
country had friendly relations with 
Germany. At that time it was not 
known that the Communists would soon 
join the Nazis to destroy Christian 
Poland. In 1938 Schreiter was an 
individual like so many others, and it 
means nothing now, as it meant nothing 
then, that he may be found 
occasionally among the persons who 
requested my professional services. 
Maldonado, Schreiter, and [Isaac] 
Guzman Valdivia had founded in the 
City of Guanajuato the Anti-Communist 
Centre, something completely different 
from Synarchism which was founded in 
Leon in 1937, by Catholic students. 
The proximity of dates and places has 
been artificially exploited to confuse 
these two organizations, completely 
different in their components and in 
their ob j ectives. ”75
According to Synarchist sources, the Anti-Communist 
Centre was formed by Callistas to foment trouble for the 
Cardenas government, but with the triumph of the latter,
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• 76the centre subsided.
We have not been able to find any conclusive evidence 
to ascertain whether or not Schreiter actually had a 
significant role in the creation of the UNS. The only 
link between the alleged founders of Synarchism and those 
of the Anti-Communist Centre, of which Schreiter was 
admittedly a member, lies in the fact that Guzman 
Valdivia, admitted by Torres Bueno to have been with 
Schreiter one of the founders of the Centre, was a 
frequent contributor to El Sinarquista - the official 
paper of the UNS.77
Perhaps the most accurate observation in relation to 
this matter was made by Arthur Whitaker, when he wrote:
"While no intelligent person would 
rule out the possibility that the UNS, 
either consciously or unconsciously, 
served the purposes of pro-Nazi and 
other subversive elements, it was 
certain that the organization was 
no mere creation of such elements, 
but was, on the contrary, rooted in 
Mexican experience. What is more, 
even among its strongest opponents it 
was privately admitted that the 
Synarchists* case against the vices of 
the Mexican Revolutionary regime was 
a formidable one and that the main 
strength of the movement lay in the 
spontaneous reaction of large numbers 
of the Mexican people themselves 
against these vices: last-ditch
apologists for this regime were merely 
deceiving themselves or trying to 
deceive others, when they represented 
the UNS as merely a product of Nazi- 
Fascist intrigue [...]
"Consequently, the answer to the 
question regarding the international 
significance of Synarchism depended to 
a considerable extent upon inference, 
gossip, and speculation. The extremes 
to which these were sometime carried
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is illustrated by the case of one 
exceedingly fearful and equally 
humourless critic of Synarchism who, 
as proof of its pro-Nazi character, 
solemnly pointed out that the initials 
of the organization's name, UNS form 
the German word 'uns'.78"
i) The Manifesto of the Organizing Committee
Once the UNS had been officially founded, it was 
necessary to draw up the programme of action of the 
Movement, or at least, the principles and the guiding 
spirit. Hence, on 12 June 1937, Trueba and Urquiza 
drafted a manifesto that appeared in several towns of the 
Bajio, and soon began to attract followers. It became one 
of the basic documents of Synarchism. It put forward the 
objectives of Synarchism:
"In view of the distressing problems 
that afflict the entire Nation, it is 
absolutely necessary that an 
organization made up of true patriots 
exists, an organization that strives 
for the restoration of the fundamental 
rights of every individual, and that 
has as its highest objective the 
salvation of the Fatherland.
As opposed to the Utopians who dream 
of a society without rulers and 
without laws, Synarchism wants a 
society, ruled by a legitimate 
authority - emanating from free 
democratic action of the people, that 
will guarantee a social order within 
which the people may find happiness, 
not in a selfish manner, but trying 
that everybody realized the good that 
each one wishes for oneself [... ] It 
would not be indifferent to any 
question of social significance; the 
common good will be its constant 
concern and it will permanently seek 
to attain it.
Synarchism is a manner of being and 
living? a manner of sentiment and work 
in the face of the problems which
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affect the general interest. It is 
spiritual action, charitable? it is 
the courage and the will to be always 
prepared to serve the rest.
A synarchist does not ask anything for 
himself, he should always be prepared 
to devote himself to any work that 
redounds to collective advantage? to 
lend the support of his physical 
strength, of this wealth, or of his 
talent to find an immediate and 
effective remedy for all that 
constitutes a social injustice.
The welfare of everyone, public 
happiness, and the moral and economic 
salvation of the country demands a 
price: the sacrifice and the effort of 
everyone, contributed according to his 
abilities.
Synarchism is a positive movement, 
which unifies, constructs, and 
dignifies: on the other hand it is
diametrically opposed to the doctrines 
which hold postulates of hate and 
devastation. Synarchism proclaims 
love for country and will oppose with 
all its strength systems which pretend 
to erase national boundaries, in order 
to convert the world into an immense 
fief, in which the perverse inventors 
of these theories may easily rule 
[...]
The Synarchist Organizing Committee 
issues a call in this Manifesto to all 
Mexicans who are ready to work for the 
glory of Mexico, to those unselfish 
persons who want to offer their 
cooperation in order to organize a new 
society based on just ice [ ...•].,|79
The Manifesto ended with its adopted motto: "PATRIA, 
JUSTICIA Y LIBERTAD" (Country, justice and liberty).
Jose Trueba Olivares wrote some years later, that the 
text was not in the nature of a manifesto. It was only a 
project of one, an outline of what he considered were the 
leading ideas for a manifesto and for future propaganda. 
It was Jose Antonio Urquiza who insisted on publishing it,
203
because he believed the ideas it contained were sufficient 
to form the core of the document. The document Trueba 
formulated managed to synthesize the desires of the group 
he commanded and the aspirations of the country as whole.80
Abascal found the text utopian in several points and 
ambiguous, lukewarm and too general, in others. He 
claimed that more than Urquiza, it was Gonzalo Campos who 
revised it.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the text lay in 
its vagueness: by avoiding any conflict of opinions, it 
could almost be given any interpretation and, thus, win 
the support and adhesion of all social classes. In this 
way, no direct reference was made to contemporary social, 
political or economic problems, so that the reader could 
be at liberty to interpret the "distressing problems that 
afflict the Nation". Besides, since the document aimed at 
no particular class, anybody who felt the victim of 
injustice: dispossessed landlords, hunted agraristas,
inflation-hit traders and even entrepreneurs threatened by 
collectivisation, could respond to the call to "strive for 
the restoration of the fundamental rights of every 
individual".
The manifesto expressed what the organization of the 
Movement had hoped for, namely, to appeal to all Mexicans 
of "good will" to work for the delivery of the Fatherland. 
Moreover, the text was reassuring about the Movement's 
intentions. There was an undeniable sense of goodwill 
when it declared its sincere desire to solve all social 
problems, even to the extent of self-sacrifice.
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However, looking at the text more closely, it 
transpires that the Revolution and the Communists, in 
particular, were the obvious targets? we read that it 
opposes doctrines of hate and destruction and that it will 
combat decisively systems that pretend to cancel borders 
and turn the world into an immense feudal organization. 
On the other hand, the paragraphs written by Trueba bring 
out more the dicta of social Catholicism, which attempt to 
solve social problems on an individual basis, through 
charity rather than a class struggle.
Undoubtedly, the general language used in the text 
was that common to Right-wing groups: there were calls to 
"save” and "sacrifice to the Fatherland", of "social 
order", of "common good", etc. However, this is not a 
sufficient condition to label Synarchism a fascist 
organization, as its critics did. The Catholic, 
nationalist and anti-communist tendencies, no doubt were 
suspicious of the Revolution, but it is easy to mistake 
religions and ultranationalism for full-scale commitment 
to Nazi or Fascist doctrine.
With the Manifesto as the first pronouncement of its 
ideological objectives, the UNS began the enormous task of 
forming a highly disciplined, ultranationalist 
organization which fulfilled the goals expressed. In the 
secret National Council of the Legions, in September 1937, 
Gonzalo Campos succeeded Julian Malo Juvera as National 
Leader. On 31 March, 1938, Jos6 Trueba Olivares resigned 
the presidency of the Organizing Committee to Manuel 
Zermeno, for economic reasons.81 On 4 May 1938, the UNS
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National Committee was integrated as follows: Leader,
Manuel Zermeno; Secretaries, Juan Ignacio Padilla, Alfonso 
Trueba Olivares, Feliciano Manrique, Felipe Navarro and
• i s oAntonio Martinez Aguayo.
ii) The UNS and the Base
Officially founded in May 1937, the UNS grew rapidly 
to an extent unthought of either by its founders or its 
foes. In the space of two years, it became a national 
movement of several hundred thousand members and a force 
to be reckoned with.
If the UNS benefited from the contingents of the 
Legions, this transfer should not, however, be 
overestimated. Many weakened legions had lost a 
significant number of their ranks through desertion. 
Besides, it seems that the secret leaders of the legions 
did not always encourage legionnaires to join the 
Movement. When they themselves participated in it, they 
invited their subordinates to follow them. But when, for 
various reasons, they worked solely at the level of the 
Base, they tended to keep their troops out of things. So 
much so, that many of those who joined the Synarchists did 
not realize, until after 1939, that the UNS had originated 
in the Legions and that, in fact, it was Section eleven of 
the organization.83
This thus seems to suggest that except for the 
leaders and a relatively marginal number of convinced 
members, the great majority of the legions did not adhere 
to the Synarchist Movement. This was the case of the old
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League for the Defence of Liberty, which continued to 
believe in the feasibility of armed struggle for regaining 
religious freedom and could not comprehend the reason for 
this civic, non-violent movement.
On the other hand, the UNS would reach other social 
strata which the Base had barely touched, like the 
peasantry. Indeed, Section 3 of the Base had worked in 
the countryside and had won some supporters, but it was 
nothing compared to the thousands of peasants that would 
form the bulk of the Synarchist troops.84
In the final analysis, although the UNS was conceived 
as a section of the Base, it looked, from the start, as a 
totally new and separate organization: it had its own
national leaders, it recruited in different social strata 
and, at least from an ideological point of view, it 
appeared more concerned with social problems.85 What is 
astonishing is that the leaders of Synarchism, Jose Trueba 
Olivares and Manuel Zermeno, did not seek to free the 
movement from the tutelage of the Base, when it appeared 
that there was no further need for it. This hesitation 
was very possibly due to a refusal by the UNS leaders to 
provoke a split with the Base, with unforeseen 
consequences. There are two considerations: firstly, they 
had not yet experienced the weight of a leader desirous to 
enter political action. Secondly, they expected political 
and material assistance from the Secret Council: material 
aid to bear the considerable expenses that the new 
organization entailed, and political aid to protect them 
from the dangers that they could face.
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In essence, they expected the Base to devote itself 
entirely to the development of the UNS and that the Secret 
Council would back the decisions of the Synarchist 
National Leader. Yet, it was not evident that it would do 
so. Certainly, the question of who would control and 
dominate the other was to overshadow relations between the 
two organizations.
However, since its foundation, the UNS was indirectly 
controlled by Antonio Santacruz, the prominent figure of 
the Secret Council, from whom the Synarchist leaders 
received their orders and the funds that were provided to 
run the Movement.86 This became more so when the Movement 
was forced to move out of Guanajuato, after Governor Luis 
I. Rodriguez exiled the leaders, on the grounds that 
their lives were threatened by the CTM and, because he 
would be held responsible if blood was shed,87 he wanted 
them out:
"So intense was the local popular 
frenzy in response to their 
declarations that the Governor of 
Guanajuato, an appointee and puppet 
for president Cardenas, drove the 
Committee from his state, whereupon 
they established offices in Mexico 
City and began publication of a 
mimeographed 'El Boletin* in an effort 
to develop a national organization”.88
iii) The rise of Synarchism
After the foundation of the movement in May 1937, the 
original members went out to spread it. They were young, 
cultivated, and intelligent? mostly under thirty-two years 
of age, they had abandoned lucrative careers as lawyers 
and civil servants to lead what they hoped would be a
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spiritual revival of the Mexican masses.89 To spread the 
doctrine, they went from village to village always living 
as the poorest peasant. In their meagre dress and habits 
of poverty, they sought to emulate the proselytizing 
methods of early Christian missionaries. When the 
Synarchist propagandist arrived at a village, he would 
assemble the most prominent Catholics and organize them 
into a cell. Each of them would, in turn, contact five 
more of the faithful, thus increasing the size of the 
Movement.90 Making use of self-sacrifice, martyrdom and 
military-like training and discipline, the UNS was 
definitely hierarchical and authoritarian.
The first norm of Synarchist conduct epitomized the 
spirit of the Movement:
"Hate the easy and comfortable way of 
life. We have no right to it while 
Mexico is unfortunate. Love
discomfort, danger and death"91
Almost every issue of El Sinarquista since the death 
of Jose Antonio Upquiza contained some reference to the 
blood being spilled by Synarchists for the glory of God 
and country. "God", it proclaimed, "requires blood for 
the salvation of Mexico."92
By means of these methods, Synarchism was capable of 
creating a fearsome popular organization, posing, in the 
meantime, an embarrassment, even a conflict, for the 
government. Synarchism secured indirect control in 
several small towns and villages? however, in the early 
stages, it grew very slowly as a result of insufficient 
funds and of government repression. In November 1937, the
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Synarchist headquarters in Guanajuato were raided; yet, 
the police did not pursue the matter very far. The 
governor, however, gave the leaders a few days to abandon 
the state. At the end of 1937, the UNS counted nearly 
five thousand members, and by the middle of 1938, the 
organization was expanding fully.
In January appeared the first issue of the "Boletin 
de la Union Nacional Sinarquista", followed, in June, by 
"Sinarquismo", a monthly magazine. This magazine became, 
after the eighth issue, the newspaper "El Sinarquista". 
It also published "Orden" an illustrated monthly magazine. 
Through these, it carried out an active and skilful 
campaign in favour of its general principles and 
particularly on behalf of the liberation of the country, 
in the interest of the common man, against the domination
• • • 93of the "communist" authorities.
According to Padilla, as the news of the new 
organization spread, the traditional champions of the 
Church, like the Cristeros, became interested in and 
attracted to the new organization.94 As a result, between 
May 1938 and May 1939, the numbers multiplied threefold, 
from ten to thirty thousand. Yet, the results were 
insignificant when compared with what was achieved the 
following year, when the organization reached nearly two 
hundred thousand elements, or "soldiers", as they tended 
to be called. This impressive increase could be 
attributed to both internal and external circumstances.95
There is little doubt that among the internal causes 
that contributed to the tremendous growth of Synarchism,
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was the role played by Abascal which was significant and 
decisive. He became the most important leader the UNS 
ever had? he infused vitality and enthusiasm into a 
considerable national political force. His militant 
spirit transformed the nature and the perception of 
Synarchism. Under his rule, its activities were fiery, 
intense and audacious.
During 1937 and 1938, Abascal worked as organizer and 
propagandist for the legions? first in his native 
Michoacan and later in the Northern states. Later on, he 
founded Synarchist councils in the Mexican communities of 
the United States, especially in the Southern states, and 
in Los Angeles, in particular, in November 1937. In May 
of the same year, he travelled to the South-East of 
Mexico, where he first obtained notoriety after the 
success of the Tabasco campaign: he organized and led a 
march through the capital, Villahermosa, consisting of 
thousands of peasants, in protest at the anticlericalism 
of the government. Marches were to be the feature and the 
nucleus of his Synarchist leadership. He declared some 
years later that the bloody events of Villahermosa (30 May 
1938)96 convinced him of the possibilities of aggressive, 
non-violent marches, and in particular, of passive 
resistance.97
The victory in Tabasco gave a boost to the legions, 
and hence to Synarchism, showing that concrete results 
could be achieved. It was at this time that Manuel 
Zermeno assumed the National Leadership? Abascal became 
the second in command.
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On 12 January 1939, Zermeno was stabbed in the back, 
following a Synarchist rally in Tepic, that was broken up 
amid violence. As a result of this injury, he was 
incapacitated for a time. Thereafter, Abascal took over 
most of the responsibilities of the leadership of the 
Movement. He remained, until December 1940, a dominant 
figure. During this period, Synarchism rose from a rather 
negligible provincial group of twenty thousand men, to be 
the most important political force of the country, after 
the official party; this in a country of not more than
• • • • 98twenty million inhabitants;
"The cry of blood which first began to 
be heard in the black earth of the 
Bajio, and later in Queretaro and 
Tabasco, and much later in Colima and 
Yucatan, in San Luis Potosi, in 
Puebla, Jalisco, etc., provided a 
veritable explosion which made the 
entire country tremble".99
The impressive growth of Synarchism was influenced by 
several factors, among which were the political 
consequences of the presidential elections of 1940 and, 
especially, the sentiment of frustration and discontent 
that ensued. No less significant to all Right-wing 
organizations was the victory of the Nationalist side in 
the Spanish civil war, and the rise in prestige of 
European Fascism. Still, it was the figure of Abascal and 
the dynamism of his personality which determined that 
growth; in the words of an analyst, he gave a mystical 
quality to the Movement;100 which Abascal himself 
corroborated. He saw Synarchism as a formidable and 
genuine Franciscan Movement. Power would come later, he
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said, and it would come with the inevitable use of force, 
but more than anything else, it would come as a 
consequence of:
"the upshot of the spiritual 
regeneration of the people, the pith 
of my policy was to throw the people 
into the arms of the Church; 
Catholicism is the essence of Mexico, 
therefore it was necessary that the 
people deeply lived out again their 
religion."
Therefore, Synarchism considered that within the 
essence of Mexico was Catholicism and within Catholicism 
true freedom, that is, the freedom of acting in good faith 
and embracing the truth.
Guided by his experience in Tabasco, Abascal began 
the era of massive Synarchist marches. These were usually 
carried out without the consent of the authorities, 
thereby unleashing government persecution:
"Since the danger was constant,
because we never asked permission to
make our rallies, parades and
concentrations, that were many, [...],
to the extent that one could say that
for a year and half - from August 1940
to December 1941 - we lived in
• • » 102 permanent mobilization [...]".
Some writers have found correlation between the 
arrival of Abascal and the increase of Synarchist 
martyrdom: in the first couple of years of its existence, 
there were very few martyrs? but after the "Abascal 
method" was introduced in 1939, the number rose to 
seventeen? in 1940, there were thirty eight, and in 1941, 
thirty two more.103 Violent death gave the Movement a
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tremendous energy and vigour.104
The "new method” began in June 1939 when Abascal 
asked Zermeno to authorize him to "capture” the city of 
Guanajuato by surprise, in response to the second raid on 
the offices of the organization by a group of miners, on 
8 June.105
On 25 June 1939, he captured the town hall (Palacio 
de Gobierno) . By the time the police realized what was 
happening, there were already one thousand men standing at 
the doors of the hall; the UNS headquarters were set in a 
house opposite. The doors were locked from the inside? 
the Governor was in the building at the time. Abascal 
explained that they did not intend to occupy the building, 
they were only going to address the crowds and manifest 
their discontent about the attacks they had suffered, 
which had gone unpunished. He prepared a programme with 
seven speakers, including Manuel Zermeno.
At the end of the rally, Abascal was arrested? this 
would be one of his many visits to Mexican gaols. He 
understood very early on that these arrests served to 
inflame the masses and to win more followers.106
These marches, eventually, ended in massacres. Two 
were notorious. On 10 July 1939, agrarian reserves 
attacked a group of Synarchists that were propagandizing 
in the village of Juan Martin, near Celaya? five died and 
eleven were injured. The following day, the funeral 
procession was attacked when it made its way through the 
centre of Celaya; seven people were killed and eight 
injured. Among the dead was Maria Teresa Bustos, the
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first woman martyr of the Movement and one of the most 
revered. She died carrying the national flag; as a 
symbolic gesture of unity each outgoing national leader of 
the UNS delivered to his successor the flag which she was 
carrying at the time of her death? it had major symbolic
• • 107value, even to the extent of mysticism. After Celaya, 
as Synarchist propaganda spread, all of the Bajio became 
aware of it and was prompt to adhere. Demonstration 
followed upon demonstration, increasing in size and in 
geographical dimension.108
Synarchist marches reached huge proportions in 1941. 
The most significant took place in Morelia, in May, when 
fifteen thousand Synarchist "soldiers" marched, in strict 
discipline and in silence; though not the largest 
demonstration in numbers, it was the most famous because 
it coincided with the visit of President Avila Camacho. 
There were many federal troops in and around the city. 
Yet, although they knew of the march, they could not 
prevent the Synarchists from entering the city? the sudden 
apperrance of hundreds of Synarchists, with their orators 
exposing the Revolution and the President that headed it, 
was an enormous embarrassment to the government.109
Zermeno declared:
"Our Movement, eminently constructive, 
has been, is and will have to be, 
assertion and life. The Synarchist 
will never make common cause with 
those who, seeking personal profit, 
provoke fratricidal revolutions that 
put the destiny of Mexico in alien 
hands which up to now have been the 
only ones to have decided the fate of 
the Fatherland [...]1,110
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Abascal ended the rally by expressing that Synarchism 
was "la Hilicia del Espiritu": that is to say, the
discipline that each Synarchist must exert over his own 
acts, before he attempts the vast task to win over and 
save others.111
After Morelia, not surprisingly, the government began 
to take measures to eliminate Synarchism. Attacks against 
the UNS multiplied, and demands from different sides were 
raised for its suppression.
Initially, the government had not taken any important 
measures to limit the activities of the Synarchists and 
the violent clashes that took place were usually of local 
dimension and involved the agrarian reserves; besides the 
movement was not considered to be of any relative 
significance to worry the government? in addition, all 
through that year, all the attention was concentrated on 
the presidential elections. In fact, the first time that 
Synarchism was discussed in Congress was in October 1940, 
when a deputy from Michoacan, Luis Ordorica Cerda,
denounced it in a speech. The truth of the matter was
• 112 that little was known of the Movement.
iv) The UNS and the 1940 elections
During the election campaign of 1940, tension was 
high and revolution was in the air. The two most 
important candidates for the presidency, General Manuel 
Avila Camacho and General Juan Andreu Almazan, approached 
the UNS in an effort to solicit its backing. Avila 
Camacho, as candidate, wanted to pact with Synarchism,
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offering justice to it. The UNS replied that it would 
neither go with Almazan nor with any other candidate, 
because it was convinced that there would be fraud in the 
elections.113 Abascal declared at a public meeting at 
Acambaro, in Michoacan, that Synarchism should not back 
Almazan or Avila Camacho because:
"they both are branches of the same 
old, rotten trunk of the Mexican 
Revolution[...] Participating in the 
elections would have cost hundreds of 
lives, with no real benefit."
The facts were to prove him right; in a single day, 
7 July 1940, more Almazan supporters died than Synarchists 
in two years.114
The same idea was expounded by Manuel Zermeno on the 
third anniversary of the UNS, at Leon, where he said that 
the elections were only an expedient pretext for an armed 
revolution already in the making. Communism and all the 
enemies of Mexico, he said, were waiting for an 
opportunity to spread anarchy and terror, the only means 
by which they could reach power. He added:
"our attitude, valiantly patriotic, 
will never prepare the triumph of 
Communism in Mexico".115
In July 1940, when the presidential election took 
place, Synarchism had grown and counted 360,000 members.116 
The following month, Abascal was promoted to National 
Leader. During the presidential campaign, the UNS kept 
strictly out of it? from its foundation, it had stated 
that it was not a political party and had no electoral
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ambition:
"We do not want to form a political 
party, words that involve the idea of 
division. We want to win over all men 
of all parties: to bring them together 
to the things that unite us, above 
those that separate us. For this 
reason, we reject the political 
qualification that some pretend to 
give to Synarchism. We are not a 
party, and we reject even more the 
idea of political party."117
The Synarchists proclaimed that under the existing 
circumstances all elections were a farce and that 
Synarchism was not going to provide credibility for the 
system by either pt/thwf op or backing a candidate.
"Synarchism is a civic movement of 
popular masses that aspires to their 
legitimate moral and material 
advancement? it is mainly concerned 
with the condition of the Mexican 
worker and peasant[...] Synarchism is 
not, and does not wish to be, a 
political party. Its fundamental 
interest lies in its social programme 
for the workers and peasants of 
Mexico.1,118
In the months that followed the elections, there was 
the prospect of an armed rebellion under the defeated 
candidate Almazan.119 Synarchism presented an alternative 
means to express opposition without resorting to arms; the 
charisma of Abascal gave thousands of peasants a man to 
follow. The number of adherents doubled between July and 
December, reaching half a million.120
During this period, Abascal led the Movement to a 
high degree of militancy? he declared that he would make 
of every synarchist "a man half-monk-half-soldier", ready
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to sacrifice himself. It was during this time that the 
••Ten Norms of Conduct11 were drafted, preaching self-denial 
for the synarchist soldier.121
Similarly, in the early months of his leadership he 
gave the Movement its rigid militaristic structure, 
because he argued:
”[Synarchism] had to acquire the 
mobility, the precision and the 
flexibility of an army on the verge of 
battle".
The Government did not perceive the Synarchist 
Movement as a serious threat until after the elections, 
when it was apparent that it had become the most important 
opposition force. It was not until July 1941 that 
President Avila Camacho sent instructions to all state 
governors and to the Minister of Defence, pressing them to 
apply the laws vigorously when dealing with the UNS; he 
argued that the organization encompassed division of the 
Nation. Consequently, in order to prevent clashes between 
the Synarchists and groups of opposite tendencies, the 
Synarchist leadership should only organize demonstrations 
when prior authorization by the local authority had been 
issued.123
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CHAPTER IV
EMERGENCE IN THE POLITICAL SCENE# 1939-1940
Thirty thousand Synarchists in December 1938, three 
hundred and sixty thousand in August 1940, at the end of 
Manuel Zermeno's term as leader of the Movement; such was 
the impressive growth of the UNS after only eighteen 
months of existence.1 Even if the numbers are not entirely 
accurate, there is no doubt that in the space of such a 
short period, it had become a real political force to be 
reckoned with.
The apparent strength of the Movement that the 
numbers revealed, soon left no doubt as to its secret 
aims. Since its formation, the Communists had not ceased 
to accuse the UNS of wanting to impose a Fascist 
government in Mexico. It was not long before the left- 
wing of the PRM, the CTM, and the CNC were convinced that 
an organization capable of mobilizing, in a short period 
of time, some ten thousand men, and to take a city, or 
other objective, could have very dangerous political 
ambitions. A paradoxical situation was arrived at by 
1940, whereby the leader Manuel Zermeno still believed 
that he commanded a movement incapable of seizing power, 
for the time being at least, whereas other nationalist 
groups and the Government were very much aware of its 
importance.
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I The UNS and other nationalist groups
Independently of the Communists, the first to 
recognize the importance of the Synarchist Movement were 
the nationalist groups that had grown in number during the 
Cardenas years, to fight Communism.2
Since the beginning of 1939, many of these groups 
sought to establish close relationships with the UNS. 
This was the case with the HFrente Constitucionalista 
Democratico Mexicano", of the "Partido Social Democrata"; 
and, of the "Vanguardia Nacionalista Mexicana". These 
associations resembled each other in their hatred 
displayed against Communism, their anti-Jewish racism, 
their admiration for Germany and for Franco*s Spain, and 
their tendency to use violence as a means of action.8
Their approach to the UNS was facilitated by a 
sympathizer, Jos£ Trinidad Cervantes, writer of El 
Sinarquista, who could bring them to the national leader. 
Hence, the president of the Vanguardia Nacionalista, Ruben 
Moreno Padres, was insistent about wanting to have a UNS 
representative at their meetings. Similarly, the Partido 
Social Democrata wrote to Cervantes, on 4 February 1939, 
inviting him to form a nationalist bloc:
11 We believe that the organization that 
you lead with courage and success, 
which is fully identified with the 
real opinion of the Mexican people, 
and staunchly opposes the communist 
leanings of the present regime, ought 
to cooperate, preserving its own 
autonomy, with the other independent 
organizations, so as to fulfil more 
thoroughly the objectives set in our 
respective programmes."4
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The Social Democratic Party ignored almost everything 
about the Synarchist Movement? above all, it thought 
Cervantes was the national leader.
As for the Frente Constitucional Democratico 
Mexicano, founded by army officers, and pursuing the same 
aim, it contacted Jos6 de Jesus Sam L6pez, a Synarchist of 
the early days and close follower of Abascal, who wrote 
to Manuel Zermeno for instructions:
111 had the pleasure of meeting Lie. 
Gonzalez, a fine person and, in my 
judgement, he seems a good fighting 
element: he has given us guidance
about how to deal with the gentlemen 
of the Front, who were in this office 
to insist that we must adhere to them, 
All this has been arranged by Lie. 
Gonzalez and Sr. Cervantes. As you 
indicated to us, we have told the 
Front, without giving up absolutely 
anything, that we are with them, that 
we sympathize with their way of being, 
etc. (diplomacy, nothing else); 
please, let us know what we should do 
next [... ]1,5
Even the "Gold Shirts", which had been authorized to 
resume their activities in the Republic, asked the 
director of El Sinarquista, on 3 October 1939, to issue a 
press bulletin explaining the reasons for their struggle, 
and invited Manuel Zermeno to participate in the 
inauguration of their new premises, on 5 June.6
Ultimately, all these nationalist groups that 
concealed behind bombastic declarations the weakness of 
their numbers, would have hoped to become allied with the 
UNS which already was a genuine popular movement.
However, the UNS leader, conscious of the strength of
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his organization, did not intend to put his men at the 
service of a nationalist cause to which they did not 
entirely subscribe to. In March 1939, he explained to the 
Regional Committee of Tepic the reasons for his 
reservations:
"We learned of the visit that the 
President of the 'Vanguardia 
Nacionalista1 made to that city and of 
the invitation he extended to 
Synarchism to attend one of their 
meetings in that city. Our position 
with regard to the anti-Communist 
organization that are fighting in 
Mexico, with so different methods, is 
simply one of friendship, and does not 
entail any commitment on our behalf. 
Heretofore, we have not made any 
alliance pact with any of them, 
because we want to preserve the purity 
of our Movement, keeping it away from 
the ambition that drives many of these 
groups, most of which only emerged at 
the eleventh hour. With 'Vanguardia 
Nacionalista' we could not easily have 
an understanding because the kind of 
nationalism that they vindicate is 
less extensive than ours, which 
strives to improve Mexico by 
encouraging her own sons, something 
that does not come out in the 
programme of the vanguardistas, who 
preach unrestrained violence and 
similar things with which Synarchism 
will never agree."7
For the same reason, Zermeno had previously rejected,
on 20 January, to participate in the Confederacion
Nacionalista Democratica - which already assembled several
small groups:
"Because the postulates of the 
Confederacion profess the destruction 
of the PRM, the CTM, the CNC and the 
Communist party, because of the 
leaders that preside over them? at the 
same time they pretend to bind 
together organizations which have yet 
to see the public light."8
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Not discouraged by these rebuffs, the nationalist 
groups persisted in their attempts; but it seems that once 
the UNS had opted to abstain in the presidential 
elections, it broke all contact with them. After the 
defeat of Almazan all the nationalist groups disappeared 
without trace, while the Synarchist Movement flourished.
Finally, it was not so much the recognition by the 
nationalist groups itself which accounted for the 
importance of the UNS in national political life? in fact, 
it became, in competition with the recently created PAN, 
a spokesman for nationalist-right opinion opposed to 
Cardenas and that is why its role in the 1940 presidential 
election was so crucial.
It is important to define the role of the UNS's 
influence on the elections because, contrary to the 
disbanding of all the other groups and parties formed for 
the occasion, the Synarchist Movement was, in 1940, a 
perfectly organized mass movement with some three hundred 
thousand members of the middle and peasant classes of the 
central states.
Despite the non-political stand of the leaders until 
then, it was very difficult not to take sides and, at the 
start of the presidential campaign, Manuel Zermeno found 
himself confronted with this dilemma: either he gave up 
the non-political attribute and backed the candidature of 
Almazan, by running the risk of launching his men in an 
armed rebellion if the PRM did not recognize the victory 
of the opposition, or, he maintained the traditional non­
political attitude of the Movement, which amounted to
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playing into the hands of Avila Camacho. On the one hand, 
if he followed the first path and refused to commit 
himself to violence - since he was convinced that the 
Government would not accept defeat - he risked losing his 
troops after the elections? on the other hand, if he gave 
the order to abstain in the elections, he would come up 
against the opinion of the militants and thus, risked 
seeing them leave, too.
Furthermore, the Government needed to obtain the 
neutrality of this worrisome movement to guarantee a 
peaceful succession. Indeed, Avila Camacho did not expect 
to win the support of the Synarchists, but if he could buy 
their neutrality the Almazan front would be broken and a 
peasant rebellion avoided.9
The actual position of the UNS with regard to the 
elections was the result of all those contradictions; 
right up to polling day, ambiguity characterized this 
attitude. Yet, this ambiguity allowed Zermeno to make a 
'tour de force': to turn the neutrality of the UNS to
Avilla Camacho while preserving his troops and preventing 
them from 'taking to the mountains'.
Justification for neutrality was not hard to make? in 
the context of the Mexican Revolution, the Synarchist view 
was that anarchy and fraud prevailed? therefore, how was 
it possible to expect the advent of an honest government? 
A change of President at the top of the government would 
not alter things in any way. After all, because the PRM 
would not respect the people's voice, it was useless to 
participate in the electoral contest. What the people
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needed was not a change of the man at the top, not a 
revolution which would only install a new figure, but a 
profound change that emanated from the people themselves. 
Only from a strong, hard working, moral people would a 
worthy government arise.10 For this policy to be coherent 
it would have necessitated a systematic maintaining of 
abstention in the 1940 elections. Still, the study of El 
Sinarquista and of the national directives revealed a 
number of contradictions. In general terms, however, the 
Movement was consistent with its decision. It never 
indicated that it would support either candidate.11 It 
constantly repeated that the UNS was not a party, that it 
was not presenting a candidate of its own and, that it 
would not back either Almazdn or Avila Camacho. The fact 
is that the UNS did not change its attitude during the 
campaign.
"El Sinarquista" of 30 June 1939, gave the official 
position of the Movement: "We are not a political party,"
it announced, and on 17 August, it made clear that "we do 
not have a candidate to nominate." On 7 September, it 
appealed to the discipline of the Movement and restated 
its commitment to remain outside the electoral process. 
It would not participate because the elections would only 
bring to power a new group.12
The position of the Movement was summed up in "El 
Sinarquista" of 1 February 1940, where it also condemned 
any attempt to rise up:
"We Synarchists must see things with 
a clear mind. The elections are a 
foregone conclusion, the Government
235
has already decided? it lets the 
people distract themselves by 
acclaiming a candidate whose victory 
is impossible. Today, like in all 
similar occasions of our History, it 
is the group in power who has elected 
the president's successor. The 
promises that the Government gave to 
respect the vote, even if they were 
sincere they would be ineffectual. 
Imposition is an inescapable fact that 
has no remedy but this: violence. And 
it is necessary to open the eyes of 
the people about the futility of an 
armed movement for the respect of the 
popular will [... ] Synarchists should 
have no illusions that the 
presidential elections can set a new 
state of affairs; and oppose any 
attempt to disturb the peace of Mexico 
in an armed struggle for public 
power.1,13
These excerpts give the impression of absolute 
lucidity. Nothetheless, at the same time, any mention of 
the order to abstain is carefully avoided. Quite the 
opposite, throughout 1939 and until February 1940, 
allegations of electoral fraud, and assertions of 
principles were paradoxically accompanied by an appeal to 
all Synarchists to exercise their right to vote. Thus, 
Manuel Zermeno called for discipline and obedience of 
those who militated in the Movement and, at the same time, 
he ordered the leaders to keep their groups out of the 
electoral contest? he explained that the "Synarchist 
citizen has the duty to vote and the right to do it for 
the candidate he considers less harmful." And added that 
at the time of polling, all Synarchists should cast their 
vote.
"But a Synarchist, as a faithful 
soldier of a discipline and 
hierarchical group, must forbear to 
belong to any political party or 
electoral club."
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Throughout this period, the leaders of the UNS made 
a distinction between the stand of the Movement and the 
individual attitude of each Synarchist. However, since 
the majority of the articles printed were negative to 
Avila Camacho, and more favourable to Almazan, it would 
appear that the leadership was urging the members to vote 
individually for the latter.
An important change of position occurred in early 
1940. Ostensibly, the same attitude was followed, yet, no 
more reference was made to voting; rather the opposite, it 
was repeatedly stressed that voting was useless in the 
prevailing circumstances of the time.
The correspondence of the national leader with the 
Committees is no more explicit on the matter. It stressed 
the need to abstain, but reasserted even in June 1940:
"Heretofore we have not denied our 
people the right to vote, instead we 
ask that they remain united in our 
ranks until the elections.1,15
Only five days before polling day, the position of 
the UNS was finally made unequivocally clear? all leaders 
were issued these instructions:
"1. All Synarchists will abstain from 
voting next Sunday 7 for any of 
the registered candidates.
2. If anybody, in private, is 
determined to exercise his civic 
right to vote, he will do so for 
a non-registered candidate.
3. Leaders and notable Synarchists 
of each place will not go to 
vote, under any circumstances.1116
237
Many areas, however, did not receive the instructions 
on time. The question arises of how to account for this 
unequivocal stand.
During 1939 and until February 1940, the leadership 
of the Movement gave way to its sympathies for Almazan. 
Both the leadership of the Base and Manuel Zermeno, 
national leader of UNS, contacted, separately, the 
candidate, to negotiate the conditions for an eventual 
support of his candidature. Notwithstanding the personal 
sympathy that Almazan inspired in them, the officials came 
out of their interviews unsettled? they soon realized that 
nothing could be expected of him. They decided, without 
committing the Movement, to let the members make their own 
choice, knowing full well that it would go to the 
candidate of the opposition.
In February 1940, then, the Movement changed its 
policy after Manuel Zermeno and Avila Camacho came to an 
agreement. Indeed, the leaders were approached by the 
Avila Camacho camp in view of obtaining the neutrality of 
the UNS. A first meeting took place in Queretaro between 
the Regional leader of Queretaro and a representative of 
Avila Camacho (Manuel Mendizabal) whereby the latter tried 
to convey the sincerity of Avila Camacho towards the UNS. 
The decisive meeting took place some days later between 
Miguel Aleman and Manuel Zermeno. On that occasion, it 
was agreed that the future president would undertake to 
give tenure to the ejidatarios of their plots, in exchange 
for the promise that the UNS would abstain in the 
elections.17 This agreement was kept secret by both camps,
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or else, it would have been considered an act of 
unspeakable treason.
Zermeno found himself, thereof, confronted by the 
problem of how to secure the individual abstention of all 
Synarchists, when they had already accepted, with 
difficulty, that the UNS did not officially support 
Almazan? besides, the ban on taking part in the political 
clubs of their choice had greatly shocked them. If, on 
top of that, he were to instruct them that they should not 
participate, as ordinary persons, in the election, he 
would have to expect violent reactions on their part.
One gathers from the correspondence between the 
national and the Local Committees that these demands 
provoked resentment and surprise, and the reaction shifted 
from a state of utter confusion to sheer rebellion. Many 
local leaders found it difficult to maintain discipline in 
the ranks. Those militants who entered political clubs, 
or attended political rallies, did so, they argued, as 
citizens and not as Synarchists.
Complying with the order to abstain was all the more 
difficult because of the constant pressure exerted by the 
almazanistas, the clergy and the PAN, which conspired to 
change their minds.18 The almazanistas harassed and 
threatened them; the clergy condemned abstention according 
to the norms of Moral Theology? and the PAN did everything 
to try to convince them to follow it, even if it meant 
separating them from their organization. Equally 
aggressive were the attacks of the agrarian reserves.19
Consequently, on polling day, the order to abstain
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was irregularly observed; some committees reported that 
the majority of their members had complied (e.g., San Jose 
Iturbide, Guanajuato)? while others declared, on the 
contrary, that their members had voted for Almazan. Many 
States gave accounts of disobedience:
"Despite the intense campaign carried 
out by the District Committee for the 
NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTIONS, 
there were many farms under our 
jurisdiction in the territory of the 
State of Guanajuato, whose Synarchist 
members disobeyed the order and voted 
for Almazan [...]"
The report went on:
"With regard to the villages under our 
control, situated in Michoacan, we are 
happy to say that few Synarchists went 
to vote. However, everybody has 
turned against us with their 
criticisms and false testimonies. We 
were called all the names under the 
sun: weak, traitors, to have sold
ourselves to Camacho, to be the allies 
of imposition? all the same, we 
remained unruffled [... ] "20
In the days that followed the elections the situation 
was somewhat confused, yet the national leader, more 
concerned about recovering the unity of his troops than 
about punishing offenders, expelled from the movement the 
most notorious rebels and asked local leaders to reinstate 
all those who had a valid excuse for being dragged by the 
almazanistas.
Nevertheless, the UNS faced a more serious problem: 
the refusal by the PRM to acknowledge the alleged victory 
of Almazan, threatened to trigger off an imminent armed 
uprising.21 Confronted with this danger, the position of
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the national leader was unambiguous: "NO REVOLUTION", he 
had incessantly declared since the start of the 
presidential campaign, and had suspended the holding of 
public assemblies in all the country while the state of 
political unrest lasted.
In spite of his orders, there were disturbing signs 
of revolt spreading in Queretaro. Salvador Abascal, who 
had just succeeded Zermeno as national leader (on 6 August
1940), was informed that about two hundred men had risen
• • ■ 22up in arms near the city, from Guanajuato.
Still, the effort put together by all Synarchist 
leaders was sufficient to pacify the rebels and to put 
down their arms, except in three municipalities of 
Jalisco, Michoacan and Guanajuato, where the rebels joined 
the almazanistas in arms.
To conclude, the fiasco of Almazan and his withdrawal 
from political life proved Zermeno right, and the 
movement, which had gone through a serious threat of 
dissolution during the election campaign, came out more 
vigorous than before to continue its startling rise
• • 23through the impetus of its new leader: Salvador Abascal.
II Synarchism Survives the Elections
After the elections of 1940, the same pressures that 
precipitated the decline of other nationalist groups, also 
had a profound effect on the Synarchist Movement. 
However, the Movement did not disappear immediately after 
the elections, as was the case with the other 
organizations; it was the opposite? during the 1941-1944
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period, it reached great notoriety and its numerous 
activities were widely commented upon and analysed.24
That the Movement soared in the course of that period 
was partly due to the fact that it was the largest
opposition movement during the war years and, the most 
singular exponent of the radical Right? an event that was 
cause for concern to the Left. Nonetheless, in
retrospect, it can be seen that the organization reached 
its peak at the end of 1940, and from that moment its
growth was minimal. That it did not crumble during that
period, despite the lack of growth, and that the rest of 
the nationalist organizations were in full decline, could 
be attributed to the nature of the movement, as well as to 
external factors.
The majority of the Synarchists were devout peasants. 
Therefore, the moderate stand adopted by Avila Camacho 
with regard to the Church, tended to ease the causes of 
discontent of this people and, hence to undermine the 
interest in the organization? at the same time, Avila 
Camacho drastically cut land redistribution, which had an 
adverse effect on Synarchism. Consequently, Synarchists 
were, on the one hand, more trustful of the Government? on 
the other hand, since the majority were farmers, 
Synarchism continued to attract them, because it promised 
them a plot of land of their own, the most desirable 
economic aspiration of the Mexican peasantry.
Unlike other nationalist groups, the strength of the 
UNS lay in its unity and centralist leadership. In the 
early forties, the Synarchists were increasingly concerned
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with containing the advance of Protestantism, the
perennial threat of the Mexican Church, that hindered the 
ultranationalism advocated by Synarchism. The new
emphasis put on combating Protestantism was encouraged, 
not only because it was the stratagem employed by the 
leaders to keep intact the organization, but also because 
of the inflow of Protestant missionaries in Latin America 
during that period, who had been driven out of Asia by the
25war.
Moveover, Synarchism initially found a new impetus 
when Mexico entered the war, especially with the
introduction of a law for compulsory military training.26
Since early 1942, there had been frequent reference to the 
need to introduce a system of universal military training?
• 27something that the UNS resolutely 'opposed
This worried the peasants who felt that the forces at 
war in Europe and Asia menaced their welfare and peace. 
Therefore, there was little sympathy for the war among 
Synarchists and, even less so when their children risked 
being drafted. When military service became compulsory, 
they refused to obey, contending that, in the end, the 
decision to enlist was the responsibility of each 
Synarchist father.
Nevertheless, once the law was introduced, the 
position of the leadership was one of obedience, even if 
it did not agree with it.28 This attitude led many 
Synarchists to feel betrayed and hence abandoned the 
Movement, as transpires from the following passage:
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"When, sadly, Mexico became involved 
in the world conflict, the authorities 
of the country issued the Emergency 
Laws, which, according to our 
tradition of respect of the Law, we 
observed calmly, particularly when 
they were not against our conscience 
and when not obeying them would mean 
contumacy and treason. Indeed, this 
attitude of ours, which was the 
appropriate one in the circumstances, 
compelled us to adopt a clear posture 
in line with the Emergency Laws, 
which restricted our activities? 
consequently, the enthusiasm of our 
members was considerably hurt [...] 
Yet, what harmed us most was the 
opposition of the Mexican people to 
the Law of Compulsory Military 
Service, which was a novelty to them, 
and a danger? the danger of having to 
fight outside the fatherland for 
something they did not understand, 
Democracy, which they had never 
experienced. Many parents and youths 
affected were hoping that Synarchism 
would rise against the Law? however, 
they were very disappointed to hear 
that the Leader, Torres Bueno had 
agreed to comply with the order and 
had asked everybody to remain calm. 
We all know the effect that this had 
on many and how many left us. They 
did not understand that before the 
individual interest comes that of 
Mexico which was in a State of War and 
that we had to be ready to defend her 
if she was attacked."
Another element that contributed to the strengthening 
of Synarchism in the early forties was the serious drought 
that affected several states of the Republic, occasioning
# • • S Owidespread famine until 1944.
The damage caused by the fall in production was made 
worse by the reduction in the import of foodstuffs due to 
the war. These conditions affected, primarily, the 
landless peasants, the poorest sector of the Mexican 
society and the backbone of the UNS.
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The various factors that conduced to promote the 
Synarchist Movement in the early forties were, however, 
redressed by the series of policies adopted by the 
Government of Avila Camacho.
Yet, Avila Camacho was not a counter-revolutionary. 
He did not seek to undo what his predecessors had done 
before. He pledged himself to uphold the principles of 
the Revolution, but he played the rdle of the 
consolidator, rather than the militant. He surprised 
friends and foe alike by being a skilful, if 
unsensational, leader, by capably steering his 
administration through the early domestic political crises 
and showing leadership in the field of war-torn foreign 
policy. Class struggle yielded to national unity, 
agrarian reform to industrialization, and revolution to 
evolution.31 Consequently, the Movement virtually remained 
with the same number of adherents from 1941 to 1944.
Although the UNS did not collapse immediately after 
1940, like most of the other nationalist groups the first 
signs of a split in the organization appeared in 1941, and 
they were to grow broader until they destroyed it. 
Nevertheless, except for the leaders of the organization, 
the aggravation of the split remained imperceptible to the 
majority, until it became apparent in 1944.
Ill The Decline of the Nationalist Right
With the elections of 1940, the Mexican Right 
attained the peak of its power. From that moment, it 
experienced an uneven but constant decline. The religious
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Right, exemplified by Synarchism, then reached a stage 
where it remained for a long time before collapsing. Its 
demise, however, was more sudden and came just after the 
elections. The causes of its decline can be classified 
into three broad categories:
(1) the moderation of the Government of Avila Camacho;
(2) the influence of external events? and
(3) the attraction that PAN exerted on the non-religious
Right.
The Mexican Revolution, after the elections of 1940,
followed a different course than previously.32 The Avila
Camacho adminstration began an era of moderation that 
contrasted sharply with the intense social reforms of 
Cardenas. Yet, in spite of the differences between the 
two administrations, there was no radical reduction in the 
social achievements realized by C&rdenas. In fact, 
Cardenas continued to exert important decision power in 
the new administration? and later, as Minister of Defence, 
he was in charge of one of the most sensitive posts of the
t • • 33administration.
Obviously, the waning of the radicalism of the 
Mexican Revolution had a comparable effect on its radical 
opponents and on the direction the moderation of the 
Government took. Perhaps the most important change that 
the new administration made, with regard to the 
nationalist Right, was the attitude of the Government 
towards the Church and religion. This change was 
anticipated when, in September 1940, as President-Elect,
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Avila Camacho declared that he was a believer. By 
affirming it he became the first incoming President of 
Mexico, in many years, to openly express having a 
religious creed.34 In the same statement, Avila Camacho 
made further attempts to try to gain influence with the 
Right, when he declared that he was not a socialist but a 
democrat? Cardenas and Vicente Lombardo Toledano would not 
participate in his Government and no communist would be 
allowed to intervene in his administration.
Many felt that those pronouncements were addressed to 
the followers of Almazan who were threatening revolution.35 
Undoubtedly, they did have some soothing effect; yet, 
whatever their nature might have been, when the President- 
Elect gave utterance to the words ”1 am a believer”, he 
provided Catholics with the most comforting words they had 
heard in an entire generation, betokening the end of an 
era of suffering. Avila Camacho pursued the line of 
reconciliation between Church and State by emphasising 
that the revolution had not intended to destroy religion. 
Archbishop Martinez gave his blessing to the new 
government in a public declaration, shortly after Avila 
Camacho's inauguration. He said:
"I feel certain that freedom of 
conscience and religious peace, which 
made great progress in the Cardenas 
administration, will not only continue 
in the new presidential period, but 
also will be consolidated and 
perfected [... ] I particularly draw 
attention to the fact that General 
Avila Camacho is the only President in 
many years who has declared publicly 
and emphatically that he is a Catholic 
and who has recognized that the 
Mexican people have certain spiritual
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needs that can be satisfied only by 
religious freedom."36
This attitude of cordiality towards the Church 
prevailed during his six years of office. The Church 
greeted it cautiously but with gratitude. When the 
administration took office, the hierarchy indicated that 
it did not wish a change of attitude? the Archbishop told 
the priests in his archdiocese that they would have to 
keep watch on the activities of the Catholics under their 
direction, so that they did not do something that could 
provoke the Government. In a circular of 15 March 1941, 
he ordered his priests to make sure that Catholic Action 
organizations stayed out not only of proper political 
action, but of social action which was in accordance with 
the norms of the Holy See and the Mexican Episcopate.37
In the autumn of 1941, the Church began to show 
confidence in the new regime and appeared again in public. 
In October the canonization of the Virgin of Guadalupe, 
the patron saint of Mexico was celebrated with great |pomp 
and ceremony ? the celebration was even attended by 
military officers in uniform. Although the law prohibited 
such public manifestations, there were no government 
reprisal like before.
This new relationship between the Church and the 
State was preceded by a coordination agreement, between 
the Archbishop and the Government, which served to temper 
relations, in order to prevent any small conflict getting 
out of their control.38 President Avila Camacho was thus 
able to declare in 1942 that there was no religious
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problem in Mexico. A more indicative sign of the improved 
relations was the return, in 1944, of the most outspoken 
and implacable critic of the Mexican Revolution, Bishop 
Jose de Jesus Manriquez y Zarate, after seventeen years in 
exile, since the start of the Cristiada.
Undoubtedly, the area of greater conflicts between 
the religious Right and the Government was that of 
socialist education.
This hael been the fundamental cause of the emergence 
of Synarchism. Although the amendment of Article 3 of the 
Constitution was made in 1934, the corresponding enabling 
legislation was not immediately introduced. Nonetheless, 
the Government of Cardenas had proceeded to implement it 
through its own devices. In November 1939, Cardenas 
submitted to Congress, a new organic law on education, 
that consisted of setting the scope of socialist 
education. It did not become effective until six months 
later, after publication in the Diario Oficial of 4 
February 19 40.39
Socialistbducation was the major cause of contention 
for the religious nationalist Right, as well as for a 
large sector of the political spectrum of the basically 
Catholic population of Mexico. It had also been one of 
the principal themes of the Almazdn campaign? although he 
was not a devout Catholic, he defended the freedom of 
education that the Catholics sustained; this won him over 
the support of the sector.40
From the outset of the new Avila Camacho 
administration, Catholics launched a campaign to modify
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Article 3, so that socialist eduction would be abolished.41 
During the first year, he granted legal recognition to the 
■'Union de Padres de Familia"; created in 1917, immediately 
after the Constitution was proclaimed, it had fought for 
years to repeal Article 3. Throughout this time, 
especially after the start of the Cristero movement, it 
had become allied to radical right organizations. By 
granting it official recognition, the President took a 
further step in his policy of moderation, that contributed 
to the demise of the nationalist Right.42
In December 1941, the President sent Congress a new 
law on education that replaced the 1939 version. The new 
law specified that reference to socialist education 
contained in the Constitution should not be of an anti- 
religious nature.43 To carry out the new Education policy, 
the President appointed a new Minister of Education in 
September 1941. Octavio Vejar Vdzquez replaced the 
cardenist Luis Sanchez Ponton, long time accused by 
Catholics for his "communist” leanings.44 Vejar Vazquez 
undertook a new policy that put the accent on the 
spiritual aspects of education.
"There can be no education without the 
sign of the cross behind it"
and he set about expelling all the Marxists and Communists 
from the Ministry of Education.45
"We need an education that responds to 
our traditions, to our physical 
environment, to our social milieu, to 
our continental destiny; a school 
where we find our physiognomy, free 
from foreign influence, specially from
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those international currents of 
dissolution that are felt today. We 
need a school where there is no hatred 
or division, as it has been almost 
since Mexico became independent, a 
school of love where our nationality 
is shaped, stripped of all that tends 
to divide Mexicans and only 
concentrated on that which unites
All these changes, together with the decision to 
eliminate the federal inspectors in private schools, whose 
role it was to make sure that no religious instruction was 
taught in those establishments, were sufficient to allow 
the re-emergence of Catholic schools all over the country. 
Consequently, the branch of the Base which gathered 
Catholic teachers devoted to the secret teaching of 
Catholicism, lost its raison d'etre and disappeared.47
The overall moderation of the Governments education 
policy had a favourable effect on other sectors of the 
Right. Even Salvador Abascal, national leader of the UNS, 
in relation to V6jar V&zquez said:
"With his words and deeds he promises 
to be a successor to Jose Vasconcelos, 
and, therefore, a decent minister who 
is going to put an end to a despicable 
affair".48
The non-religious Right also calmed down when the 
Government of Avila Camacho began a series of political 
and economic changes that ensured a different direction 
for the Mexican Revolution. Most welcomed of these was, 
unquestionalbly, the attitude towards labour.49 At the 
beginning of 1941, in a speech delivered to the Second 
National Convention of the CTM, the President stated that
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the support of the Government would no longer be 
unlimited, as it had been during Cardenas' administration, 
indicating that the workers:
"were in duty bound to show more 
discipline, adopt a more moderate 
policy, and cooperate in the national 
life".
At the same time, Vicente Lombardo Toledano .was 
replaced as general secretary of the CTM by a less 
ideologically minded Fidel Velazquez, who set about 
purging the labour movement of all communists, with the 
aim of uniting all the labour unions of the nation. 
Lombardo Toledano was, with all certainty, the most 
abhorred person in Mexico by the Right, even more than 
Cardenas was, because they considered him "malicious".51
When the new administration came in, Miguel Aleman, 
Interior Minister, announced what the new tone would be:
"the revolutionaries had accomplished 
their mission [... ] the turn of the 
administrators has arrived."52
Modernization and industrialization were the keynote. 
With this policy, Mexican entrepreneurs, ignored and 
repressed by Cardenas for so long, would be supported, 
motivated and encouraged by different means; for example, 
tax concessions for new industries, decreed in April 
1941.63
Not least important among the changes introduced was 
a re-appraisal of the legality and the need to grant 
liberty to the municipality (municipio), for which the 
Right had so bitterly struggled.54
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Another element that contributed to the decline of 
the nationalist Right was the course of the international 
situation. Many Right organizations received some kind of 
financial support from abroad, in the late thirties. 
Initially, a large proportion came from Nazi Germany; the 
German colony in Mexico had to conduct a compulsory 
collection from its members. After the end of the Spanish 
Civil War, the Spanish Falangists residing in Mexico, 
engaged in similar activities; their propaganda was very 
effective.65
In 1939 and 1940, the spread of propaganda reached 
considerable proportions; as early as April 1938, the 
Government of Cardenas had considered it advisable to 
dissolve the Mexican branch of the Falange Espanola 
Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S., and to expel many of 
its leaders, that it considered were engaged in subversive 
activities.56
These activities consisted of the provision of 
regular subsidies to the printed press, or for the 
creation of new publications that they could use to 
further their own interests. It seems that the German 
press attache, Arthur Dietrich, was in charge of Nazi 
propaganda; he utilised the German news agency Transocean, 
to provide German news at very low cost. The magazine 
Timon, directed by Jose Vasconcelos, generally carried the 
German point of view of the war. It expressed that 
Germany was fighting a war to defend the world from 
liberal-capitalism and from British imperialism. 
Publicity was paid by the German firms in Mexico,
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specially the Bayer group.57
German propaganda activities lessened in July 1940 
after Dietrich was declared persona non grata and the 
Government began a general quell. Timon, among other 
publications, was suppressed at that time.58
One element of foreign affairs that radically 
influenced the decline of the nationalist Right was, 
undoubtedly, the war declaration of Mexico, in May 1942, 
on the side of the Allies. This had a double effect: the 
Mexican Government categorically repressed the subversive 
activities of the Axis, subsidies and propaganda materials 
were checked. Secondly, the patriotic sentiment that the 
war generated, brought about general solidarity with the 
Government, which had been seriously damaged by the 
dividing tactics of the Right. In conclusion, of all the 
nationalist organizations of the right mentioned, only 
one, the UNS survived the War.
IV The Leadership of Abascal
After the defeat of Almazdn, and in the wave of 
increasing support and influence of the UNS Manuel Zermeno 
tried to tackle a problem that was not to be solved until 
it was too late, and with the near total destruction of 
the Synarchist Movement, namely the control that the Base 
still exerted on it.59 He suggested, from a position of 
strength after the successes of 1939-1940, that those who 
were arresting a movement which they regarded too 
dangerous, should end the dual leadership and place only 
one absolute chief. Antonio Santacruz, the leader of the
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Supreme Council of the Base, seized the opportunity to 
keep the UNS under his control and suggested the name of 
Salvador Abascal to take over the leadership of the 
Movement, whom he considered ”loyal, obedient and 
pliable”. Indeed, in the opinion of his companions, 
Abascal was the most loyal, the most courageous, the most 
austere and the most disciplined of them all. On 6 August 
1940, Abascal acceded to the leadership of the UNS, an 
organization of three hundred thousand disciplined and 
resolute members.60
Abascal was thirty years old? he was born in Morelia 
in 1910, the fourth of twelve children, in an old 
landowning family from the Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato.61 
His father, a lawyer and a declass6 landlord, had been a 
member of the Catholic secret organization "Uni6n Popular" 
(also known as "la U") , at the time of the religious 
conflict and, found it difficult to support his family.62 
Abascal studied at the seminary and later read law at the 
university. He began working at an early age to help his 
family. At twenty-one years old, he was appointed judge 
at Ayutla, in Guerrero. His opposition to the local
caciques (he refused to let free their gunmen, murderers 
caught red-handed), earned him swift transfers before he 
resigned in 1932. When the religious conflict started 
again in 1934, he was contacted and later enrolled by the 
Legion, for which he organized and mobilized the existing 
legionnaires. He did not wait for the order to come, he 
asked for them? he himself looked for a place where he 
could put into practice his apostolic anxieties. He went
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to Tabasco, where he fought the first great battle of his 
life for religious freedom, against the tyranny of Garrido 
Canabal? he re-established Catholic cult in the State. 
He was offered, in 1937, the leadership of the emerging 
Synarchism, which he turned down, because the action then 
envisaged did not match his impetuous style. He travelled 
extensively throughout the country, organizing and 
advising Catholic peasants and workers how to confront the 
communist cells that were implanted in the unions, where 
he achieved considerable success. He became more involved 
in the Synarchist Movement when he went to work with 
Zermeno? after a few months, he made a name as one of the 
most active propaganda organizers. Under his relentless 
onslaught, the number of Synarchist committees soared.63
Abascal was working in Yucatan, organizing Synarchist 
groups, when he was summoned to Mexico City. The Supreme 
Council of the Base informed him that because of the 
resignation of Manuel Zermeno, he was being offered the 
leadership of the UNS, which he accepted
"because I was convinced that Zermenno 
could not hold on to it, and because 
I felt inside me enormous happiness 
and a big urge, a call from Above, to 
complete the work of Synarchism.".64
Antonio Santacruz had known Abascal since 1935; in 
1940, he decided to nominate him the new leader of the 
Movement.
"Why did he choose me?" Abascal 
puzzled out, "either because he did 
not know me, or, perhaps, his 
advisors, the other members of the 
council, especially Lie. Emilio Cervi,
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suggested it to him; or, because he 
did not have, at the time, another 
candidate with popular support."65
Abascal was aware, like the Base and the UNS, that an 
armed movement could only succeed if it had the support of 
the United States and, therefore, that it was first 
necessary to develop a public opinion movement, starting 
with the peasants, who were the easiest to convince 
because of their dissatisfaction with the agrarian reform, 
then the workers, then middle-classes and, lastly, the 
intellectuals. Abascal called it a nationalist
nonviolent, mystical struggle. The UNS was an "army in 
the mystical [Loyola] sense of the word, that served to 
transform the regime:
"Synarchism is not an organization 
aimed at seizing power in the literal 
sense of the word. The sole aim of 
the Movement is to restore social 
order in Mexico, destroyed by 
Liberalism, anarchy and pseud- 
democracy.1,66
In 1941, the Synarchist crowd, that "spiritual 
militia" morally moulded by the "Ten Norms of Conduct", 
organized along military lines (in cuadros, centurias and 
companias) by Abascal, marched, saluted, sang and 
"captured" large cities: Le6n, Morelia, Guadalajara. Under 
him, the Movement reached its peak? from August 1940 to 11 
July 1940, four hundred cities and important towns were 
the theatre of Synarchist events. Following the orders of 
"looking for the enemy in his own house" or "at the scene 
of the crime" - where a Synarchist had fallen, was
• 67imprisoned or was persecuted.
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Synarchist demonstrations, contrary to what the 
adversaries of the UNS argued, did not cost the Movement 
a lot? there was no need for the Nazi money they hinted to 
rally together fifty thousand men.
"Peasants were poor but they somewhat 
managed and, the leaders, lived in 
poverty: they travelled in second
class trains and buses, on foot, 
stayed in the worst hotels, eating 
thrice nothing, spending a pittance. 
And the peasants, they bought each 
week the journal, and travelled on 
their own expense [...] Risking their 
lives, the prison, the bullets? no 
salary, no bureaucracy."68
On 18 May 1941, the President, his ministers and the 
principal ambassadors attended the celebrations of the 
fourhundredth anniversary of the City of Morelia. The UNS 
decided to take advantage of the occasion to make show of 
its strength, and celebrate its own fourth anniversary: 
twenty thousand Synarchists from the state of Michoacan, 
who had gathered the previous night, assembled at dawn, to 
march on the city in military style.69 Luis Ordorica 
Cerda, a member of the House of Deputies, commented 
afterwards:
"The Synarchists have paraded through 
the streets of Morelia [... ] but what 
hurts us most, we who love the 
Revolution, is the spectacle of a 
strong and disciplined column made up, 
for the most part, of ejidatarios and 
workers. "70
The following week, at Leon-Sinarcopolis (as they 
used to call it71) on 25 May, forty thousand men celebrated 
the fourth anniversary of the Movement. An American
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commentator observed:
"I shall never forget the face of the 
Mexico I saw there, many thousands but 
all alike in an intense tragic 
preoccupation, a look made up of 
hunger and hope and the excitement of 
marching with the gold banners, the 
grand white horses, the drum corps, 
and also with each other. And it all 
did make a fine effect. The plaza at 
Leon is pure Spanish colonial, with 
arched colonnades along two sides, and 
the municipal palace and a great old 
church taking up one end. Between the 
two they had built the speakers' 
stage, and hung a vast Synarchist flag 
[... ] All the while the church bell 
tolled steadily, a stately background 
for the jefes's demagogy and the sound 
of marching feet."72
But who was this man capable of "capturing" a city in 
a matter of hours, and then disperse as if nothing had 
happened?
No other leader of the Synarchist Movement was more 
passionate and controversial than Salvador Abascal. 
People wondered whether he was a caudillo, a mystic, a 
visionary, a genius, self-complacent, or a madman. His 
exploits attracted attention and general admiration.
• • • # • 7^American opinion labelled him the "Mexican Fuhrer." 
Juan Ignacio Padilla, himself a [future* leader of 
Synarchism, drew his portrait:
"Above everything else, he is a 
Catholic, a true Catholic who accepts 
the dogma and the morality of Christ, 
which constitute the invariable and 
rigid rule of his life; a true 
Catholic who accepts, with utter 
submission, the Magisterium of the 
Church. A Catholic of the School of 
St. Paul, who turns his life into a 
perpetual apostolate: he is
intransigent with himself, and often
259
with others. He is a Catholic who 
tends to perfection, in the practice 
of the teachings of the gospels, 
without due attention to the 
observance of the precepts. Totally 
divested of material possessions, he 
aspires to the spiritual goods and 
strives, tenaciously, to get them.
He is a misfit. Abascal fee}sthwarted 
in the revolutionary and materialistic 
environment of Mexico. Uninfluenced 
by the milieu, he strives to change 
the world where he and his people live 
[...] Some see his way of life 
intolerable and absurd: hard work
hours on end, and no concession for 
any leisure pursuit: cinema, theatre,
bullfights, sport, drink, a circle of 
friends, are all unknown to him. The 
temple, his home, his work and, his 
apostolate, made up the framework of 
his life.
He is restless. He aspired to the 
priesthood, where he tried to attain 
the highest degree of Christian 
perfection [but] his agitation, his 
humbleness, or perhaps his passionate 
temperament, made him abandon [it] and 
turn to the study of the Law for an 
adequate formation for his secular 
apostolate. Disappointed by the 
meanness and misery associated with 
the profession, he resigned [...]
He is also a mystic and a visionary. 
His inner life is intense, he submits 
all his actions, as trivial as they 
may seem, to God and to divine will. 
He believes that the decisions he make 
are inspired by virtue. Hence, he is 
at the same time brave and 
audacious. "74
However, this "genius" was grievously attached to his 
"defective spiritual formation". Because of the way he 
lived: his self-sacrifice, his intransigence, etc., he
expected other people to act likewise. This brought him 
many enemies, not least the leader of the secret council 
and, worried the Government, the Americans and, the
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Church. Padilla accused him of falling into "the trap of 
the perfect ego". Moreover, at every turn of his life, 
Abascal found himself exposed to crises, deceptions, lack 
of understanding and bitterness? best illustrated by the 
experience of the colonization of Baja California - a 
subject to which we shall return.
Much of the criticism of Synarchism was actually 
addressed at Abascal. In the short period of his 
leadership, some sixteen months, he provoked the most 
specific reactions, produced the most striking Synarchist 
frenzy, and gave permanent definition to the features and 
organizational substance of the Movement. It is 
therefore, essential to study his work. Going back to the 
day when he took over the leadership of the UNS, the 
outgoing leader Zermeno introduced him to the crowd thus:
"I have the inmost conviction that 
Salvador Abascal is the man 
predestined by God to lead us and with 
a heart full of happiness and of faith 
I turn over to him the position of 
Chief of Synarchism."
Abascal gave the following reply:
"I accept the leadership of Synarchism 
to better serve my Country. My models 
shall be the Truebas, the Zermenos, 
the Urquizas [... ] I have never 
feared that our Movement could fail, 
I have immense faith that Synarchism 
brings about a new life for Mexico. 
I can make my own the final words that 
Cortes addressed to his soldiers 
before he set on to conquer Mexico: 
and so, let us turn the words into 
actions [...]75
To turn words into actions, that was the aim he set
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himself and he intended to achieve it. He received a 
movement in action: "moved by a powerful mystique that
could not be stopped except by ourselves." The official 
written doctrine was contained in two documents: the
Manifesto of 1937 and "the Sixteen Basic Points of 
Synarchism11.
The new leader summed up this doctrine in an axiom:
"Within the Fatherland, free from 
foreign powers, the common good 
prevails over the individual 
interest,"
and a motto?
"To the Communist cry of 'All 
proletarians', we say 'All owners'".
The written doctrine of the UNS, except for the assertion 
of complete Independence, focused, primarily, on the 
generic solution of the socioeconomic problem, with verbal 
condemnation of Communism and Liberalism. Undoubtedly, 
the Movement still lacked definition on many points: what
type of organization of the factors of production was 
needed to fulfil the ideal of "All owners"? what political 
regime would replace the existing one of "false 
revolutionary democracy and unnatural federalism"? how to 
render effective municipal freedom, within a sensible 
regional autonomy? how to promote real culture and, hence, 
how to combat barbarism and atheism? how to return to the 
Church her freedom, her right to education, and so on.
Notwithstanding the need to give more shape to the 
doctrine, Abascal believed that in so doing, it would only
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[exasperate the enemy. Besides, he pointed out,
"both our people, even the most 
simple, and the anti-Mexican 
Revolution, are aware of where we are 
going: to the Catholic State, which
we know that for natural reasons has 
to be corporative.11
On account of this, he concluded that peasants - the 
backbone of the Movement - were being persecuted. This 
only came to show:
"the Revolution was full of rage at 
the fact of losing those it had always 
considered a thoughtless and 
subservient herd."76
The attitude he would adopt in the face of this 
challenge was that of meeting danger head on. Thus, he 
demanded of the leaders love of danger and death? which he 
considered essential for the triumph of Truth; and 
exhorted them to express themselves clearly, directly and 
without resorting to ambiguity, compromise or conventional 
methods. It was necessary to convince the peasantry, even 
at the expense of blood and prison.77
Although originally a supporter of the principle "an 
eye for an eye", in 1938, after the experience of Tabasco, 
he realized that it was more Christian, more effective and 
more fruitful, the attitude of the patriot who endangered 
his own life but did not expose that of the organization. 
He was convinced that it was the only way to defeat the 
Cardenas regime. In fact, he was going back to the 
position held by the founders of the Movement (Urquiza, 
Trueba and Zermeno), in 1937, and thus, acknowl|e<^ t>^  that
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they had been right; since Cardenas would have ordered, at 
the first violent clash, the immediate suspension of the 
Movement, or, at least, IwouU luvecv«*AcAolsU&Us.
The approach he adopted, since Tabasco, to captivate 
the people, was to run considerable personal risks and to 
be sent to prison as frequently as possible. The results 
proved him right: in the few months of his leadership, the 
total number of registered adherents rose from fifty 
thousand, between 1 January and 21 March, 1940, to four
78hundred thousand between January 1940 and October 1941. 
This explains why he felt he was at the top of a tidal 
wave that he deemed irresistible. He thought he was "the
• • • , 7qincarnation of Saint Ignatius of Loyola."
Both Alfonso Junco and Jose Vasconcelos praised 
Synarchism. The latter said:
"[...]" the best banner that the 
Mexican youth can take in its hands 
is that of Synarchism.1,80
El Sinarquista published, in August 1940, Abascalfs 
new orders: the swift win of the countryside; the
organization of numerous concentrations, always by 
surprise; never provoke the opponent; the leaders should 
always stand up to danger.81 It was essential that they 
bore in mind that what was needed was a second 
Independence of Mexico, much more important than the 
first, achieved by Agustin de Iturbide, because at stake 
was the very soul of the Fatherland: Independence from the 
United State|s, a materialistic and anti-Christian power 
which held the country to ransom, subdued to the Mexican
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• £2 Revolution.
Abascal was always on the move? every week he got 
away from the Capital to supervise and attend rallies in 
towns and villages, and even in farms. He was imprisoned 
on at least twenty occasions, and his credo was that he 
would recover freedom of association by organizing 
meetings and rallies. His plans for the immediate future 
of the UNS were set out in famous speech: "Habla el Jefe”; 
where he announced that the first stage of Synarchsim was 
not yet completed:
"Recruitment;
Organization and?
the winning of freedom of association 
and expression of ideas.
"With regard to recruitment and 
organization, each Regional and 
Municipal Committee must now be self 
sufficient, in order and that the 
National leader can assign its 
brigades to those States where 
Synarchism only has few men. As for 
acts to win freedom of association 
[...] National support will always be 
provided when requested. We have 
undertaken a truly extraordinary war, 
never before experienced in Mexico, or 
in another country? like all wars, we 
have lost and will continue to lose 
lives and property? instead we are 
giving FREEDOM? we are destroying the 
power that enslaves and maintains the 
people divided and hopeless. We are 
soldiers of freedom. We fall not just 
like martyrs, but like soldiers."
"It would be regrettable, and sad, if 
we did not loose any life, any 
personal comfort: when the enemy is 
fought in his own trenches, more lives 
have to be sacrificed. Marvellous and 
extraordinary war that of Synarchism! 
Those who persecute us are our 
brothers too. Towards them we are not 
soldiers but missionaries? that is why 
we have no revenge spirit. As for us, 
because we are soldiers, our life is
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in constant danger, and that is why 
we must sacrifice it.”83
Therefore, the Synarchist programme consisted of 
uniting and organizing the people in a hierarchy, in 
"militarizing the spirit", that is to say, the effective 
exercise of the freedom of association and expression, 
which could only be secured when the dangers associated 
with any militia were fully accepted. To this end, 
Abascal intensified the discipline of the Movement and 
took it through all the tests that, in his opinion, would 
strengthen Synarchism. "An organization is what its 
leaders are" he used to say; hence, he expected them to be 
real leaders at all times? not simple employees with no 
initiative of their own, but models to the soldiers, 
courageous, dedicated, humble and loyal. Abascal 
professed that the final objective of the 
"concentrations", the marches and parades was not the 
"literal militarization of the people", instead:
"by making these acts extremely 
attractive to the senses, through the 
display of order and discipline, and 
the profusion of beautiful flags and 
martial songs, Synarchism will enthral 
the people, winning them over to the 
ideas and sentiments that will 
militarize Mexico spiritually, and 
thus attain her liberty, since action 
inescapably follows thought."84
With the publicity of his successes, Synarchism grew 
with Abascal. Insofar as Abascal epitomized the national 
values in the opinion of the peasant masses, a personal 
bond was established with him.
During his period as leader, he took the Movement to
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levels of fanatical militancy; he announced that he would 
make each Synarchist "half-man, half-monk", prepared to 
sacrifice himself for the organization. He strengthened 
the military structure of the movement and promulgated a 
set of strict moral rules which defined his notion of a 
"spiritual militia". Synarchism thus understood meant the 
discipline that each synarchist should have over all his 
actions, before he attempted to convince and save others.
This spiritual militia also presumed deep 
understanding and total submission to the doctrine, the 
ideals and the discipline of the Movement. Individual 
codes of conduct for men and for women were drawn up - 
"the Ten Norms of Conduct for the Synarchists" and "The 
Ten Norms of Conduct for the Synarchist Woman" wherein 
resided, in their view, the spiritual strength of the 
Movement.85
The significance of discipline and blind obedience to 
the Movement was nowhere more apparent than in the 
militaristic organization of the UNS, which Abascal 
perfected for his celebrated mass events.
V Militaristic Organization
Synarchists were organized along military lines. They 
were drilled in military discipline, and carried out in 
military style the peaceful "assaults" of cities and other 
designated "military" objectives.86
It was the duty of each Municipal Chief to organize 
his people at once in Cuadros, Centurias and Compahias:87 
The Cuadro consisted of a Chief of Cuadro, an
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Assistant chief and thirty soldiers, in six rows of five 
men each.
The Centuria consisted of a Chief of Centuria, an 
assistant chief, a first and second assistant, and three 
Cuadros. Total: one hundred men.
The Compania was a unit composed of three Centurias, 
four liaison officers, and a chief and assistant chief.
The Cuadros, Centurias and Companias of the cities 
were formed through the organization of Jefaturas of 
blocks, sectors and districts. The Cuadros and Centurias 
of peasants were formed through the existing organization 
of Rural subcommittees.
The Synarchists were proud of their ability to parade 
thousands of members into a plaza in segments which 
arrived at two to three minute intervals. The show of
* • • • • • fifl •discipline and planning was impressive. Detailed
instructions were given regarding mobilization plans and 
procedure. The surprise factor was of the utmost 
importance. The instructions for the organization of 
public functions, marches and rallies were meticulously 
laid out in the UNS's "Instructions for Mobilizations and 
Public Rallies". Strong emphasis was placed on 
punctuality and discipline.
It was also stressed that constant training would 
make the organization of cuadros, centurias and companias, 
a permanent reality, and soldiers would grow accustomed to 
Synarchist discipline.
Mobilizations were carefully prepared: the
authorization of at least the Regional leader was needed
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for the concentration of contingents; the person in charge 
of the mobilization fixed each committee the number of 
militants that it had to send and made clear what were the 
available means of transportation. Each member paid his
Oft #
own fare. The day and the time of departure of each 
contingent was equally planned since everything had to go 
like clockwork. Synarchists were expected to arrive not 
more than five to ten minutes early. Everything was done 
by surprise? to this end, lodgings were arranged with the 
local Synarchists, and were summoned to different places, 
in closed quarters and were not told of the mobilization 
until the last moment.
At the head of the column were the Chiefs of the 
highest category who might be there at the time. If there 
was any cavalry, it marched at the rear, four in a row? 
eight rows of horsemen formed a Cuadro. If it was deemed 
convenient, the eight best horses would be selected to 
march at the front, distributed thus: first the Chief and 
assistant chief, preferably mounting black horses? 
immediately behind them, two other horsemen protecting the 
banners.
The mathematical precision of the column movements 
was also rigorously underlined. For this purpose, strict 
punctuality was required of all members. Surprise was the 
general rule. Some rules were drawn: when the situation 
was difficult, the assembly would be announced in a 
different town, or one or more days in advance, but 
provided there was no confusion among the members, the 
general public should never be invited? they should rely
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exclusively on their own people to whom orders were passed 
verbally.
When the contingents were very strong, it was not 
convenient to summon them all to the same place, but 
rather to several places, combining the march in such a 
way that the contingents reached the appointed place at 
the same time, or that they joined each other with 
mathematical precision until they all formed one column.
Along the march, contingents distributed at either 
side of the column, to protect it, had to salute the Chief 
with absolute uniformity, making the motion without saying 
a word, and then join the column at the rear. Before the 
column approached, these contingents had the appearance of 
mere bystanders. Watchmen were placed at the most 
critical points, appearing as mere bystanders.
Women were not allowed to form part of the column, 
nor to cheer or talk. They had to behave like "soldiers”. 
Their mission during the marches consisted of spreading 
propaganda, assisting the wounded, and walking at both 
sides of the column, but always on the pavement. They 
should not be perceived as protecting the column, they 
were not to run the same dangers as men.
A 1 safe pUce was prepared to take
care of the wounded, with a Synarchist physician and 
nurses.
The place where the rally took place had to be 
carefully selected, and be adequate for the rapid settling 
of people, so that the formation and the spirit of 
discipline were not broken. Speeches were few and to the
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point, not more than three or four. Only previously 
accepted speakers were permitted to address the rally. 
Women were not allowed to do so. Once the function was 
over, the column dispersed rapidly, in order and silence.90
There are two important related aspects worth 
mentioning: first, the use or carrying of arms, of any 
kind, was strictly prohibited. The leadership believed 
that the use of arms could incite their enemies to undue 
violence that could culminate in civil war. Second, the 
leadership considered that when the government authorities 
were fully responsible, and respectful of the law, there 
was no objection to informing them with due anticipation 
of proposed Synarchist actions.
The great feasts of the UNS were 12 October, Day of 
the Spanish Race; 11 July, official martyrs1 day? and 23 
May, Founding Day. The object of these marches was, 
according to the Synarchists, to achieve perfect control 
of their people, so as to prevent disorder, infiltration 
of extraneous elements and, above all, to develop in them 
a total sense of order. Synarchism not only combated 
Communism, but also revolutionary conduct, which, in their 
view, lay at the root of Mexico*s ailments and anarchy.
The strictly authoritarian nature of the UNS was 
clearly set out in the "Handbook for Chiefs", which 
stipulated:
"There should be no discussion in the 
assemblies. All decisions should be 
made by the Leader, who may request 
the advice of the members of the 
Committee? if there should be time for 
this, he may also ask the opinion of 
any Synarchists and if the situation
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is difficult or grave, he should 
inform the superior Chief immediately. 
The general and absolute rule is that 
NO HATTER MUST BE SUBJECT TO VOTING BY 
THE ASSEMBLY. Our movement is 
organized hierarchically and therefore 
the chiefs are the ones who dictate 
orders and solve all conflicts. Do 
not forget that the Chiefs are the 
ones who |appoint; subordinate chiefs; 
the soldiers obey.91
This was frequently reaffirmed in El Sinarquista, as 
this extract reveals:
"Our meetings have a peculiar style, 
there are no discussions because we 
Synarchists have nothing to discuss 
about, since we agree on everything. 
In our assemblies there is no 
deliveration; there is no need. One 
consults and listens to the opinions 
of the leaders, and orders are 
dictated.1,92
The basic inequality of men was emphasized in all 
Synarchist literature and spread by its newsparer:
"The authority which on earth is 
exercised by men to govern their 
fellows has a solid foundation: God, 
who is the source and sustenance of 
all human power[...]
”[T]he absurd equality of liberalism 
and of anarchism has disappeared. Now 
each man has his own place in 
accordance with his personal 
inequality before his fellow men. 
Each one has a task to perform by 
himself. All obey superior orders and 
feel the responsibility of their 
actions before God and the Fatherland. 
If you wish to know how to command, 
learn first how to obey; this should 
be the rule of Synarchism[...]”
The UNS paid considerable attention to the 
functioning of this organization. The efficiency and
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coordination of the mobilization were the pride of the 
Movement; yet, at the same time, to its disparaging 
critics, they were suspicious acts, extraneous to Mexican 
reality. Some even compared them to the Fascist "assalto" 
and the Nazi "Sturm."94 The impressiveness, significance 
and sheer organization of these marches did not take long 
to worry the revolutionary leaders, who were not prepared 
to share their claim to be the sole representatives of the 
Mexican masses.95
VI The response of the Government
Before Abascal assumed the leadership of the Movement 
not very much was known about the UNS ? but with the 
spectacular growth that the Movement experienced as a 
result of his tactics of mobilizing thousands of men to 
"seize" towns and cities, and in particular after the 
"March on Morelia", the concern of the Government and its 
related associations mounted, introducing therefore a 
series of measures to resist it.
A pamphlet of the period drew attention to the 
implications of the "March on Morelia" of 18 May 1941:
"The events of Morelia must be 
considered in all their worth, in what 
they mean symbolically and as an 
organizing feat, in what they convey 
and what they refer to in what they 
contravene and in what they 
deserve. "96
Calls to disband the UNS came from a variety of 
sources: unions, workers' and peasants' leagues,
syndicates, as well as from Masonic lodges and political
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groups.
Most attacks against the UNS were very abstract, 
focusing on its alleged Fascist and fifth-columnist 
nature, and stressing the threat it presented to the 
Revolution and the working classes. This perception 
followed very closely, almost literally, the judgment of 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the CTM who described it as
• Q7"the enemy number one of the proletariat".
The attitude of the CTM had been prompted by 
President Lazaro Cardenas who declared at the Fifteenth 
CTM Congress, on 25 November 1940, in his last year in 
office:
"Faced with the restoration of the 
conservative front we must not abandon 
the battlefields, we must resolutely 
rectify the errors and deficiencies, 
so that they are not used as an excuse 
by retardatory elements of Accion 
Nacional, of Synarchism or of alleged 
anti-communism, who take advantage of 
any discord between the ejidatarios, 
the workers, the women, and the young 
people, in order to win over and turn 
into unconscious victims in the full 
knowledge that new generations will be 
sacrificed in bitter fratricidal
Nevertheless, it was not until after Morelia that a 
coordinated and rigorous counterattack was set in motion. 
On 31 July 1941, President Avila Camacho addressed an 
official message to the State Governors, the Minister of 
Defence and the Ministry of the Interior whereby they were 
instructed that:
"In view that S y n a r c h i s t  
demonstrations have been effectuated 
with no legal justification and there
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being no sufficient reason to sanction 
it, but on the contrary with 
provocations to antagonistic 
organizations, public demonstrations 
by the Synarchists must not be allowed 
without the prior consent of the 
authorities and, if granted, these 
should be carried out according to the 
law, making responsible the leaders of 
these groups for any violation, who 
will be severely punished”.99
The guidelines set out by the President were widely 
publicized and received the approval of all the 
revolutionary establishment.100
Congress debated the threat that Synarchism posed to 
the regime. On 14 October 1941, Alfredo Felix Diaz 
Escobar said that the UNS was the fifth column in Mexico 
and that although it worked under a mystical appearance, 
the reality was that it worked to a premeditated plan of 
long date. He warned that if the Reaction was allowed to 
organize under Synarchism, it would not be long before 
Congress found it impossible to stop it. He urged his 
colleagues to close ranks and to form a solid front to 
defend the Revolution and democracy. Hence, on 31 
November 1941, Congress approved the constitution of a 
group to resist the "regressive tendencies represented by 
the UNS”: the Comite Nacional Antisinarquista y en Defensa 
de la Democracia.101
The PRM, very much influenced at the time by CTM 
elements, defined the UNS as anti-democratic and counter­
revolutionary, subversive and aggressive, and an 
instrument of Nazi penetration and clergy domination. It 
argued that the success of Synarchism was based on and 
took advantage of the ignorance, the confusion and the
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poverty of the poorest masses. The peasant element was 
disorganized, isolated and in many parts of the country 
still had an "impressionable, superstitious and sceptical
102 tnature". It stressed that Synarchism had several
masters: first, the resentful large estate owners who
regretted the loss of the haciendas and aspired to return 
to the previous status quo and? then, industrial 
capitalism which opposed organized labour because it stood 
in the way of development.103
The PRM issued a Manifesto signed in Morelia on 3 
June 1941 and endorsed by several unions and political 
associations, condemning Synarchism which it described 
as being "born dead" ("el sinarquismo nacio muerto"). The 
Manifesto laid down some of the accomplishments and some 
of the benefits of the Mexican Revolution which were 
"evident and undeniable"; they only needed to be 
definitely distributed, multiplied and supported to ensure 
their complete assertion. The manifesto asked the 
workers, the ejidatarios, the country folk, the middle 
class incorporated in the party's "popular sector", the 
revolutionary women, the young people and the students, 
and whoever identified with the Revolution, "to be on 
their guard and act decisively when needed to frustrate 
the restoring prospects of the Reaction".104
One labour organization which responded zealously to 
the appeal of the PRM was the Comit6 Regional de Control 
Politico Ferrocarrilero, Guadalajara and Sinaloa 
Divisions. The Committee made a series of proposals, 
albeit ambitious, to arrest the advance of the Synarchist
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Movement and to enlighten and win back those who had been 
attracted by Synarchism, or who could be so:- establish 
two Cultural Brigades, under the direction of the 
Committee, one of which would travel the States of 
Guanajuato and Michoacan? the other those of Jalisco, 
Colima, Nayarit and Sinaloa, setting up Cultural Centres 
in the places they visited. The Brigades would be made up 
of a leader, an assistant, a doctor or medical 
practitioner, two nurses, a speaker and a projectionist. 
The mission of the Brigades would be to visit towns and 
villages giving cultural and guidance lectures, about the 
work being carried out by the Federal Government; to 
proceed to vaccinate those people who required it? to 
provide free medical examinations, supplying medicines and 
care; distributing educational books and leaflets, clothes 
and shoes to the needy? as well as showing educational and 
entertaining films.105
The Committee would oversee these activities from 
Guadalajara. In the meantime, it would set in that city 
a soup kitchen for 500 unemployed workers or their 
dependants and, with the approval of the State Government, 
form a labour exchange and a recreation centre for 
unemployed workers. The entire project would be 
supervised by the Interior Ministry, in order to secure 
that the practical and effective results of the goals 
pursued followed a strict orientation.
The President gave his personal approval to the 
mission and asked the State Governors to "give the 
Committee every facility for the best realization of its
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task.”100 The Interior Minister gave the Committee two
thousand pesos for November and December 1941, and 
promised to look into the possibility of providing a 
budget of 16,000 pesos per month for the following
107year.
In the final analysis, the regime became aware that 
the problem lay in the shortcomings of the revolutionary 
programme, and in particular of the Agrarian Reform? the 
efforts to win back the peasantry had to be directed at 
understanding and satisfying its demands. An apologist of 
the Revolution summed up the nature of the problem thus:
"The Synarchists are agitating the 
peasants and this action is grave and 
dangerous.
Agrarian reform is going through a 
critical phase [...] This is a trying 
moment. We need that the peasant 
remain firmly in his post to defend 
the Revolution, and through his own 
work help to fulfil the Agrarian 
Reform, by raising production? but 
since the Reforms has not been 
successful, a large section of the 
peasantry is in need of urgent 
attention, which will not be given if 
Synarchism, the first outbreak of 
totalitarian infiltration in Mexico, 
is not cut out at the root.
The regime cannot allow that in those 
places where Agrarian Reform has not 
yet come to a head, intervene exotic 
groups manipulated by the most 
sinister interests of Mexico, with the 
purpose of criminally exploiting those 
who had been the fundamental concern 
of our social struggle".108
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cooperating with the new administration. Abascal fiercely 
condemned any attempts at moderation and rapprochement 
with the Government? he even envisaged the use of force to 
seize power.3 In a recent article, he elucidated on his 
views on the subject of a coup d'etat:
"I was convinced that true liberty 
[... ] would only be gained if the 
revolutionary government was 
overthrown and a totally Catholic 
Regime was set? to achieve this a 
fulminating national coup was needed, 
not supposedly democratic elections 
that will never be won. But the 
American Embassy suspected it and 
ruined it, and with the help of two 
traitors and of many of my comrades of 
excellent good faith, it succeeded in 
throwing us out and in changing the 
course of that Movement which after 
the Cristiada had been the last hope 
of Mexico to this day.”4
Therefore, the kind of militancy that the UNS 
leadership was espousing in 1941, posed a serious threat 
to the advances achieved by the moderate leaders of the 
Church.
"Within the hierarchy itself, more 
than one bishop felt unhappy about the 
extraordinary growth of Synarchism 
[... ] The good relations between the 
Episcopacy and the government of Avila 
Camacho, which had improved after much 
and patient diplomacy, could be 
jeopardized [...] [The members of the 
Base] constantly had to admonish the 
leaders of the popular movement? who, 
in turn, reacted more impatiently, 
declaring that the Base was afraid of 
everything."6
Besides these factors, in the eyes of many people, 
not least, of Congress, Abascal was perceived as an ally 
of Nazi and Falangist subversive elements that abounded in
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the country, at the time. This was contrary to the 
political line of the Government and, consequently, the 
Supreme Council felt it necessary to remove him from the 
national leadership, so as to give the movement a more 
moderate image.
However, Abascal was an immensely popular leader, and 
his removal could undoubtedly bring the split of the 
movement, or even uncover the existence of the secret 
leadership of the organization. Hence, his dismissal 
would have to be handled with extreme tact and ability, so 
that it appeared to him and to the mass of the 
organization, that he had voluntarily taken that step. 
Therefore, in 1941, Abascal convinced himself that he had 
to leave the leadership of the UNS in order to embark on 
a new and bold feat. The starting point would be the 
conquest of the Northwest desert of Mexico and establish 
there synarchist settlements. It was suggested that 
Synarchism fulfilled its promises of obtaining land for 
the dispossessed by opening up new frontiers.
II. The Colonization of Lower California
The project was conceived in August 1941, when 
Abascal made a successful tour of the Northwestern 
states.6 The UNS was, at this time, in full ascent; 
everything seemed possible, even attaining power.
Synarchist speeches, everywhere, always exalted the 
colonial past of Mexico. In Sonora, Abascal quoted 
Cortes, who had given his name to that inner sea? the 
Jesuit Kino, who founded the short-lived Loreto colony
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(1638-1685), in Lower California? the missionary work of 
the Jesuits, which lasted until the Society was expelled 
in 1768.7 Thus, Abascal was not speaking of himself when 
he talked about resuming the "the task ruined by the 
forces of evil", and the continuity broken in 1768; he was 
giving a Messianic connotation, typical of his perception 
of what the role of the UNS should be, to the leader of 
the movement, commanding over 500,000 militants, desirous 
to see him President of the Republic. But he got carried 
away and offered the President, on behalf of the UNS, the 
opportunity to colonize Lower California.8 On 11 
September, ten days after Abascal presented his offer, the 
President gave his approval.9
Abascal presented to the President a project which 
contained the following main points:
1. Complete freedom to mobilize the synarchist families 
that the Movement had chosen?
2. The first expedition, in December 1941, would 
comprise one hundred families?
3. A second expedition would follow in January or 
February 1942, with up to one thousand families, if 
the Government gave priority to Synarchist workers in 
the construction of the La Paz-Santa Rosalia federal 
road?
4. Government assistance to carry the settlers from 
their places of origin to the port of La Paz?
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5. Guaranteed complete religious and educational 
freedom, so that they could have genuinely Catholic 
schools, with no restrictions or strings attached;
6. Grant possession and later ownership of the national 
lands that the settlers had chosen, with a rates- 
exeption |of at least five years.10
During a meeting between Abascal and Avila Camacho, 
in late 1941, the President assured the leader of the 
Synarchist Movement that the Government would pay for the 
rail and ferry passages of the synarchist settlers. 
Besides, they would have priority in obtaining jobs in the 
construction of the trans-peninsular road.11
Abascal and his followers were convinced that this 
mission would provide an excellent and startling example 
of Synarchist determination and the materialization of 
Synarchist philosophy. It was an enterprise for the 
salvation of the Americas and the world: the model
Synarchist republic.12 Thereon, he expected to forestall 
an American invasion of the peninsula, longtime attracted 
by its emptiness and by its strategic value.
The political storm raised by the Synarchist project 
strengthened Abascal's intuition. In October, the attack 
in Congress was led by Alfredo Felix Diaz Escobar who 
obtained unanimous support for a commission that would 
approach the President, to demand the banning, not only of 
the colonization project, but of the UNS itself, which he 
accused of being a Nazi organization and an| enemy of the 
United States. Yet, the President told the commission
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that the Synarchists had the right, as Mexicans, to go to 
Lower California.13
Meanwhile, Abascal was thinking of the one hundred 
families that would accompany him in December, and of the 
other two hundred that would follow a few months later. 14 
He made scant preparations and, by the end of October, he 
realized that he had not yet obtained any money, but 
stated:
"The abstruse reasons of my haste that 
the first expedition left on 18 
December were the following: the
innermost certainty that a few days 
after that date we would not be able 
to leave, because of the extreme 
nervousness of the Revolutionary 
Government following the war events of 
those days? and the intuition that 
things should be done as we went 
along. Indeed, if I had waited - to 
leave with the first expedition, to 
have the two hundred thousand pesos 
that were absolutely essential for the 
first expenses and to count with good 
accommodation in Santo Domingo, and 
with a working schedule planned to the 
last detail, we would never have 
accomplished anything. The venture 
was so crazy that nobody believed in 
it; and, therefore, I was not helped 
before I embarked on it. I needed to 
get going to force many people to 
cough up."16
Synarchist colonization was not limited to Lower 
California; however, what was done elsewhere, did not 
count for much. In January 1942, Jose Trueba Olivares was 
put in charge of Villa Kino de Santa Maria Guadalupe,16 a 
colony on the Gulf coast of Sonora, 90 kilometres 
southwest of Hermosillo, 12 kilometres from the Gulf of 
California. In May, 1942, another colony, Salvatierra,was 
set, 36 kilometres south of Culiacan (Sinaloa). Finally,
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local committees founded colonies in Sonora (San Jose 
Opodepe) and in Tamaulipas (Nuestra Senora del Refugio). 
Salvatierra collapsed almost immediately? and although San 
Jose and Refugio functioned for four years, their small 
size meant they had little effect to talk about. After 
just over a year of Villa Kino's existence, the number of 
families that composed it shrank from seventeen to eight. 
And after two years, it collapsed in desperate 
circumstances.17 This proved that the settlers in Sonora 
did not receive any more aid than those in Lower 
California.
It was on the initiative of Antonio Santacruz that 
Abascal accepted to lead the migration into the desert.18
Taking advantage of his extreme religious sentiment, 
he was persuaded that his efforts on this enterprise would 
represent:
"a renewal of the work of the
missionaries, interrupted by
Freemasonry, indeed, by the
Revolution, with the expulsion of the
Jesuits in 1767."19
Moreover, he was also led to believe that by 
establishing a settlement in Lower California, annexation 
of the peninsula by the United States would be prevented. 
Indeed, for some time, the Americans had been obsessed 
with the possibility that the Japanese might get hold of 
the Bay of Magdalena, on the pacific coast of the 
peninsula, and set up a naval base there? Abascal feared 
that the United States, on the pretence of preventing this 
from happening, could simply seize Lower California.20
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Originally, Abascal did not intend to be personally in 
charge of the expedition; but, in the context of his 
eventual dismissal, and for his own survival, he agreed, 
with pleasure. He saw this outlet as the possibility to 
recover his losses amd prepare for a comeback to confound 
his enemies. Given the chance, Abascal, the national 
leader, would have concentrated all the weight of the 
movement behind the foundation of the ideal republic, the 
synarchist utopia. Abandoned by most, he took immediate 
refuge and retreated into his extreme, even puritanical, 
religiosity, which he believed gave him the possibility 
to accomplish the impossible.
"Though I had a deep vocation to 
combat the damned Revolution, I would 
have to resign myself to fight the 
desert: the change was tremendous.
But I accepted it with pleasure, not 
cheerfully - as Meyer has suggested - 
as expiation for my sins and for the 
following reasons:
1) by sacrificing myself, the 
Movement would avoid a split;
2) the change of National leader 
would greatly disconcert our 
enemies [...];
3) Synarchism would be immensely 
respected and unassaiable for 
its dedication to such a pure 
and patriotic exploit as the 
colonization of the California 
desert;
4) God was putting in my hands the 
foundation and creation of a 
society that would be Catholic 
to the core;
5) the life of the Colony would be 
a rich source of experiences that 
would help to understand the 
solution to the most serious 
national problems, political,
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economic and even spiritual;
6) if I emerged victorious from the 
Colony, I could come back one day 
to settle the score with 
Santacruz and company.”21
From the start, the settlement suffered various 
setbacks. The uppermost problem was the same that had 
jeopardized the efforts of the Spaniards many centuries 
ago; the lack of water. Everything got more complicated 
because of the incompetence of the leaders and the 
settlers, not accustomed to such extreme conditions. 
Abascal was no settler, no agricultural expert.22
He had proved to be a fearsome leader of peasant 
troops, able to organize massive rallies and take cities 
by surprise, to march with unarmed contingents against a 
well equipped army. But when he took charge of a task 
wherein the economic factors prevailed over the spiritual 
ones, he was bound to fail. He embarked on this project 
without ever making detailed estimates and preparations 
for what was essentially a material exploit. He did not 
perceive it in these terms. He regarded the whole venture 
solely in apostolic and providential terms;
"I founded Maria Auxiliadora in the 
desert of the southern territory of 
Lower California, out of spiritual and 
patriotic necessity which could not be 
postponed; in the full knowledge that 
I lacked the technical and pecuniary 
resources which are essential for the 
swift success of what is basically an 
exploit of material order. And there 
in the desert is Maria Auxiliadora, 
living on faith in Providence and 
preaching to Mexico three things which 
are in fact only one: detachment from 
superfluous goods, unlimited and
295
absolute faith in God and the Virgin, 
and subjection of the material to the 
spiritual, the temporal to the eternal 
[... ] The true greatness of Maria 
Auxiliadora lies in the resumption of 
the missionary work banefully 
interrupted by Freemasonry, that is to 
say, the Revolution, with the 
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 
[...], a date that marks the true 
origin of the Mexican Revolution, 
which is not more than a branch and a 
b y - p r o d u c t  of the global 
revolution.,|2S
Abascal advocated that he had been assured that he 
would receive all the financial backing that an enterprise 
of such magnitude required? Santacruz, he argued, made 
specific promises that the Movement could count on 
contributions from American Catholics, which would serve 
to sustain the colony while it became self-sufficient.24 
Also, President Avila Camacho and the Government promised 
to support the colonization project.
Later, Abascal was to blame Santacruz for deceiving 
him and for being mistaken about the assistance he had 
been offered.25 Although it is not clear whether the 
Government and the Secret Council of the Base acted 
together to conspire against Abascal, their actions 
complemented each other.
Nevertheless, when the President announced the 
assistance his Government was prepared to give the 
Synarchists, the Left bitterly criticized him, 
particularly in Congress. On 30 November, 1941, a group of 
senators and deputies opposed to the President's offer of 
support to the Synarchists, formed the National Anti- 
Synarchist Committee, conceived to demonstrate the
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counter-revolutionary and seditious nature of the 
movement.26
III. The Leadership of Torres Bueno
During the III National Synarchist Meeting, in 
October 1941, to the surprise of all the synarchist 
leaders gathered for the occasion, Abascal revealed his 
plan to take one hundred synarchist families to Lower 
California to establish a colony there, and, for that 
reason, he was handing over the leadership of the UNS to
27Manuel Torres Bueno.
Torres Bueno was a young provincial lawyer, lacking 
the charisma and the dynamism of his predecessor? but his 
disposition to comply with the orders he received, made 
him acceptable to the Supreme Council. He became the new 
leader of the UNS on 13 December, 1941. He took on the 
leadership of the movement at a time when colonization was 
already on its way, with expeditions leaving for Lower 
California and Sonora. The attention of the Movement and 
of Mexico focused on the progress of the project which 
attracted curiosity and anxiety. Hence, initially, the 
agenda for the new leader was already set by the course 
of events: to gather all the spiritual and economic
strength of Synarchism behind the settlers, since the 
scheme has been given overriding importance and the 
reputation of the movement itself was at a stake. 
Reflecting on the style of leadership of Torres Bueno, 
Padilla commented:
297
Hthe climate of brotherly military 
companionship characteristic of 
Abascal1s cheerful and audacious 
leadership, gave way to a stern and 
plain order, an arid discipline and a 
strict sense of duty, and even to a 
melancholic mystique.”28 ^
Although at the time there was no radical and sudden 
transformation of the Synarchist movement, a gradual 
change towards moderation began under Torres Bueno. This 
transpired from his declarations after assuming office, in 
the sense that the UNS agreed with him in his programme of
• • • • 29 |increasing national production. Nevertheless, this was 
only a statement of purpose; many of Abascal*s followers 
still occupied important positions in the movement and he 
himself, although secluded, still commanded some 
influence.
Torres Bueno undertook an extremely significant task, 
namely, to rid the movement of all violent elements, and 
adapt it to the new prevailing conditions. This was 
appreciated by one of his detractors;
”He assumed the leadership of the 
Movement at a time when all enemy 
forces, external and internal, 
conspired to ruin the Movement. He 
took the helm in the middle of the 
storm ?”
who went on to say:
"Synarchism has always had the leader 
it has needed at each stage [...] In 
that hour of danger, which lasted four 
years, luckily we got a cool, 
calculating, enigmatic, unshakeable 
man, divested of all sentimentality 
and even capable of repudiating 
friendship when necessary.1,3
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Torres Bueno and the secret Supreme Council of the 
Base, with which he aligned, worked closely to find a 
solution to the problem of the colonies, which they deemed 
imperative. No changes could be attempted as long as they 
did not attain total economic autonomy. Hence, an 
ultimatum was sent to Abascal, which, in the end, resulted 
in another more serious problem: his violent withdrawal 
from the Colony and from Synarchism, in 1944. The 
consequence of this action sparked off the so-called 
internal problem: the threat of a split in the
movement.31
Torres Bueno decided to tackle the colonization 
problem by dealing with the question of selecting 
potential settlers, The fact that colonization
represented a heavy burden on the organization, not only 
financially, but more important, perhaps, in terms of the 
sacrifices that those potential settlers would have to 
make, prompted him to issue a circular to all regional and 
municipal leaders, outlining the aspects that they should 
take into consideration, when choosing candidates. The 
most significant feature of this circular, was the 
emphasis placed by Torres Bueno to de-mystify 
colonization. He cautioned candidates:
”[...] life in our Colonies is very 
tough. There is only room for the 
most dedicated and devoted, those who 
have really given their lives for the 
service of Mexico and of Synarchism 
[...] It is essential not to eulogize 
any more the heroic and romantic 
aspect of colonization? instead, you 
must consider the great hardship in 
store for those who embark on this 
expedition.,|32
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The colonization experience eventually appeared at 
the root of the breaking forces within the Organization. 
In our opinion, the colonization of Lower California was 
both a cause and the catalyst for the eruption of the 
crisis.
We mentioned that on 18 December 1941, Abascal, at 
the head of 85 families (or 490 persons), left for Lower 
California to establish a synarchist colony. After many 
incidents, the Colony of Maria Auxiliadora was founded, 
near the Bay of Magdalena, consisting of a few improvised 
huts and some land prepared for cultivation. His 
certainty of success rested on these bases:
1) the Divine Providence,
2) the spiritual quality of the men who accompanied 
him,33
3) the generous, enthusiastic and unlimited cooperation 
of all Mexicans,
4) the help promised by the Government (transport, jobs, 
equipment, etc.)
In this spirit he had set out.34 Yet, there were 
problems from the outset. When the Government failed to 
deliver the railway and ship passages, Abascal ordered 
each Synarchist to pay for his own fare? whereupon, the 
already scant economies of the peasants, were 
significantly affected.
Once in the Colony, it soon became obvious that most 
of the synarchist settlers were lacking in farming 
experience, and those who did have it, were used to the
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rich and fertile lands of the central states.35
The lack of funds soon became desperate? besides, the 
jobs on the construction of the federal road and the 
contribution from American Catholics never materialized. 
Abascal criticised the UNS leadership for not delivering 
to him the funds he continuously requested. Torres Bueno 
replied that the movement could not become an organization 
entirely oriented to maintain the colonies? instead, it 
had a much higher mission.
Differences arose in other areas too. Because of the 
very trying conditions settlers faced, many decided to 
turn back. Abascal could not forgive them. He treated 
them as cowards and deserters, and believed that they 
should be punished and expelled from the Movement. The 
leadership in Mexico City regarded them simply as 
disillusioned, unlucky individuals, not suitable for 
settler life, but they could still be loyal to the
• 36Synarchist Movement.
Years later, a UNS internal report by the National 
Leader outlined the failures of the colonizing experience? 
he said:
"There is no doubt that, in the 
beginning, the colonizing endeavour 
awoke enthusiasm and gave impetus to 
Synarchism? but as time passed, the 
harsh truth revealed many errors that 
have been the cause of serious 
problems. One of these errors was the 
lack of technical and precise 
preparations for this venture. We 
left everything to enthusiasm which 
was not enough to withstand the 
hardships of the enterprise. Another 
error was the wrong selection of the 
Colonists, who were not in their 
majority farmers, and who gradually
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took the road of desertion, followed 
by attacks on the Movement and its 
leaders".87
By the end of 1942, the differences between Abascal 
and the UNS leadership, and the split between radicals and 
moderates became public. In October, Miguel Aleman, the 
Interior Minister, announced that he had learned that the 
UNS was experiencing a deep internal crisis, which 
threatened to split it up.38
In December 1942, Abascal returned to Mexico City to 
attend the meeting of Synarchist Leaders. He had talks 
with Torres Bueno and the Supreme Council, in which he 
strongly criticized the course that was followed. They 
justified their action on the ground that it was the 
appropriate one to keep the movement alive.
Abascal's response was:
"I never expected Torres Bueno would 
sacrifice the dignity of the Movement, 
the historical truth and the purity of 
the doctrine. He and his people 
thought they could justify themselves 
alleging that they were right because 
they were pursuing the ultimate aim of 
maintaining the movement alive. If 
Synarchism had to die like a Martyr of 
the truth, it would not have been long 
before it reappeared and with 
increased strength.1,39
He returned to Maria Auxiliadora even more vexed. 
Hence, the leadership of the Movement and the Supreme 
Council feared that he might take advantage of his 
popularity with the masses to carry out an internal coup 
that would lead the UNS to a kind of neo-Cristero 
crusade.40 This could only be detrimental to Synarchism
302
and to the Church in Mexico; thereupon, the leaders 
decided to warn all Synarchist units of the danger that an 
uprising would entail. During 1943, the split between 
Abascal and the leadership in Mexico City was definite, 
though not altogether open, yet. In July, he went to the 
Capital for health reasons. On the way, he came across 
some back issues of El Sinarquista, where he read, to his 
astonishment and horror, that in the annual celebrations 
of the foundation of the UNS in the city of Leon, the 
names of Hidalgo and Morelos, whom he regarded as 
traitors, were put at the same level of Iturbide, who was, 
in his view, one of Mexico*s greatest heroes. His 
indignation increased with the series of articles on the 
"Good Neighbour Policy", which the paper qualified as 
"absolutely sincere" and not an American trick. This was 
indeed a very serious blow to his ego, because he had 
always considered the United States the perennial enemy of 
Mexico and; in the case of the Good Neighbour Policy, he 
had stated:
"I have never believed in the Good 
Neighbour Policy, nor will I ever do, 
until the United States convert to 
Catholicism. "41
The articles in El Sinarquista described the United 
States as a country of Christian origins and culture. 
"Nothing of the Sort!", he cried out.
When he arrived in the Capital, he learned that one 
of his closest followers, Alfonso Trueba, editor of El 
Sinarquista, had been replaced, because he had refused to 
print pro-American articles. He also learned that Jaun
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Ignacio Padilla, whom he had appointed secretary in charge 
of colonization, just before he left the national 
leadership, had been also removed.42 Confrontation with 
the leader of the Supreme Council, Antonio Santacruz, was 
inevitable, since Abascal blamed him for all that was 
happening. He accused him, and Torres Bueno, of the 
downfall of Synarchism, and warned:
"From this moment I consider myself 
separated from the Movement? which I 
will not make public at present, for 
the good of the Colony, but if the 
National leaders of the UNS persist in 
their policy of complete submission to 
foreign powers [i.e. the United 
States], and of undermining the 
Colony, I will openly attack Torres 
Bueno and you [...]”
After he returned to Maria Auxiliadora, Abascal 
condemned the declarations that Torres Bueno had made in 
December 1943, at the Fifth National Assembly of 
Synarchist leaders (the Junta de los Volcanes, so called, 
in derogatory terms, because it had taken place in a 
location near Popocateptl44) . On that occasion, the UNS 
leader declared that Synarchism would support Pan 
Americanism and continental unity. To Abascal this was 
anathema. Still, he remained in his post at Maria 
Auxiliadora and prayed for divine intervention. However, 
when he learned that Torres Bueno had sent the President 
a message of congratulation for his three years in 
office,45 he burst in anger and wrote to Torres Bueno 
accusing him of committing an act of treason.46 He vowed 
in his Memoires to have envisaged, then, a way to 
overthrow the National Committee and regain the leadership
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by placing Jose Trueba Olivares as national leader.47
Conscious of the threat that Abascal represented, the 
Supreme Council decided to take the lead. In February 
1944, they sent Gustavo Arizmendi, secretary of 
colonization, to Lower California to summon Abascal to 
Mexico City. Abascal refused to obey that order and sent 
Arizmendi back with the message that he was no longer 
compelled to obey, because he had broken with the 
organisation since the previous July. In March, the 
council sent Jose Valadez to replace Abascal as head of 
the settlement. Valadez was accompanied by Manuel Zermeno 
and Father Miguel Madrigal - whom it was thought could 
have an influence on Abascal, given his devotion, to 
relinquish his position at the head of the Colony.48 
Father Madrigal, acting on behalf of the Archbishop of 
Mexico and of the Church, asked him to leave the Colony 
and abandon everything.49
Thus, on 31 March, Abascal handed over command of 
Maria Auxiliadora to Valadez. On 9 April, 1944, he left 
the Colony. Abascal left Maria Auxiliadora convinced that 
his work had been undermined and that he had been 
ridiculed. However, he believed that by abandoning the 
leadership, the Colony would receive, immediately, all the 
necessary aid for its prosperity. He turned his anger 
against Torres Bueno making strong accusations and 
invectives. What is more, he condemned the entire 
movement as Mjust another deceit.”
A few days after his arrival in Mexico City, Abascal 
made a transcendental declaration. Because of its
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importance it is quoted at some length:
"Manuel Torres Bueno, current leader 
of the UNS, has not requited with 
honesty my attitude of reserve and 
discretion. Being used to lying and 
deceiving, Torres Bueno has continued 
to tell false, and even slanderous, 
versions of my withdrawal from 
Synarchism. I no longer have to hide 
a truth that the people must know.
1. - Last July, I came to Mexico City 
for a cure and to discuss certain 
matters of Maria Auxiliadora? I became 
fully aware that Torres Bueno and his 
yes-man, Salvador Narvarro, chief of 
information of the National Committee, 
told many lies, and false or unfair 
judgments of my conduct as the head of 
the settlement. I have also become 
aware that they could have supplied 
the necessary resources for the 
expedient success of Maria 
Auxiliadora, but they systematically 
withheld them, arguing that there was 
no money, when in fact there was.
2. - I was, equally, very upset to 
learn about the exoneration of Benito 
Juarez, at last year's Leon rally
3. - For these two motives, I broke 
with Torres Bueno at a meeting we had 
in late July [...]
4. - Afterwards, I reproached him, in 
a letter, a most shameful act: putting 
on the same level the Christianity of 
the Mexican people with the 
"Christianity" of the protestant 
United States, which he did when he 
was asked by foreign journalists what 
Synarchists meant by the words 
"Christian order" [...]
5. - with regard to the Colony, Torres 
Bueno continued to invest me with 
starvation, refusing me everything I 
asked him, so that I failed.
6. - I seriously considered resuming 
the national leadership of the 
movement, relieving Torres Bueno [... ]
7. - I have become convinced,
unfortunately, that lawyer Torres
Bueno has corrupted the organization,
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since many of its leaders are nothing 
but unconditional employees, without 
personality or mind of their own; 
content merely because under the 
policy of the lawyer they run no risk. 
Those below continue to die and to 
fall in gaol. Those above are in no 
danger at all. In view of this I have 
entirely desisted from disputing 
Torres Bueno his command? I would be 
able to count on only a few leaders.
8. - Rumour has it that I left the 
settlement of my own free will and for 
health reasons. Both things are 
totally false [...]
9. - It is said that Synarchism will 
fight Communism on whatever ground. 
This is a demagogic means of Torres 
Bueno to maintain deluded people under 
his rule. It is also a fantasy that 
perhaps Torres Bueno and his clique 
believe in. They believe, or pretend 
to do so, that when the break between 
the United States and Russia occurs, 
[the Americans] will ask of the 
Mexican Government the annihilation of 
the Left, whereupon the President will 
be compelled to call on Synarchism, 
which, then, if necessary, will take 
up arms [...] What is needed is that 
Synarchism be prepared to defeat the 
revolution that has been dividing 
Mexico for a century, long before the 
word Communism was heard in the 
Fatherland? the revolution will 
continue to destroy Mexico even if 
Communism is wiped out from Asia or 
Europe or the whole world. What is 
needed is that Synarchism reverts to 
tell the truth to the people and 
nothing but the truth. Yet, Torres 
Bueno will take no such action.
10. - Finally, it has been said that 
Synarchism will turn into a political 
party and that it will resist the 
imposition of an official party. It 
is very easy to boast about opposing 
the PRM. The difficult thing is to 
face the bayonets to defend the vote. 
If Synarchism turns into a political 
party, all it will be doing is playing 
into the hands of the "much-vaunted 
democracy" and the revolution.
The people, in the end, as always, 
would have been misled. The people
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should withdraw from this Synarchism 
which is only another deceit.
11. - I must ask for forgiveness of 
the Synarchists, and I do so now, for 
the very grave mistake I made when I 
appointed Torres Bueno national leader 
[...]“
We must stop at this point to consider the possible 
causes that led to the change of direction of the 
movement, and the adoption of moderation by the 
leadership.
IV. The Role of the American Clergy
Many explanations have been put forward for the 
causes of the change of the UNS towards moderation. Some 
have argued that, following the defeat of the German army 
at Stalingrad, the Synarchists pretended to change the 
exterior character of the organization, in order to join 
the allies. This view was held by the Left, and the 
Communists in particular.52 Other theses sustained that 
the cause of the internal division was the result of 
American dirty tricks ? arguing that the group that 
controlled the Supreme Council of the Base had sold itself 
to the American embassy, thus becoming an American 
instrument of propaganda for PanAmericanism, which was in 
tacit opposition with the idea of Hispanidad, the core of 
Synarchism. This was the opinion of the radical faction 
of the UNS, conveyed by Abascal in the series of articles
(  ^ # C Q  # # ,
he wrote m  Manana magazine? as well as by Padilla m  his 
book "Sinarquismo: Contrarrevolucion."54
Another interpretation of the new direction followed
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by the UNS was given by Mario Gill in his book 
"Sinarquismo".55 In reality, this is a modified version of 
the Stalingrad interpretation. Gill maintained that the 
UNS had been, in the early years, a thoroughly fascist 
organization. He claimed that, initially, the Mexican 
clergy interfered in the movement, and later, in 1943, 
unexpectedly, the Synarchist Movement came under the 
control of the Americal Catholic clergy and, consequently, 
modified its policy towards the United States and Pan- 
Americanism. This version was given after the Fifth 
National Assembly of Synarchist leaders, at the end of 
which, the national leader, Torres Bueno declared that 
there was no conflict between Pan-Americanism and
Hispanidad. He also expressed his wishes to cooperate 
with North America in the war.56
Some weeks earlier, Bishop Fulton J. Sheen had
visited Mexico to participate in a eucharistic congress. 
Mario Gill and El Popular, immediately, associated this
visit with the synarchist leaders* new PanAmerican 
feelings. El Popular reported it thus:
"There is no doubt that the recent 
visit to Mexico of Mgr Sheen, the pro­
fascist "black leader" of North
American clericalism, contributed to 
obtain the conversion of the Mexican 
Synarchists to a new policy in tune 
with the demands of the situation of 
the new world."57
According to Gill, the UNS was no longer the subtle 
arm of the "nazi-falangist" conspiracy against Mexico? it 
had, now, become the instrument of "the most reactionary 
of Anglo-American imperialism".58
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Though this interpretation was the most publicized, 
it contained a number of important misjudgements regarding 
the so called "Junta de los Volcanos", and the influence 
of Mgr Sheen. First of all, it did not take into account 
that the UNS had opted for moderation since 1941, when 
Abascal was removed from the leadership. The change of 
direction was the result both of the work of the American 
clergy (in particular, of Monsignor John O'Grady) ,59 and of 
the new tone in Church-State relations, brought about by 
the Avila Camacho administration, and had nothing to do 
with Stalingrad, or the defeat of the German army. As an 
American analyst observed:
"Synarchism was an obstacle to inter- 
American cooperation, for it was not 
only hostile to the liberal democracy 
that characterized Pan American 
principles [... ] but it also 
maintained a vigorous isolationism 
that was directly antagonistic to that 
united action of the American nations 
against the Axis [...]
When the position of the UNS on the 
latter question was untenable by 
Mexico's declaration of war in June, 
1942, the organization acquiesced in 
the Government's decision [... ]60
Moreover, Mgr Sheen's visit did not mark the 
assimilation of Synarchism by the American Catholic 
clergy. This view did not appreciate that the UNS was 
already under the control of the moderate hierarchy in 
Mexico; and there was a long history of close cooperation 
between the Mexican and American clergies, with a strong 
influence of the latter over the former.
At least since the time of the Cristiada the American
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clergy had intervened, substantially, in the affairs of 
the Mexican Church, exerting, in particular, a moderating 
influence.
Hence, the **Junta de los Volcanos11 did not signify 
the sudden turn in Synarchist ideology, since the 
organization had always been under the indirect authority 
of the American clergy, because of the close relationship 
of the hierarchies of both countries.
Gill's thesis overlooked this fact. Nor did it 
consider the attitude of moderation adopted by the 
Synarchist organization, since 1941, more perceptible in 
relation to domestic matters, but also showing a gradual 
turn in Synarchist ideas on foreign affairs. The 
declarations of "los Volcanos" were not a new and dramatic 
starting point, but, rather, a further step in a 
development process that had been taking place for many 
years.
This notwithstanding, American Catholic pressure 
intensified from 1943, particualrly on El Sinarquista, 
which had very slowly changed the tempo of its anti- 
American attitude. Some of the members of the Supreme 
Council of the Base feared that the Government of the 
United States might request the Mexican Government to 
disband the organization, considering it a danger to the 
safety of the continent - after all, the American public 
had been incessantly exposed to stories about the Nazi 
Fifth Column.61 They arranged with several American 
Catholic priests, that a number of the writers on El 
Sinarquista visited the United States, with the idea that
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their anti-American style of writing be stopped - what 
Abascal called a "taming tour" (jira de amansamiento)? 
however, there was no change of attitude on the part of 
Alfonso Trueba Olivares, the editor of the paper, who was 
expelled at the end of August 1944.62
According to the First Secretary of the American 
Embassy, Raleigh A. Gibson, the secret council decided, in
Organization towards the United States had to be changed, 
since it was not a good one for either Mexico or the 
United States:
"[T]he members of the Governing Board 
of the Sinarquistas [Base] was split 
on the question of its attitude toward 
the United States, three members being 
definite in their stand that the 
organization should be 100 per cent 
Mexican that an unfriendly attitude be 
taken toward the United States. 
Salvador Abascal came from the colony 
in Lower California in order to argue 
for his position, that of an 
unfriendly attitude toward the United 
States. The Governing Board held five 
meetings before a definite position 
could be determined. The final 
decision of the Board was reported to 
a friend of the Embassy to be as 
follows: The salvation of Mexico is to 
work with the United States, without 
losing decorum, we have the best 
chance at the present time, since 
American Catholics are taking an 
interest in Mexico and our 
problems' [... ]68
However, he could only say that this change "is 
believed11 to be due to the work of several American 
Catholic priests in convincing the organization that their 
attitude towards the United States was not one that was 
good for Mexico or the United States.
mid-1944 that the attitude of the Synarchist
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V The Removal of Abascal
1. The UNS. the Base and the American Embassy
At the time the United States entered the war, 
Abascal passed on the leadership of the Movement to Manuel 
Torres Bueno, and embarked on a venture that would, 
reputedly, bring fame to the UNS and glory to him: the 
colonization of Lower California. He left for the deserts 
of the Peninsula following in the steps of the Jesuits of 
the XVII and XVIII centuries and, at the same time, to 
build a rampart against "American imperialism”. The 
significance of his departure was that he had been halted 
in his road to power, and the movement restrained, stopped 
and integrated into the Mexican and continental political 
systems.
How was the removal of Abascal carried out and how 
did the organization change its direction?
The conflict of the UNS with the Base had existed 
from the start, as the UNS grew in importance. The schism 
that would finally take place on 12 October 1944, had been 
in preparation for a very long time. It was first 
apparent in 1940, when Abascal replaced Zermeno as 
national leader. Some time later, Abascal encountered the 
same problem Zermeno had faced, namely, the authority of 
Santacruz and his advisers of the secret Supreme Council. 
The inevitable question raised by the existence of a dual 
leadership was one that would eventually lead to the 
collapse of the movement. The issue was one of control. 
How long would Synarchism (founded by the Base, but 
already an out-flanking organization) have to be
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controlled by a group of men determined to preclude it 
from active political participation and to confine it to 
the framework of Catholic Action? The Right wing 
revolution, young, nationalistic and catholic-populist 
collided with the old conservatives.
Abascal pointed out that it was not a question of 
individuals:
"No, the core of the problem is 
ideological [... ], the secret group 
advocated an agreement with the United 
States [...]/ 1 thought that our
destiny was in our Hispanic culture 
and in the ideological battle against 
Yankee imperialism.1,64
He was not mistaken, since Antonio Santacruz was in 
contact with the American embassy and with Washington? his 
intention was to get on well with the United States.65 
Santacruz told the followers of Abascal:
"With Abascal you are on the road to 
death and, if you persist, you are 
heading for revolution. Without 
Abascal we are going to develop an 
even more important movement, but 
without all these risks, without all 
this danger to you every week? we will 
get on well with everybody, no need to 
be at war with anyone, the Government 
and the United States. On the 
contrary, we must agree with the 
United States —  because since Pearl 
Harbour it is a matter of life or 
death —  and we must infiltrate our 
Government until we transform it."66
In May 1941, the movement |&sserfceA that 
PanAmericanism concealed American imperialism and 
reasserted its intention to create an international bloc 
of Hispanic-American States to oppose the United States.67
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The close cooperation between the Mexican Government and 
the United States within the framework of continental 
defence, provided an opportunity to exploit the popular 
anti-American feeling; which it did, on 20 October, 1941, 
by warning of the threat of American intervention, of the 
American designs over California, etc. Meanwhile, 
Santacruz won the trust of Washington? he told the 
American Embassy that Abascal would be removed and 
indicated that a change of attitude towards the United 
States was imminent:
"Certain positions may have seemed 
unfriendly to the United States, but 
the leaders of the movement have 
manifested their firm intention to 
modify any policy that could come 
against the interests of the United 
States [...]"
"Far from being opposed to the program 
and polices of the United States 
[reported Gibson], there is reasonable 
ground for believing than the 
Sinarquista leaders may become one of 
the best points of contact with the 
Mexican people. They are in close 
touch with situations all over the 
country ? through them we have an 
excellent means to reach the masses of 
the Mexican people. They will also 
provide a most useful point of contact 
with the leadership of the Catholic 
Church in Mexico".
At the time Abascal could only have an intuition of 
this. Yet, he was effectively overthrown by the Base on 
12 December 1941, just after Mexico conformed to the 
American war line. The Supreme Council had been uneasy 
about the direction he was giving to the movement. He 
talked, almost publicly, of seizing power, thereby putting 
himself in direct conflict with the Supreme Council, and
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the Mexican and the American Governments. Abascal left 
without much ado. Why? According to some analysts, the 
intervention of Mgr Martinez was decisive.69 He had long 
exerted great influence over Abascal (posted many years in 
Morelia, he was an old friend of the family) . He appealed 
to his religious feelings and to the virtue of obedience. 
However, Abascal denied this. He declared:
"On this occasion it was not necessary 
[to call on the bishop]. I alone took 
the decision which I judged 
inevitable.1,70
He sustained, however, that the Americans could 
persuade Mgr Martinez to comply with whatever he was asked 
because they could threaten him with facing the 
consequences of divulging that had founded the secret 
'■Liga de la 0", which they claimed had never ceased to 
exist.
Indeed, the Americans believed, incorrectly, that Mgr 
Martinez had organized the secret group "Union Popular", 
which they erroneously called "Liga de la 0". 71 An 
American Naval Intelligence Report could not reflect more 
accurately the prevailing paranoia of the American
• 79 • • •services when it fabricated the story that Archbishop 
Martinez:
"had formed the fLiga de la 0 1, a 
secret band of priests on Gestapo 
lines, to spy on and dissolve the 
Cristeros, an objective that was 
achieved. He formed a tight
organization that years later, when 
Spain turned falangist, he could 
reorganize it as the base for a secret 
Falangist-Church Order. The 'Liga de 
la O' is, then, the historic base on
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which the Synarchists were 
organized.1,73
In actual fact, the Church feared that the Synarchist 
threat could compromise the "modus vivendi". On the other 
hand, when Abascal contemplated rebellion, he realized 
that his supporters had been worked on by the Base and, 
thus, considered that there was great risk of shocking the 
militants. He believed that his defeat was temporary and 
thought, as he left to colonize Lower California, of 
coming back one day, covered in glory, to settle the score 
with the Supreme Council.
A major crisis was, thus, unexpectedly, avoided. The 
secret of the internal division was well preserved, since, 
until 1944, nobody found out anything. What the 
Synarchists learned was that their beloved leader was 
handing over the leadership to another militant, to embark 
on a heroic, patriotic and holy enterprise: the
colonization of the desert.
The elimination of Abascal was made easier because 
the UNS did not approve of personality cult, although 
militants had a tendency to idolize charismatic leaders 
like Abascal (no leader before, or since inspired such 
frenzied excitement). The fact that nobody (except the 
leaders) knew of the Base's existence, made the move 
simpler. A majority decision of the council removed him 
from his post.74 That could not have been possible but 
for the duality of command. In 1944, Torres Bueno, who 
had succeeded Abascal and endorsed the new moderate line, 
broke with the Base. However, it was too late by then.
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The conflict had only been put off by the ousting of 
Abascal? when it finally erupted, the hour of the UNS had 
passed.
So, on 12 December, 1941 Abascal left. Two days 
later the press reported that the UNS intended to rally 
behind the Government, and give its support to the 
President, on condition that the country did not enter the
75war.
In the opinion of the First Secretary of the American 
Embassy, the man who succeeded Abascal, Manuel Torres 
Bueno, was considered to be:
"much more aware of the importance of 
the international situation than Lie.
Abascal, who is a fanatical catholic 
and probably did not take the world 
situation into consideration. It is 
felt that it will be much easier for 
the directors of the Sinarquista 
movement to control Lie. Bueno and 
that the relations of the organization 
with the Government will be improved.
This will also mean greater
possibility for a better understanding 
of the organization with the United 
States."76
Santacruz had gone over to the Government as early as 
1938, when contacts between the two were established, and 
since 1941, a sort of "gentleman's agreement" existed
between the two, strengthened by his excellent relations
with the American ambassador, George Messersmith. His 
close ties with the Mexican Church hierarchy eased his way 
to the State Department, through the American prelates. 
A consideration, indeed, that the President must have 
weighted to defend the Synarchist colonization of Lower 
California against congressmen.77
318
"Santa Cruz is [... ] a close friend of 
the Archbishop of Mexico, and it is 
understood that he keeps the 
Archbishop informed of the 
developments of the organization. It 
is known that the President of Mexico 
knows of his connection with the 
organization, since Santa Cruz has 
called on the President on several 
occasions, one of which, according to 
Santa Cruz's own statement to inform 
the President that he could rely on 
the organization's support. A report 
prepared by one of the investigating 
agencies of the Mexican Government on 
Sinarquism stated: One truth is
evident, they love and respect the 
President of the Republic, and 
frequently repeat his political 
thoughts of national unity and 
governing for all.”78
The American Embassy pointed out that the
organization should be closely observed, because the 
sections that made it up were more prone to be won over by 
the "totalitarian powers”. But it added that with the 
leaders in favour of a friendlier attitude towards the 
United States, it was evident that the organization could
70 • •be kept under control. In conclusion, Gibson wrote, the 
policy of the United States should be to keep contacts of 
an informal nature with the organization by the Embassy. 
He believed that past formal contacts over a period of 
some months had had a useful effect on the policies of the 
movement; and that through third parties of Mexican
nationality, efforts should be made to promote the 
definite pro-United States attitude that was decided by
the Secret Council of the Base, in order that the
friendship of the agricultural element could be obtained 
for the United States. Gibson stressed the importance
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that encouragement, and guidance as to policy, should be 
given to those American Catholic organizations and 
Catholic priests, like Monsignor O'Grady, who were in 
contact with the movement, in order that greater influence 
could be brought to bear on the organization; with the 
thought in mind that all Synarchists were lay-Roman 
Catholics and that perhaps one of the best links between 
the United States and the other American Republics, was
the Faith which prevailed throughout Latin America and
• • • 80which had so many members in the United States.
2. The UNS and the Government
The manifest strength of the Synarchist movement, the 
large crowds it mobilized and controlled, often served the 
Government to check the Left. The Base, in return, could 
play its role of pressure group, speeding up the 
renunciation of radical policies. The United States thus 
would no longer have to fear the opening of a "Mexican 
front".
It transpires, very clearly, from Abascal*s writings 
that he was taken by surprise by the events. In his 
colonization scheme, he was counting on a constant inflow 
of people; yet, the UNS decided not to send any more 
people, which had the effect of a manpower shortage, 
blocking the growth of the colony and condemning it to 
failure; and, so, preventing him from returning to power.
In January and February 1942, the National Anti- 
Synarchist Committee became intensely active, forcing the 
President to ask the UNS if its designs were to organize 
Catholics on a totalitarian and anti-patriotic basis. The
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reply of the UNS was categorical: it was a purely
nationalist movement.81
In April 1942, the Mexican and American Governments 
reached an agreement on the question of oil reparations. 
This gave Mexico the opportunity to intensify its pro- 
American propaganda and to become more hostile to the Axis 
powers. Meanwhile, however, the economic situation of the 
country worsened.82
In the past, these two issues would have given the 
UNS the ammunition to burst forth. But, as a moderate 
organization, it stressed that its struggle was directed 
at restoring Christian Social Order, and had nothing to do
• • • • 83with liberal democracy, Fascism and Communism. 
Nevertheless, if the national leaders were able to 
restrain their press; silencing local leaders, who voiced 
popular grievances, proved more difficult. They attacked 
the United States on two related issues: they feared that 
the United States would drag Mexico into the war to turn 
Mexicans into cannon fodder. When General Cardenas was 
appointed Minister of War, the Synarchists thought that 
their fears had been confirmed, since they suspected that 
he had been called to make the preparations, and using his 
popularity with the masses, would sell them to the 
American army. Besides, they blamed the United States for 
the prevailing shortages of staple commodities (mainly, 
corn), which they accused the United States of hoarding.84
On 28 May 1942, Mexico entered the war and the 
President called for national unity. The National Anti- 
Synarchist Committee launched a new attack against the
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UNS, which once again received a Presidential warning. 
The response of the UNS was published in El Sinarquista 
and came in the form of an official instruction to the 
militants to combat the activities of Axis sympathizers, 
and to keep watch on those nationals inclined to works 
against the democratic powers. The article emphasized the 
President's call to participate in the war effort and in 
the union of the country.85
According to Abascal, this declaration was drafted by 
Santacruz and the Base and did not express the general 
feeling of the militants who, like many other Mexicans, 
sympathized with the Axis, though did not necessarily 
understand what it meant, and were against the United 
States. To Santacruz, the geographical factor was 
definite and, therefore, there could be no safety outside 
the United States.
The UNS was useful to polarize and contain popular 
feeling. There were some frictions between the two 
tendencies which became more marked at the time of the 
"Congreso Nacional de Labradores", in August 1942, where 
the Union de Labradores Mexicanos was founded.86 Created 
by the Base, these associations were conceived to ensure 
the legal defence of the interests of the peasants by 
extricating them from the abuses of rural officials and 
banks. They would, for example, set up experimental farms 
to serve as examples for the peasants of the regions. But 
most important, they were to guarantee a source of credit 
independent from the state banks. A whole system of rural 
credit would thus be founded. The task for the UNS would
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be to educate the peasant, to encourage him to work, to 
save him from the vices that afflicted the Mexican 
countryside; it was sufficiently strong to protect him 
from the agrarian reserves, and to give him confidence to 
start.
The official declaration stated that the Conference
was:
"an act of cooperation of the UNS in 
the Presidents war effort policy, and 
it aims to achieve an increase in
• 87agricultural output."
The radicals, on the other hand, spoke in terms of 
dispossessed peasants for whom the State:
"denies the right to have a property 
to work on, the means to educate 
themselves, and the dignity of human 
persons. "88
These two conceptions of perceiving problems 
foreshadowed the future split of the Movement.
The year ended with a hardening of relations between 
the two factions: the resumption of anti-American
propaganda was the consequence of the renewed anti- 
American feeling of the people, after entering the war. 
In November 1942, all members of Congress subscribed to 
the formation of the National Anti-Nazi, Anti-Fascist
Committee11 (an enlarged Anti-Synarchist Committee) , to
• • • • 80 •fight the fifth column in Mexico. The Committee
considered (though never proved) Synarchism a fifth column 
which followed in Mexico the lead of the Falange Espanola 
and used Nazi-Fascist tactics. It warned that its 
activities were a threat to the nation and were
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systematically opposed to good relations between Mexico 
and other democracies.90 In this sense, it was echoing the 
attacks launched by the CTM back in June 1941, when 
Lombardo Toledano described it as the only authentic fifth 
column in Mexico, and the number one enemy of the 
proletariat.91
The UNS riposte is summed up in a tract of the time:
"The fifth column in Mexico:
The Communist Party manipulated by 
STALIN
The Mexican Popular Front (PRM) 
manipulated by STALIN 
The leadership of the CTM manipulated 
by STALIN
VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO manipulated 
by STALIN
Stalin manipulated by HITLER
Against Communism, Nazism and 
Francoism
enemies of the people, synarchism 
s t a n d s  up r e s o l u t e  a n d  
pacificatory.I|92
In this climate took place, in December 1942, the 
Fourth National Assembly of Synarchist leaders. On this 
occasion, one of the speakers insulted the figure of 
Juarez, bringing down upon the organization strong 
condemnation from the Communist party, the CTM and the PRM 
which demanded its suppression. Torres Bueno eventually 
apologized.93
In early 1943, there was considerable discontent 
among the population arising from the difficult economic 
situation, attributed in part to the war effort? the fear 
of joining the American army? as well as for some local 
motives? all which went to explain the appearance of small 
armed groups to the south of the Capital.94 Some senators
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blamed the UNS and demanded that it be dissolved.95 The 
enquiry however came to a sudden end when the UNS offered 
to come before the court? the accusers were careful not to 
take it at its word.
The question of the introduction of compulsory 
military service, as part of the scope of the war effort, 
was a more delicate matter to handle for the moderate 
leadership. Indeed, compulsory military service had never 
before existed in Mexico, and its introduction in 1942- 
1943 was widely opposed. In other times, perhaps, it 
could have been one of Synarchism*s battle horses. On the 
other hand, it might not, because the Movement had always 
paid court to the army and kept good relations with it? 
besides, it had a favourable opinion about the principle 
of military service: hierarchy, discipline, nationalism, 
cult of the flag, were all themes close to Synarchism. 
The matter was discussed at the Fourth National Assembly 
but no clear stance was agreed.96
The national leadership thus found itself in a 
dilemma: the UNS, both leaders and militants, was hostile 
to the war and to military service, as rumours of a 
Mexican expeditionary force grew. At the same time, the 
UNS was, generally speaking on good terms with the army 
and did not wish to offer a pretext to its enemies. To 
the charge that the organization was making propaganda 
against military service, Torres Bueno replied that 
Synarchists obeyed the law, even if many disapproved of 
military service and an expeditionary force. This 
attitude had a negative effect on the Movement, since many
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parents and youths expected that the UNS resisted the law; 
so, when they learned that Torres Bueno had declared that 
Synarchists would comply with it, and asked them to remain 
calm, many left.97
As for the activities of the anti-Synarchist, anti- 
Nazi and anti-Fascist committees, they were, for the most 
part, of an electioneering nature? 1943 being an election
Q O  # M
year. Diaz Escobar, chairman of these committees, 
regularly wrote to the President informing him of the Nazi 
plots of which the UNS was part. Similarly, he published 
several articles in the United States warning Americans of 
the dangers of the fascist activities of the UNS. In one 
of these articles, he labelled the UNS a "Spanish Falange 
in guaraches". He argued that from the start there had 
been "a firmly established accord between the Nazi 
organization and the Synarchist Movement."
It seems that the ulterior motive of articles like 
this was to frighten the Americans; he stated that the 
colonization of Lower California was a German and Japanese 
concern; that the Trueba Olivares brothers were "two 
famous Spanish Falangists" (which was false)? that 
Synarchist mobilization cost more than a quarter million 
pesos (which was also false)? that it received financial 
aid from Nazis and Falangists to print El Sinarquista 
(also false), which he described as:
"one hundred per cent anti-United 
Nations and two hundred percent anti- 
United States"
His final claim was that the UNS already counted with
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fifty thousand well organized members in California, and 
that its activities were:
”A menace to the security of the 
Western Hemisphere, laying it open to 
attack from within prepared by the 
Nazis with the complicity of the 
Phalanx.""
On the other hand, his own organization, he boasted, 
worked in agreement with labour unions and farm groups and 
numbered two million members - a figure that under any 
criterion was largely exaggerated.100
Meanwhile, Torres Bueno, in regular contact with the 
President, wisely steered the UNS according to the line 
prescribed by Santacruz and suceeded in containing the 
threats of revolt that began to take shape.101
The attitude of President Avila Camacho towards the 
Synarchist Movement might appear, more often than not, 
ambiguous. However as one observer noted:
"President Camacho, faced with divided 
counsels in his Cabinet, and acting in 
his characteristic role of balancer, 
decided to play the UNS into a 
position where they would be unable, 
or would not dare to join forces with 
really seditious elements such as the 
Spanish Falange, but would be brought 
to support his national unity instead. 
In so doing, he was electing to treat 
the UNS as the chief potential centre 
of opposition to his Administration. 
He was recognizing the opposition as 
essentially counter-revolutionary, but 
was banking upon its fundamental 
Mexicanism.1,102
He was proved to be right? Synarchist support for his 
policy never stopped, neither in 1942 nor in 1943. What
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• ( i i »  103is more, the UNS toned down its anti-Americanism. At 
the Fifth National Assembly, Torres Bueno ratified the 
pro-American turn and declared that the aims of the 
movement were compatible with Pan Americanism, and 
friendship with the United States.104 He made clear that 
the UNS had never felt the slightest sympathy for the 
totalitarian regimes and that its foreign policy ideas 
were those of President Roosevelt.105
VI. The Crisis of 1943
This state of affairs continued during 1943-1944 
until it was called into question by the disclosure of the 
crisis between the UNS and the Base. The immediate 
origins of the crisis went back to July 1943, when Abascal 
broke with Torres Bueno and the Secret Council, in 
connection with the failure to provide sufficient aid to 
the colonies, and because he felt that Torres Bueno had 
increasingly deviated from the true ideology of the 
movement? Abascal did not forgive him for whitewashing 
Juarez and for speaking well of American Protestants, at 
the time of the annual Le6n rally, in May 1943. The break 
became public in 1944 when Abascal attacked Torres Bueno 
for turning what had been a social and spiritual movement 
into a political party sold to the Mexican government and 
the United States. He declared that the organization was 
corrupt, and advised people: to withdraw from this
Synarchism which was "only another deceit."106
Abascal was expelled from the UNS? but many important 
leaders (like Jose and Alfonso Trueba Olivares, Ruben
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Mendoza, Rafael D6v6ze, etc.) followed him. Hence, for 
the first time, the bulk of the organization discovered 
that something was rotten. Disaster was not far off; the 
number of militants would fall dramatically in a matter of 
weeks, just as it was estimated that the UNS had
• • • 107approximately 800,000 to one million followers.
1. The "fatal blunder”
The commotion created by Abascal could explain the 
"fatal blunder”108 committed by Padilla, then deputy 
leader, in June 1944.
Padilla, deeply shocked by Abascal*s pronouncements 
of treason, was overzealous to clear the movement. In 
June there were unverifiable rumours of a general strike 
organized by the Left, for 5 July, in the event that a 
labour dispute at Puebla, was not solved. This strike, he 
warned was insurrectionary.109
Padilla inferred from this general strike, that the 
country would become a Soviet republic. The publication 
in HE1 Sinarquista" on 22 June of two articles, entitled 
respectively "Eso no es gobierno" and "El Sinarquismo hace 
un llama do al Ejercito",110 set off the fury of the 
authorities. The first of these declared that the 
Government was no government at all and that the President 
was under the influence of forces bent on sovietizing the 
Republic. The second was a direct appeal to the Army to 
stand ready in the event of a Communist coup which would 
be directed to transfer effective power from the 
Government to the Soviet Embassy.
The worst, from the point of view of the Public
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Prosecutor, was the seditious tone of the call:
"We have raised an army of 500,000 
soldiers who are resolved to give 
Mexico a Government with real 
authority. Can a regime be called a 
Government when it is presided over 
by a man who prefers to abandon his 
people to the mercy of vultures in 
order not to annoy the vultures?"111
President Avila Camacho had more than once irritated 
the Left Wing by refusing to take action against the 
Synarchists, however vividly they were described as 
"Nazis" or "Falangists"; but this time, the Synarchists 
had gone too far. On 22 June, a ban was imposed on 
Synarchist meetings in the eight States which were its 
stronghold and was extended within a week to all 28 
States.112 El Sinarquista was suspended and its editor 
indicted?113 Synarchist headquarters were searched and an 
investigation was begun into its activities. Mass 
demonstrations were held by the Left to acclaim these 
steps? Excelsior declared that national safety had obliged 
the President to take strong measures at last.114
The Foreign Office in London described the situation
thus:
"The whole affair represented a 
disquieting heightening of tension in 
Mexican politics and further imperiled 
such chances as remain for the 
Presidents policy of moderation.1,115
During the summer of 1944, the government severely 
repressed the UNS with unparalleled determination. It is 
not clear why the Government decided to act with such 
resolve? yet, it is possible that it had done so to take
330
advantage of the strife within the organization. On the 
other hand, it could have been a manoeuvre to avoid the 
embarrassment that a general strike would connote for the 
government. In any case, the immediate cause was the 
publication of those articles.
As for the publication of the two articles, there are 
two possible explanations. The one advanced by the
sympathizers of Synarchism stated that it had been an 
unwise act, lacking in precision and foresight in what it 
said; but it was done in good faith, ”it was God*s will
and we face the consequences trusting in his
• 116 • Providence." Shortly before, the Supreme Council had
assured Avila Camacho that the UNS would cooperate with
him. If this interpretation is right, it is possible that
when the articles were printed, the President could only
have concluded that the moderate leadership was losing
control of the organization and, therefore, he decided to
curb it.117
The other interpretation considered the whole affair 
as part of a general offensive of the moderate elements of 
the organization to counter the charges imputed by 
Abascal, that it had become subservient to Avila Camacho. 
This was the opinion of Abascal himself. He argued that 
Torres Bueno and Padilla thought that the time had come to 
prove Abascal wrong. According to Abascal, Padilla was a 
courageous but naive man. He committed a blunder. Yet, 
as he observed, Padilla took all the risks, while Torres 
Bueno, if everything went right, would take all the 
credit? if it did not, he had prepared an alibi, whereby
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Padilla would appear as the sole culprit. Torres Bueno 
had, in effect, gone away from the Capital, and in his 
absence and without his knowledge, as he later said, and 
against his express orders, Padilla launched his call.
The call was not addressed specifically or primarily 
to the Catholic and anti-communist people? instead, it was 
addressed to the Federal Army, which was, in the opinion 
of Abascal and other Synarchists, "atheistic, supportive 
of the government (gobiernista), Masonic, revolutionary 
and communistic". Abascal blamed Padilla and his 
colleagues for believing that their call would find favour
with the Government and the Army, who would immediately
• • • • • 118invite the Synarchists to fight Communism together.
Abascal was aware that he could not count with the 
Army since:
"The Army, created by the Revolution 
and in the Revolution and nurtured by 
atheism, cannot stop being 
revolutionary. It can come into 
conflict for material interests, but 
never in defence of an ideal [...]
All the officers are of the 
revolutionary ideology, totally unable 
to understand us, least of all to 
expose themselves for an ideal that 
they knew would not obtain the 
approval of the United States [... ]
Padilla made a terrible mistake when 
he appealed to the army to save Mexico 
from a communist coup d'Etat that he 
believe was imminent, because a 
communist coup d'Etat has already been 
made in Mexico since the triumph of 
the Reform in 1867 [... ] ”119
Nevertheless, the articles must not be taken in 
isolation, as a sudden outburst? on the contrary, they
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were part of a campaign that ”E1 Sinarquista" had started 
at least three months before, and since then, almost every 
issue carried a warning of the imminent communist 
takeover. In April it had revealed:
"Every day it becomes more clear that 
there is a communist plan to seize 
power in Mexico through a coup 
d'Etat”120
In the same month, Padilla wrote an editorial 
denouncing the "incongruities of the President”, where he 
accused him of asking the peasants for their support in 
his battle for production, while, at the same time, he 
allowed the presence of the reservists to continue:
"The farmers could not listen to the 
President. More significant than his 
message was the presence, throughout 
the Mexican countryside, of the armed 
reserves, with their latent 
revolutionary hate. At the same time 
that the wireless was transmitting the 
appeal of the Government to produce, 
it informed the Republic of the 
assassinations and violent acts 
committed by the reserves in the 
states of Guerrero and Michoacan. The 
Government, however, did not do 
anything to restore law and order, to 
bring back confidence and peace [...]
"For a very long time, real farmers 
have been asking for the disband of 
the reserves; this is ineluctable if 
the pacification of the countryside 
and the thriving of our agriculture 
are really intended. Now, on the 
occasion of the President's
production programme, the campaign has 
been kept up and redoubled. Nobody 
listens to us. Except the Reds, 
because they have deeply resented it, 
since it is in the reserves that they 
find the best elements for their 
agitation and crime, as well as the 
best support for the day when they 
attempt their Communist Revolution.
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That is why they have yelled and 
protested. If the reserves were 
disarmed, their hopes would die. The 
Government, meanwhile, remains silent 
and refuses to intervene.
"Is this an attitude congruous with 
the objectives expressed by the 
Government? [... ] The people genuinely 
want to produce. We, Synarchists, 
genuinely want to produce. The only 
lacking is the sincerity of our 
Government, so that our intention 
turns into concrete acts, beneficial 
to Mexico."121
The matter of the two articles of 22 June, came 
before the Public Prosecutor who indicted Padilla and 
banned El Sinarquista. The charges were abuse to the 
President, breach of the peace, violation of the law of 
the press, and treason. Padilla testified on 29 June. He 
stated that his motive had been to avert the threat of a 
red revolution, by pressing the President and the army to 
intervene. He cited the recent cases of Guatemala and El
199 •Salvador. On 5 July, the Public Prosecutor denounced 
Synarchism as a mixture of "Spanish and Italian fascism, 
of 'Jonsismo* of Ledesma, and of traditionalism of Vazquez
123 • •de Mella." The UNS was broken up, its paper banned, its 
archives seized, and some of its leading officials taken 
into custody.
In the ensuing days there were a number of public 
demonstrations in support of the Government's decision, 
the most important of which took place on 9 July, and it 
involved hundreds of members of the official labour and 
peasant organizations.124 The President also received the 
support of many quarters: Masonic lodges, unions,
political organizations, etc., which demanded the definite
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suppression of the UNS and of the PAN, which they accused 
of being Falangist and a front for clerical intervention:
"This Masonic Lodge congratulates you 
for your patriotic and energetic 
dispositions [... ] which redound to 
the suppression of the tendentious 
campaign that the Synarchist Party 
[sic] and National Action have been 
developing to discredit the government 
of the Mexican Revolution [... ] and 
aimed at agitating the Mexican people 
[by] fanatic elements of the Catholic 
clergy, manipulated by political 
elements cast aside for their 
unscrupulous conduct in former 
administrations [... ]t|125
The British Legion in Mexico assessed the situation 
of the UNS as the result of a press campaign that 
originated in the United States arising from what turned 
out to be an inaccurate official report?
"Early in the year a press campaign 
was begun in the United States against 
the Synarchist Movement in Mexico on 
the ground that it was Fascist- 
inspired and directed by the Roman 
Church. There were good reasons for 
thinking that these attacks were based 
on a supercharged but inaccurate 
report of the United States office of 
Strategic Services housed in the 
embassy. The Mexican press followed 
the scent, and something like a heresy 
hunt began at a most convenient moment 
for those in and out of the Mexican 
Government who were making fortunes on 
the various black markets, and were 
only too willing that public attention 
should be diverted away from their 
activities. Later in the year the 
diplomatic personnel of the embassy 
queried many portions of the above- 
mentioned report, but in the meantime 
the Public Prosecutor had banned all 
synarchist meetings and had taken 
action against their newspaper.
Possibly by way of riposte, the 
Archbishop of Mexico opened in
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November a counter-campaign against 
Protestantism, which had some 
unfortunate but unpublished results
c...]"128
The internal crisis of the Synarchist Movement and 
the crisis between the UNS and the Government, hastened 
that between the UNS and the Secret Council of the Base. 
The crucial issue was what kind of UNS they each wanted, 
what its purpose should be, and whether or not it should
seize power. Santacruz and the Base wanted to limit the
i
role of the organization to one of a pressure group, 
similar to Catholic Action. Torres Bueno and the majority 
of the leaders, disconcerted by Abascal1s statements, did 
not intend to stand about, because the bulk of the 
militants was uneasy and impatient.
By mid-1944, the UNS was submerged in utter 
confusion. Many of its most popular leaders had broken 
with the Organization, and remained bitter about it. Week 
after week, Abascal attacked Torres Bueno and the leaders 
of the Supreme Council. He accused them of "lying and of 
anti-Christian cowardliness"? and averred that the UNS was
• • • • 127neither national, nor a union, nor even Synarchist. 
Torres Bueno was unable to refute the charges raised by 
Abascal, since "El Sinarquista" had been banned and its 
correspondence blocked.128 Moreover, the Government ban 
on Synarchist meetings represented a serious obstacle for 
the recovery and re-strengthening of the organization, and 
for stopping its fragmentation.129
In 1944, several members of the radical faction 
attempted an internal coup. Early in November, a group of
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dissidents, calling themselves "abascalistas," attended a 
meeting at the Synarchist headquarters, where they accused 
Torres Bueno and the acting leaders of the organization. 
They maintained that he had been responsible for the 
division of the UNS, by expelling and slandering Abascal? 
that he had shown lack of courage in resisting the recent 
Government repression; that he destroyed the most 
important work the UNS had undertaken: its colonies; and, 
lastly that he had embezzled 20,000 pesos, which he used 
to bribe some regional leaders to back him in his conflict 
against Abascal. They argued that they were the 
representatives of the "supreme council of the National 
Synarchist Union", and that, as such, they were sacking 
him. Since he refused to go, they accused him of 
revolt.130 This attempt to be recognized as the legitimate 
authority of the UNS was instantly rejected as false by
131Torres Bueno's supporters.
The rebels were astounded to learn that Abascal had 
declared that he would not back the coup - which could 
only succeed if he led it, because of his extreme 
popularity among some of the leaders and the majority of 
the militants, and which would help to overcome the strong 
pressure exerted by the obedience with which they had been 
pervaded. Instead, his religious devotion prevailed and 
he refused to disobey the official hierarchy of the Church 
which, at the time, supported Torres Bueno. He stated:
"The best we can do is not to get 
involved with it [the UNS], nor with 
any public activity, because it is 
better to devote ourselves, 
exclusively, to Catholic action, so as
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to put ourselves and the others, under 
the orders of the hierarchy of the 
Church.1,132
Therefore, during 1944, the Synarchist Movement 
suffered a severe split between radicals and moderates 
which was made worse by the repression of the Government. 
The consequences were catastrophic. At the end of the 
year, it was evident that the UNS had significantly lost
in strength and fighting spirit; its leaders no longer
enjoyed prestige and the organization no longer carried
• 133influence over the masses.
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CHAPTER VI
DIVISION IN THE UNB
I. The Collapse of the UNS
In April 1944, Abascal had returned to Mexico City; 
in May, he openly denounced the collusion between the UNS 
leaders, the Base, the Mexican Government and the American 
Embassy. Was this a prelude to an attempt on his part to 
recapture the leadership of the UNS? The Base and the 
Church, and hence the Government, believed that he was 
ready to seize power and to exercise it; and that he 
viewed non-violence merely as a tactical means.
From the beginning of the Movement, many militants 
had called for precise objectives, otherwise they might 
leave it.1 In 1942, after Abascal was removed, some became 
impatient and demanded to make use of the strength 
acquired; two years later, even the collaborators of the 
Base, like Torres Bueno, believed that the UNS should 
become more politically active, and indeed form a 
political party.
The Base replied that both the radicalism of Abascal 
and the political orientation of Torres Bueno would lead 
to massacre or to failure, because the Government was 
invincible, since it counted with the support of the 
United States and the army. The course should therefore 
continue to be that of working within the law, 
infiltrating and converting.
The "fatal blunder" of June 1944 had provided the 
Government with a pretext to finish off the Synarchist
351
organization, before Abascal could regain it. The danger 
was very real, as they perceived it, since Padilla, second 
in command in the Movement at the time, had disobeyed 
orders, showing that the UNS could elude the Base, 
changing both its strategy and objectives.
El Sinarquista had been suspended and demonstrations 
were banned; meanwhile Abascal multiplied his assaults in 
the national press. The UNS was unable to retaliate and 
to stop the outflow of members. It was not until after 
the radical leaders had been removed that Torres Bueno 
broke off with the Base, and sought to stop desertions 
through political commitment and rediscovered 
aggressiveness against the Government and the United 
States.
II. The Split between the UNS and the Base, 1945
The disintegration of the UNS did not end with the 
removal of Abascal and the radicals from the organization, 
in 1944. The following year, yet another schism arose 
which, in some respects, was more serious than the 
previous one. Until then, the secret leadership of the 
Synarchist Movement, the Supreme Council of the Base, had 
been able to keep its control over the organization, 
through the obedience that the visible leaders paid to it. 
Despite the great difficulty it had in controlling Abascal 
in 1941, in the end, he was persuaded, after some gambit, 
to step down and hand over the leadership to Torres Bueno, 
who seemed more docile. However, in 1945, the Supreme 
Council was to regret this decision, because he brazenly
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disobeyed it and set himself up as the sole leader of the 
organization, breaking off with the Base.
The origins of this rupture went back to the start of 
1944, when the leadership of the movement was in chaos, 
after the scathing attacks of Abascal against Torres 
Bueno. As a result, Torres Bueno decided to submit his 
resignation on 5 March 1944. This was neither accepted 
nor rejected by the Supreme Council, but left hanging in 
the hope that time would heal the wounds. However, in the 
ensuing months, Torres Bueno began to take decisions 
unilaterally; decisions that normally required the consent 
of the Supreme Council. In order to avoid the continued 
desertion of members, he undertook a more militant 
campaign in 1944, which was followed by Government 
repression, in June and July. The Supreme Council was 
even more anxious when it learned that Torres Bueno was 
considering taking Synarchism into the electoral process.2
The repression of the Government led Santacruz to 
start conversations with Avila Camacho and other Mexican 
and American officials, in which he assured them that 
Synarchism was not subversive and that it would not 
participate in electoral politics, but would be devoted to 
founding schools, rural settlements and carrying out 
religious deeds.3
In October 1944, the Supreme Council pushed the 
matter further by accepting Torres Bueno*s resignation. 
Only his time, he refused to go and, in fact, challenged 
the Supreme Council. Santacruz attempted to discredit him 
by calling on the hierarchy to denounce him? but it
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refused to do so because it was not its intention to get 
directly involved with Synarchism.4 Torres Bueno realized 
that only if the hierarchy was induced to condemn him 
publicly, the Supreme Council had in practice no control 
over the UNS. So, by the end of 1944, Torres Bueno was 
convinced that there was no reason for the UNS to continue 
being subordinated to the Base? he therefore informed 
Santacruz and the Supreme Council that from that moment 
the Synarchist Movement would be totally independent. He 
soon obtained the support of the leader of the Base in his 
native state of Guanajuato.5
On 8 October, 1944, the Supreme Leader of the Base 
ordered Torres Bueno to hand over the leadership to 
Gildardo Gonzalez, advocating the need to provide the 
President with another interlocutor, as Torres Bueno had 
been damaged by the June affair.
Confronted by Torres Buenofs resistance to hand over 
the leadership and by the refusal of Gildardo Gonzalez to 
accept it, arguing that the order was unfair, and that a 
change of leader in those circumstances would be 
detrimental to the prestige of the hierarchies of the 
Movement, the Base sent armed men to occupy the offices 
of the Synarchist Movement and also accused him of 
embezzlement. Torres Bueno reacted by convening the
regional leaders of the Base (the Divisions), in Celaya, 
where it was decided to break with the Supreme Council.6
He revealed to his supporters what the Base was and, 
what it expected from the Movement:
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11 [The UNS] should abandon completely 
and for ever all political standpoint, 
reflexion or action, because, it 
feels, the slightest political 
gesture, albeit extremely discreet and 
well conceived, would cost us the 
friendship of the American Catholic. 
However, this touches the core of our 
Movement, since we have always 
pretended to be marching towards a 
Christian Social Order, we have always 
maintained that power is, as an 
element of society, more or less an 
instrument in the service of the 
objectives we pursue. It is essential 
that aspiration be upheld."7
The Supreme Council took this decision as an act of 
treachery and immediately mobilized to resist it. It 
considered the UNS as an inseparable part of the Base, and 
any attempt to divide them was deemed abhorrent.
Santacruz tried to appeal to the Church, as he had 
done in 1941 against Abascal? but the bishops declined to 
give an opinion when he asked them to condemn publicly the 
UNS. He then resorted to schism, with some success, 
taking the regions of Quer^taro, Aguascalientes, Yucatan 
and Zacatecas. In court, he won possession of the title 
"El Sinarquista" for his group.8
And so, in February 1945, the Supreme Council got 
together the regional leaders that remained loyal and 
elected Carlos Athie Carrasco as the new National Leader 
of the UNS. The new leader was unknown to the majority 
of Synarchists because he had never held any important 
position; he had worked as a teacher in the school for 
Synarchist leaders in Mexico City, and only a restricted 
inner circle knew of him.9
Because Torres Bueno continued to view himself as the
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national leader, two organizations claiming to be the true 
representatives of Synarchism existed side by side. That 
led by Torres Bueno, or UNS-MTB, eventually was the most 
important. Yet, before that happened, a strong battle 
developed, in 1945-1946, during which the two groups tried 
to destroy each other. Torres Bueno, however, had the 
upper hand. The very existence of the dual leadership and 
the need to maintain the secrecy of the Supreme Council 
had placed the leader of the UNS, from the very beginning, 
as the absolute leader of the organization, recognized by 
all the members and responsible only to God. Thus, when 
a new leader was chosen, the decision was perceived by the 
Synarchist masses at large and, indeed, by the outside 
world, as stemming from the will of the previous leader 
who, for reasons of his own, had resolved to step down. 
Consequently, when Torres Bueno broke off with the Base, 
he was universally known by the rank and file which he had 
led for three years and which he had addressed on 
innumerable occasions. The Secret Council and the Base 
were, on the other hand, totally unknown, not only to the 
masses, but to the local leaders, as well.10
And so, when Torres Bueno made his coup, he carried 
along with him nearly two thirds of the members, and the 
local and municipal leaders decided to follow him. They 
had sworn allegiance and obedience to the leader when they 
had joined the movement, and, because they ignored the 
existence of the Base and the Supreme Council, they 
thought of Athie Carrasco as a usurper, since Torres Bueno 
had not relinquished his command. Nevertheless, many
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regional leaders, who did know of the relationship between 
the UNS and the Base, followed the orders of the Supreme 
Council and supported Athie Carrasco, persuading many of 
their personal followers to rally behind the UNS of Athie 
Carrasco, or UNS-CAC.
The differences between the two groups lay not only 
in the personal ambitions of Torres Bueno and his 
intentions to integrate Synarchism to the electoral 
process, but in the acute difference of their respective 
ideologies. The orientation of the UNS-CAC was of 
rejecting electoral politics, and politics in general? 
this faction was committed exclusively to solving the 
social and economic problems of the rural regions and was 
particularly active in matters such as literacy campaigns 
and the establishment of market cooperatives. It 
rejected, above anything else, any tendency to revolt or 
agitate:
"The UNS, now as ever, condemns 
violence and declares that any armed 
uprising, especially in the present 
circumstances, would be tantamount to 
betrayal of the Fatherland”11
By virtue of the latest schism, Synarchism found 
itself, in fact, divided into three main factions:
the most extreme was that of Abascal, who had left 
the organization in 1944. This group was opposed to 
any form of compromise with the Mexican Government 
and sustained a form of militant agitation and 
opposition, which was constantly on the verge of 
armed rebellion?
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the moderate faction was led by Torres Bueno? it 
avoided any kind of violence and wished to channel 
its opposition to the Government by entering the 
electoral arena?
the most conservative faction was the newly formed 
UNS-CAC which, far from opposing the Government, 
advocated, instead, to collaborate with it in "all 
its honourable and just projects." It made a 
distinction between the Government as "the permanent 
organ of authority and the Mexican Revolution, 
transitory accident of our political life."12
The radical faction, which neither the national 
leadership nor the Base controlled, was at a disadvantage 
to take Synarchism in the direction it envisaged. 
Although it had a wide following among the masses, the 
fact that Abascal had refused to lead a rebellion, left 
the leaders with no alternative but to withdraw from the 
movement in peace, or to go underground.
Nonetheless, some of its leaders attempted to create 
their own brand of Synarchism, arguing that differences 
between the factions were not exclusively about 
individuals - between Abascal, the Supreme Council or 
Torres Bueno - but rather encompassed the basic ideas of 
Synarchism. They declared illegitimate the other two 
factions and tried to exploit the popularity of their 
militant action to call a national Synarchist convention 
to elect the leaders that would bring back unity into the
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movement.13 Although this proposition was put forward by 
some preeminent leaders of the radical sector (Alfonso 
Trueba Olivares among others), the fact that they could 
not count with Abascal implied that it had very little 
chance of success. Consequently, during 1945 and 1946, 
the centre of Synarchist activities revolved round the 
UNS-MTB and the UNS-CAC.
Once separated from the Base, Torres Bueno undertook 
the formation of his own secret council. He argued that 
the system of a secret leadership was not intrinsically 
wrong, but rather the people who made it up .14 He 
concluded that since he was the target of the attacks of 
both the radicals and the UNS-CAC, it was politically 
appropriate to leave the national leadership, and to 
proceed to control the organization from behind the 
scenes, through his own supreme council. In this way, he 
would avoid, on the one hand, the criticism of the UNS- 
CAC, which accused him of violating the vows of obedience 
to the Base; and, on the other hand, the criticisms of the 
radicals, who blamed him for betraying true militant 
Synarchism for his own personal gain.15
The celebration by the UNS-MTB of the eighth 
anniversary of the foundation of Synarchism, in Leon, on 
20 May 1945, was attended, according to its officials, by 
50,000 members? constituting the most exiguous presence 
since that celebration was first held.16
The occasion was used to announce that Torres Bueno 
was leaving the leadership and that Gildardo Gonzalez 
Sanchez, former regional leader of Puebla, was taking
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over. He was chosen because of his close friendship and 
his blind subordination to Torres Bueno. He was to remain 
leader for two years.
1. The fldissidentsH
Unquestionably, public opinion, already surprised by 
Abascal's revelations, was even more baffled by the latest 
blow to hit the organization, and the claim by two groups 
to be the true representatives of Synarchism. The 
situation was intensified by the press which, at least in 
the beginning, admitted the reports of the Athie group, 
and recognised him as the only National Leader.
Taking into account that the UNS-MTB could not make 
use of a press organ to guide Synarchists and sympathizers 
in their favour, they were at a disadvantage to explain 
what was happening to Synarchism. Greater confusion was 
added, when the virtually extinct Organizing Committee 
attempted to intervene.
What were the consequences of all these problems?
2. Consequences
i) Division and confusion
One of the tangible effects of Abascal1s conduct and 
of the emergence of Athie's group was the relative 
division in the Synarchist ranks and the confusion that it 
instilled in public opinion, the Government and in 
American circles.
By May 1945, the following groups were considered to 
be rebellious - from mainstream Synarchism (i.e. MTB) - 
all, but one, of the groups of Queretaro (the home state
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of Santacruz)? three of Colima; all the groups of Yucatan 
(eleven) 7 those of the District of Zamora, and that of 
Villalongin, Michoac&n, seven of Puebla; nearly all of 
Aguascalientes; one of Tlaxcala, and small groups of other 
less important States. In total, it amounted to
approximately five per cent of the Synarchists.17
ii) Disorganization
Because of all these difficulties it was natural that 
the organization of the Movement suffered, and the elan 
and moral of the troops weakened; due in part to the lack 
of money to readjust, to the absence of a propaganda
organ, and to the reduction in public meetings and visits.
Consequently, according to the report of the National 
Leader for 1946, the situation at the beginning of that 
year had been the following:
i) there were not enough secretaries in the National 
Committee and those there were had to perform various 
functions at the same time;
ii) there were no Deputies, they could not be sustained;
iii) public activities were still banned, the annual Leon 
celebration had been the first one allowed;
iv) the colony of Maria Auxiliadora continued to be
insubordinate and seditious since the departure of
Abascal, despite the efforts of the new leader,
Valentin Lozada;
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v) there was still a ban on the circulation of its mail 
and its propaganda;
vi) the trial of Juan Ignacio Padilla and El Sinarquista 
was still pending?
vii) the records and files of the UNS had not been 
returned from the Prosecutor's office;
viii) no working programme had been devised for the Leaders 
and the Secretaries, who went on with the same old 
rudimentary working system? and
ix) many leaders were irresolute and tired.18
Torres Bueno and his group, which still represented 
the majority of the Synarchists, set themselves one task: 
to put a definite end to the prevailing state of affairs, 
by thoroughly observing Synarchist discipline and loyalty 
to the principles and programme of the UNS. He instructed 
his troops to close ranks in order to make the 
organization more effective and to awaken the initiative 
and the fighting spirit of the Synarchists. Or, as he put 
it:
"strict discipline in obeying orders 
to achieve flexibility in the struggle 
and cohesion in our ranks. " 19
A plan was drafted to fight the "divisionistas" (i.e. 
the followers of UNS-CAC). The Secretariat of Orientation 
and Propaganda emphasized in the set of instructions 
entitled "General guidelines to conduct UNS propaganda 
during the Ninth year of struggle":
362
"Our propaganda should inspire in
friend and foe the ideas of security 
and determination in all our acts; let 
us avoid indecision and hesitation, 
especially with regard to the internal 
problems that have affected the UNS"20
The same Secretariat of Orientation and Propaganda 
formulated a working plan against the "divisionistas"? of 
which the principal sections were these:
1. It asked the Regional leaders to assess and report
the situation and the activities of the
"divisionistas" in their areas.
2. It demanded that a wide campaign of orientation be 
set targeting Synarchists, public opinion, and misled 
groups, covering these points:
a) the nature, scope, and meaning of the conflict;
b) the groundless accusations and smears directed 
against the UNS and against its leaders, and 
hence, refute and defend Synarchism;
c) justify the attitude of the Movement in
expelling those elements which attempted to
undermine the programme of the Movement,
3. The campaign of orientation should make use of all 
the propaganda means at their disposal (tracts, 
newspapers, literature);
4. As preventive measures the following were 
recommended:
a) prevent the circulation of the dissidents'
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Bulletin of Information, and of all the
propaganda they issued?
b) denounce publicity Athie and all the members of 
his group, warning all the loyal leaders and 
soldiers of their activities, so that they would 
not be misled;
c) expose the limited significance and lack of 
strength of the dissidents;
d) penetrate their groups so as to be always aware 
of their activities and plans.
5. At the same time that these tasks were carried out,
they should be concerned with strengthening their own
groups and giving prestige to Synarchism,
particularly:
a) by actively working and fulfilling the orders 
and instructions of the National Leadership;
b) by raising the morale of all Synarchists;
c) by strengthening discipline?
d) by spreading the traditional doctrine of the UNS
contained in the ”16 Basic Points”?
e) by spreading the doctrine of the Church as
regards social and political matters.21
The change in leadership was very significant,
insofar as it involved the definite affirmation of two 
attitudes that would mark the organic structure of the 
Movement, in its new phase: the condemnation of
caudillismo and the effective selection of the best men 
for the posts of command.
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Gonz&lez Sanchez was the first leader of the Movement 
to have climbed every step of the hierarchy. Under his 
leadership, Synarchism entered a period of political 
maturity, during which the first serious endeavour to 
systematize life, activity and organization, were 
undertaken. In the past, the Movement had grown without 
measure, driven on by an outburst of nonconformity and an 
urge to redeem the country to a position of grandeur and 
transcendence.
Gonzalez Sanchez received the leadership when the 
Movement was still proscribed. Slowly, but effectively, 
he succeeded in returning Synarchism to a normal public 
role. He reorganized the regional leadership, by placing 
young fighters for the most part, with wide political 
views and with foresight of the political problems the 
Movement was likely to face.22
However, the most important aspect of his term was 
that, for the first time, it was assayed to draft the 
statutes of the UNS. He personally collaborated in the 
commission charged with this task, and presented the 
results to the VII National Assembly of Synarchist 
leaders, in December 1945, which approved and promulgated 
them, early the following year.23 Only the leader of 
Queretaro, Antonio Santacruz, was absent from the 
Assembly.
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III. The "Partido Fuerza Popular"
In 1946, what remained of the Synarchist Movement - 
the faction led by Torres Bueno - entered electoral 
politics. Torres Bueno had first proposed forming a party 
in 1944, but was turned down by the radicals of the 
Movement, because that implied making concessions to the 
Government. In fact, one of the charges imputed by 
Abascal when he withdrew was that Torres Bueno was seeking 
to turn Synarchism into a political party.
And so, although the UNS-MTB retained strength, the 
leaders found themselves in an awkward predicament when 
they decided to take the movement into the national 
political system, create a party and participate in 
elections. After all, everybody knew that the UNS had 
drawn its strength from its outright rejection of the 
traditional political game. Indeed, one of the key tenets 
of Synarchism had been that it never formed a political 
party or participated in elections in any way. Jose 
Antonio Urquiza, The Founder of the Movement, had said:
"We do not aspire to form an electoral 
party, a word that implies in itself 
a concept of division. We want to win 
over the men of all parties; to bring 
them together according to the things 
that unite us all, above those which 
separate us. For this reason we 
reject the political attribute which 
is given to Synarchism. We are not a 
party, and we reject even more the 
idea of political party."24
When Torres Bueno became the national leader in 1941, 
he stated that Synarchism "had never been nor will it ever 
be a political party."
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"Synarchism is not an electoral party 
[... ] Synarchism is not an 
organization aimed at obtaining 
political power [... ] It is an 
organization which strives to restore 
social order in Mexico, and destroy 
Liberalism, pseudo-democracy and 
anarchy. " 25
He reiterated this stance, in May 1944, adducing that 
"democracy does not exist in Mexico."26
Hence, the UNS-MTB leaders decided to carry out 
consultations with the regional leaders to study the 
plausibility and the chances of a political party. They 
sent a questionnaire covering several aspects:
- The interest of the various Synarchist groups in 
electoral politics and, in particular, in the
presidential succession, and the official candidate, 
Alemdn;
whether Synarchists had been pushed to join an
official political group supporting the candidate of 
local politicians, when and with what result; 
whether there were conflicts between the 
revolutionary politicians, and why;
what would be the consequence for their members if 
they were to support the official candidate; 
evaluate the strength of Accion Nacional in their 
region;
determine the effective strength of the CNC, the CTM, 
the CNOP, and other groups, like Freemasonry and the
• 27Communist party.
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Finally, in September 1945, when the country was 
getting ready for the 1946 presidential elections, 
Gildardo Gonzalez announced that the UNS would participate 
in the campaign, although he did not give any details as 
to how that would be. This new point of departure, he 
contended, did not contradict Synarchist principles; but 
was, instead, a gradual progression, adapted to the 
prevailing political circumstances.
Moreover, they declared that the new electoral law, 
soon to be introduced, gave Synarchism the possibility to 
enter the electoral register. So, in February 1946, the 
UNS-MTB announced that it was to form its own political 
party and that it would present candidates of its own in 
the July elections.
"The decision was taken after 
carefully considering the present 
conditions in Mexico, and we have seen 
that they are very promising, because 
both the victory of the Democracies 
and the attitude and the promises of 
the Government to respect the vote and 
the determination of the people to see 
that their rights are respected, have 
somewhat cleared the political climate 
and have changed the circumstances 
that prevailed in previous years. 
Similarly, we have taken into account 
the fact that the UNS cannot become a 
political party because its purpose 
and field of action would be abated. 
We have also studied the different 
existing parties and concluded that 
none completely coincided with either 
our aspirations or our principles and 
that therefore we could not use them 
for the systematic exercise of our 
political rights. Lastly, we have 
considered that to be able to 
participate actively in accordance 
with the Electoral Law, it was 
necessary that we organized in a 
national political party [... ] "28
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The magazine Orden announced the creation of the new
party in these terms:
"Synarchism will form a great 
political party"
"The creation of this party will not 
affect the nature of the UNS, but 
rather the opposite, it will serve as 
an instrument to exercise the 
political function of a large sector 
of the Mexican people, who were 
demanding it as an essential need to 
satisfy their popular interests. 1,29
The party was formed in February 1946, the name 
adopted was Partido Fuerza Popular, with Enrique Morfin
• • SO • •Gonzalez as the first president. The Party published its 
own newspapers, El Poder. The decision to nominate a 
presidential candidate was put off until the celebration 
of the party's convention. On 23 March, a national 
constituent assembly was set and a programme was drafted.31
The Manifesto of Popular Force expounded some of the 
following objectives and principles:
"Full of enthusiasm and faith, the 
Popular Force Party comes into the 
political life of Mexico. It enters 
the Mexican scene as the standard 
bearer of Social Justice, and as the 
defender of the dignity and the 
freedom of the Mexicans. It has not 
come to divide, or to sow the seeds of 
hatred; it comes with a National 
Mission: to unite and bring together 
all Mexican in the fraternity of a 
single Fatherland and in the communion 
of the same ideals: the COMMON GOOD 
and the true UNITY of the Mexican 
People.
"Popular Force" does not belong to 
either the revolutionaries or the 
reactionaries. It has no compromises 
with groups or factions and it only
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fights for Mexico. Its position is 
fundamentally constructive and one of 
positive work for the benefit of the 
Mexican Community.
"Popular Force" declares the war on 
Communism, because Communism attacks 
the very essence of the Fatherland, 
human dignity, and it serves a foreign 
country."
The underlying principles expounded included:
"The absolute reform and amendment of 
the political system of Government 
[... ] So that the freedom of the 
municipio be the best protection for 
the family and the strongest guarantee 
for the higher political institutions.
We want a State in the service of the 
Nation, a just Government that loves 
and serves its people, and that 
genuinely represents it. We want to 
get rid of the system of official 
parties and cacicazgos that constitute 
a political monopoly and the most 
outrageous machinery for the violation 
of the suffrage.
There is no other solution to the 
labour problem than social justice, 
always improving it, and providing 
guarantees to both factors of 
production [...]
"Popular Force" asserts as the first 
principle of the national coexistence, 
the guarantees and freedoms to live 
and the rights of all the inhabitants 
of Mexico, and fights for the rule of 
Law and Justice, where the authorities 
should set the example and be the 
first to submit to it."82
IV. The 1946 Elections
The elections of 1946 resembled those of 1940 in that 
there were also two presidential candidates of importance: 
Miguel Aleman, Interior Minister under Avila Camacho, and
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Ezequiel Padilla, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
representing the most conservative elements of the PRM. 
When it became clear that Aleman would win the party's 
nomination, Padilla left the PRM to found the Mexican 
Democratic Party to uphold his candidacy.33 Before this 
happened, there were indications that the UNS-MTB might 
back him. However, during the ensuing months, the 
Government began its customary process before elections, 
of neutralizing, or forming alliances with sectors of the 
Mexican political ambit, to ensure unanimous support for 
the official candidate. One element of this course of 
action was to grant certain concessions. The Synarchists, 
in return for supporting certain of its candidates for 
various legislative offices, would have complete freedom 
to conduct their programmes. Besides, they were promised 
some seats in Congress. Although they were not urged to 
support the official candidate, in view of the concessions 
granted, they agreed not to sustain Padilla.34
The PRM did not wish the Popular Force to present a 
candidate because it considered that the UNS still 
represented the radical Right, whose aim was to overthrow 
the Mexican Revolution, the very base of the official 
party. Therefore, not content that the UNS did not 
support Padilla, it raised the matter of the legality of 
Popular Force to register. Thus, when the registration 
period closed, on 7 May, Popular Force was left out. The 
Public Prosecutor stated that the registration had been 
denied because it was a confessional party and, hence, not 
eligible under the Law (Article 130 of the Constitution) . 36
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Nevertheless, on 13 May it was announced that thanks 
to a special presidential concession both the Communist 
Party and Popular Force would be permitted to register. 
This was effected after Popular Force agreed to make some 
changes to its programme, such as recognizing the 
"institution” rather than the religious value of 
matrimony.87
The Government could thus express its disdain for 
anti-revolutionary Synarchism and, at the same time, enter 
into an alliance with it, that would benefit it in the 
presidential campaign; but, above all, it benefited Avila 
Camacho, who appeared as a devout democrat and a generous 
magistrate, because he had allowed the participation in 
the elections of both the extreme Right and Left.38
The elections were a disaster for the Movement. Many 
Synarchists were disenchanted with the sudden backtrack 
that meant participating in the elections; and more 
desertions followed. This gave some vindication to the 
claims of the radical faction that Torres Bueno had sold 
out to the Government. Besides, the disastrous results 
seemed to sustain the position of the UNS-CAC that 
Synarchism should stay out of politics, electoral or 
otherwise. None of the Synarchist candidates to the 
Senate was elected, and only one, to the Chamber of 
Deputies, won .39 But even this small victory was short­
lived, because this one deputy resigned from the UNS 
before one year and became a high ranking Government 
employee.40
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V. Synarchism in 1947
The UNS-MTB, disquieted by the results of the 1946 
elections, resumed its attacks against the Government, 
accusing it of electoral fraud; however, it did so in 
subdued manner, so as to prevent agitation and to act 
completely within the law.
In early 1947, the magazine Orden stopped writing 
about the unfairness of the elections and returned to make 
an appeal for renewed cooperation with the Government, 
particularly in view of the foot-and-mouth epidemic that 
hit the countryside and which threatened the national 
economy. Orden undertook an education campaign urging its 
readers to work with the Government to combat the 
epidemic.
The UNS-MTB also resumed an attitude of good 
disposition towards the President; it praised his 
endeavours to put end to injustice in Mexico, but warned 
him of the obstacle that local political leaders and the 
PRI officials represented. Similarly, it adopted a 
friendlier tone towards the United States, which was very 
much apparent at the time of President Truman*s visit to 
Mexico, in March 1947; the visit was welcomed by Torres 
Bueno who urged the Government to adopt a policy of close 
friendship with the United States.42
In 1945, when Torres Bueno contested the control of 
the Supreme Council of the Base, he sought to win the 
support of the regional leaders, by promising them greater 
intervention in the leadership. In December 1946, at the 
VII National Assembly, a new programme of general statutes
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to govern the UNS-MTB was approved. The most significant 
article (article 31) referred to the national leader; it 
stated that he should hold office for a period not 
exceeding two years, and that his successor would be 
elected by a Board of Directors, the Sinarquia Nacional, 
made up of the regional leaders.43
Henceforth, Synarchism abandoned the practice of 
caudillismo, characteristic of the early years, to adopt 
a more democratic procedure.44
The radical leaders who remained in the Movement - 
because of loyalty to the national leader (Torres Bueno), 
or out of interest to continue the struggle - were 
extremely annoyed about the attitude of subservience to 
the Government that the UNS had embraced since 1947. What 
is more, many non-radical leaders were troubled by the 
permanency of Torres Bueno behind the scenes.
Thereupon, the radicals judged that it was fit and 
timely to go back to the policy of uncompromising 
opposition to the Mexican Revolution and the Government, 
and wholehearted Hispanidad. They maintained that the 
elections had caused great dissatisfaction. Torres Bueno, 
they argued, had been outwitted by the Government. He had 
said that if Synarchism cooperated with the Government and 
participated in the elections, it would win a prominent 
position in the political process, that it could otherwise 
never reach, were it to pursue with its intransigent 
attitude. Yet, this offer was never met, thereby 
upsetting many people in the organization.
The old radical argument about electoral fraud and
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the incompatibility of Synarchism with the Government of 
the Mexican Revolution was reasserted. Whereupon, in 
April 1947, the Sinarquia Nacional got together to appoint 
a successor to Gonzalez Sanchez, for the period 1947-1949. 
They chose Luis Martinez Narezo as the new national 
leader.45
Under his leadership, the organization underwent a 
fundamental change in direction. This transition was not 
immediately obvious. Nevertheless, there were some 
indications that a change was in progress when, on the 
occasion of the annual celebration of the foundation of 
Synarchism, several statements by former militant leaders, 
including Trueba Olivares, Zermeno and Abascal, were 
published.46 This was significant because not since the 
reappearance of the magazine in 1946, had the views of the 
opponents of Torres Bueno been printed.
In June, collaboration with the Government was coming 
to an end. An open letter appeared in Or den strongly 
criticizing the Government for its handling of the foot- 
and-mouth campaign, and demanding that the UNS cease its 
cooperation.47 The following month, Martinez Narezo 
declared that Synarchism would espouse a more vigorous 
stand against Article 3 of the Constitution. Synarchist 
opposition to the amendment on education had been in 
suspense since early 1946, when some of the dispositions 
least agreeable to the Catholics had been eliminated.
Martinez Narezo also strove to restore the internal 
unity of Movement: for which end, he definitely broke with 
the system of a dual leadership under a Secret Council.
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In September, he put in doubt all the authority rights 
exercised by Torres Bueno. According to the general 
statutes of 1946, the board of directors, made up of the 
regional leaders and the members of the National 
Committee, was the only supreme authority of the 
organization; hence, he summoned the board to decide 
between a distinct leadership, and the return to militant 
intransigence, or to continue with the secret leadership 
of Torres Bueno and his policy of relative moderation.
Padilla, who was present at the meeting, wrote that 
Torres Bueno himself proposing that the matter be settled 
by ballot - he would accept autonomy if there was a 
majority of three fourths in favour of it. A decisive 
vote of 28 to 4 gave the victory to Martinez Narezo.48
After that meeting, Martinez Narezo began to 
implement his plans for modernizing Synarchism, by 
instilling a new militant energy. First, he removed from 
the posts of responsibility all the unquestioning 
supporters of Torres Bueno and other moderates, and 
replaced them with members of the old guard. Torres Bueno 
was even eliminated from his editorial post at Orden.
At the IX National Assembly of Synarchist leaders 
(11-14 December 1947), the symbolic re-admission of the 
radical leaders was approved. Abascal said on that 
occasion:
"I sincerely congratulate you for the 
new course the organization is taking, 
and I can say, with no embarrassment, 
that as it is now directed, it is 
legitimate.1149
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There were many intellectuals present at that 
meeting, Alfonso Junco, Jesus Guisa y Acevedo, Antonio 
Cuadra; and Jose Vasconcelos sent the following message:
"I have always regarded Synarchism as 
a sincere effort to establish 
democracy firmly in Mexico. 
Synarchism sprang from the heart of 
the people and has taken shape in a 
struggle, always heroic on its part, 
but frequently disloyal on the part 
of its enemies.
[... ] You have been accused of echoing 
foreign movements, when in fact, you 
represent the most Mexican of all the 
political movements of the country
I have frequently made reference to a 
shortcoming in your political process, 
and that is, that you have not wanted, 
or have not been able to form 
caudillos recognized by the entire 
nation. A political movement requires 
not only martyrs but leading figures 
and personalities forged by 
experience, too. Nevertheless, I 
believe that your Movement will make 
itself felt, more and more, in 
the political development of our 
Nation."60
A clear sign of the renewed intransigence adopted by 
the Movement under Martinez Narezo was his attitude to the 
President. We recall that after 1944, the UNS-MTB was, in 
general, favourable to the President, both to Avila 
Camacho and to Aleman. Although it had continued to 
comdemn communist infiltration in the Government, when it 
attacked the Government, it spared the President, arguing 
that the guilty ones were those who surrounded him, who 
misinformed and ill advised him. But with the entrance of 
Martinez Narezo, the old concept re-emerged that the 
President, as the leader of the Mexican Revolution, was
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the source of all evil.
The campaign against the foot-and-mouth epidemic 
constituted the issue that provided the most ground for 
attack. The epidemic very seriously hit the rural regions 
of Mexico in the late forties. The Government adopted a 
method that became popularly know as "the sanitary rifle", 
according to which, all the infected livestock and that 
likely to have been in contact with it was exterminated.51 
This worried cattle breeders because they had to put down 
apparently healthy livestock. The Government stated, 
however, that such a strict method was necessary to save 
the Mexican cattle industry millions of dollars.52
The strong Synarchist attacks and its stand in favour 
of a vaccination programme - also supported by other 
groups, like Acci6 n Nacional, which was pessimistic about 
the method used, criticizing the high social costs53 - 
contributed to exacerbate the opposition of breeders and 
peasants to the Government efforts, notably, in the Bajio 
region.54 Peasant reaction was strong, often armed and 
sometimes with brutal consequences. Indeed, there were 
occasions when the health brigades were ambushed and 
killed.65
The Mexican and American Government worked closely 
together in the campaign and it was on the advice and the 
aid of American experts that the "sanitary rifle" was 
introduced, largely to prevent the epidemic from reaching 
American territory.56 This gave the UNS the motive to 
criticise the Mexican and American governments, in line 
with its renewed anti-Americanism and its rediscovered
378
Hispanidad.67 Since the United States exerted considerable 
pressure over Mexico, and partly took charge of the 
operation, many people in the country got flared up .58
The end of the forties and the beginning of the 
fifties were difficult years for the peasants, marked by 
the foot-and-mouth epidemic and by migration. The UNS 
fought this temporary or definite exile (and the 
discrimination and maltreatment that it involved) , but the 
fact was that people were leaving because they could not 
do much else.59
This state of affairs continued throughout 1947 and 
1948, with little [respond 5 from the authorities. However, 
as the congressional elections of 1949 approached, it 
became obvious that this time no agreement would be 
possible with Popular Force, like in 1946: in 1948 the
moderates had gone, and the new leadership was not 
interested.
The Government, however, took advantage of an 
incident provoked by the members of Popular Force in 
December 1948, to exclude Synarchism |from direct 
participation in the elections. The X Annual Assembly 
ended with a rally convened in the Alameda Central of 
Mexico City, where the statue of Juarez is situated. 
Juarez is the representative par excellence of Mexican 
laicism, and, therefore, to the Synarchists, the greatest 
villain of Mexican history. There were many speeches 
vilifying him; and, at some point, the crowd decided to 
cover the statue with a black hood provoking the anger of 
the authorities. Before the meeting was over, several
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• • 60 leaders were arrested and interrogated by the police.
The PRI used the occasion to send a warning to all its
militants to be on the alert, emphasising the implicit
danger that the activities of those "fanatics” meant, and
asking for unity and the closing of ranks.61 The
desecration of Juarez enraged certain sectors of the
public who demanded that immediate reprisals be taken?
propaganda was distributed exculpating Judrez and
vilifying the "Synarchist anti-revolutionary
perpetrators". Unions organized marches and massive
demonstrations? Congress passed a resolution condemning
the Synarchists and proclaiming the anniversary of
Juarez's birth a national holiday.62
The Synarchists continued to assail the Government 
and the President unrelentingly? finally, on 28 January 
1949, the Minister of the Interior, Ruiz Cortines, took 
retaliatory measures. The registration of Popular Force, 
was cancelled. The decision was justified by the Minister 
in these terms:
"The unpatriotic activities of the 
Popular Force Party, its confessional 
nature, its campaign of proselytism 
based on stirring up religious 
feelings, its ardent desire to modify 
the political organization of the 
country by means of violence, longing 
for times that have definitively gone, 
and the resemblance of its structure 
to Fascism, have been undeniably 
established by the sad events of 19 
December at the Juarez Hemiciclo, 
perpetrated by Popular Force and the 
UNS"63
The cancellation of the registration meant that 
Popular Force could not participate in the July elections.
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We have considered the internal reasons of the 
decadence and collapse of the UNS: yet, it is perhaps more 
important to realize that 1947 was not 1937; Mexico had 
experienced religious peace for ten years; the PRM had 
symbolically become the PRI. Revisionism had really begun 
with the election of Aleman, in 1946, when all traces of 
Marxist ideology were virtually absent form the regime. 
The Synarchist Movement found justification in "red” 
agitation; but Aleman had nothing to do with Cardenas, or 
his followers, in fact, he opposed him. And so, Cardenas 
on the Left, and the UNS on the Right, disappeared from 
the scene, replaced by the PRI and the PAN; confrontation 
was superseded by the hegemonic compromise of the modern 
urban sectors.
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PART THREE IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
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CHAPTER VII 
IDEOLOGY
I. The Synarchist Concept of the Ideal Regime
Synarchism, engendered by the Mexican Revolution, 
represented, the counter-revolutionary response of the 
ensuing generation:1 Synarchism appeared publicly in 1937 
(though it had been in gestation since 1934, date of the 
revolutionary "relapse”, of the resumption of an elaborate 
anticlericalism, of the introduction of socialist 
education) , it reached its peak between 1940 and 1941, and 
faded, but did not disappear, between 1944 and 1948.
The UNS emerged as a national movement, and not as a 
party, a movement of union, and not of division, of 
salvation that sought to save the Fatherland from the 
revolution, the Communists, the Americans, the Freemasons, 
the Protestants, the Jews (though very little emphasis was 
placed on them since the issue had no relevance in the 
rural areas) . 2 Its Anti-Americanism was heightened by a 
moderate irredentism which, historically, was the first to 
take the defence of the greasers (American derogatory term 
to denote Mexican-Americans), victims of racial 
discrimination. The Movement called on the religious 
sentiment of the people, hardened by the continuous 
Church-State conflict (1926-1929, 1931, 1934-1938), and
exacerbated by the renewed anticlerical legislation of a 
State, that, in 1935, did not allow more than five hundred 
priests to celebrate the cult in a Catholic country of
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some twenty million inhabitants.3
Synarchists believed that Mexico would be saved by 
the Catholic faith, the Spanish traditions, the Christian 
social order and the economics of the "common good”.
One observer wrote that the surprising thing about 
Synarchism:
"(...) was the fact that the
Synarchist reaction against the
radical Revolution developed great 
strength among the common people.
Indeed, by most accounts, an
overwhelming majority of the
Synarchists were poor, illiterate
peasants ( . . . ) 1,4
Both its admirers and its critics agreed that the 
Movement had "a resilience and vitality which its 
predecessors lacked”? this, in turn, raised the question 
of whether the UNS was something more "than the clutching 
hand, in rigor mortis, of a dying order. " 6
The Synarchist Movement managed to attract nearly a 
million poor people at the peak of its existence? the 
question of why it did so, has no simple answer. There are 
several possible explanations: firstly, there was the
nature of the Movement itself, the system of detailed, 
carefully planned, minutely directed organization:
"It is this highly centralized and 
hierarchical form of organization, not 
numerical strength, which makes the 
Synarchists so strong ( . . . ) 1,6
Another explanation sustains that the success of the 
UNS was in direct relation with the excesses, the abuses
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and, fundamentally, the failure of the Mexican Revolution, 
particularly of the agrarian reform:
"Synarchism is a protest against the 
excesses and failure of the Mexican 
Revolution. The vast majority of the 
Synarchists are rural people, whose 
problems are closely related to the 
land and to agriculture. In some areas 
of rural Mexico there has been serious 
disappointment with the 'Fruits of the 
Revolution'. In these areas a great 
deal of land has been redistributed, 
but [living standards had hardly 
changed since the Revolution] . "7
Lastly, Synarchism provided the reaction with an 
instrument that could reach down, for the first time, to 
the very foundation of Mexican life and make an appeal to 
large sections of the peasantry? an appeal to the profound 
religiosity of the peasant, his latent anti-Americanism, 
and his suspicion of "Communist" agitation.
To the Synarchist the colonial era was the golden 
period of Mexico's history. New Spain prospered and 
developed under the auspicious authority of the viceroys. 
It was a period when people, united by a community of 
language, religion, and ideal, benefited from the material 
prosperity that was a consequence of the choice of 
Christian human values.
This notion of History was shared by a number of 
intellectuals, Vasconcelos and Reyes among them. In his 
speech to the Mexican Academy of History, Toribio Esquivel 
Obregon underlined the differences between Anglo-Saxon 
civilization and Hispano-American culture:
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"Glorification of poverty freely 
accepted as a means to serve our 
fellow man [constituted] the ideal 
basis of Hispanic culture”
by contrast, Anglo-Saxon culture chose "the glorification 
of wealth.”8
In New Spain, they argued, the right of the State was 
based not on the force of arms, but on the duty of the 
crusader to spread Christian culture? he relied on the 
Church to achieve this goal, and the Church in turn 
counted on the arm and the organization of the State to 
propagate the Faith. There was a marvellous harmony of all 
social classes, united under the paternal authority of the 
two powers, the temporal and the spiritual, indissolubly 
linked.9
Convinced that the Colonial past constituted the 
"ideal order", they sought the reasons for its 
disappearance:
"Modify this state of affairs, 
establish financial, military or 
political success as the criterion for 
evaluating man, make abstraction of 
the supernatural purpose in that 
evaluation, and separate, at a stroke, 
the moral and the material forces, 
leaving to the latter alone the 
direction of the State, and we would 
have created the antagonism between 
the Church and the State, between the 
rich and the poor, between the citizen 
and the government, between one class 
of society and the other? when 
tranquillity disappears, wealth 
disappears and revolution ensues."10
They concluded that only through Christian values 
would the world find peace and a stable organization. At
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home, a "Christian Social Order," the ideal Synarchist 
State, could be established, if those values were 
recovered.
A careful study of the public statements, of the few 
documents published by the Organization, and especially of 
El Sinarquista and Orden, help to draw an inference on the 
nature of the Christian Social Order. We must strive to 
discern the Synarchist idea of the State through their 
appreciation of different contemporary political regimes, 
and see which corresponded more closely to that ideal.
However, Synarchists did not conduct an analysis of 
the institutions of each system. They were satisfied to 
pass passionate judgements which they tried to validate 
after the event with sledgehammer arguments, convinced 
they had shown the flaws of these organizations.
Consequently, in order to appreciate what image the 
Synarchist State had, we must make a diversion and proceed 
to study, first, the position of the UNS in relation to 
the Second World War and the belligerent countries, since 
the choice of one camp or the other provides a valuable 
insight as to its preference for a regime? then, we will 
outline its attitude vis-a-vis the systems of government 
that surrounded it: liberal democracies and fascist
regimes on the one hand; the Soviet Union on the other? 
and finally, the Mexican system which concerned it more 
directly? lastly, after this diversion and based on its 
criticisms of these regimes, we can proceed to delineate 
a picture of the Synarchist Social Christian Order state,
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as it would perhaps have been.
II. The Synarchist Movement and the Second World War
To avoid any misinterpretation and in order not to 
treat Synarchists as "Fascists” right away, for their 
support of Germany, it is important to put their position 
in the context of 1940 Mexico. In fact, the majority of 
public opinion (the Left included) was, at the beginning 
of the war, violently hostile to a rapprochement with the 
United States. The country as a whole did not present the 
unbroken democratic front that the government's official 
stand wished to indicate. The administration of Avila 
Camacho continued the line of its predecessor in foreign 
affairs, but this policy was as unpopular among the groups 
which attacked Cardenas as was his domestic programme. The 
divisions of opinion that effected such grievous political 
struggles under Cardenas were not solved despite the new 
President's appeals for national unity. On the other hand, 
the memories of the expropriation of the oil companies 
(1938) and of the economic difficulties that ensued were 
still very much in the mind of everybody, and nationalist 
opinion was very suspicious of the new regime's "good 
neighbour" policy, launched by President Avila Camacho for 
economic reasons: the war and the progressive involvement 
of the United (States fn the world conflict opened not 
insignificant possibilities for economic development. This 
trend of opinion was not confined to the middle classes, 
since the CTM and the Communist party considered the
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United States their main enemy, while the German-Soviet 
pact was in effect.11 In fact, according to a Foreign 
Office Intelligence Report, on the outbreak of war, the 
Mexican government's antipathy towards the totalitarian 
States:
"was balanced by a lack of confidence 
in the democracies as the defenders of 
law and justice, and this was tinged 
in Left Wing circles with positive 
hostility (. . .) In these circles the 
view tended to prevail that there was 
little to choose between the 
contending Powers; and the Government 
itself adopted an attitude of strict 
neutrality”.12
Indeed, while denouncing Fascism and Nazism and 
condemning Hitler's "New Order", the Left Wing interpreted 
the war as a struggle of rival imperialism, and Mexico, 
said El Popular, was interested in the triumph of neither. 
Neither party was fighting for democracy.13
President Roosevelt's appeal for American continental 
solidarity against Nazi penetration was considered in 
Mexico to be a cloak to hide a strong United States 
campaign to monopolize Latin American markets. El 
Universal wrote that while Latin American officials might 
pay lip service to the Roosevelt plan in order to attempt 
to obtain United States political support, Latin America 
was actually extremely distrustful of Roosevelt's 
policies. And added:
"In justice very few Latin American 
regimes may be termed democratic. The 
great majority, even before the word 
was invented, have been totalitarian,
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and continue to be. A league of Pan- 
American solidarity for the defence of 
democracy against anti-democratic 
theories therefore lacks basis. The 
poorest and most decadent systems 
invented by Europe and Asia can teach 
us nothing.
"What, then, do the United States 
Officials repeated invocation for a 
union for the defence of the 
democratic systems of the Americas 
really mean? It is really desired to 
isolate the markets of the Americas 
from extra-American interventions. 
Since this is true, the role of the 
weak nations of the American continent 
is reduced to that of patients. There 
cannot be equality of rights when 
there is marked disequality of 
strength.
"If many officials of Latin America 
have hastened to approve the plan 
President Roosevelt has espoused, and 
applaud the vast increase of US 
armaments, it is because they realize 
that such applause and acquiescence 
maintains them in power, which many of 
them hold even at the expense of 
democracy. The protection of the 
Western hemisphere against non- 
American intervention is worth nothing 
if, coincidentally, there is no 
defence against the risks of inter­
continental intervention. We live an 
epoch when words serve more to hide 
thoughts than to express them."14
An illustration of the prevailing anti-American 
feeling could be observed at the time of the announcement 
that the government had come to an agreement with the 
United States on the question of setting military bases on 
Mexican territory. On 1 April, 1941, an Agreement was 
signed between the two countries which, on a basis of 
reciprocity, permitted United States military and naval 
aircraft to utilize Mexican landing grounds for 24-hour
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halts.15
There was a strong negative reaction to this news? 
public opinion, left and right, perceived any type of 
collaboration as a threat of territorial expansion and of 
cultural penetration by the United States. The traditional 
suspicion embedded in the memory of the territorial losses 
of 1847, faction and group political interests, fears of 
a return of the levy, fear of getting involved in a 
struggle that the people considered remote and that did 
not concern it, sympathy for nations capable of 
challenging powerful ones? all these elements combined to 
form an opposition bloc to the United States-Mexico 
military understanding.
Something exceptional happened with the internal 
political forces whereby a bridge was built over the gap 
that separated the Left from the Right. Both, although for 
different reasons, were opposed to military co-operation 
with the United States. The forces of the Right were not 
only suspected of Axis affinities, but they also inherited 
a historical tradition going back to the Nineteenth 
century. Their opposition to any type of cooperation thus 
found its raison d ’etre in the perception of a threat of 
territorial expansion and of cultural penetration by the 
United States. And if the Right gave signs of animosity in 
that respect, the Left - official and non-official - also 
viewed with distrust the approaching struggle. The 
Communist Party and the higher dchelons of the CTM had 
accepted the Soviet interpretation of the European war
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which was formulated, after the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact, 
in terms of non-collaboration in a war that it described 
as inter-imperialistic.16 Division of opinions in the 
government was also centred around both attitudes. On the 
one hand, it perceived the American threat; on the other, 
it realized that if the United States entered the war, 
Mexico would find it extremely difficult to remain 
neutral.17
In this sense, the Synarchist pro-German sympathies 
were not exceptional: as a matter of fact, they expressed 
what many believed in secret.18 However, this position did 
not remain constant throughout the war; on the contrary, 
it evolved even to the point of backing the Anglo-Saxon 
democracies. The increasing tendency of the Mexican 
government to lean towards the allies, certainly had a 
bearing on the change of attitude of the Synarchist 
Movement and determined the principal stages:
April 1941 - signature of the agreements with the United
States authorizing American aeroplanes to 
fly over Mexican space and making provision 
for the setting of military bases;
8 April - Mexico issued a decree seizing vessels
belonging to the Axis;
7 December - Pearl Harbour; the United Sates entered the 
war;
9 December - the United States declared a state of war
with Germany;
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11 December - Mexico broke diplomatic relations with 
Axis;
13 March and 
20 April
1942 - Mexican tankers sunk by German submarines?
1 June - Mexico declared a state of war with
Germany.19
As these events unfolded, Synarchists sided first 
with one camp, later with another. For the first two years 
(1939-1940), while Mexico was not particularly concerned 
with the conflict, the Synarchist Movement was rather 
indifferent towards the war. This period corresponded to 
the presidency of Manuel Zermeno.
In fact, so long as the war was confined to Central 
Europe, the Movement did not show a special interest. 
Synarchists did not foresee a new global conflict even
• • • • 2ftwhen Hitler was ready to send his troops into Danzig, and 
did not even report the war declaration between France, 
England and Germany. Nor did they mention Hitler's 
blitzkrieg in Central Europe. The German-Soviet pact 
offered them the opportunity to hold the CTM and the 
Communist Party, who were in a predicament to justify the 
attitude of the Soviet Union, up to ridicule.21 Besides, 
they particularly highlighted the Soviet attack on Finland 
and laughed at the victory of the Russian "giant" who 
defeated with difficulty the Finnish "dwarf."22
Moreover, they were amazed at the sudden fall of 
France which they perceived as a crisis of men? which 
resulted from letting her organism be penetrated by
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communist ideas. The official circles were overrun by the 
same ideas and the leadership of France was soon under a 
government of Popular Front and with Communism, they said, 
came its consequences: "things that exhausted the economy 
of France and distorted, disastrously, the patriotism of 
the People [... ] "23
Apart from this regret for country they admired, the 
war, as a whole, did not significantly interest them.
The tone changed from March 1941 when the question of 
American military bases was raised.24 Throughout this 
period, which ended with Pearl Harbour, Synarchists 
championed nonintervention and hoped to influence the 
government so that it would disengage itself from the 
conflict and not follow its neighbour in preparing for 
war. The breaking of the German-Soviet pact and the German 
offensive in Russia, undoubtedly played a role in 
Synarchist decisions? which were, until June 1941, wildly 
anti-American and supported the German cause. Nonetheless, 
they made a distinction between the German people and its 
army and the Nazi government, which they condemned. They 
justified Germany's policy of revenge on the grounds of 
the iniquity of the Treaty of Versailles.25
Soon El Sinarquista carried more frequent news on the 
triumphant German offensive in Europe; the British 
withdrawal from the Balkans, and her defeats in Africa, 
and the German campaign in the Soviet Union.26 The latter 
event filled them with joy, because they could foresee the 
utter destruction of Russia:
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"Churchill expects us to believe that 
England is close to victory, defeat 
upon defeat? that Germany is close to 
disaster with every triumph of her 
armies [... ] Deception is the 
democracies1 favourite weapon [... ] 
After the sudden defeat of the 
Belgian, French and British armies in 
Flanders; after the collapse of 
France, Hitler offered peace. Mister 
Churchill replied with contemptuous 
arrogance that Germany would first 
have to lay down her arms, and go back 
to the state of servitude from where 
it had come out [... ] Russia is now 
the last hope of the large 
democracies, but Russia will perish 
more easily than the other countries 
subdued to the process of abject 
disintegration imposed by Democracy, 
Socialism and Communism [... ]1,27
and stated:
"The peoples of Europe, hurt by 
Communism, join Hitler to destroy the 
universal plague."28
In line with their desire to see the destruction of 
the Soviet regime, Synarchists revelled in describing the 
striking advances of the German armies in the Eastern 
Front, which they believed were welcomed as liberators by
on •
the peasants after years of slavery. They continued to 
report German wins, and on the eve of Stalingrad, they 
asserted that the victory of Germany over Russia was a
• SOprelude to her triumph over England.
Meanwhile, France inaugurated a New Order based on 
new organizations which replaced, thereafter, political 
parties, and which involved the natural communities: 
families, corporations and provinces. Synarchists approved
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General retain*s crushing of the "treacherous” forces of 
the Fatherland, in particular, Freemasonry and political 
parties.
At the same time, they reported that the Anglo-Saxon 
democracies attempted to win over the largest number of 
allies to their cause by announcing the eight point 
agreement that envisaged the organization of the world 
after the war; upholding, after the defeat of Nazism, the 
right of the people to self-determination in a disarmed 
world, where wealth would be distributed among all 
nations. Yet, they wondered what the real meaning of these 
words was, when the Anglo-Saxon democracies retained the 
largest share of the world's wealth.
In the end, they concluded:
"the weapons will have the last word 
in this controversy sustained between 
two worlds: the world of Germany,
Japan, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal 
and other countries which struggle to 
create a "new order" according to "new 
ideas;" and the Anglo-Saxon world, 
which aspires to preserve the
"democratic and liberal order."
Their support for Germany was accompanied by a hostile 
campaign against the Anglo-Saxon democracies, with strong 
anti-American tones. Synarchists rose up against the "good 
neighbour" policy and against the progressive commitment 
of Mexico on the side of the United States, in a conflict 
that was not hers:31
"We do not agree to help England 
destroy anybody; given that we were 
not asked to declare war on Hitler's
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totalitarianism, we do not understand 
why we are asked now to help win a 
dispute that does not interest us.
On the other hand, we do not agree 
that the Germans and the Italians be 
overrun simply because these peoples 
are ruled by Hitler and Mussolini. We 
do not agree with that because it 
would be outrageous that in order to 
free the world from a Cardenas, for 
instance, the Mexican people, ruined 
and vilified by him and the main 
victim of his Communist regime, had to 
be subdued."32
After all, they argued, England was an imperialist 
power herself, as her policy in India attested. On the 
other hand, the American government imposed its point of 
view on the Latin American countries because it was the 
strongest; but they advised it to listen to the voices of 
protest that came from its own public opinion, opposed to 
the involvement of their country in a conflict so far 
removed from its shores.33
Abascal published a Manifesto outlining the 
Synarchist international position:
"We are radically and resolutely 
Mexican and nationalist. We repudiate, 
because it is despicable, that 
colonial mentality which only takes 
Mexico as a satellite country, 
destined to rotate eternally in a 
secondary, obscure and miserable 
orbit. We subordinate everything to 
the supreme interest and the honour of 
the Fatherland, to the material and 
moral prosperity of the Mexican 
people; regular sacrificial victim of 
a fierce and belligerent democracy.
From an international political point 
of view we are not interested in the 
war between Germany and her allies and 
England and hers. We do not believe
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that England fights for the freedom of 
the world, nor to save Christian 
civilization, nor to preserve a 
democracy which, if it is the one we 
see, is not worthy of respect [...]
It must be said that England fights 
for what all domineering nations have 
always fought: to preserve her power 
and prestige.
We do not want war with anybody, for 
or against anybody. After 30 years of 
enduring an odious and criminal civil 
war, all we want is order, peace, 
liberty, justice within our borders 
and friendship with everybody.”34
Synarchism condemned Pan-Americanism? and it reminded 
its supporters of the past American interventionist 
policies in the Continent, and in Mexico in particular, 
with the loss of half her territory.36
Synarchism also referred to the racist nature of 
United States policies towards blacks and Mexicans; it 
denounced the abject treatment braceros endured in 
exchange for miserable wages.36
The Movement*s anti-American period corresponded, in 
fact, to the leadership of Abascal? his influence had, 
without doubt, a lot to do with the extremism of the 
Synarchist position.
The Third National Assembly of Synarchist leaders, in 
November 1941, was a watershed in Synarchist positions. 
Abascal was replaced by Torres Bueno, the radicals were 
succeeded by a more accommodating faction. Jose Trueba 
Olivares defined the new international orientation of the 
Movement as:
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[N]either anti-yankee Hispanism nor 
anti-Hispanic Pan-Americanism we could 
not be Nazis: in the Nazi State man is 
the slave of the State; the present 
war is the result of the hatred 
between peoples, and Mexico is, 
because of her geographic position, at 
the confluence of Hispanism and Pan- 
Americanism? it is, therefore, 
necessary to adopt an attitude of 
conciliation and to encourage 
peace."37
Several factors contributed to the change of attitude 
in the leadership of the Movement: the removal of Abascal 
and his subsequent loss of influence on the National 
Committee? the United States entrance into the war, 
pulling Mexico along in its wake (the United States once 
at the centre of the conflict could not accept along its 
borders the existence of a "fascist” movement threatening 
the peace of its neighbour, and likely to exert an 
influence with disastrous consequences on the rest of the 
Continent). Hence, by the end of 1941 and early 1942, a 
press campaign against the Synarchist Movement was in 
place. Several press correspondents interviewed Abascal 
and Torres Bueno and published articles, mostly 
unfavourable to Synarchism, wherein they expressed the 
hope that the government should keep a close watch on its 
activities.38 There was also the increasing pressure of the 
CTM and other unions, as well as of the PRM, to dissolve 
the UNS.39
Finally, there was the President's determination to 
increase the country's level of production, originally, as 
a contribution of Mexico to the war effort? and later on,
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in June 1942, as a necessity, after it had joined the war 
on the side of the Americans.
In these circumstances the Movement could not remain 
unperturbed. As long as the war constituted no 
significant issue in Mexico*s foreign policy, the 
Synarchists had a choice; but the moment the United States 
entered the war pulling in its wake the entire American 
Continent, it became almost impossible to maintain a 
contrary position, its very survival was at stake. The 
Synarchist Movement fully approved the President's plan to 
increase production40 and? hereafter a change of attitude 
towards the United States was favoured which they 
justified to their supporters in Christian moral terms:
"Christ teaches us to love our 
neighbour [... ], friend or foe. If the 
United States have been our enemies, 
all the more reason to embrace their 
cause.1,41
It is important to note that the suspension of 
individual guarantees decreed by the President (3 June 
1942),42 banning public and private gatherings without the 
prior authorization of the authorities, constituted a 
severe obstacle to the activities of the Movement. With 
regard to the introduction of compulsory military service, 
the UNS opposed it, because it saw it as a prelude to 
direct intervention in the war, with Mexican armed corps 
fighting with the American troops? they demanded that no 
Mexican fought outside the national territory."43
The Synarchists also participated in "unity rallies"
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(pro-unidad) which they gave a purely nationalist
interpretation? they considered these demonstrations as an 
expression of the unity of all true patriots, in support 
of the presidential orders regarding the battle for
production. They did not share the interpretation of the 
CTM which considered these rallies as a struggle against 
Fascism.
Nevertheless, in relation to the bracero scheme set
up by the government, the Synarchist Movement staunchly
criticised it denouncing it as a smoke screen to cover up
the exodus of thousands of peasants faced with
starvation.44
If the Synarchists changed attitude towards the
United States, and went as far as to recognize the 
benefits of American democracy, and to pledge, on the 
occasion of Roosevelt's visit to Mexico, in April 1943, 
for a comprehensive collaboration between the two
countries,45 they never diverted from their condemnation of 
the Soviet Union. Indeed, as time passed and as the Soviet 
Union occupied most of Central Europe, their attacks 
became more and more violent against the "Red peril". The 
Soviet Union was the principal threat to Europe and to the 
world as a whole. Much as they condemned:
"false doctrines of racism, imbued in 
a militaristic, active, intelligent 
and vigorous people, who built the 
powerful German State after the war of 
1914-1918, whose acts of violence and 
ambitions since the absorption of 
A u s t r i a  and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a  
definitively made them a danger for 
Europe and for the world."
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they did not believe that the Germans should be made the
"main enemy” for that sole reason, since:
"Russia, with the apparent weakness it 
portrayed during the war against 
Finland, managed to deceive the world. 
England and the United States 
considered that the greatest danger to 
them and to their power was Germany 
alone, Nazi totalitarianism, and they 
relegated to second place the soviet 
danger, which, in a larger scale than 
Nazism, for many years, crossed the 
Russian borders and spread through the 
world by means of a powerful 
international organization, which has 
usually been tolerated and even seen 
with sympathy by the so called 
democratic nations [... ] After the 
latest events the least that can be 
said is that Russia constitutes a 
danger and a threat at least equal to 
those represented by Germany [... ]1,46
Thus, Synarchists never ceased to expect the
destruction of the Soviet Union, productive of Communism 
in the world. In 1940, the USSR was the only 
representative of the socialist system and Synarchists 
thought that by annihilating this regime and implanting a 
"new order", Communism would disappear for ever. Moreover, 
one of the grievances that they held against the
democracies was letting Communism develop in all
countries. To infer like Mario Gill that Synarchists were
fascists for their pro-German leanings, would be hasty and 
simplistic.47 Indeed, there is an important gap between 
showing pro-German feelings and wanting to impose the Nazi 
solution on the country. Besides, Synarchists adopted, as 
far as Nazism and democracy were concerned, very ambiguous 
positions. On the one hand, they wanted the victory of
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Germany and the implantation of a New Order, while 
disapproving of Nazism? on the other hand, they often 
acknowledged the benefits of American democracy while 
dismissing the system. Only the condemnation of Socialism 
was absolute.
Certain elements of Synarchist ideology were found in 
Fascism, but also elsewhere: the definite criticism of
party democracy and of elections, the refusal of the 
Right-Left division, the opposition to all other groups 
and political parties. Synarchists were opposed to the 
class struggle, which they viewed as a factor of social 
dissension? they combated Marxist ideologies because they 
repudiated nationalism? but they were also opposed to 
Mexican capitalists, whom they judge timorous and sold to 
the foreigner. In the Synarchist vision, workers and 
employers had common interests.
All that is not sufficient to make the UNS a Fascist 
movement, and other ideological components (especially the 
Christian social factor), and other methods (the 
condemnation of violence and the resort to arms) preclude 
any perfunctory assimilation.
Its contemporaries, opponents of the UNS, saw it as 
a "Mexican Fascism, as a "fifth column", preparing the 
Axis invasion of the Continent. The American secret 
services kept a close watch over its activities and their 
conclusions were final: the reports of the Office of
Strategic Services, and of the embassy and consulate, much 
as they emphasized the anti-Americanism of the UNS, they
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asserted that the UNS did not have contacts with either 
the Germans or the Japanese.48
Abascal protested against those accusations in May 
1941 and explained:
"Nazism cannot be our model, it is a 
specific German revolution, legitimate 
off-spring of Luther's Protestant 
revolution. Nor can Fascism, which is, 
like Nazism, deification of a race by 
the Government: arrogance that will be 
punished by the annihilation of 
Mussolini and Hitler. There is no 
arrogance that God does not humiliate.
We are called Nazi-Fascist, but (in 
Mexico, there is no other movement 
more sincerely anti-Nazi than 
Synarchism. We are radical 
nationalists and we do not seek abroad 
models to imitate or masters to serve.
Hitler is the scourge of God, he is a 
military genius [... ] When he had 
fulfilled his mission, the destruction 
of Russia, he would incur the same 
fate of all the instruments of God: he 
would break like a reed".49
And when in 1943 Italian Fascism crumbled, El 
Sinarquista commented:
"Mussolini and the Fascist party have 
fallen. That is an example of what 
happens to an organization that 
depends on the megalomania of one man. 
Nazism will disappear with Hitler. 
Synarchism is essentially different, 
it is anti-Fascist by nature".50
On the other hand, the UNS never concealed its 
enthusiasm for the nationalist victory in the Spanish 
Civil War:
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"What appeared in the beginning as an 
insane adventure, has become the 
greatest transformation of the 
twentieth century".
Years later, resuming his condemnation of Mussolini 
and Hitler for their fundamental doctrinaire mistakes, 
Abascal said:
"As for Franco, it is altogether a 
different matter? I have always 
considered that the salvation of 
Mexico would come through the 
reaffirmation of her Catholic spirit, 
of her Catholic tradition, and since 
we have got these from Spain, we must 
strengthen our ties with Spain, 
through Hispanidad. And it is 
precisely Franco who has restored 
Hispanidad to Spain. With Spain we 
have ideological, mystical relations".
That did not mean that Fascist attraction was absent. 
Juan Ignacio Padilla confessed that it had existed when he 
said:
"We would not be honest if we denied 
the influence that totalitarian 
movements had on Synarchism. Here, 
like in all other countries, Hitler 
and Mussolini soon attracted 
admiration, affection and approbation, 
not only among ordinary citizens, but 
also among important officials and 
statesmen. Of course, the admiration 
and approbation were not for the ideas 
and systems themselves, marked by 
errors and serious human right 
violations. What was often admired and 
imitated was the spirit, the
unshakeable will of these people, 
which, under the leadership of
undeniably remarkable men, succeeded 
to rescue their countries from the 
most ignominious prostration, to a 
level of astonishing material progress 
and military might. The external 
signs, like the salute, the
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discipline, and all that was good in 
those people, such as the national 
mystique, made an impression on us and 
we were ready to imitate them.”51
Had Salvador Abascal not been banished to the desert 
of Lower California by the leaders of Base, he could have 
taken the Movement to seize power, with the use of 
violence if necessary. He had all the attributes of the 
Leader, and he could have been one. But even then, it 
would have been difficult to consider the UNS a Mexican 
Fascism; and if a comparison were to be made, one should 
look more towards Rumania and the Saint Michael Legion, 
with its Iron Guard.52
III. Synarchism and the Mexican Political System
Synarchism ranked the Mexican Revolution on the same 
level of what in its opinion was the most intolerable 
totalitarian regime: the Soviet Union. The UNS had arisen 
in response to Cardenism, and had openly proclaimed:
"Long live the reaction! We are 
r e a c t i o n a r i e s  and c o u n t e r -• • f>3revolutionaries.
The ideological content of "El Sinarquista" was 
entirely devoted against the Revolution which inspired 
Synarchists with hatred, contempt, anger and indignation.
For the Synarchists, the Revolution had not brought 
any progress to the country; and, thus, they could not 
support a govenment which falsely presented itself as the 
producer of big political, economic and social reforms.
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What had the Revolution achieved? asked the Synarchists. 
Did it establish democracy in Mexico? Did it implement 
social reforms favouring the distribution of wealth among 
all Mexicans? Did it succeed in maintaining the peace and 
order propitious for economic development? No, they 
replied. Contrary to what the revolutionaries claimed, the 
Revolution had only managed to destroy the remnants of 
colonial civilization, without creating a superior order. 
Illiteracy, injustice, misery and terror continued to 
dominate Mexico. Ironically, they commented, the 
Revolution of 1910 had given Mexico a Constitution which, 
apparently, was one of the most progressive. But they 
queried if it had been implemented.
Power lay in the hands of the PRM which imposed its 
own candidates in elections, by whatever means possible. 
Electoral fraud in all its forms dominated the Mexican 
electoral system. Fraud began with the corruption of 
voters, the intimidation of abstentionists, the 
impossibility pvcjenftng a candidate not approved by the 
establishment, the falsified fcouMfc(A£. of votes; and 
ended, on occasions, with the disappearance or 
assassination of citizens too keen to defend their rights.
Supposedly, the Constitution protected citizens from 
abuses of power. But to the Synarchists the reality was 
different. Everyday, caciques committed, with impunity, 
all sorts of crimes. Synarchists had their harvests 
sacked, their cattle stolen, their men tortured, sometimes 
murdered, for no apparent reason. The murderers of Teresa
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Bustos, they claimed, were rewarded for their crime with 
posts in the administration, where they could go on 
committing offences undisturbed. Was this revolutionary 
justice? they asked.
Faced with this kind of injustice, the people 
traditionally saw no other course of action than to resort 
to arms; the eternal illusion, the Synarchists warned, was 
repeated at each time: a "saviour" appeared and obtained 
the support of the masses who expected that this 
"caudillo" would set up a more just regime. Unfortunately, 
the newly arrived did not do better and the people, in the 
end, bore the cost of these fratricidal disputes.
The revolutionary "gang", as Synarchism denoted it, 
had come to power without the support of "true patriots", 
and was determined to keep it by fraud or violence, and to 
rule the country according to its whims with no regard for 
others.
The politicians had taken power for their own good, 
which they could use and abuse at will. From the bottom to 
the top of the pyramid, political carriers had no other 
aim than to make a fortune and to climb the rungs that led 
political men ever closer to the Chief of State. No 
elected member, waiting to reach the summit, would dare to 
contradict the decisions of his superiors, lest he 
disqualified himself from the course to power. His role 
did not consist of defending the interests of the 
community with the executive, but simply to approve 
"courteously" the measures he was presented with.
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Moreover, the government, they contended, chose its staff 
from the least commendable and the easiest to buy. At the 
local level, shady characters filled the positions of 
municipal presidents, uncouth and illiterate individuals, 
who knew of no other constitution than that "of their 
guns." The function of governors or deputies did not 
always go to honourable men: witness the case of Garrido 
Canabal, governor of Tabasco, who made a reputation for 
his abject anti-clericalism.
Blinded by power, this minority of "Freemasons" 
imposed its idea of democracy, certain to get the support 
of the "People's representatives;" and so:
"In the name of democracy, the public 
treasury sguanders in feasts and 
luxuries for the politicians, while 
the country lacks roads, schools and 
all kinds of public services.
In the name of democracy, they have 
mocked in sanguinary fashion the most 
honest and legitimate aspirations of 
the peasants of Mexico to own a piece 
of land.
In the name of democracy, the workers 
have been forced to endure the 
oppression of the union bosses and the 
terror of the closed shop.
In the name of democracy, the most 
violent religious persecutions have 
been unleashed in Mexico; intolerable 
tyranny has been imposed in Mexican 
schools, first, debasing laicism. and 
then, anti-national socialism."5
Let us consider in succession the key issues the 
Synarchists held against Mexican democracy.
The land problems of the nation contain the key to
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understanding Synarchism. Mexico was primarily a semi- 
feudal, agricultural nation, hence, the most reliable 
barometer of the advance of the Revolution was the extent 
to which land had been distributed among the peasants. The 
varied land-reform programmes attempted in the three 
decades after the Revolution, while distributing vast 
tracts of land to thousands of peasants, had left, 
nevertheless, the bulk of the landless peasant mass 
intact.
The agrarian programme had been least successful in 
the Bajio region, a region where Synarchism had a wide 
following: Guanajuato, Quer^taro, Michoacan, Jalisco and 
Guerrero.
In these states, explained Whetten,55 the agrarian 
programme experienced greater difficulty than in most 
other states. He suggested that, based on the fact that 
practically the only source of agricultural credit for the 
ejidatarios was through the Ejido Bank, whose policy had 
been to extend credit only to those areas in which there 
appeared to be reasonable chance of recovering the loans, 
an adequate index of the success of the ejido programme 
was to be found in the relative amount of credit extended 
by the bank. The share of the total number of ejidatarios 
in the country that resided in these states was 21 per 
cent, yet, in 1941, they had only received 12 per cent of 
the credits to ejidatClrios granted by the Ejidal Bank.56 
So, the Bank did not estimate that the ejido programme in 
these states was sound enough to warrant risking any great
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amount of funds.
Considering the level of illiteracy of the population 
provides another indication of the welfare of the country. 
The percentage of illiteracy in 1940 for all localities in 
Mexico having less than ten thousand inhabitants was 61.1 
per cent. The corresponding average for the five states in
• 57question was 69 per cent.
In consequence, from this perspective, the UNS made 
more progress in the areas where agrarian reform had 
experienced most difficulty. The Synarchists capitalized 
on the poverty of the peasant and on his lack of culture. 
Paradoxically, the UNS emerged among the poor to contain 
agrarian redistribution at a time of renewed revolutionary 
feeling (nationalization of railways, expropriation of oil 
companies, attempts to make the ejido a permanent
• • • 5£institution ) .
Peasant dissatisfaction with the agrarian programme 
derived from two causes: first, the provincial
revolutionary government had lost touch with the masses, 
in several respects; the leaders had emigrated to the 
cities where they had become wealthy and, had practically 
no further contact with the people. The Indian peasant was 
up against a large number of bureaucrats who denied him 
loans, and educated his children in a strange manner. 
Moreover, in some states, during the Cristero rebellion, 
both the poor and the rich suffered the voracity of the 
federal army. Disillusioned by the Revolution, many sought 
a new ideal. Second, the young leaders of the Catholic
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party expounded a brilliant nationalism, that captivated 
the spirit of post-revolutionary Mexico. They used the 
populism of the agraristas against its former advocates, 
many of whom had become civil servants of the urban 
centres.
During the six-year term of President Cardenas the 
Mexican Revolution had become a movement of fundamental 
social significance. It penetrated deeply into the 
structure of Mexican life. However, with the introduction 
of socially oriented policies, a division occurred amidst 
Mexican society. On one side were all the beneficiaries? 
on the other, those directly prejudiced, including some 
groups of peasants and workers who, though pertaining to 
the social groups to which the official policies were 
addressed, did not obtain any benefit during those years.
The dividing effect of those policies provoked a 
politically explosive situation, when dissident elites 
coincided with alienated masses. Hence, agrarian reform 
was the measure that had the deepest effects, and in 
particular, because of the speed at which it had been 
enforced.
Although the number of peasants who had benefited was 
considerable (over one million ejidatarios59), there 
remained nearly three million peasants with recognized, or 
pending, claims, for whom there was no good quality land 
available.
To satisfy their demands, the government considered 
it necessary to embark, beforehand, on an extensive
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programme of agricultural development, rural re-education, 
public works, banking and credit ventures, irrigation and 
hydraulic systems, as well as organizing the peasants.60
However, the lack of arable lands was not the only 
element that frustrated the expectations of the peasant; 
there were other more technical, and even political, 
obstacles. Of the former, red tape constituted the most 
serious. There was considerable bureaucratic slowness in 
the demarcation of limits, a necessary condition for land 
distribution. This was aggravated by the ever larger 
number of land petitions sent to the organizations of the 
agrarian reform.
The lack of arable land and the bureaucratic red tape 
combined to restrict the extent of the cardenist offensive 
in agriculture, and hence, left many peasants hoping to 
receive a piece of land, but uncertain of the future. 
They, therefore, constituted an available mass for 
political proselytism. It was the UNS which made the most 
of the situation.
Many were the political obstacles that frustrated the 
hopes and aspirations of the peasants and deepened their 
distrust and fear of the government; yet, we must ponder 
over the characteristics of the agrarian movement, because 
in many instances it adopted a dynamic of its own, often 
intermingling with local interests.
Under the aegis of agrarian reformism caused by 
government actions, agrarian committees soon became poles 
of attraction for landless peasants and, political centres
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for ambitious individuals aspiring to a political career, 
or to predominance in the region.
From the confluence of interests between the peasant 
mass that expected land and the aspiring politician, 
together with the interest play of local cliques and the 
corruption of some agrarian officials, supervened an 
increase in the number of petitions for land, especially 
over areas that were not legally liable for distribution.
With this state of affairs, tension in „ the
countryside grew, giving rise to complaints about 
insecurity, sometimes, legitimate, other for political 
interests.
Agrarian disorder, however, was not confined to the 
redistribution of land? it also affected those who already 
possessed it. The problem here was one of credit? the 
amount granted and its course. In 1936 and 1937 both 
Ejidal Banks (Banco Nacional de Credito Agricola and Banco 
Nacional de Credito Ejidal) had substantially increased 
their credits, but from 1938, the tendency began to 
change, and consequently, the number of persons and co­
operatives ("sociedades locales de credito ejidal") which 
benefited diminished.61
1. The peasants against the official agrarian policy
What did the peasants think of that agrarian reform 
and of those who benefited from the situation of rural 
commotion?
The losers were the small owners who had their
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property seized; while the ejidatarios, in return for the 
land they were given, turned against their brothers. On 
the other hand, rural society could not assimilate readily 
the ejido system: it was often considered dishonest to ask 
for the land that belonged to someone else. It was 
perceived as a disgrace and a degradation. No doubt this 
was mistaken, but the idea that peasants had of property 
and of the means to obtain it, did not correspond to the 
government's, and the results of the agrarian reform, as 
they experienced it, did not invalidate their idea. They 
all aspired to have land, but not at any price? they would 
obtain it by "honourable" means, by acquiring it, or 
inheriting it.62 They believed that lack of a clear deed 
made them vulnerable to the greed of the agrarian 
superintendent. This is how the leader of the Municipal 
Committee of Xochimilco described his plight, and this was 
by no means an isolated case:
"The ejidos of Xochimilco have not 
yielded, since 1917, the expected 
return, because the ejidatario, 
regarded only as usufructuary of the 
land, having no title deed, does not 
work it with the same determination, 
care and interest as he would if it 
were his. There is no yield because 
the lower ranking agrarian authorities 
are bent on maintaining, with no 
concern for the well-being of the 
community, incompetent people in the 
Ejidal Executive Committee, who deal 
and do illegal business with the 
stubble, which not only prevent the 
ejidatario from enjoying the full 
value of his stubble, but by serving 
other outside interests, the cattle of 
Xochimilco is left with insufficient 
quantities, [...], creating discontent 
among the people [... ] "6S
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It was for this reason, claimed the Synarchists that 
the agrarian reform failed to rally the Mexican peasantry 
- and thus prepared the ground for the Synarchist 
missionaries, who took every opportunity to denounce its 
faults. The peasants not only showed little enthusiasm for 
the existing system, but more seriously, they often 
preferred to withdraw rather than participate in it? and 
even the beneficiaries manifested their dissatisfaction 
once they had listened to the Synarchist message:64
"A large percentage of peasants in 
this region (Ario de Rosales) has 
continuously opposed to come together 
as ejidatarios and be considered as 
such, maintaining that they will 
continue working as share-croppers or 
tenant farmers in the fields that have 
been turned into ej idos as share­
croppers or tenant farmers [... ]1,64
2. Synarchists and ejidatarios
The success of the UNS was proportional to the 
shortcomings, or the non-fulfilment of the agrarian 
reform. The Synarchist Movement addressed itself to all 
those who had grievances and who were often the victims of 
the reform (small owners, labourers, tenant-farmers), and 
finally to those who, although they had benefited, found 
themselves hardly satisfied. This proved, as the 
Synarchist reasoning went, that the system was alien to 
the rural world and that it had been imposed upon it. It 
had been a political undertaking: division and control (by 
each other) of the peasants? creation and exacerbation of 
antagonisms, in particular those that opposed small owners
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to ejidatarios, comuneros66 of traditional Indian 
communities and ejidatarios, tenant farmers and 
ej idatarios.
The ejidatario was tied to the State through the plot 
of land he held in usufruct, but did not own. A minority 
of ejidatarios was armed, in order to control, 
politically, the countryside: they were known as "reservas 
rurales11, or "reservistas".67
President Cardenas had encouraged the formation and 
development of rural militias, of which both the army and 
the peasants disapproved. He vaunted
"I will give the peasants the Mau^ er 
they used to make the revolution, so 
that they defend it, so that they 
defend the ejido and the school.”68
The UNS lost a number of militants killed by the 
"reservistas”, mostly in July 1939 and July 1940. The 
reason for this violence lay in the fact that the 
Synarchists had infiltrated the ejidos, threatening from 
within its political structure, challenging the position 
of the caciques and the PRM:
"[In the region of Ario de Rosales], 
the Synarchist Union has expanded 
considerably [... ] On occasions even 
the Comisariados ejidales have become 
Synarchist, often completely 
abandoning their duties, and sometimes 
resigning from their posts."70
Synarchists entering ejidos, ejidatarios becoming 
Synarchists, the movement achieved considerable 
penetration in conformity with the Synarchist order of
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seeking to have their men elected to the posts of ejidal 
superintendent (comisario ejidal).
Salvador Abascal gave a warning to the peasants:
"Ejidatario, your enemies do not want 
you to be the absolute owner of the 
land you have received, that is why 
they say you should combat Synarchism. 
The UNS fights to make you the 
absolute owner of the land, to get you 
a definite deed.”71
Declarations of allegiance to the Synarchist creed 
were always followed by demands for permanent land 
endowments and by allegations of abuses and persecutions 
from the local authorities and the reserves. The UNS 
encouraged its militants to accept the plots allotted, 
expecting thereby to ultimately turn the ejidos 
Synarchist? it would then ask them to solicit from the 
agrarian authorities the registration of the plots, so 
that they became real private property:
"We, the peasants and ejidatarios of 
the municipality of Villa, Escalante, 
Michoacan [... ] consider that agri­
culture will not progress in the 
Fatherland, as long as possession of 
the plot of land, for which many of us 
went to the Revolution, is not secured 
[... ] and as long as we do not free 
ourselves from the modern leaders who 
want to add more blood to the price we 
have already paid for the lands 
entrusted to us. Therefore, we ask 
that we are given, as soon as 
possible, the title deeds? this being 
one of the reasons why we joined the 
Synarchist Movement: to insist that
the promises of the Revolution are 
fulfilled."72
Thus, the question of why the peasants followed the
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Synarchist Movement, challenges the entire concept and 
system of the agrarian reform.
The village that the agrarian reform had conceived 
was a bold socio-cultural exploit, administered from the 
city, according to methods that antagonized country folk; 
it was a village torn apart by the tragic opposition 
between small owners and ejidatarios; it begot a rural 
anticapitalist sentiment, which Synarchism capitalized,
73understood and expressed.
The union that had been long sought, was intrinsic in 
its name, Synarchist Union:
"Synarchists are united by no other 
ideal than to strive for the greatness 
and prosperity of Mexico, and for the 
spiritual and material welfare of all 
Mexicans. This ideal could only be 
achieved on the basis of a real social 
solidarity that guaranteed the liberty 
of all, and where the principles of 
social justice attained their highest 
degree of realization. The ensemble of 
this things constitutes the social 
order, which is not conceivable 
without an authority that looks after 
the common good and has the sufficient 
moral and material strength to enforce 
that order. Therefore, the 
denomination Union Nacional 
Sinarquista was the most appropriate 
to describe the Movement that emerged 
to bring together all those who defend 
authority and social order."74
The Synarchist Movement,
"spiritual current that sought the 
internal and permanent cohesion of the 
Mexican society, by creating a state 
of collective consciousness that would 
be permanently revealed by a true and 
lasting National Union,"
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could serve conservatism, but it could also breed 
rebellion and even revolution.
The fact that the UNS drew its strength from this 
ambiguity, that it recruited from the entire rural sector 
and, that this ambiguity grew more intense, concerned 
those in the Government, in the United States and among 
the conservatives, who feared that the Movement could 
become unexpectedly more radical.75 Meanwhile, the UNS 
carved out an easy triumph by condemning the damaging 
effects of capitalism and the Revolution, by denouncing 
the ravages of caciquismo, the PRM, the revolutionary 
regime and the agrarian reform.
The Synarchist Movement spoke the language of the 
peasants; as a modern political movement, it managed to 
capitalize on the "peasant tradition", Catholic and 
national, whose cause it vindicated.
Peasants, as an observer wrote, joined the UNS in 
large numbers (until 1941):
"Mainly because it has given him 
something - a status, a position in 
his own eyes and those of his 
neighbours. It also had given him a 
channel for his discontent. Thus, 
aside from the unmeaning promise of 
land, the bond which ties the simple 
Indian to the Movement is an amalgam 
of the worst and the best passions he 
possess. There is the black 
stultifying hate, so disciplined that 
the object of hatred can be changed at 
the will of the Jefe; but there also 
is the longing to be somebody, to 
belong, in a society which so far has 
not let him be much of anything but a 
carrier beast. He might even be a 
martyr? if not that, he can at least 
march, and sing and hope".76
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Synarchism, therefore, was a protest against the 
errors of the Revolution in religion and education - a 
subject to which we shall return - against the 
shortcomings of agrarian policy; against the American and 
urban invasion. All grievances were brought together in 
one belief, all malcontent country folk organized in one 
movement. In the great upheaval that the rural world had 
been experiencing, many forms of socioeconomic structure 
were destroyed, though not definitively, without replacing 
them.
The implications of this situation had been the 
shattering of social cohesion? agrarian reform had created 
serious division in the countryside, but did not put an 
end to the misery and the exploitation of its inhabitants. 
The mass of underprivileged peasants, at the bottom of the 
rural social scale, did not obtain land. To escape their 
plight, they could only leave for the cities and the 
United States (the American war effort required importing 
hundreds of "braceros") - a drift from the land that was 
fought unavailingly by Synarchism?77 or hire themselves out 
to the ejidatarios.
The UNS made the demands of the peasant its own: 
complete ownership of the land, work and bread for all, 
the right to preserve his property, security and dignity. 
Therefrom, it set up a national movement which showed that 
the peasants needed outside orientation to get organized, 
so that they could take on the political system behind the 
existing social structure. The UNS was successful in this
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respect because it knew the countryside, it was aware of
• • 78its problems and it spoke the same language.
IV. The UNS and the Agrarian Problem
The ideology of the Synarchist Movement was the 
reflection of the immediate results of the agrarian 
reform. It was the point of view of the country folk, the 
"petits possedants" in the face of the disorder that 
entailed land distribution; it was the opinion of the 
underdogs who were subjected to reform which was 
undertaken without their actual participation. It was also 
a lack of understanding over the structural change that 
Cardenas expected from the ejido made to play a new 
economic role in the development of the nation; lastly, it 
was a pessimistic view of the aims of the Revolution which 
had, since 1920, made fun of the peasants by promising 
them "land and freedom," and uniquely satisfying a few 
privileged ones, only to subjugate them to the government.
The Synarchist condemnation of the agrarian programme 
appeared in 1938 in an article entitled: "Campesino: la 
Revolucion te ha traicionado". The following quotation 
vividly shows the allurement of Synarchism. Because of the 
forcefulness of the appeal, it is quoted at some length:
"Peasant: You were living in the peace 
of your fields when the revolutionary 
clamour reached your ears [... ] The 
shadow of a leader appeared before you 
[...] He said to you: 'You are being
exploited. The piece of land which was 
yours has been snatched away from you.
Follow me.' And you left the peace of
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the fields in order to follow the 
leader. When necessary, your blood was 
spilled in the trenches. You wanted a 
less cruel life for your son, for your 
wife, for your father. You wanted to 
be free. That is why you went, with 
your arms, to the Revolution. A banner 
was unfurled before your eyes. The 
Land Belongs to Him Who Works It. And 
another one touched your heart: Land 
and liberty. You, peasant, who loved 
the land, had a right to own it. You 
wanted to be the owner of the soil on 
which your perspiration fell [... ] You 
wanted all that to which you have a 
right: bread, justice and liberty
[...] LAND AND LIBERTY: these two
ambitions prompted you to fight. And 
you loved the revolution which came in 
your aid, which promised to deliver 
you from slavery. And you followed the 
leaders with your faith, with your 
loyalty [... ]
The fighting ceased [... ] One day you 
returned to your field. The revolution 
became a govenment. A GOVERNMENT FOR 
THE POOR, you thought. A government 
which was to protect the weak, the 
exploited, the Indian. And you asked 
that government for land to be 
ploughed, to produce crops for you, to 
enable you to buy clothes to cover 
your body and bread to nourish you.
And the government did not refuse 
anything. It replied: the land will be 
distributed. And it made you an 
ejidatario. You, on the other hand, 
must offer blind allegiance to the 
leader of your village. You, in 
exchange for what you were given, must 
join the political demonstrations, 
must abandon your labours to receive 
[... ] the figurehead who went for your 
votes. And you formed herd. You became 
election fodder [... ] But you 
continued firm. LAND AND LIBERTY: For 
those two things you sacrificed 
everything, even your pride.
You saw how the man from your own 
class, now a legislator, began to 
forget you. You saw how he was growing 
wealthy, how he was giving up his 
simple manner of speech, his humble
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clothes, his friendly gestures. And 
you saw him become the accomplice of 
your former masters [... ] When you 
reminded him of his duties, you 
received kicks and curses. Your 
apostles, the men who had spring from 
your own class, were deceiving you. 
You continued to wait for LAND AND 
LIBERTY. The large holdings were 
subdivided. The former owners were 
exiled [...] And they told you: There 
it is, for you, the land you work. The 
ejido emerged: a piece of land that 
you were to cultivate with your 
companions. A bank lent you money to 
buy seed. But the bank was full of 
overseers. They were not your friends. 
They were men who would profit from 
your poverty [...] You knew that you 
were not able to use the land as if it 
belonged to you. The land was still 
another's If you failed to
observe discipline, you ceased to 
enjoy your plot of land. Through the 
intrigues of your leader, sometimes 
you were deprived even of the fruits 
of your labour. You continued to be 
exploited and poor. You changed 
masters, that is all [•••] The 
revolution was beginning to betray 
you. The piece of land that had been 
offered to you was exploited by the 
revolutionaries to keep you tied, 
submissive, enslaved. The revolution 
had betrayed you then, peasant. The 
land is not for him who works it, it 
is not yours. You are not free. It is 
not given to you, even though you 
bought it at the price of your blood. 
Today the collectivistic revolution 
is directed against you.
LAND AND LIBERTY: two words, peasant, 
which have been abused."79
This pessimistic conception of what the agrarian 
reform was, from 1917 to 1934, formed the basis of 
Synarchist ideology which, once expounded, would not 
subsequently evolve. The Synarchists would only content 
themselves with denouncing more and more strongly the
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failure of Cardenas1 reforms and with launching furious 
attacks against the measures they estimated insufficient 
to combat the economic crisis engendered by the outbreak 
of the world war.
What were the main elements of Synarchist thinking 
about the agrarian reform?
Their point of departure was that agriculture was the 
principal source of wealth of the nation. Since 65 per
cent of the active population lived in the countryside, in
80 • • •1940, agriculture should be the top priority of the
government, which should devote all its efforts to solve 
the acute agrarian problem. However, they did not attempt 
to put forward an explanation as to how agriculture could 
be a source of development? they simply stated their 
desire that it should be so. They dreamt of a country that 
would live in autarky, and this was the reason why they 
condemned the inflow of foreign capital, which put the 
country under foreign control, and broke the existing 
harmony. Consequently, they rejected the idea of 
development through industrialization.
Synarchists believed that the resources of the 
country were almost inexhaustible: it was only a question 
of taking advantage of the thousands of still unexploited 
lands of the North and the Pacific coast. They 
categorically affirmed that every Mexican had the right to 
cultivate his own piece of the national soil? 
"appropriation that they held as "a condition for the 
freedom of everybody," or rather, of each family, since
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"the formation of the patrimony of the peasant family 
rests on the ownership of the land.”
Indeed, every family that could live in autarky and 
could sell its surplus in the local market, did not need 
to sell its labour to an employer who could exploit it and 
constrain it to renounce its true convictions. The 
Synarchist concept was one of sheer individualism, pushed 
to the extreme; individualism which took the name of 
liberty.
Nevertheless, they did not condemn the distribution 
of land to the peasants, but rather considered the ejido 
"an imperfect form of property”? which in certain cases 
should continue to exist as it did during Colonial times, 
but their desire was that it should become individual 
property.82
And so, distribution of a plot inside the ejido was 
a first step ”in the direction of individual and absolute 
property”, which would allow each person to be independent 
of the State and the credit institutions, so that he could 
own the produce of his labour, and benefit from economic 
independence, which they saw as the basis of all 
freedoms.83 The aim was not simply to transform the 
peasantry into a mass of small farmstead owners 
(minifundio), with little or nothing to live on; it was 
not a question of creating a uniform mass of 
"dispossessed” as would a collectivization rdgime, but 
rather of forming a "landed bourgeoisie that would share 
in the welfare of the community and the economic security
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of the largest number of Mexicans.”84 The new owners should 
not be left to their own devices and condemned to a 
humdrum agriculture: the peasant should have guarantees, 
credit, protection, security and support.
In order to create such stratum, land would have to
be found? first, in the still vast unexploited regions of
the country, and afterwards:
"If the common good demands the
distribution of latifundia, adequate 
compensation must be granted to those 
affected? [only the] small property is 
sacred, Synarchism is opposed to 
dispossessing small owners who are 
made worse off to the benefit of the 
State."86
Synarchism rejected outright the reform carried out 
by the Revolution because it saw it as rendering the
peasantry subservient to the government. In this context 
it rebuked the creation of collective ejidos because:
"It is detrimental to production? it 
maintains the bondage of the peasant, 
destroys self-initiative and creates 
a new tyranny over the peasants."
By constantly attacking the collective ejido, 
Synarchists were inevitably ranked with the hacendados and 
large foreign property owners.87 However, Synarchists did 
not spare their disapproval of the latifundia? time and 
time again, El Sinarquista voiced this opinion. It 
I Announced that the hacienda was a thing of the past,88 
and remarked:
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"The regime of free economic 
competition gave rise to large misuse 
of property. While thousands of tons 
of wheat were dumped in the sea to 
avoid the ruin of the capitalist 
concerns, thousands of people died of 
hunger. The misuse of the right to 
property leads to collective unrest."89
Accordingly, they persistently rejected the 
accusation raised by the Left of wanting to hand back the 
latifundia to their former owners.90 In fact, El 
Sinarquista denounced the abuses committed by capitalists 
and politicians - whom they saw as the new propertied 
class.91
Their reaction to these accusations was a strong 
condemnation of the Revolution:
"The Revolution declares that it 
establishes social justice in the 
workshop and in the field and that 
Synarchism, is, instead, the enemy of 
the ejido and of the union and that 
it fights for the old hacendados and 
the owners of the factories. No one 
can believe the Revolution any more, 
because in its many years it has not 
been, and will never be, but this: 
arrant enrichment of politicians and 
leaders, who every day have more? 
misery of the people, who every day 
have less; persecution of what is good 
and license for all that is bad: 
Communist school, public immorality, 
etc.; hatred between brothers, since 
the army "reserves" do not possess 
arms to defend Mexico from abroad, but 
to cut up and despoil with impunity 
simple ejidatarios; Totalitarianism, 
dictatorship, Porfirsmo, anti­
democracy, because the people cannot 
elect even the municipal president, 
anywhere in the country? slavery of 
the workers, who have to carry out the 
whims of the leaders (special fees, 
demonstrations, elections), for fear 
of the closed-shop" .92
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Despite their criticism of the misuse of private 
property, Synarchism did not condemn private property 
itself:
11 [Contrary to Communism] which denies 
men the right to possess. Communism 
seeks to destroy private property and 
to make of|everyman a dispossessed one 
[...]
[By] denying this right, it intends to 
deprive man of the things he obtained 
through his labour. Man, by using his 
strength, seeks to obtain and to own 
certain things? by getting a job, he 
earns the right to demand a salary and 
to dispose of it as he chooses. 
Therefore, if the worker invests his 
earnings to obtain a good, this good 
belongs to him [... ] Property must not 
be abolished. Property must be shared 
more equitably.”
The real problem lay not in property but in the use of it:
"Certainly we defend property as an 
inalienable and primordial right of 
man, essential for the peaceful and 
prosperous life of societies. And as 
a right, we recognize the faculty all 
men have to "use" it, as much as their 
needs for a decent life demand it? but 
under no circumstance do we defend the 
"abuse" of this right whereby man sets 
himself up as an immoral hoarder of 
wealth, without regard for the 
methods, or the misery and misfortune 
of the underprivileged, victims of his 
ambition. This "abuse" is the real 
cause of the present state of 
injustice which we resist and strive 
to remove from society."94
Synarchists had been aware, since 1940, that the 
development of the country rested on industrialization. 
However, they rejected this path because it placed the
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nation under foreign tutelage and did not allow for the 
possibility of building a nation of small independent 
owners. They aspired to a return to Nineteenth century 
competitive capitalism, where industrial production was 
still done by craftsmen, and wished to ignore 
monopolistic, as well as state capitalism.
It was what we might call the "small-owner-ideology" 
which attracted the masses to Synarchism and secured its 
success, especially in the Bajio.
V. Synarchism and Socialist Education
The design of the revolutionary state "to take 
possession of the minds of children" was incorporated in 
the 1934 amendment to Article 3 of the Constitution, which 
established "socialist education". This caused a burst of 
indignation in Catholic circles which led to the formation 
of the secret organization •'Base” to fight what it 
regarded as the "Bolshevik" government.
For Synarchism, depositary of the Catholic tradition, 
Article 3 remained at the heart of its grievances.95 The 
eventual amendment of Article 3 constituted the latest 
anticlerical measure dictated by the government to contest 
the influence of the Church. The aim of its instigators 
was to form a new generation totally removed from the 
authority of the priest. Synarchists were not long in 
reacting? Article 3, they protested, was unconstitutional, 
anti-Mexican, oppressive, obscurantist and retrograde:
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"It is unconstitutional because it is 
opposed to the spirit and the letter 
of the Constitution [... ] Article 6 
establishes the freedom of expression 
which presumes the freedom of 
education; while Article 3 establishes 
that individuals do not have, by 
themselves, the right to educate? but 
in the event that they obtained it, 
they should conform to the "Ideology" 
of the State.
It is anti-Mexican because it goes 
against our [Catholic] tradition, 
against the national sentiment and the 
destiny of the Fatherland, whose 
greatness is placed on the glorious 
Hispanic, Graeco-Latin and Christian 
tradition.
It is oppressive because it denies 
parents the sacred right to establish 
schools for their sons [...].
It is obscurantist because it pretends 
to give the youth "a rational and 
precise notion of the Universe and of 
life", which entails a denial and 
ignorance of contemporary culture 
[...], at a time when scientists are 
more modest than ever and declare that 
"we know little or nothing."
It is retrograde because [its] 
defenders [... ] proclaim and 
misinterpret an obsolete science 
[Socialism], which the twentieth 
century has surpassed and even 
declared some of its main assumptions 
untrue.1,96
Synarchists demanded the respect of the rights of the 
family in the education of the children because:
"the duty and the right to educate 
pertain directly to the parents. A 
basic condition for the stability of 
the social order is that there must be 
perfect harmony between the elements 
that contribute to education, namely, 
the family, the school, the State 
[... ] The State has the responsibility 
to provide each member of the
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community with the opportunity to 
educate himself."97
In the final analysis, Synarchism especially 
reproached Socialist education being directed against the 
Catholic Church, whereby the State denied the traditional 
right to form the conscience of children and whose 
influence it intended to oppose.
Synarchists pointed at the results of the new 
education: by putting boys and girls together, socialist 
education stifled all sense of decency and ill-prepared 
women for their future vocation. Moreover, sexual 
education was an abomination? not only did it wantonly 
reveal life's secrets, but it also corrupted the soul of 
young children with obscene images and degrading 
spectacles.
Besides, revolutionary education formed the new 
generations in the image of the Revolution. It gave them 
its principles and its "ideal", namely: corruption,
ambition for power, etc. School, they argued, did not 
teach respect to parents, to be charitable towards the 
unfortunate, to love and fear God, to help one another? it 
taught them, instead, the opposite: to hate the Creator, 
to despise the authorities, to be envious of the more 
fortunate and to desire their ruin. Perversion was, in a
• • • • • 99word, the ultimate aim of socialist education.
1. Synarchism and education
The Synarchist stance in education was clear: the 
abolition of socialist education. It was their belief that
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the reform of Article 3 was undeferable, and that it 
should be drafted according to the terms of the "natural 
law” and thus bring the nation to the "level of
civilization”. Putting aside the natural right of parents 
and the divine right of the Church in education matters, 
it was urgent, they claimed, to start a policy of
harmonization and complementarity between their 
educational activity and that of the State's.
Education, they emphasized, had to be religious and
privately run - the "Escuela Libre" (Roman Catholic 
school) - and backed by State subsidies.
The aim of Synarchism was to promote culture in order 
to destroy political subservience and guide the national 
community towards the attainment of the highest spiritual 
values."
Synarchist thinking was based on the premise that men 
live and interact in three societies: the family, the
State and the Church. All three, albeit in different 
manner, intervened in education. But it behove 
fundamentally to the family and to the Church for natural 
and divine right; the State had a supplementary r6le, as 
promoter of the common good.
Parents had a special right in the education of their 
children. Nature entrusted them not only with the 
procreation of progeny, but also with their development 
and progress. Parents had the mission and therefore the 
right to educate their children; an inalienable right at 
that, because right and duty were inseparably bound; it
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was a right that anteceded any right of the State, and 
hence, it was inviolable by any worldly authority. 
However, the right of parents was neither absolute nor 
despotic, since education had to agree with both the 
rational nature and the metaphysical end of children.
The Church had the mission and the supreme authority 
of teaching, she was the repository and the custodian of 
the faith which redeemed men and nations? she was the 
pillar and the foundation of the truth. She was given the 
authority to educate nations and to teach them to observe 
the divine laws. This authority was not subject to the 
rule or control of any worldly power, either in its 
inception, in its exercise, in its objective, or in the 
means necessary and adequate for its fulfilment.100
The State received from God the right to intervene in 
education not by way of teaching, like the Church, or by 
way of parenthood, like the family, but because of the 
authority bestowed upon it to promote the temporal common 
good, of which culture and intellectual prosperity were a 
special part.
The State's role in education was supplementary. It 
had to do with the protection of the children's right to 
receive an education when the duty of the parents was 
physically or morally wanting because of absence, 
incapacity or unworthiness. Given that the right of the 
parents was not absolute, but dependent on the natural 
law, it was thus subject to the supervision and the legal 
tutelage of the State, in relation to the common good. In
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this case, the State neither replaced nor absorbed the 
right of the family, but it protected and helped its 
progress and initiative.
Any aspirations that the State may have had in the 
sense of setting outlines for the personal education of 
children, or for controlling it in any way, were unfair 
and illegal because they violated the natural law. Even 
more unfair and illegal was an educational monopoly which 
compelled parents, physically or morally, to send their 
children to State schools against their Christian moral 
obligations and against their legitimate preferences.101
Because man is essentially a religious being,
education could not be neutral, "laic", or irreligious, 
without being defective and inappropriate to achieve its 
formative mission. Laic education , far from bringing up 
capable and efficient citizens, endowed with authentic 
cultural values, produced disabled spirits, devoid of the 
religious element, which was, in the opinion of the 
Synarchists, the only effectively valid one. Anti-
religious schooling, which not only ignored God but fought 
Him, was contrary to nature because it tended to destroy 
the very source of all spiritual life in man. Coeducation 
was anti-religious, especially in teenagers; sexual
education was anti-religious and evil? so was Marxist 
education.102 Education, then, should be religious if it 
was to consider man in his spiritual integrity and if it 
was to be formative and not destructive.
Synarchism claimed that if the State did not intend
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to change its conception of education, then it should not 
oblige parents to send their children to its 
establishments; and concluded that it was better to remain 
illiterate than to become corrupted. It accused socialist 
education of being more concerned with "poisoning the soul 
of the children" than with educating them. It further 
stressed that national education was in communist hands 
(they particularly accused the Education Minister, Sanchez 
Ponton), whereby the school was exclusively utilized for 
political ends.
If all the criticisms of the UNS arose from violent 
anti-revolutionary feelings, it is also true that they 
found a favourable echo in large sectors of the 
population, not only for their ideological base, but also 
because of the excesses of socialist education.108 Of the 
many groups and organizations that made public their 
indignation regarding socialist education, the most 
important were: the Church, the Union Nacional de Padres 
de Familia, student organizations, the Partido Accion 
Nacional, the Partido Nacional Agrarista, almazanista 
groups, the Union Democratica Institucional, the 
Asociacion Nacionalista de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
the Confederacion de Agrupaciones Independientes and the 
Partido Nacional Antirreleccionista.104
Indeed, it must be noted that teachers, quite aside 
from the Synarchist assumption that they wanted to corrupt 
the children, very often had the tendency to confuse 
Marxist training and anticlericalism, in a word,
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elimination of illiteracy and political enrolment for the 
Left. De facto means were utilized, specially in the rural 
areas, with the frequent collusion of political caciques. 
In order to explain this, one must bear in mind that the 
vagueness of the precept, caused a change in the role of 
the teaching profession, since by accepting as a possible 
aim the socialization of the means of production, 
education took shape as a political weapon. So, teachers 
who wanted to comply with the constitutional order and who 
went on to apply it according to the best of their 
knowledge, fell to political activity and became, 
particularly in the rural communities, local leaders, who 
led the discontent of the peasant groups.106
The social role of the teacher was not new, it went 
back at least to Obregdn, and arose from his (the 
teacher*s) close contact with the peasant milieu - often 
his own - and from his own precarious situation. But it 
was Cardenas and his administration who encouraged the 
teacher*s role as leader and defender of the revolution. 
After establishing rural schools, the administration 
created two institutions aimed at completing and improving 
the work of the teachers: the Escuelas Normales Rurales 
(rural training colleges) were designed to form future 
teachers for the peasants, setting them in areas akin to 
their own backgrounds and in conditions of close mutual 
influence; the Cultural Missions were created as brigades 
of ideological agitation and to bring up to date the 
knowledge and methods of the teachers.106
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President Cardenas often alluded to the social duty 
of the teacher. In a speech at Uruapan, in 1939, he said:
"The mission of the teacher ought not 
to be limited to the confines of the 
classroom? in the social domain, that 
mission demands his collaboration for 
the absolute fulfilment of the 
programme of the revolution. The rural 
teacher is the guide of the peasant 
and the child, and must be involved in 
the improvement of the people. The 
teacher must help the peasant in his 
struggle for land, and the worker in 
obtaining the wage that the law of 
each region had set."107
In the centre regions of the country where the clergy 
still had a strong influence on the traditionalist peasant 
strata, and on the urban petite bourgeoisie,108 it was 
certainly not by provoking public opinion in this manner, 
that the Left wing of the PRM, and the Ministry of 
Education, would succeed in introducing the changes it 
desired.
On the contrary, the peasant populations revolted 
against "socialist" teachers. They followed, it must be 
said, the advice of the petit-clergy and of the UNS which 
urged them not to send their children to their 
establishments.
Teachers risked their lives in teaching socialist 
education, and especially for defending popular claims. 
According to David L. Raby, the caciques and large estate 
owners of the region cut off their ears and sometimes 
mutilated them as a reprisal for their involvement in 
demands for land, in the organization of peasants and
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workers in co-operatives and unions, and finally, in the 
fight against them. Their atheism precipitated violence in 
some States of the Republic, notably Michoacan, Guanajuato 
and Zacatecas; but it was not the cause elsewhere.109 In 
these cases, the ear-cutters and the killers were rebel 
groups of recalcitrant cristeros.
The Communists naturally blamed the Synarchists for 
all the atrocities committed against the teachers. 
However, these crimes should not be attributed to the UNS, 
or to Synarchism; as one observer suggested, the 
xenophobia of the communities, the disregard for life in 
the villages, were sufficient to explain those violent 
reactions.110
VI. The Abandonment of Socialist Education
The Ministry of Education soon recognized that the 
policy had not only failed to penetrate ideologically the 
countryside, but also that it lagged behind in the 
provision of schools for children. By taking primary and 
secondary education from the Church, the State, which 
neither had the staff nor enough premises, was less able 
than in the past to provide all children with education. 
All these reasons, together with the ideological choices 
of the government of Avila Camacho, accounted for the 
progressive renunciation of socialist education, and at 
the same time, the application of more moderate measures. 
The UNS saw with some satisfaction this turn of events.
Since its official foundation, the Movement had
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organized many public demonstrations demanding the reform 
of Article 3, and was unabated in its attacks of the 
Ministry of Education. Until the end 1941, all these 
protests had no success. However, Avila Camacho announced 
some changes in his 1941 address to Congress. He 
acknowledge that "public education was unsatisfactory"; 
and called upon the teachers to help restore education to 
favour.
Notwithstanding this, he emphasized that Article 3 
would not be modified but that he would propose a reform 
of its Statutory Law. The statement was followed by the 
resignation, on 18 September, of Sanchez Ponton, and the 
appointment of Vejar Vazquez.111 The reforms enacted by the 
new Minister bore witness to the new frame of mind of the 
Government. He expelled from the Ministry many elements 
judged unnecessary or suspected of leanings that were too 
leftist? he also had the school texts replaced.112
On 26 December 1941, the President asked Congress to 
draft a new statutory law of Article 3. This modified, in 
fact, the spirit of that article. Avila Camacho stated on 
that occasion:
"Article 3 is not Marxist Socialism 
but Mexican Socialism [... ] The 
education provided by the State must 
not be anti-religious.
"It is important to recognize that the 
family has an essential mission in 
education, since the school must 
educate children in accordance with 
tradition, so as to eliminate the 
petty hatreds and discords from which
• • 113Mexico has suffered in the past."
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The government went further; in 1942, Vejar Vazquez 
called upon the private sector to collaborate with the 
government to set up new schools. The Church was given the 
possibility to recover some of the ground lost. The
Minister of Education even spoke highly of the work of the 
missionaries and the priests.114
Thus, without interfering with the text of the law, 
the Government of Avila Camacho had completely gone into 
reverse, by expurgating the Marxist dispositions that 
sustained his predecessor. The resignation of Vejar 
Vazquez in December 1943 did not signal a return to the 
old ways, because his successor, Jaime Torres Bodet, 
pursued the same policy.
Still, all these changes were carried out in a
torrent of political passions: the Synarchists criticized 
the reforms they judged "too timid"; while the Left was 
indignant at its loss of influence.
During 1942 and 1943, the two tendencies were in 
confrontation: the Left attacked Vejar Vazquez whom it 
accused of being "reactionary". Vicente Lombardo Toledano 
warned the government against the reactionary inclinations 
of the successor of Sanchez Ponton and pontificated: 
"either Socialist education or Synarchist education!1,115
On the Synarchist side, they continued to protest
against the upholding of Article 3, but welcomed the
government project authorizing the establishment of 
private institutions.116
The Minister did not have an easy road; he had to
444
defend the new measure in Congress, where he was strongly 
challenged: whether he had intended to depart from the 
Marxist principles that should rule education? and deliver 
the rural school into private hands and grant freedom of 
religious education. Was the new education not opposed to
• • 117the teachings of the Revolution?
To water down the practical extent of the statute, 
the opponents of Vejar Vazquez required all private school 
teachers and directors to sign a declaration stating that 
they accepted without reservation the text of Article 3 ? 
that in their establishments socialist education would be 
imparted, that there would be no religious education, no
place for religious worship and no religious demonstration
118whatsoever.
This was the last refuge of Socialist education which 
could not go on withstanding general condemnation. By 
losing the support of the Head of the State, the Left 
could not bring its ideas to victory: Socialist education 
was a thing of the past.
Although the attitude of the regime had substantially 
shifted with Avila Camacho, the Synarchists were not 
content. In fact, they deplored the indifference with 
which the Minister of Education regarded them, and 
complained that he did not want to rely on his real 
supporters:
"There has, unfortunately, been on his 
part an unwarranted apprehension with 
regard to the support that he could 
get from the honest elements of the 
teaching profession, and the support
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that the people would certainly give 
him if he decided to act energetically 
against Communism. But he had not done 
so for fear of being branded 
reactionary and fascist",
wrote the UNS leader in 1942. He bid the government to 
choose between Communism and Synarchism; he was annoyed to 
see:
"There has been a desire to create a 
kind of revolutionary education which 
pretends to be equally distant from 
Communism and Catholics? a sort of 
compromise all could adjust to. Using 
word games it rejected the principles 
of Socialism but pretends to be 
socialist still [...]
This half-heartedness was out place, he said, since:
"In Mexico there are only two forces 
which from day to day specify more and 
more their antagonistic contours, on 
one side Communism, on the other, the 
Catholic people of Mexico [...]" 19
In brief, Synarchism never ceased to vigorously press 
for the repeal of Article 3? all legislation that rendered 
it inoffensive was deemed insufficient? they maintained 
that as long as it was not definitely removed from the 
Constitution, it could always be brought back into effect.
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CHAPTER VIII 
ORGANIZATION AND MYSTIQUE
I. Synarchist militia
It is impossible to appreciate the influence of 
Synarchism in Mexico without an understanding of its 
mystical character. The leaders of Synarchism were true 
mystics. They were men of true religious character. They 
were unselfish. They were not animated by ulterior 
political motives and they did not want people in their 
organization that were animated by ulterior motives.
The life of a Synarchist was totally marked by 
action. He participated in assemblies at different 
levels, he marched in regional and national mobilizations; 
he met his companions at least once a week. Besides, he 
was concerned about the sale of the journal, the 
propaganda, the collection of funds, etc. Each militant 
had his own place and role. Activity was intense, 
particularly in the early years, the years of 
"synarchisation”, when the Movement was oriented towards 
spreading the doctrine, and winning supporters.
"Synarchism is at the same time SCHOOL 
and ACTION. Indeed, it is and ACTIVE 
IDEA that urges us to work with love, 
to be useful, and to serve others. A 
Synarchist does not content himself 
with upholding a doctrine, he lives it 
out and propagates it with his word 
and his example.”1
Entering the UNS was like entering a religion: the 
member became a new man, he was mobilized like a soldier
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and was on the move. Life had a meaning, new hope for 
those who had been striving to find a meaning to their 
life. Indian communities, women, children, landless 
peasants, small owners who felt threatened by the agrarian 
reform, dissatisfied ejidatarios, artisans, etc., were all 
united in the UNS which offered them a political faith, a 
secular Catholic action, in a language that was their own. 
The UNS found the political style of the moment, hence its 
success and hence the anxiety of its adversaries.2
Davis pointed out that the Synarchists capitalized on 
the enthusiasm that the candidacy of General Almazan had 
generated at the 1940 presidential elections. The 
discontent associated with the belief that he had won over 
General Avila Camacho, the candidate chosen by Cardenas, 
and the frustration many people felt when he failed to 
fulfil the promise of an armed revolt if the victory was 
taken from him,3 made Synarchism the faction of electoral 
reform, the honest party which had advocated abstention 
and predicted fraud.4
"The strongest appeal Synarchism 
makes, and the most dangerous, is to 
the unrealized ambitions of the 
Mexican Revolution itself. To the 
unemployed, and to the discontented 
and poorer middle-class youth of the 
cities, Synarchists hold out the 
prospect of private land ownership 
through the colonization schemes they 
have diligently advocated. Throughout 
rural Mexico they make a strong appeal 
to the small landholders (and large 
ones, too) who, rightly or wrongly, 
fear confiscation of their lands and 
fear the "communism” of the Cardenas 
ejidal communities such as the Laguna 
project near Torreon [... ]1,5
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Although Synarchism did not constitute a political 
party, and its members did not vote in elections, or carry 
arms, its aim was to reach power. It seems that it would 
achieve this by winning over the largest number of 
followers that would insure the success of a takeover.
II. The Synarchist Movement and the Cristeros
The Synarchists drew their inspiration from the 
Cristiada:
"The Cristero rebellion, notwith­
standing all its faults and its 
failure, certainly is the most 
beautiful and brightest moment of 
Catholicism in Mexico, and the most 
stunning outburst of faith of our 
people. It defended highly the banner 
of our defiance against the enemies of 
our liberties, and constitutes the 
shore and the glorious background of 
Synarchism.1,6
The UNS was intended as an order of Christian 
democracy, first under God, then under a God-fearing 
state, and the UNS was most directly descended from the 
earlier Cristero movement.
Undoubtedly, the ideas of Anacleto Gonzalez Flores 
and the Union Popular, had won more support in the 
traditional sectors of the large Mexican peasant mass? and 
it therefore comes as no surprise that Synarchists 
considered themselves "the genuine expression of the 
supreme aspiration of the Fatherland”, and characterized 
the Cristero Movement as "eminent movement of popular 
wisdom and of great sociological influence". Synarchist
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tradition had, then, very remote antecedents, which had
come to the surface in the Cristero struggle:
"Its most profound characteristics, 
its doctrinal code, |
, its rigorous configuration and 
its noble content found, after some 
years, faithful reproduction in the 
National Synarchist Movement [...] 
Even in the provincial origin the 
affinity is evident, although the UNS 
— for clear providential designs—  had 
[... ] the opportunity to spread to all 
corners of the country and beyond."7
Synarchists maintained that the Union Popular and the
Cristero rebellion had been the authentic origin of
Synarchism:
"In style, in the way of being and of 
living, the Union Popular, the 
Cristero Revolution and Synarchism are 
one and the same thing. With one 
reservation: the Cristero Revolution 
was a movement of warriors, while the 
Union Popular and Synarchism are 
movements of citizens. This minor 
difference apart, purely accidental, 
the cause of one and the other is the 
same; just as the former were able to 
reach martyrdom, we, its followers, 
have sown the historic course of 
Synarchism with our martyrs? and yet 
both for the same reason? for God and 
country.8
Like the Cristeros, the Synarchists were not only 
ardent Catholics but also disciplined soldiers of a 
militant theocratic faith. Again, like the Cristeros, 
they directed their efforts towards the forgotten peasant 
masses - those who had benefited little from the 
Revolution. Both movements eventually gained their 
greatest strength in the Bajio region of Mexico, where, 
generally speaking, agrarian reform and rural welfare had 
made least progress. In contrast to the policies of
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President Cardenas, whose objective was the communization 
of land, the two movements urged the development of small 
private property. There was another feature of the 
Cristiada that brought it into harmony with Synarchism: 
its popular nature. Both had been movements that not only 
had influence on but originated among the people.
"Appealing primarily to the humble, 
the Synarchists were markedly anti­
intellectual, as the Cristeros had 
been a decade earlier. Their
militancy was in direct line with the 
intransigent position taken by pre­
revolutionary conservatives, and it 
reflected a strong sense of alienation 
from the entire revolutionary 
tradition, perhaps more so than any 
other single conservative group. In 
effect, the Synarchists were heirs to 
that extra-legal approach which the 
Cristeros had helped to revive, and 
they weakened the more tolerant forces 
which had attempted to take full 
command of the conservative movement 
in the post-revolutionary period."9
It was in fact precisely by its appeal to the 
credulity and religious fervour of the peasantry, its 
prowess in organizing "marches" of semi-religious, semi­
political character, and its knowledge of the peasant 
character, that Synarchism was able to forge a radical, 
popular movement with traits of similarity to the old 
Cristero movement and flourishing most strongly in those 
states which were the scene of the Cristero uprisings in 
the late twenties.
At the same time, however, there were important 
differences between the Cristeros and the Synarchists. 
The Cristeros had been openly supported by the higher 
clergy? later, these same bishops professed no open
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backing for Synarchism. Besides, the Cristeros were armed 
rebels; but the Synarchists called for passive resistance 
and a return to the organizing principles of the early 
church fathers.
"| Most J important of all, the 
Cristero movement was based on an 
offensive stand for religion. The 
Synarchist Movement took a defensive 
position which challenged the 
government on the grounds that the 
Revolution had not fulfilled the 
promise of a better life for the 
Mexicans".10
The failure of the Cristiada resulted, in the eyes of 
the Synarchists, from the lack of direction; the leaders 
ignored basic military strategy. The guerrilla tactics 
invariably adopted by all the groups was extremely 
anachronistic and inadequate.11 Though they died 
heroically, they did not make the revolution in the
military sense, because there was an essential element
• • • • 1 • 12missing: unity of plan, of hierarchy and of leadership.
Synarchists believed that through the Base and the 
politico-militaristic structure of the UNS, the 
deficiencies of the Cristiada would be overcome and their 
cause would be successful.
III. The Synarchist Organization
The National Synarchist Union, for reasons of 
organization, direction, control, and proselytism, divided 
the national territory:
1) in Divisions, comprising several states of the
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Republic, according to the needs of the national 
leadership; there were six Divisions: of the North, 
South, South-East, North-East, Central Division, and 
the Division of the Valley of Mexico?
2) in Regions, which corresponded, in general, to the 
States of the federation;
3) in Districts, which comprised various municipalities, 
clustered together for strategic considerations;
4) in Municipalities, which, in general, coincided with 
the equivalent political division?
5) in Rural zones, made up various rural committees,
united for practical purposes?
6) in Urban zones, corresponding to city divisions
(barrios, colonias)?
7) in other divisions which included the smallest rural 
hamlets; and
8) in Sectors, the internal divisions of the urban
zones.13
At the head of each of the aforementioned divisions,
there was a leader or chief in charge, responsible to his
superior chief in the next highest division.
1. The Committees
The entire organization was presided over by a
Supreme National leader, or Jefe, an assistant leader, and
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a secret committee consisting of ten persons, the National 
Committee. The UNS was Section 11 of the Base, and until 
1945, the Supreme Council of the Base, which appointed, 
controlled and removed the National leaders, was the 
highest authority of the Movement.
There were also regional committees, usually 
corresponding to states, although some states could have 
more than one regional committee. There were also 
municipal committees corresponding to the municipalities 
and there were rural subcommittees.14
The committees executed and co-ordinated all 
synarchist activity? and their duties were to carry out 
the plans and programmes, assisted by various specialized 
groups under their command. The committees were under the 
direction of the respective territorial chief. A 
committee was composed of a sub-chief and as many 
secretaries as the development of Synarchist activity 
required in each territorial division.16
Each municipal committee was made up of: a municipal 
Chief, a secretary of assemblies, a treasurer, a secretary 
of propaganda, a secretary of organization and statistics, 
a secretary of youth action, and a secretary of feminine 
action.16
The secretary was in charge of the correspondence, 
records and all the documents of the Committee.
The treasurer collected a weekly quota from each 
member, the regular amount to be agreed upon voluntarily 
by the member.
The secretary of propaganda played, in close
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collaboration with the National Secretariat for Press and 
Propaganda, an essential role. The doctrine of the 
Movement was contained in two basic documents: "The 16
Points” and the "Synarchist Pentalogue", which were 
unflaggingly repeated, commented upon and quoted. Oral or 
written, public or private, this propaganda was strictly 
controlled; no tract, poster, or text was printed without 
the prior approval of the hierarchy. Besides the 
traditional media, other propaganda methods were employed, 
such as demonstrations, public rallies and concentrations.
The secretary of organization and statistics divided 
towns and villages into districts, subdivided in sectors 
and blocks; a person in charge was assigned to each one. 
This kind of organization permitted a rapid mobilization 
of everybody when a meeting or rally was planned. The 
secretary had to do his best to evaluate the exact number 
of militants. To this end, he constantly solicited 
updated information of new groups and new recruits. He 
was also responsible for the statistics of the 
subcommittees. In conjunction with the municipal leader, 
he shared out the work among the propagandists and fixed 
the schedule of meetings for all the various groups.
By order of the municipal leader, he organized the 
marches and other public functions, after obtaining 
authorization from the National Committee.
The secretary of youth action was responsible for the 
Synarchist youth and small children. His role was to 
instil in them the Synarchist spirit, inspire in them the 
exhilaration that came from spiritual and bodily health:
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Militia and not sport, Latin and not Saxon spirit.17 He 
should give special attention to the organization of 
children who were considered to make excellent 
propagandists.
The secretary of feminine action had the same 
obligations as the municipal leader, and she was assisted 
by the same number of secretaries. The organization was 
the same: secretariat, finances, propaganda, organization 
and statistics and youth. She participated in the 
restricted weekly council of the municipal committee and 
she convened her own feminine council every week. The 
duties of Synarchist women were contained in the "Ten 
Norms of Conduct for Synarchist Women". These described 
the role of the Synarchist woman as that of persuading and 
encouraging her father, husband, brother and son to adhere 
to the UNS and to fight for its objectives.18
Each municipal committee was responsible to a 
Regional committee and should maintain close contact with 
it, strictly obeying all orders and dispositions which 
emanated from the Regional committee. The latter was, in 
turn, directly responsible to the National Committee.
Committees had to deliberate and rule on applications 
of membership and suspended provisionally any member upon 
request of other members, and simultaneously submitted the 
case to the National Commission of Honour and Justice 
(which only came into existence until after the break with 
the Base). Suspension was usually prompted by actions 
which were detrimental to the progress of the movement.
The organization was effectively set in what we might
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call the "synarchisized" regions. In Colima and 
Aguascalientes, there was a municipal committee in each 
municipality; in Guanajuato, there were 38 committees for 
45 municipalities and countless rural subcommittees; 
Apaseo controlled 57 in March 1940, Acambaro 67 and 
Comonfort 30. Michoacan had 73 municipal committees for 
102 municipalities and hundreds of rural subcommittees; 
Puruandiro controlled 54. In Zacatecas, Jalisco, Nayarit, 
San Luis Potosi and Tlaxcala, the ratio of committees to 
municipalities was of 75 for 100, 60 for 100, 60 for 100 
and 5 for 100, respectively. Guerrero and Morelos 
followed with 40 for 100. Then came the group of States 
with between 30 and 20 for 100: Durango, Coahuila,
Chihuahua, Puebla, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Hidalgo. The rest 
fell below 10 for 100.19
Besides this structuring, the rank and file was 
organized along militaristic lines - which we discussed 
in Chapter IV.20
2. The Leaders
The chief, or leader of the committee was the 
depository of the authority of Synarchism within the 
respective territorial division. It was his
responsibility to appoint the sub-chief, the collaborators 
and the chiefs of immediate lower rank, and to remove them 
from their charges.21
The chiefs, along with their committees made up the 
hierarchy of the Movement. The National leader had the 
responsibility of the functioning of the entire system of
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chiefs. He was the depository of the supreme authority of 
Synarchism, the conduct of which was in his charge.
The divisional leader had the duty of co-ordinating 
the regional organization, each with its own chief. Next 
were the chiefs at the district, municipal and rural 
levels. The executive function of the Chiefs along with 
the committees was to direct, coordinate and execute the 
orders and programmes that were issued form above.
After 1945, the faculties and obligations of the
National Leader were set out in the Statutes of the
organization; among these were:
i) to convene the National Sinarquia - a renamed
National Committee - every two months and preside 
over its work;
ii) to promote the development and organization of
Synarchism everywhere, guiding and directing every 
activity;
iii) to submit working plans to the National Sinarquia for 
its consideration.
Perhaps the most radical innovation introduced after 
1945 was that the National leader was no longer appointed, 
but elected. His term would be for two years and could be 
re-elected. The election was made by the National 
Sinarquia in secret and direct ballot. Most of the 
National leaders were young and the fact that they were 
removed every two years prevented a personality cult and 
the possibility that the movement became the instrument of
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one of them. The limits of his authority were set by 
justice, Catholic morality, the good of the Organization 
and the National Sinarquia.22
Synarchist publications stressed the point that the 
UNS was to be highly stratified, with a definite hierarchy 
of offices, each taking orders from his superior. The 
rank and file of the members were urged to have implicit 
faith in the officials and to render strict and prompt 
obedience to all instructions. As an illustration, when 
Salvador Zermeno passed on the leadership of the Movement 
to Abascal, in 1940, he urged all Synarchists to accept 
the new leadership with utmost confidence:
11 Of us, soldiers, only one thing is 
expected: to accept his decision and 
to follow the conduct which he 
himself, who is our model, has just 
taught us, that is, to place our 
entire faith in him who since today is 
our Chief.”23
It behoved to the Chiefs to foment and maintain 
discipline: yet, this should never be achieved by force or 
coercion, but by persuasion:
"Each chief should make of each 
follower, a convinced Synarchist, 
impassioned of our ideals, so that he 
accepts with joy the discipline of the 
Organization. Love, persuasion,
passion for our ideals should serve to 
give strength and cohesion to the 
Synarchist Movement."24
After the split with the Base in 1945, the structure 
of the UNS became more organic by the adoption of the 
Statutes of 1946.
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3. Finances
At the outset, the Synarchist Organizing Committee 
obtained, after exhaustive negotiations with the Base's 
Supreme Council, a small quantity of funds to set up the 
organization, while it sought alternative and more 
independent means of support, so as not to be a heavy 
burden on the Base. Jose Antonio Urquiza succeeded in 
obtaining further aid when the UNS was expelled from 
Guanajuato and had to move to Mexico City.25
Subsequently, the UNS was financed from weekly quotas 
assessed for each member? from the proceeds of the sale of 
Synarchist publications - its newspaper, El Sinarquista, 
and the magazine, Orden, as well as from individual 
contributions.
The duties of the secretary of finances of the 
committee were detailed in the "Handbook for Chiefs11; 
these consisted of the collection of a weekly quota from 
each Synarchist, the regular amount to be agreed upon 
voluntarily by the member, together with the extra 
assessments that were to be made whenever a companion was 
killed. These extra assessments would be remitted in 
total to the person designated (usually the widow) by the 
National Committee.26
The funds derived from the regular quotas were 
allocated as follows: 60 per cent for the use of the
Municipal Committee, 35 per cent for the Regional 
Committee and 5 per cent to be set to the National 
Committee.
He should also collect the quotas from the rural
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subcommittees and dispose of them as follows: 50 per cent 
should go the Municipal Committee, 35 to the respective 
Regional Committee and 5 per cent to be sent to the 
National Committee. The remaining 10 per cent was kept by 
the rural subcommittee.
The financial means of the UNS were never 
considerable because it lacked an external source of 
finance. The members' quota constituted the only 
permanent resource: these were fixed, as we have
mentioned, by voluntary agreement, and paid weekly. 
However, the Synarchist militant usually had a very modest 
revenue, consequently his quota could not amount to more 
than a few cents. The scantiness of these revenues 
transpires from the extra contribution that was requested 
when a companion was killed.27 Similarly, when the UNS 
issued bonds, 50 for 100, at 5 cents, and the large ones,
1 for 100, at 5 pesos, the militant was unable to pay his
• 28 • quota and, at the same time, buy bonds. This was also
the case of the receipts from the sale of El Sinarquista:
the Administrator of the paper, constantly dispatched
memoranda to the rural subcommittees requesting payment
for the papers they received. In most cases, the reply
came stating that if all members were to pay for the
paper, few would able to read it, since few could afford
it.29
If the UNS had a shortage of funds, it was because 
the Base, which could have provided them did so 
exiguously. Both Zermeno and Abascal had made attempts to 
free the Movement from the tutelage of the Secret Council,
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with no success. It is clear that financial security 
would have been an inducement to become independent? 
whether or not the Base used the financial lever to keep 
the UNS under its control, we cannot definitely tell; 
however, both Abascal and Padilla, and later Torres Bueno, 
suggested that this was, indeed, the case.30
According to the critics and detractors of 
Synarchism, the Movement was mainly financed by Fascist 
and Falangist sources, provided by the Axis powers, Spain, 
and the commercial interests of these nations in Mexico. 
This opinion was sustained by the Mexican left, through 
its charismatic standard bearer, Vicente Lombardo 
Toledano, the CTM, and its newspaper El Popular, and by 
some sectors of the government, the PKM and its official 
organ El Nacional.31 In the United States, this opinion 
was spread by American journalists working in Mexico, such 
as Betty Kirk, Margaret Shedd, Allan Chase, etc., for whom 
the UNS was a front for Nazi penetration, part of a 
"fifth-column conspiracy11.32
Despite these allegations we could find no evidence 
that any substantial proof was ever submitted. The First 
Secretary of the American Embassy noted in 1941:
"Many of the critics of the 
Sinarquista movement in Mexico assume 
that the movement must have large 
financial resources. Sometimes they 
go as far to insinuate that the 
resources of the organization come 
from sources that are inimical to 
democratic institutions. A careful 
analysis of the situation, however, 
will show that Sinarquismo has very 
little money [... ] The national office 
of the Sinarquista movement is greatly 
handicapped by lack of funds [. .. ] Many
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of its workers are contributing their 
time voluntarily and are depending on 
their families [... ] "33
IV. The Synarchist Programme
The Synarchist Movement opposed the agrarian reform 
as it had been carried out by the government? but, short 
of using violence - which it rejected - it decided to 
endure in silence until other solutions were available, 
hoping that the Movement would become sufficiently strong 
in the future to negotiate with the government the 
readjustment of its agrarian policy. The Movement had a 
more immediate problem? namely, how to save from despair 
the thousands of Synarchist farmers who had lost 
everything? how to keep them interested in the Union and 
at the same time ask them to continue the struggle.
In order to deal with this difficulty, the Movement 
drafted a programme of activities which attempted to 
channel the desires for change manifested by the peasants, 
by proposing concrete actions to be carried out at village 
level. This programme appeared as the Synarchist 
contribution to the government's new policy on 
agriculture, the President's "battle for production" of 
1941, set to satisfy the requirements of the countries at 
war. It was, indeed, the policy of "National Unity" which 
attracted Synarchists and encouraged them to wait.34
In his 1941 address to Congress, Avila Camacho 
exhorted the workers to work more and to trust the Law: to 
abide by the law that their leaders ignored: the moral law
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to choose their leaders among honest men. He reminded 
them:
"Neither the employers nor the workers 
should forget that they are, first of 
all, Mexicans and that above class 
divisions there is the unity of the 
Fatherland."35
Synarchists understood the necessity to stall and to 
remain within the policy of "national unity" that the 
President advocated which, in fact, coincided with 
Synarchist ideology. Among the propositions contained in 
the programme presented to the Synarchist National 
Committee, the following are worth mentioning:
"We will create new population 
centres, like the ones already 
established in Lower California and 
Sonora, by moving families to the 
fertile lands of the country, so that 
they exploit them and produce the 
goods that the Mexican people demands; 
We will cooperate in the construction 
of bridle paths (caminos vecinales) 
and in the foundation of rural and 
urban schools, especially in the 
Indian communities?
We will go on fighting for the 
pacification of the countryside, so 
that we can all devote our efforts to 
cultivate the land and yield the 
necessary to sustain us?
We will strive to increase production 
at all levels until Mexico attains 
self-sufficiency and ceases to depend 
from abroad [... ]1,36
Several considerations were necessary to implement 
the Synarchist programme:
"The 'defensas rurales' must be 
disarmed? the only way to establish 
again peace and security in the
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fields; or else, to barrack them and 
turn them into true military corps. 
The ej idal executive committees must 
be freely elected by the peasants; the 
will of the majority must be 
respected, and the said committees 
must be designated with absolute 
independence from political leaders;
Severe punishment must be applied to 
communist agitators who, by virtue of 
occupying government posts, resort to 
official force to despoil ejidatarios 
of their lands. The plot of land 
owned by each man must be declared 
untouchable, and, since it is his only 
heritage, it is an unspeakable crime 
to deprive him of it;
Disarming the reserves, securing land 
tenure and independent rural 
institutions must permit the 
allocation of credit for rural 
ventures, which is the only way to 
revive land production;
The establishment of positive 
democracy in our Fatherland, starts in 
the Municipio [... ] ”37
These points were discussed and analyzed more 
extensively at the "Congreso de Labradores" (13-15 August 
1942), by 104 delegates representing 200,000 Synarchist 
peasants. The participants were asked to consider and to 
put forward solutions to several issues; such as, 
alcoholism and other vices that ravaged the countryside; 
dealing with the "agrarian reserves”; obtaining credit for 
Synarchist farmers; ensuring that each peasant household 
obtained a plot of land of its own; the establishment of 
the foundations of rural health; improvement of farming 
techniques; the establishment of rural schools and 
elementary education.38
The conclusions of the Congress gathered, in fact, 
the principal aspirations outlined in the programme of May
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1942, stressing the right of every peasant to own a piece 
of land, and to be morally and materially assisted in 
order to come out of their poverty.
The Congress organized a Farmers' Union, the "Union 
de Labradores Mexicanos" to implement its conclusions, 
which, as it made clear, would be completely separate from 
politics, and would comprise legal, technical and 
financial departments.39
It is important to note that in order to put into 
practice these ideas, it was essential to pacify the 
countryside; yet, the solution depended on the government 
and not on Synarchism. But, by declaring that the 
Farmers' Union would be divorced from politics, the 
National Committee was actually depriving it of the power 
to exert pressure on the Government. It contented itself 
with the expectation of eventual changes which it believed 
were independent from its will - the influence of the 
moderate faction of the UNS leadership was obviously 
behind this. On the other hand, it directed its militants 
to participate in organization activities at the local 
level that could help improve the living conditions of the 
communities, without trying to control decisions at the 
national level.
Thus, the UNS limited itself to a series of specified 
measures that frequently conflicted with the lack of 
goodwill of the local caciques.
What did it achieve? For an indication, we refer to 
the colonization scheme for Lower California and Sonora. 
Suffice it to say that the Synarchists saw in this venture
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a way to prove to the government and to their detractors 
their ability to solve the agrarian problem of Mexico. 
They concentrated a lot of their energies on it, but the 
results, as we have noted, did not match their 
expectations.
They also had a special interest in the foundation of 
rural schools. Undoubtedly, Synarchist endeavours 
undertaken in this field, after 1942, are one of the least 
known and most difficult aspects to comprehend. Later on 
it constituted the Synarchist response to the literacy 
campaign launched by the government in 1944. To that end, 
they elaborated school programmes and set in place an 
organization in 1945.40 These schools were for the most 
part unknown to the authorities and El Sinarquista rarely 
mentioned their existence lest the authorities intervened.
Nevertheless, all Synarchist contributions, whatever 
their merit, inevitably came up against one inescapable 
reality: Synarchists were excluded from agrarian reform, 
despite the fact that many had lost their lands and found 
themselves reduced to pauperization. Wherefore, one 
wonders what was the aim of these measures: either to
solve effectively a problem that could only have a 
solution at the national level, or, paradoxically, to 
maintain the considerable mass of discontented peasants 
non-political and passive?
To accuse the Synarchists of standing up for the 
hacendados, as the Left maintained, would be debatable, to 
say the least. Admittedly, by defending the right to 
private property, by demanding the non-apportionment of
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small properties, and by opposing collectivization, the 
Movement effectively took responsibility for the interests 
of the large estate-owners. Nevertheless, after closer 
examination, it was not so much this type of farming 
concern that Synarchism defended, than a programme of 
economic development which the revolutionary regime soon 
made its own (after Cardenas): in fact, by advocating the 
formation of a landed bourgeoisie, by expecting to make 
the small property a source of economic wealth, and by 
preventing peasant demands from taking the form of armed 
rebellion, Synarchism fought, paradoxically, to make 
positive the results of the agrarian reform. As for the 
peasant masses, they had not changed their original 
demands: land and "municipio libre".
1. Municipio
It is interesting to attempt an approach to the theme 
of municipio by outlining two clearly defined criteria. 
The first - and the one upheld by Synarchism - corresponds 
to the jus naturae school of law, which conceives it as a 
natural entity. The other corresponds to the legalistic 
school which grants the State the means to create it. In 
this case, it is the task of the lawmaker to establish, by 
means of positive rules, its activities and determine the 
requirements that the Municipio must satisfy so as to 
grant them legal recognition. In this sense, the 
Municipio is a legal person of public law, instituted by 
the Constitution and regulated by the law as a territorial 
entity of the republic.
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According to the Diccionario de la Real Academia
Espanola, a municipo is: "a group of people living on the 
same territorial jurisdiction, ruled by a municipal 
government (ayuntamiento) with regard to its local 
interests.” This is understood as a corporation made up 
of an Alcalde (mayor) and several Concejales (aldermen) 
with the purpose of honourably governing a community. 
Professor Carlos Mouchet alleges that the Municipio is:
”a natural society, intermediate 
between the family and the State, and 
coexistent with these two. To 
consider it only as the creation of 
the legislator, means denying its true 
nature and the inherent ends that it 
must fulfil.41
Communal needs determine the function that pertains 
to the municipio, that is, to protect the rights and 
promote the development of all its members; to regulate 
relations between families and organizations? to look 
after general welfare, advancing the intellectual, moral 
and material well-being of all. In general terms, the 
municipio should attend to all the activities that surpass 
lower administrative entities, on which the common good 
depends (e.g., public education, urban planning, etc.)
Consequently, the municipio ought to have the faculty 
to charge citizens with fair taxes, according to their 
possibilities and to the requirements of the common good. 
So that the municipio can accomplish its role as promoter 
and custodian of the common good, it must have autonomy. 
Municipal autonomy comprises two things: the right for the 
municipal community to elect its "ayuntamiento” (municipal
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government) and, the freedom of action and of management 
over the municipal funds. Municipal autonomy does not 
only mean the right the inhabitants of the municipality 
have to elect their own authorities - a generally accepted 
principle - but also the faculty to set the politico- 
administrative organization of the Municipio, and to 
determine the powers and the sphere of action of the local 
government, in harmony with the powers of the state 
government.
Synarchism advocated the municipio libre; it strove 
to win municipal autonomy, whereby the inhabitants of each 
municipality designated, in freedom, and without outside 
intervention, their local governments (ayuntamientos) - 
free of dubious promises or deals, to serve the municipal 
community for its own good. The financial resources of 
the municipio should be for the benefit of taxpayers and 
not the patrimony of caciques.42
That these social strata supported Synarchism and 
consequently stood up for a new bourgeoisie, can be 
readily explained: the Movement expressed their deepest 
desire. This did not imply, in practice, that they paid 
no heed to their current situation? they accepted the 
ejido plot in the expectation that it would be turned, 
eventually, into effective property.
Indeed, despite claims made to the contrary, 
Synarchist ideology did not try to keep the masses out of 
the ejido and to take away the benefits of the reform? 
instead, it infiltrated the very core of the agrarian 
revolution by winning over its beneficiaries. If that had
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not been the case, the Agrarian Department would not have 
devoted so much energy to exclude the Synarchists from the 
Reform? it would not have persecuted the many small 
peasants who were "wrong" to expect that the ejido plot 
would become the rightful patrimony of the peasant family.
For all that, how reactionary really were Synarchist 
peasants in the rural ambit of 1940 Mexico? The success 
of the Movement within the ejido points to a different 
conclusion. In the end, the leaders of the UNS were not 
completely mistaken in suggesting that the great majority 
of ejidos would turn Synarchist if freed from the control 
of leaders and caciques? on account that the Revolution 
had not succeeded in giving the rural world a mystique and 
a solid ideology that allowed for the transformation of 
the countryside. The mystique existed only at the 
intellectual level, among the agraristas that surrounded 
Cardenas and not among the agrarian agents who were 
responsible for implementing the reform.
Moreover, discussions about ideological issues 
(collectivization vs individual concerns) often escaped 
the grasp of the majority of the ejidatarios who 
experienced the Reform and who discovered, instead, the 
cupidity of the executive committees and other caciques in 
charge of land distribution who, by their attitude, took 
away any social meaning from that distribution. They had 
been told that the hacendados were exploiters and that 
they were the "social defenses"? however, the peasants 
noticed that the new leaders, who shared their condition 
and often their beliefs, exploited them just as much and
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used the arms at their disposal not to protect but to kill 
them.
V. Synarchism and labour
In the opinion of the Synarchists the social policy 
of the Revolution was blameworthy, for it had caused the 
political and economic disorder and the impoverishment of 
the Nation. Architect of the Popular Front, Cardenas 
brought the union bosses into the PRM. That was not a 
measure conceived to defend the "true interests” of the 
proletariat, they remarked, because the CTM was simply a 
toy in the hands of the government, like the "red 
battalions” that Carranza had organized to combat Zapata*s 
"hordes". The government protected the workers but at the 
cost of their ideological independence.43
The Synarchist view was that the ideology imposed on 
the working class was based on the false and dangerous 
Marxist theory which:
"if it continued to subdue the working 
masses, it would inevitably lead them 
to foreign subservience, to national 
poverty and to the loss of fundamental 
values. "44
Synarchist doctrine repudiated the principle of the 
class struggle for it was false and tendentious. It 
asserted the natural necessity of cooperation among 
classes, according to a higher principle of justice, for 
the greatness and the strength of the nation. National 
prosperity meant the welfare of all Mexicans; the enemies 
of Mexico were the enemies of the Mexican worker. Foreign 
and international forces were the cause of the misery of
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the workers and of the backwardness of the national 
industry.45
The Marxist assumption that all the benefits of the 
employers and the interests of the shareholders were 
uniquely the product of the workers' labour, labour that 
was not remunerated, and hence exploited from them, was 
considered by Synarchism as an undermining theory because 
capital had the right to a share of the profits, a just 
reward for the risks incurred.
In the opinion of the Synarchists, for all the 
unions' claim to champion the proletarian revolution, the 
CTM did not, in fact, fight so much to improve the lot of 
the workers, as for the triumph of world Communism and the 
establishment of Socialism in Mexico. With the aid of 
Cardenas and his administration, which tolerated their 
activities, they multiplied the number of strikes,46 with 
no apparent reason, awaiting the moment to trigger off a 
general strike, the signal of the "red revolution". 
Besides, the social advantages obtained after each strike 
were not desirable; they only contributed to price 
increases, which affected, in the first place, the workers 
themselves. In addition to inflation, social disorders 
disrupted production, which left national producers 
incapable of fulfilling their commitments and forced upon 
the Nation greater dependency on the United States.
Manuel Torres Bueno defined the Synarchist view:
"If there is a true defender of the 
worker, the peasant, and the citizen, 
that defender is Synarchism. We do 
not want to foment thereby new
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upheaval; we do not want 10,000 
strikes per year, like under the 
previous regime. Let it be know that 
we only fight for the benefit of the 
working classes, which is the supreme 
interest of the nation. We will 
follow closely the path that leads to 
the unity of the people, so that they 
make the decision to fight for their 
freedom, a freedom that is not an 
empty work. We are freedom fighters, 
and since it is imperative, at the 
present time, to elucidate the 
concepts and to specify the ideas, we 
affirm that the war in progress cannot 
produce a New Order; we profess that 
this war is not the start but the end 
of a cycle of mechanization, 
mercantilism, and materialism."47
The belief that the factories should be surrendered 
to the workers was demagogic. The Synarchists cited the 
case the railways which Cardenas handed over to them. The 
result of workers1 management was catastrophic: the number 
of accidents rose constantly and eventually the company 
went bankrupt. This was not an isolated case, they 
hastened to point out, all the concerns entrusted to the 
workers incurred a similar fate.48
The Synarchist Movement stated that by defending the 
interests of the Nation, they were not attacking the 
workers; they were, instead, adducing the truth. Because 
the workers were the slaves of the union bosses, whose 
sole aim was to make a fortune - as was patently clear in 
the case of Morones - and to seek power, they placed 
everything (goods, as well as their own persons) in the 
service of the government. Under the threat of expulsion 
from their jobs, the workers were compelled to renounce 
their deepest convictions, their Catholic faith. They 
were forced to march on labour day and on any political
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occasion? they were not allowed to adhere to the union of 
their choice, and so forth. They warned the workers that 
it would be naive to think the introduction of a socialist 
government would significantly alter this state of affairs 
and:
"[that] wealth would fall into your 
hands. It will not [...], but it will 
end up in the hands of a new 
capitalist class: that of the leaders, 
the directors and the State itself."
Because of their condemnation of the unions, 
Synarchists were often accused of siding with "the enemies 
of the people". They denied this accusation and asserted 
that Synarchism desired that the workers preserved all the 
advantages gained "despite the Revolution", and that they 
secured for ever a guaranteed minimum wage, and a share 
in the firm's profits.50 They added:
"We are friends with the workers and 
with their defence organization [...]. 
We aver it necessary to organize all 
our workers in trade unions [... ] so 
that united they defend and improved 
themselves. We vigorously condemn 
man's exploitation. We have condemned 
hypocritical Liberalism, which 
surrenders the worker, weak, isolated 
and defenceless, to the greedy 
capitalist [...] In the Liberal 
countries, in the capitalist 
countries, everything is anarchy and 
everybody dominated with force. The 
capitalist dominates the worker with 
his money and the workers exploit the 
entrepreneur with their strikes and 
stoppages, while the government 
remains impassive, unable to restore 
order and justice."51
In the Synarchist state, all abuses would be dealt
with:
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"The yoke of the treacherous leaders 
would be thrown off by the strength of 
the working masses, inspired by the 
principles of their faith, their 
tradition, the brotherhood of classes 
[... ] to open ways for a fresh, 
liberating and heroic trades union 
movement."52
Synarchism would destroy the principle of hatred that 
had guided revolutionary trade unionism and introduce:
"A trades union movement that will be 
the voluntary and permanent union of 
all workers for the just defence of 
their interests, without having to be 
hostile to capital [... ] A movement 
which will devote its strength to the 
construction of the material and 
spiritual greatness of the Fatherland, 
and against the enemies of Mexico and 
the Mexican worker. The myth of the 
class struggle will collapse before 
the beautiful and fruitful reality of 
cooperation and harmony between the 
classes."53
Despite the attempts to develop an ideology for the 
working masses, Synarchism did not have the success it 
expected in that field. The large groups of affiliated 
trades unions remained closed to this doctrine and UNS 
penetration was limited to a few independent and minor 
unions.54 The leaders of the Movement blamed the failure 
of their efforts on the closed shop, which gave union 
bosses the power to expel workers recalcitrant of union 
discipline. The strict surveillance of union
representatives over the political thinking of the workers 
they controlled, constituted, in fact, an effective 
barrier against the advance of right-wing ideologies in 
labour circles.
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Many Synarchists experienced this at first hand and 
ended up losing their jobs. For instance, in December 
1941, at Guadalajara, twenty one workers of "Cerveceria 
Modelo” were sacked for demanding the election of a new 
union committee?65 in February 1942, a Synarchist worker 
of ”La Moderna” tobacco company of Monterrey, was expelled 
and lost his job; he was reinstated in his job after the
• • • • KflArbitration tribunal granted him an "amparo". In July 
1943, the Union of Textile Workers of Jalisco declared 
that it would not tolerate the presence of Synarchist 
workers and that it would have them expelled.57
It is worth emphasizing, however, that more than the 
vigilance of the leaders it was the hold the Government 
had on the unions which explained, in the final analysis, 
the failure of Synarchism to conquer the labour world.
VI. Synarchism and Catholicism
That the UNS had nothing to do with the Catholic 
hierarchy, was the result of the bitter experience of the 
religious conflict of the twenties. The Movement, in 
fact, never had official ecclesiastical advisors, or 
chaplains. The leaders only had contacts with the bishops 
in a private capacity (this did not prevent the Archbishop 
of Mexico from playing a key role in the removal of 
Abascal from Lower California, over whom he had 
considerable personal influence58) . The attitude of the 
hierarchy towards Synarchism varied according to the place 
since Catholic Action was often at odds with a movement 
that stole its executives and infiltrated its
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organizations.
The UNS talked of establishing a "Christian 
democracy” in Mexico, "a Christian social order", 
radically different from the prevailing "revolutionary 
disorder", rejecting Communism and Liberalism. This was 
the language of intransigent social Catholicism.
The Synarchist Movement confronted the "evil" forces 
of the revolution; refused the anti-Christian notion of 
class struggle, as well as socioeconomic liberalism, which 
drove towards social and national disintegration. 
Synarchists advocated the corporative organization of 
Christian society, according to the principles and 
traditions of social justice and charity. As the enemy of 
Communism and Liberalism, Synarchism commended the 
"Christian Social Order of Christ the King".
To start a new Catholic City, making the state 
Christian, was the aspiration of the political factions 
inside the UNS; for the others, the old "Base" and its 
followers, headed by Santacruz, they wanted first to 
rebuild a Christian society and people, because, in their 
view, institutions followed morality. Thus, two different 
models were in confrontation, neither of which renounced 
to the idea of a Christian rebirth.
This current of thought of intransigent Catholicism, 
arose from the French Revolution claiming to be counter­
revolutionary; it asserted itself with Pope Gregor|»an XVI 
and grew in scale with Pope Pius IX (QUANTA CURA, 
Syllabus).
Synarchism followed this tradition: refusal of the
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Reform (both Protestant and Mexican), the Revolution 
(French, Russian, Mexican), individualism, rationalism and 
secularization.
This form of Catholicism which condemned commerce and 
money, left a significant mark in the Mexico of the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, and, like elsewhere, 
generated social Catholicism, a critique of one world and 
the extolling of another, a utopia of a world corrupted by 
revolution that an incarnate religion would regenerate.
Tradition was glorified, the present rejected? there 
was a feeling of anti-capitalist nostalgia for an 
idealised past society, the ideal of an "organized" 
society, "organic", made up of "corps", a yearning for the 
Christian Hispanic empire, which was succeeded by an 
America divided in nations. Social and ultramontane, 
these Mexican Catholics resembled, like brothers, the 
French and Belgian of the Young Right who became 
Christian-democrats, the Italians, Germans and Austrians, 
all Christian-social, who were against Socialism 
understood as the cost of Liberalism. The implication was 
the introduction of religion in all aspects of life and 
the institution of the social rule of Christ. It 
corresponded to the Neo-Thomism of theologians, to a 
return to the Middle Ages, which they praised and extolled 
the social organization, and which provided them with the 
fundamental notion of "the common good".69
The search for a third way, opposed to Liberalism and 
to Socialism, accounted for the ambiguity of these 
movements, and Synarchism was no exception, it was at the
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same time a movement, a party, of unions and deeds, a vast 
"Christian social order" which resembled the carlo- 
populism of European Catholic social legitimists:
"Synarchism, like the Cristero 
movement, was a kind of Mexican 
Carlist crusade, essentially romantic, 
rooted in tradition, and feeding on 
the myth of ancient Spanish glory, 
with which its adherents identified 
themselves. Its romanticism was 
manifest in many ways. The ideals to 
which its young men were dedicated 
were poverty, obedience, and loyalty - 
- loyalty to the Catholic Church and 
to the "true" Mexico, not the 
"spurious" Mexico of the Revolution, 
which they confidently told themselves 
they would destroy. The new Mexico 
was to be an Augustine City of God on 
earth, born in blood and suffering."60
Synarchism could be defined as a lay Catholic 
movement corresponding to a Catholic revival from which it 
fed, and which characterized the Mexico of that period.
On this basis, it won the sympathy of American 
Catholics, who defended it in their press organs against 
the accusations of Fascism.61 The majority of American 
Catholics were conservative and viewed the Synarchist 
social programme favourably, in the tradition of the 
encyclicals RERUM NOVARUM and QUADRAGESIMO ANNO. The 
religious fervour of this mass movement, the enthusiastic 
youth and the unselfishness of its leaders, their concern 
for the poor and forgotten masses, all looked like 
Catholic Action and did not frighten them, unlike the 
Cristeros. Even liberal Catholics were, in part, 
persuaded? especially because the adversaries of the UNS 
were recruited from the Protestants. The UNS benefited,
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therefore, from the fact that it appeared as the popular 
response to the anti-Catholic aspects of the Mexican 
Revolution, born and conceived in the climate of religious 
persecution of the thirties.62
VII. Synarchism and the defence of the Church
By pursuing the reform of Article 3 of the 
Constitution, Synarchists personally resumed the defence 
of the Church, although they remained discreet about it 
for a long time.
If the oath taken by the "legionnaires” brought to 
the fore the struggle for freedom of worship, the 
Synarchist Movement, on the other hand, made sure that it 
was not mistaken with an organization in the service of 
the Church.
Consequently, denunciation of religious persecution 
and of anticlerical legislation only appeared at the end 
of accusations addressed to the Revolution and always with 
extreme caution.
Thus, in its reproaches levelled at socialist 
education, the right of the Church in this domain was 
never alluded; similarly, any mention of the cristeros was 
virtually absent from its history columns.
It was at the end of 1943 that El Sinarquista printed 
its first direct attack on Article 3:
"Article 3 must be repealed!
We want the reform of Article 3 of the 
Constitution. We demand the Catholic 
Church has not only a decent status in 
Mexico [...] but a privileged 
situation, as she justly deserves it
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by right, because it was the Church 
who built our nation.”
In Mexico, in contradiction with our 
background as a people, the Catholic 
Church has been persecuted and obliged 
to live in the narrow limits of the 
temple and the sacristy; she has been 
denied even of the right to exercise 
charity; she is not recognized a legal 
personality; priests, and in fact only 
those of the Catholic persuasion, are 
deprived of their prerogatives as 
citizens [... ] despite the fact that 
the entire country professes the 
Catholic faith."63
Declarations such as these led the left to no longer 
stigmatize the Movement as Fascist, but (now return to its 
original accusation of "a restored conservative party."64
Manuel Torres Bueno issued the following statement in 
relation to that accusation:
"1. the Catholic Church clergy has, 
nor had, absolutely no participation 
in the activities of Synarchism.
2. We are not in the habit of asking 
for advice, or even for guidelines to 
any minister, when it is a question of 
determining our Synarchist activity as 
citizens. In purely civilian and 
political matters we, and only we, 
decide of our affairs.
3. The Mexican clergy had until now 
maintained the position outlined by 
the Archbishop of Mexico, totally 
abstaining from intervening in our 
affairs, yet having deep respect for 
the free civic-political activity of 
each Synarchist.
4. Synarchism is FUNDAMENTALLY 
political action, where the Church 
cannot, and does not want to take the 
slightest participation.
The only relationship between 
Catholic priests and Synarchists is 
the one dictated by our religion, in 
taking part in the sacraments and in
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the individual direction of our 
conscience in the metaphysical order.
5. We Synarchists are totally 
responsible for our action and we do 
not admit that the clergy be made 
responsible for a conduct that is 
exclusively the product of our 
innermost convictions.
6. Synarchists are determined to 
prevent that once again in the history 
of Mexico a struggle that is 
essentially political in nature, be 
given a religious connotation.65
Indeed, after the 1929 "agreements”, the hierarchy 
refused to give official support to the new organization. 
Officially, therefore, and at the public level, there was 
no contact between the ecclesiastic authorities and the 
leaders of the Synarchist Movement.
It is worth recalling that the hierarchy emerged 
divided from the Cristero war, maintaining very different 
stances vis-a-vis the UNS. In general, the prelates who 
were opposed to the League, did not favour the activities 
of the Movement. Monsignor Placencia y Moreira, bishop of 
Zacatecas, summed up this view:
"Synarchism is a political movement 
with the same tendencies as the 
National League for the Defence of 
Religious Freedom; the only difference 
between the two is that Synarchism is 
not talking at the moment of armed 
movement, yet, the tendencies are the 
same. We will not get involved in 
this, but if someone asks us, we will 
tell him to abstain”.66
Nevertheless, relations with the Church played a 
significant role in the development of the Movement, in 
particular, the ties that linked the members of the
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Supreme Council of the Base to the hierarchy. This was 
revealed in an internal report by Manuel Torres Bueno at 
the time of the split with the Base. In this report, he 
alluded to the relation that the Base had with the 
ecclesiastical authorities which, not only advised the 
supreme leaders, but also intervened directly in the
• 67internal problems of the Movement.
Monsignor O'Grady reported in his memorandum 
regarding Synarchism that before the movement was launched 
as a public movement, the leaders were able to secure 
assurances from the Church that there would be no 
interference with their activities. The Church
authorities were willing to regard Synarchism as a civic 
movement. It was a lay movement operated by laymen. The 
Church would not interfere with it except in the matter of 
doctrine. This gave the leaders the autonomy that they 
felt was needed for a real national movement.68
He observed that from the beginning, the leaders of 
the Church in Mexico had not shown any disposition to 
interfere with the Movement. Most of them were friendly 
to the UNS. Some, however, had many reservations with 
regard to it. For instance, the director of Catholic 
Action in the diocese of Leon was very strongly opposed to 
Synarchism. He felt that it interfered seriously with the 
Catholic Action programme in the diocese. The Coadjutantj 
Archbishop of Puebla, the national director of Catholic 
Action in Mexico, also felt that Synarchism interfered 
with Catholic Action. Nevertheless, he stressed:
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"While Synarchism is not under the 
control of the Catholic Hierarchy of 
Mexico, it is a Catholic movement. In 
fact, one might be justified in saying 
that it bears the earmarks of a new 
Catholic revival that will reach all 
the people of Mexico. Synarchism is 
at pains to emphasize that it is 
interested basically in the masses of 
the city and the country.”69
Undoubtedly, the prelates considered intervening in 
a private capacity. Luis Maria Martinez, Archbishop of 
Mexico, personally knew the Abascal family for a long time 
and he was instrumental in persuading Salvador Abascal to 
relinquish command of Maria Auxiliadora; although he did
70not hesitate to do so ”m  the name of the Church". 
Father Madrigal, the Archbishop*s envoy, told Abascal that 
his departure was in the interest of the Church and for 
the salvation of the people at large.71
At the local level, the clergy played a similar role, 
and perhaps even more so. Officially the position of the 
Church was one of reserve and non-involvement.
Nevertheless, the local clergy did not renounce advising 
its parishioners. Several testimonies coincide to suggest 
that in many villages, it was the priest who decided the
fate of the Movement in his jurisdiction. If he was
favourable, Catholics would proceed to join up? if he was 
against it, the task of the Synarchist propagandist was 
considerably more difficult.72
It is worth emphasizing, however, that if the UNS 
progressively adopted a more open stand in favour of the 
Church, by condemning, in retrospect, religious
persecution and anticlerical legislation, the hierarchy,
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for its part, strove to dissociate itself from the 
Synarchist cause. The more aggressive El Sinarquista was 
in its condemnation of the revolution, the more it 
reasserted its respect for the government of Avila 
Camacho.
With regard to the Synarchist demand to reform 
Article 130 of the Constitution, Monsignor Luis Maria 
Martinez declared:
"The Catholic Church in Mexico is not 
related to either the PAN or the UNS, 
or any other organization of political 
or civic nature, even though they are 
composed of Catholic and have Catholic 
tendencies, because she has frequently 
asserted and proved with her conduct, 
her firm and sincere commitment to 
stay in the spiritual domain.
Consequently, the Catholic Church is 
not responsible for what the said 
organizations express or realize, nor 
does she stand by the opinions or 
tendencies of Catholic writers or 
speakers since the true voice of the 
Church is expressed through her 
official organs.
The Catholic Church in Mexico has 
accepted the present legal situation, 
not because she does not vividly wish 
the disappearance of a number of legal 
restrictions which limit at present 
Catholic activities, but she respects 
the reality where she lives and knows 
that all vital processes, both in 
societies and in individuals, are 
realized through a slow and methodical 
evolution.
The Catholic Church in Mexico is 
prepared, as she has often 
demonstrated in practice, to 
collaborate, honestly and effectively, 
with the Civil Government, for the 
good of the Fatherland, in the field 
that concerns her. In this difficult 
hour when Mexico is involved in a 
transcendental war that will mark a 
new direction in human History, I
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considered it untimely and anti- 
patriotic to provoke discussions that 
divide the Mexican people [... ] We 
must concentrate our energies and 
enthusiasm to strengthen National 
Unity, as the President of the 
Republic has keenly requested, which 
is the key to the success, the welfare 
and happiness of our Fatherland.1173
This statement marked a definite turning point in 
Church-Synarchist relations. The hierarchy was relatively 
satisfied with the status quo with the government and did 
not intend to resume a dispute, preferring to keep at 
arm's length an ally that had become too embarrassing.
Circumstances were no longer the same in 1944 as they 
had been 1926: the government did not need anticlericalism 
to unite the PRM. Extricating itself from the alliance 
with the Left, it sought the support of the propertied 
classes. In this context, Synarchist activity was 
condoned because it favoured the reversal of alliances 
planned by the government.
President Avila Camacho belonged to the moderate 
tendency of the Mexican Revolution, a group whose 
interpretation of the objectives and ultimate aims of the 
revolution varied significantly with what was orthodox 
during the days of Cardenas. And it is in the nature of 
moderate governments that they adhered to the middle of 
the road only to the extent that roughly equivalent 
pressures from both sides operate to keep them there.
Cardenas' left-wing programme, especially in its 
relations with the Church and with foreign oil companies, 
alienated large sectors of American opinion. Yet, under 
the Good Neighbour policy the two countries were able to
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settle their difficulties. On the one hand, the United 
States exercised forbearance in its reaction to the 
expropriation of petroleum properties; on the other, the 
Government of Avila Camacho introduced a period of pause 
and consolidation in Mexican internal policy. The 
contrast between the regime of President Avila Camacho and 
that of President Cardenas lay in a slowing up, a 
consolidation of the revolutionary programme, rather Ithan 
a swing to the Right.
The principal keynote to the Avila Camacho 
Administration was its emphasis upon national unity. The 
President seems to have played a waiting game with labour, 
hoping to align it eventually with his administration in 
a middle-of-the-road course.
Synarchism attacked Communism, and those elements of 
the rdgime that it believed were connected with it (e.g., 
the CTM). Certain groups in the Administration (Maximino 
Avila Camacho, Octavio Vejar Vazquez, among others) 
appreciated the Synarchist attacks against Communism. The 
President protected the UNS to some extent (for instance, 
in the summer of 1941, he had found it necessary to 
denounce Synarchism as "exotic” and separatist because it 
opposed his efforts at national unity. However, later on, 
he announced that he had accepted the offer of the 
Synarchists to colonize Lower California). The reason for 
this could be that the Administration desired to balance 
the fanatical leftists element in Mexico with a fanatical 
rightist element. In other words, it seems as if the 
Government was taking the stand that the UNS offered a
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protection to the Government since it balanced the ultra­
leftist factions in Mexico.
By 1944, however, the Administration had succeeded in 
introducing a series of reforms that managed to hold the 
left in check;75 making it unnecessary to play the 
Synarchist card. The Labour code was revised by 
forbidding illegal "lightning" strikes. It was a 
resounding victory for the Government over extremist 
unions? it stipulated the exact terms under which strikes 
might be called, and established heavy penalties for 
violations. The reforms in the Agrarian Law linked the 
peasant more closely to the soil - by giving individual 
title to the land he worked on the ejido. It did not 
abolish the ejidos but gave encouragement to the principle 
of private ownership. The reforms in the Petroleum Law 
maintained intact the needs of national sovereignty and 
national control over national resources, but opened the 
field to Mexican initiative. The reforms in the railways 
were to save the roads from bankruptcy.
By and large, Synarchists had opposed all the 
policies of Cardenas which they viewed as Marxist 
inspired. The change of direction instigated by Avila 
Camacho did not entirely calm down their progressive 
disposition. Whilst El Sinarquista approved of the 
abandonment of socialist education and the slowing down of 
collectivization, and the removal of Lombardo Toledano 
from the leadership of the CTM (1 March 1941) was 
perceived as a positive sign; criticism of the government, 
on the other hand, was more poignant as the fate of Mexico
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became increasingly more bound to that of the liberal 
democracies in the world conflict, and as it accepted, too 
readily, American economic "imperialism" by entering into 
what they described as "humiliating trade treaties". By 
an agreement concluded in July 1941, the United States 
undertook to buy the entire surplus of Mexican strategic 
minerals, and in November a series of agreements were 
signed for the friendly settlement of all major questions 
at issue between the two countries. It was then announced 
that a reciprocal trade treaty would be negotiated, that 
financial assistance would be given to Mexico to stabilize 
the peso, and the United States would purchase newly mined 
Mexican silver. Mexico agreed to make full settlement of 
general and agrarian claims by United States citizens and 
an arrangement was made for the settlement of the oil
• 76dispute.
All this ranting and raving at the government was 
not, however, without object. If the Synarchists were 
often blinded by their hate of the revolution, they, 
nonetheless, expressed the frustrations that the agrarian 
reform had bred in the peasant masses. The working 
classes, allied and protected by the government, were by 
this fact unable to take charge of the opposition, which 
came from a reactionary movement: that was the cause of 
its success.
VIII. Synarchism and Nationalism
Synarchists were ardent nationalists and, what is 
more, patriotic, claiming to be the exponents of Mexico in
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the face of all its enemies, internal as well as external.
Although the frontiers of the country were accepted, 
that did not mean that some irredentist element was not 
present; Synarchism worked on both sides of the border 
with sufficient success for the FBI to keep watch on it77 
and to be blamed for the "zoot-suiters” riots in Los 
Angeles (3 to 13 June 1943) ,78
Synarchism contended that Mexican-American and 
emigrant were thorough Mexicans and it undertook their 
defence in the United States. It mounted guard on the 
border and its dream to colonize Lower California 
corresponded to the desire to protect the region against 
American imperialism.
According to Synarchism, the people, second component 
of nationality, commingled with the UNS: they were both 
rtte °f mixed race, born of the fusion of the Indian and
the Spaniard of Hispanic culture and Catholic religion:
"The real Mexico does not lie in the 
cities. It is not in the Capital, in 
any case, alienated, americanised, 
false; nor is it in the cities, 
corrupted by the cinema, the 
nightclubs, the strident music, where 
life is faked and simulated. The 
reality of Mexico, the deep reality, 
the essence of our authentic being is 
found in the villages, in the hamlets, 
on the roads travelled by the Indian 
alone and before, by the missionary 
[... ]
The people were divided by bad 
leaders, foreign agents that preached 
them class struggle and hatred of 
Spain; they wanted to lead them to 
apostasy, essential precondition for 
assimilation by the United States."79
The cult of the national flag included all these
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themes? through the flag it was national unity which was 
celebrated, according to the thesis that intended to 
expunge class differences by the organic restructuring of 
the people.
Mexico, civilized by Spain and the 
Catholic Church, has a flag that was 
given to her after the war of 
Independence. This flag is green, 
white and red [. .. ] The three colours 
represent the CATHOLIC RELIGION, THE 
UNION OF ALL MEXICANS AND THE 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FATHERLAND".80
To hoist the flag was, above all, to denounce the 
enemy, the communist and American enemies. The black and 
red flag against the tricolour:
"We refuse all symbols foreign to our 
nationality. Neither the Nazi
swastika nor the Communist red star: 
Mexico has a symbol and he who does 
not defend it is a traitor [... ]1,81
"The red and black flag of the 
Communists represents black hatred, 
blood, because Communists do not like 
religion, nor the unity and 
independence of Mexico? that is why 
they raise this flag and want to 
substitute it for the tricolour flag. 
The Nazi flag with its twisted cross 
they called swastika, represents Nazi 
hatred of Christianity. Communists 
and Nazis are enemies of Mexico, they 
want to dominate the world and to 
finish Christianity, to subdue free 
people."82
Thus, Synarchists identified the flag with the 
nation, with the Fatherland, with Mexicaness 
("mexicanidad"): they turned it into a sacred symbol. In 
all their events, Synarchists waved hundreds of flags, 
which were at the same time the national banner and the
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flag of the Movement. Each time a new Synarchist group 
was formed, the militants received a flag in ceremony. 
The blood stained flag of Santa Cruz de Galeana and Celaya 
- the centre of Synarchism martyrdom - went round the 
entire country: flag and blood were intertwined.
Raising the national flag was an efficient way to say 
many things in a symbolic and precise manner; so much so 
that the government instituted a flag's day (24 February) 
so as not to be outmanoeuvred by Synarchism.
1. Synarchism and the United States
The kind of nationalism advocated by Synarchism was 
not held in check, nor was it restrained or silent? it 
crystallized on a foreign enemy: the United States? on the 
subject of which, resided the ambiguity of the Movement.
Some leaders, like Abascal and the majority of the 
militants, were violently and openly anti-American. 
Others made the same analysis that the government or the 
PAN did, preaching a policy of friendship with the United 
States.
"Synarchism is openly anti-American. 
Its ideology is diametrically opposed 
to the American ideals of liberty and 
democracy. Therefore, the Synarchists 
are bent upon preventing the further 
extension of American influence in 
Mexico. In order to arouse
chauvinistic sentiment against her 
northern neighbour, the Synarchists 
are reviving national resentment of 
historical wrongs, real and imaginary. 
The Mexican War of 1846 is played up 
as Mexico' s greatest national calamity 
and the United States is dubbed 'the 
invader'. Synarchist publications 
continually deplore the 'materialism' 
of American culture. American foreign 
policy is stamped vile Yankee
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imperialism1 and the efforts of 
American Protestant missionaries are 
decried as a manifestation of 
aggressive American politics,' 
designed to undermine Mexico*s 
national unity. Violently opposed to 
Pan-Americanism, the Synarchists are 
prone to emphasize that the United 
States is a country with different 
customs and traditions, with another 
religion and a strange language. On 
the other hand, the Spanish heritage 
is glorified and Pan-Hispanism is 
advocated as against Pan- 
Americanism”.83
Such was the language that the militants used. On 
the other hand, calls for Mexican-American friendship 
reflected the ideas and tactics of the Base.
2. The Synarchist mission
The spiritual unity of the Fatherland, the 
exploitation of the country's wealth for the greatest 
benefit of the Mexican people, the creation of a new 
society founded on the eternal principles of Christianity, 
the solution of the economic problems of the poor, such 
were the aims pursued by the Movement when it embarked on 
the colonization of Lower California. Inspired by the 
attitude of the missionaries and the soldiers, who were 
prepared to sacrifice everything for an objective.
"Synarchism is the anti-revolution, 
because the revolution is the anti- 
Fatherland.
1. The r e v o l u t i o n  is a 
disintegrating process which 
began with the American 
ambassador Poinsett84 in 1822 and 
reached its climax with the 
latest governments.
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2. It institutes a false division, 
bringing into conflict, 
deceitfully, revolution with 
reaction.
3. Synarchism brings National Unity .
4. Synarchism is not the reaction 
but the anti-revolution.
5. Synarchism is only the fighting 
instrument of the new 
generations ? it advocates the 
destruction of the Revolution and 
the restoration of the Christian 
order that the revolution has 
ruined.1,85
IX. The Synarchist Concept of the State: Christian Social 
Order
"Synarchism is struggling for the 
restoration of a Christian order, and 
liberal democracy, as well as Nazi- 
Fascism and Communism, is contrary to 
this order.t|86
By concentrating their efforts to censure 
contemporary systems, Synarchists took no care of 
specifying their concept of the State. Nevertheless, if 
we consider their criticism of the totalitarian regimes, 
as well as those of democracy, we can draw a portrait of 
the Synarchist state: the Christian Social Order.
In a pamphlet published by the organization, and 
written by Alfonso Trueba, in 1941, entitled Mexico-1960, 
contrast is drawn between the conditions anticipated by 
the Synarchist state of 1960 and those of the
• • • , 87revolutionary period during the forties. Allegedly, the 
successful passage from one state to the other would have 
been achieved by the dauntlessness of the Synarchist
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leaders, the “bravery of our soldiers", and the "torrents 
of blood shed in our epic struggle."
Mexico-1960 represents an already instituted 
Synarchist state working with improved capability.
In the Synarchist state, power lies in one single 
individual, probably the leader of the Movement. He would 
hold absolute power and the houses would only have an 
advisory role, although in this respect Synarchist thought 
is considerably ambiguous since they stressed the need for 
control of the executive by the legislature, so as to 
avoid the dangers of a dictatorship, while estimating it 
essential to concentrate all power in the hands of one 
individual. In any case, the existence of a congress was 
not in doubt: it would be made up of the representatives 
of the corporations. They drew their inspiration, in this 
respect, from XIX century right-wing political thinking; 
although this concept remained very vague in Synarchism.
One democratic institution would be maintained: the 
municipio, which according to Synarchism should be the 
basis of all the political and civil life of the Republic. 
Synarchists outlined very thoroughly the organization of 
this situation:
"Granted full political rights to the 
family, the group of these domiciled 
in a city elect the members that are 
to govern the municipio and take 
charge of the matters that concern 
them all. The head of each family 
disposes of a number of votes 
proportional to the importance of the 
household he directs. In this way, 
the municipal community designates the 
most honest and capable member to run 
the municipal government."89
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Unquestionably, it was an authoritarian government 
that the Synarchists wanted to introduce. All initiative 
would come from the head of the State who, working for the 
"common good", would impose all the measures he deemed 
necessary for the "salvation of the Fatherland". However, 
the authorities would allow, to a certain extent, 
political opposition in the independent press, as long as 
it did not threaten the common good nor did it harm 
national interests.90
The Christian Social Order would rest on three 
pillars: the Church, the Army, and the People.
In the Synarchist state, the Church would have a 
considerable role: guardian and protector of public
morality; she would be concerned with primary, secondary 
and higher education. She would recover her privileges, 
particularly the right to private property? and, she would 
work in close collaboration with the government. There 
would be harmony between the two powers:
"The Church and the State are two 
perfect and autonomous societies in 
their specific purposes. Within the 
Christian State which Synarchism 
advocates, they will both coordinate 
their efforts directed towards 
achieving the integral happiness of 
man, but respecting each other*s field 
of action."
The army would be the foundation of the regime, too. 
However, it would not be the oppressive arm, nor the 
instrument of the parties, but the strong arm protector of 
national integrity, created to serve the common good and 
to secure peace and the rule of Law. The army,
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domesticated, would be at the exclusive service of the 
civilian authorities.92
Lastly, the people would be the fundamental support 
of the State, since the entire policy of the government 
would have no other aim than their material and spiritual 
advancement.
The class struggle would disappear; and all patriots, 
united in the love of the Fatherland, would work in 
harmony for the development of their country.
Unions would be maintained but they would abandon the 
revolutionary struggle and would restrict themselves to 
defend the interests of the workers:
"Each worker belongs to the Synarchist 
labour union, a trade union
corporation created to defend the 
workers. Synarchist trade-unionism 
will be national. It will not be 
subject to any international 
organization. The reason for its 
existence shall be the benefit of the 
workers and the good of the country. 
In a word: Capital and labour shall be 
impelled by the drive to serve Mexico 
and to make her people more powerful, 
stronger and richer."93
With regard to the workers, the Synarchist state 
envisaged: a share in the profits obtained through the 
association of the labour and capital sectors? the 
creation of a savings system and social insurance; the 
establishment of schools and cultural centres for workers? 
in general, the paternalistic protection that the State 
gave to the workers would turn him into a more useful 
individual for the community, and would make him enjoy a 
more ordered, more wholesome and more placid life.94
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Moreover, capitalists would be brought to heel. 
Indeed, Alfonso Trueba wrote, for there to be social 
harmony, the bourgeoisie would not be allowed to exploit 
the proletariat:
"The capitalist world will be 
destroyed and the exploitation of one 
class by another will be a thing of 
the past”96
Trueba did not make it very clear whether the 
Synarchist state would nationalize private firms. It 
rather seems that the Synarchists envisaged limiting the 
powers of this class by forcing its members to 
redistribute a share of their profits to the workers, and 
by erecting a rigorous protectionist system, which would 
protect the home industry and prevent capital flight. The 
argument was that the propertied class, having to invest 
in a country closed to the invasion of foreign capital, 
would be in a position to lay the foundation of the 
economic development of the country.
In the new regime, Mexico would be a country of small 
and middle industries, so as to eliminate the economic and 
political power of the big concerns, which was tied to 
international capitalism.
At the same time that they would seek to harmonize 
capital-labour relations, Synarchists intended to sort out 
the agrarian question by creating a middle-landowning- 
bourgeoisie-class, which could broadly live on sufficient 
large concerns (twenty to fifty hectares): the "Granjas 
familiares".
To meet the demands for modernization that the
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agricultural sector would require, the Synarchist state 
would set up a credit system advantageous to the farmers. 
It would also devote considerable effort to the education 
of the peasant population. In the rural schools, the 
peasants would receive the technical education that would 
prepare them for a scientific exploitation of the land. 
Teams of specialists would travel the countryside 
explaining new techniques, etc.96
The State would also devote itself to the systematic 
utilization of the available agriculture resources of the 
country? it would undertake extensive irrigation works in 
the desert areas of the North, and would set up the 
infrastructure essential for the development of the still 
unexploited regions.
In order to effect their programme of reforms, the 
Synarchists counted on the voluntary and generous 
participation of the entire population. Thus, they were 
very interested in the means of propaganda (radio, cinema, 
press), that would permit the state to mobilize the 
masses; and contribute to what Trueba described as the
• • 07formation of "the new conscience".
By making full use of the radio network, the 
Synarchists intended to build morale and patriotism:
"to develop a sense of self-confidence 
in the Mexican and faith in his 
country; and to combat the unwarranted 
feeling of inferiority that had long 
dominated the free action of the 
people"98
All the resources of the mass-media would be used to 
launch important education campaigns? a priority would be
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the elimination of illiteracy of the masses. In this 
context, the Church would resume her role in education.
Equally, the Church would strive to liberate the 
masses from their underdevelopment: in collaboration with 
the State, she would organize health and vaccination 
campaigns, campaigns against alcohol abuse, etc., in view 
of radically transforming the mentality and make them 
capable of embracing progress. The final result of all 
this intensive collective undertaking would be the 
prosperity of Mexico.
Behind the Synarchist project stood out the real 
design of the middle-classes to attain power and bring to 
heel the two classes that antagonized them: the
bourgeoisie and the working class.
In fact, in the Synarchist state, the proletariat 
would be made harmless; by becoming middle-class, it would 
loose its revolutionary zeal. By the same token, a 
bourgeoisie isolated from international capitalism would 
be more involved in the destiny of the country. Besides, 
Synarchists did not challenge either the State, or its 
leader; they were prepared to collaborate with the Church 
and to acknowledge her an important role in the State. 
Besides, the Christian spirit tempered militant 
aggressiveness and banned the use of violence.
1. An Ideological framework
Catholicism thus became the official policy of 
Synarchism; its programme included "maximum respect for 
the Catholic tradition of our race":
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"Synarchism considers that within the 
Mexican essence is Catholicism and 
inside Catholicism true freedom, that 
is the freedom to do good and to 
embrace the truth".99
The first task of Synarchism was to destroy the 
"false" philosophers, to clear away all modernism, 
democracy, liberalism, the Reform and the Revolution, 
thereby making room for the return of spirituality. Only 
when this was done could Mexico again achieve her former 
greatness. A programme was ready at hand. Mexico had 
only to accept as her objectives the "return to our Faith" 
- the Roman Catholic Church.
Only faithfulness to Hispanic culture, 
to Hispanidad, and to the political 
integration of all Hispanic America 
could free us from hypocritical judeo- 
yankee imperialism, whose only 
objective is the destruction of our 
essence.1,100
The fear that Mexico lost her Spanish heritage and 
traditions found an ideological framework in the doctrine 
of Hispanidad which appeared in Spain in the early 
thirties, and whose main exponent was Ramiro de Maeztu, in 
his book Defensa de la Hispanidad.101
An editorial in El Sinarquista outlined the basic 
principle:
"All those who have been concerned 
with dignifying the life of Mexico, as 
well as those who have wanted to point 
the way to the real aggrandizement of 
Mexico, speak of Spain. To put it 
more correctly, they speak of the work 
done by the Mother Country during the 
historical colonial period. She 
showed us the road and gave us our 
bearings. So Mexico must cling to its
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traditions to find the meaning of its 
future. Thus, those who feel the 
desperate uncertainty that today hangs 
dense and heavy over the nation, want 
to return to Spain."102
Three ties bind Spanish America to Spain: language, 
race and religion. These are also exactly the differences 
that separate Spanish America from the English-speaking, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant United States.
The fear that Anglo-Saxon culture displaced the 
Spanish heritage led the Synarchists to eulogize Spain and 
condemn the United States. They also denounced Communism 
and Soviet Russia, and they regarded both communism and 
Anglo-Saxon culture as a threat to their cultural 
heritage.
"The present [... ] is opposed to our 
past. The main values of Hispanic 
culture have been replaced by the 
Anglo-Saxon culture. The profound 
spiritual ideals have been exchanged 
for economic utility. We severed our 
ties with Spain in order to adopt the 
Yankee way of life, and its necessary 
extension, bolshevism. Therefore, to 
defend Spain and to defend Mexico is 
to fight against the degrading 
influence of both the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Communist [...] The policy of the 
United States and the interference of 
the Komintern, apparently two
contradictory tendencies, are two 
aspects of the same action against the 
culture which we inherited from Spain. 
And what is most regrettable in our 
present situation, and at the same 
time the greatest handicap for the 
defenders of our destiny, is the 
veiled deceit, the hypocritical
complicity of North American
capitalism with the Bolshevik 
i m p e r i a l i s m  of the Third 
International. We suffer all the 
anxieties of an artificial dilemma, of 
a false conflict, without realising 
the perfect unity of the two
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tendencies [...] The Fatherland is 
degraded and destroyed just as much by 
the rightist influence of the Anglo- 
Saxon as by the leftist one of the 
Marxist.1'103
What, then, ties the Hispanic nations together? It is 
religion, the only force that can save them. Beset by 
bolshevism on one side and liberalism on the other, "they 
must return to the principles of Hispanidad if they are to 
emerge victorious.1,104
2. Hispanidad
From its Nineteenth century American and Iberian 
origins Hispanidad (or Pan-Hispanism) was inseparable from 
anti-Americanism.105 An ideological movement of reaction 
to American expansionism, it was recovered in the 
Twentieth century, and took on, in Spain and Mexico, a 
strong maurrassian tone.106 The main original aspect of 
Charles Maurras was that he succeeded in amalgamating two 
tendencies that had been until then very distinct and for 
a long time even opposite: counter-revolutionary
• • • • • 107traditionalism and nationalism.
It is important to emphasize that there was a 
difference between the Hispanidad upheld by Synarchism and 
other organizations, such as Accion Nacional and the 
Falange, and that of most Hispanistas. Many of the latter 
championed it primarily as a protection against the inroad 
of "alien" cultures and institutions, as a means of 
preserving the treasured Hispanic culture. On the other 
hand, for Synarchism and the others, Hispanidad included 
not only close spiritual and cultural ties with the mother
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country, but also a return to the old Church-feudal status 
quo, and perhaps even to old Spanish hegemony - it was 
also used as a political tool to further the cause of 
Franco.108
"Hispanidad [wrote Arthur P. Whitaker] 
was a new form of the long-familiar 
Pan-Hispanism, which was originally 
designed to bring about the cultural 
and spiritual reunion of all spanish- 
speaking peoples under the leadership 
of Spain. Hispanidad was conservative 
where the earlier Pan-Hispanism had 
been liberal, and reactionary where it 
had been progressive."109
From this perspective, Hispanidad was really a 
doctrine about the enemy to fight: the Anglo-Saxon, about 
stopping decadence by a return to the simple life. Its 
themes were those of anguish confronted by the threat of 
disappearing. Mexico was threatened to disappear under 
the influence of the revolution, from within, and the 
United States, from without. The loss of national 
identity was a threat deeply felt by the Synarchist 
leaders who shared it with their troops.
William B. Bristol said: "The conception of
Hispanidad often included the idea of opposition, not only 
to the political influence of the United States, but also 
to its influence in moral and religious realms".110 
Hispanidad, in varying degree, stood for conservatism and 
Catholicism as well as Hispanism, but all of these 
elements were usually present. Therefore, Hispanidad 
would take the form of Church-State government.
As we understand it, Hispanidad was the community of 
destiny of peoples related by permanent and dynamic bonds
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of ancestry, of language, of religion, of culture and of 
history, which drives them forward together towards the 
same universal deed and stand together in the face of 
equal contingencies in time. Hispanidad was born of the 
exceptional Spanish manner of fulfilling Catholicism as a 
norm of individual and collective life.111 The "essence" 
of Hispanidad was not a race, it was not a politico-legal 
identity: the spirit of Hispanidad would be traditional 
Catholicism in permanent action.112 Hispanidad rested on 
the conviction that Catholicism provided the most 
important source of unity among the Hispanic nations and 
that a future tightening of the bonds that joined them 
depended upon a resurgence among its members of militant, 
uncompromising, exclusivist Catholicism.
The myth of Hispanidad - with all that characterized 
it: the Hispanic ideal, the Hispanic race, the Christian 
or hispanic knight - constituted, without doubt, one of 
the basic ideological supports of Synarchism. The myth is 
projected like a dialectical weapon to revive the 
catholic-traditionalist interpretation of history, where 
the philosophy of history turns into magic theology of 
history. The historic revision implies, thus, the 
rejection of modernity and, through other ways, the 
utopian attempt to go back to the tradition of the XVI and 
XVII centuries. Hence, Catholic and traditional
nationalism needed, not so much a revision, as an 
effective I declay&iiov> and a practicable adaptation.
Basically, the crisis of Hispanidad, the crisis of 
tradition, of the missionary spirit of Spain, was the
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crisis of religion which, when secularization was forced 
upon, the "hispanic ideal” disappeared. The crisis of 
Hispanidad, Maeztu would say, was that of its religious 
principles. In the final analysis, Hispanidad was the 
credo that could save "Hispanic America" from Communism. 
It was a reactionary ideology compounded with the most 
traditional notion of Christianity and defending a 
Christian order. It appeared as an authoritarian answer 
to liberal "Pan-Americanism" and to the positions of the 
democratic and socialist left.113
Pablo Antonio Cuadra, the Nicaraguan intellectual, 
wrote on Hispanidad and Synarchism:
"Hispano America is not continental 
but universal. It is not a matter (as 
the Yankee wants) of what it contains 
but of what drives it towards its 
oecumenical destiny. Not the 'defence 
of the Continent' but the defence of 
the content. That is, defence of our 
own being [propio ser], of the very 
essence of our Graeco-Roman and 
Catholic civilization. What Dawson 
summed up in a sentence: Defence of 
the Faith! and that we have called 
with Maeztu: Defence of Hispanidad" 
"For a large part of America, the 
bulwark of the defence of Hispanidad 
is Mexico? and the soldiers of that 
defence are called, for many, 
Synarchists [...]1,114
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CONCLUSION
After the 1929 agreements the Church strove to 
preserve her apolitical image, and maintained an 
ambivalent attitude towards the faction organizations that 
identified with her, in particular, the UNS. From 1942 
the Synarchist organization went through a process of 
internal decline which Church indifference and the 
Government's strategy contributed to make worse. The 
modus vivendi guaranteed the Church direct communication 
with the government. If the hierarchy had explicitly 
promoted the organization and the success of a political 
party or faction it could have damaged her interests, 
restoration above all. The symbolic reconciliation 
carried out by the Avila Camacho administration 
neutralized effectively the possibility that the Church 
united an opposition front around the traditional themes 
of social defence: individualism and private property.
But not even the anti-communist alliance of those years 
succeeded in dissolving the bases of opposition between 
the Church and the State.
After 1940, secularization was no longer the explicit 
objective of the policy of the government removing thereof 
one of the main sources of conflict between Church and 
State. The reform in 1945 of Article 3 of the 
Constitution, which deals with education, was the concrete 
expression of that change, given that socialist education 
represented the most perfect attempt of a policy of 
secularization directed at the social values undertaken 
by the State.
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Mexican democracy was a firm-handed government that 
recognized in the UNS a potentially subversive and 
revolutionary organization, which used nationalistic, 
organic and Unitarian ideas, that the PRM wished to 
monopolize. The UNS was relatively free to play a radical 
role, free to make untenable promises, free to attract 
those individuals dissatisfied with the absorption and 
integration by the government of a revolutionary Left. 
Therefore, opposition to the revolutionary rdgime was 
taken up completely by the Synarchist Movement.
"The Synarchists had taken up the 
government challenge that the Catholic 
was a traitor to Mexico and had turned 
this challenge back on a government 
which they claimed was a tool of 
Soviet Russia. They also created an 
ideal of a nation based on Catholicism 
and order which found response in 
those disturbed by the upheavals of 
the thirties".1
The UNS had three possible courses of action:
1) suspicious isolationism, withdraw to the confines of 
the countryside and the village?
2) revolutionary struggle, impossible without at least 
the support of the army; and
3) compromise, the search for government support, for 
effective pressure.
In fact, the UNS found it impossible to choose between 
either of the latter two, because of the conflict between 
the Base and the Movement? and it took refuge in the 
first, from where it could eventually re-emerge again one 
day.
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However, isolation was never absolute; national 
leaders like Zermeno and Torres Bueno were often received 
by Cardenas and by Avila Camacho.
The UNS followed methods in accordance to the 
institutionalist and legalistic spirit of the Movement; 
supported by infiltration and by putting pressure on the 
Agrarian Department, the Ministry of the Interior, and the 
Army. It made use of agitation and propaganda as part of 
its essentially nonviolent direct action. This
nonviolence, marked by numerous millenarianist factors, 
did not signify a passive attitude. It internalized and 
channelled a disciplined aggressiveness. Non-violence 
corresponded, intuitively, to the existence of opposing 
forces, of waiting and acting. It also revealed the 
nature of the Movement; a movement of the poorest 
Mexicans, which translated the role of the pariah onto the 
national political level, with which it identified.
The success or failure of the Synarchist Movement 
largely rested on the significance of national and 
international circumstances. The fighting resources and 
the strength of the Movement were determined by and 
depended on the numerous actors that were in play, their 
power, their alliances and antagonisms, and the legal and 
political rules that governed conflicts and their 
solutions. The key factors were the United States, the 
Spanish Civil War, the European, and later the World War.
From the configuration of the forces present, it 
transpires that the Synarchist Movement had very little 
economic or political power; it never won the earnest
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support of the wealthy (Mexican or foreign). Recruitment 
was done among the middle classes, the artisans, and 
especially the peasants.
The peasant was, in the context of the agrarian 
reform, an ideal subject for manipulation, by the 
Government and by the UNS. Consequently, the UNS was, in 
turn, manipulated, on three counts: firstly, by the Base, 
the secret authority representing the interests of the 
Catholic conservative sector, which sought to turn the UNS 
into a pressure group? then, by the Government of Avila 
Camacho which used the UNS, by taking advantage of it, to 
defeat the forces of the Left and take down the position 
of the cardenista group and? finally, by the United 
States, which sought thereof to strengthen the regime of 
Avila Camacho to prevent a return to the old cardenista 
practices, and to fight the establishment of a fifth 
column in Mexico. The intervention of the United States 
was to be decisive in removing Abascal.
In all these instances, the Base was present in the 
person of Antonio Santacruz -leader of the secret Supreme 
Council, close to the Archbishop of Mexico, and 
intermediate with the Mexican and American governments.
The UNS thus had to find a compromise between its 
interests and those of the Government and of the United 
States, without threatening them. That accounted for the 
internal crisis that marked the Movement from the outset, 
since the large popular following it had attracted had 
done so because of its stance vis-a-vis the Government and 
the United States? it also explained the contradiction
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between the Movementfs everyday activism and a long term 
immobilism.
However, the movement presented neither a positive 
plan for the solution of Mexico's economic problems nor a 
blueprint for seizure of power. Because of this lack of 
programme, the Synarchists were doomed to failure.
Once Abascal was eliminated, unquestionably the only 
leader capable of mobilizing the movement to seize power, 
and thereby define its position (total destruction, or an 
alliance with other right-wing forces), all that remained 
were untenable promises.
Within Mexico, the UNS participated, before 1940, in 
the general rise of the anti-cardenist sentiment and 
forces; afterwards, it became allied, in practice, with 
Avila Camacho against cardenism and, following the defeat 
of the latter in the election to the presidency of a 
civilian and a conservative, Miguel Alem&n, the Synarchist 
Movement lost its raison d'etre.
In the end, the Synarchist Movement failed because of 
the very negativeness of its philosophy.
"It has always been the case", wrote 
Wilhelm Reich, "that the 'ethos' of 
the few, with their discipline, leads 
to the incompetence of the large 
majority of people. Myth and ethos 
may be heroic, but they are always 
dangerous, undemocratic, and 
reactionary measures. It is a question 
of the character, the will, the 
conviction, joy of assuming 
responsibility, and enthusiasm of the 
broad masses of working men and women. 
They themselves must be willing and 
capable of sticking up for their own 
lives and insisting on the wealth of 
their own experience. An ethos based 
on the misery of masses and demanding
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such great sacrifices and discipline 
that only a few are capable of 
measuring up to it, an ethos that is 
so severe and continues to be so 
severe that even those who support it 
cannot keep the pace, may have an 
elevating effect; but it will never 
solve a single objective problem of 
the social community11.2
ENDNOTES
1 Albert Michaels, "Fascism and Sinarquismo: Popular 
Nationalisms Against the Mexican Revolution”, A Journal of 
Church and State, Vol.VII, No.2, 1966, pp.249-250.
2 Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New 
York, Touchstone, 1970, p.306.
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Michaels described, respectively, the UNS during its 
formative years.
532
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Mexico City
Archivo General de la Nacion 
Hemeroteca Nacional
Archivo Historico del Instituto Nacional de 
Antropologia e Historia
Biblioteca del Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
Biblioteca del Congreso de la Union
London
The Public Record Office 
Madrid
Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
Washington, D.C.
The National Archives of the United States
SECONDARY SOURCES: BOOKS
Abascal, Salvador. La reconquista espiritual de Tabasco en 
1938, Mexico, Editorial Tradicion, 1972.
  La Revolucion Antimexicana, Mexico , editorial
Tradicion, 1978.
  Tomas Garrido Canabal, sin Dios, sin Curas, sin
Iglesias 1919-1935, Mexico, Editorial Tradicion,
1987.
  Mis Recuerdos. Sinarquismo y Colonia Maria
Auxiliadora, Mexico, Editorial Tradicion, 1980.
  La Constitucion de 1917. Destructora de la Nacion,
Mexico, Editorial Tradicion, 1984.
  Lazaro Cardenas. Presidents Comunista, Mexico,
Editorial Tradicion, Vol.I, 1988.
Adame Goddard, Jose. El Pensamiento Politico y Social de 
los Catolicos Mexicanos (1867-1914), Mexico, 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1981.
Alba, Victor. Las ideas sociales contemporaneas en
Mexico, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960.
Alessio Robles, Miguel. Historia Politica de la 
Revolucion Mexicans, Colima, Universidad de Colima, 
1983, 4a edicion.
Almazan, Juan Andrew. Memorias del General,.... Informes 
y documentos sobre la campana politica de 1940,
Mexico, Editorial Quintanar, 1941.
533
Alvear Acevedo, Carlos. C&rdenas: el hombre y el mi to,
Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1961.
  Episodios de la Revolucion Mexicana, Mexico,
Editorial Jus, 1988.
Amaya, Juan Gualberto. Los gobiernos de Obregdn, Calles 
y regimenes "peleles" derivados del Callismo, Mexico, 
n.p, 1947
Anguiano, Arturo. El estado y la politica obrera del 
cardenismo, Mexico, Ediciones Era, 1975.
Ankerson, Dudley. Agrarian Warlord. Saturnino Cedillo and 
the Mexican Revolution in San Luis Fotosi, Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1984.
D*Antonio, William and Pike, Fredrich, eds. Religion, 
Revolution, and Reform. New Forces for Change in 
Latin America, London, Burns and Oates, 1964.
Asociacion Cultural Hispano-Americana. Voces de 
Hispanidad, (Ciclo de Conferencias), Madrid, n.p., 
1934.
Ashby, Joe C. Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution 
under L&zaro Cardenas, Chapell Hill, University of 
North Carolina Press, 1967.
Avila Camacho, Manuel. La ruta de Mexico, Mexico, S.E.P., 
1946.
Bailey, David. Viva Cristo Rey! Cristero Rebellion and the 
Church-State Conflict in Mexico, Austin, University 
of Texas Press, 1974.
Balderrama, Luis C. [pseud, of Jose Gonzalez]. El Clero 
y el Gobierno de Mexico (Apuntes para la historia de 
la crisis en 1926), Mexico, Editorial Cuauhtemoc, 
1927.
Barba Gonzalez, Silvano. La rebelion de los cristeros, 
Mexico, n.p., 1967.
Benitez, F. Lazaro Cardenas y la Revolucion Mexicana. 
Mexico. Fondo de Cultura Mexicana, 3 Vols., 1972-
1978.
Beteta, | Ramon, ed. Rrograma economico y social de Mexico, 
(Una controversia), Mexico, n.p. 1935.
Blanco Gil, Joaquin [pseud, of Andres Barquin y Ruiz]. El 
clamor de la sangre, Mexico, Editorial Rex-Mex, 1947.
Blanco Moheno, Roberto. El Cardenismo. Mexico, Libro-Mex 
Editores, 1963.
534
Bosques, Gilberto. The NFR of Mexico and the Six-Year
Plan, Mexico, NPR Bureau of Foreign Information,
1937.
Brandenburg, Frank. The Making of Modern Mexico, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1964.
Bremauntz, Alberto. La educacion socialista, 
(Antecedenteds y fundamentos de la Reforma de 1934),
Mexico, Imprenta Revadenevra, 1943.
Brenner, Anita. The Wind that Swept Mexico. A History of 
the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1942. New York, Harper, 
1943.
Cabrera, Luis. Un ensayo comunista en Mexico, |in Obras 
Completas, Mexico. Ediciones Oasis, 1975.
— --  Veinte ahos despues. Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1937.
Campbell, Hugh G. La derecha radical en Mexico, 1929-1949,
Mexico SepSetentas 276, 1976.
Cardenas, Lazaro. Obras, I. Apuntes 1913-1940, Mexico, 
Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 1973.
  Epistolario de Lazaro Cardenas, presentacibn de Elena
Vazquez Gomez, Mexico, Sigle XXI Editores 1974.
  La unificacion campesina, Mexico, Biblioteca de
Cultura Social y Poitica del PNR, 1936.
  Palabras y documentos publicos de ..., vol.I: 1928-
1940, Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 1978.
Cardenas Noriega, Joaquin. Morrow, Calles y el P.R.I., 
Mexico, Editorial Pac, 3s edicibn, 1986.
Carreno, Alberto Maria. El Arzobispo de Mexico, Excmo. 
Sr. Don. Pascual Diaz y Barreto y el conflicto 
religioso, Mexico, Ediciones Victoria, 1943, 2a.
edicibn.
  Pastorales, edictos y otros documentos del Excmo. y
Rvmo. Sr. Dr. D. Pascual Diaz, arzobispo de Mexico,
Mexico, Ediciones Victoria, 1938.
Chase, Allan. Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the
Americas, New York, G.P. Putnam, 1942.
Chebel d'AppolIonia Ariane. L'Extreme-Droite en France.
De Maurras a Le Pen, Bruxelles, Editions Complexe,
1988.
Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1963.
  Mexico, Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960, London,
Oxford University Press, 1962.
535
Coleccion de efemerides pubicadas en el calendario del mas 
antlguo Galvan, Mexico, Antigua Libreria Mexicana,
Mexico, Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1977.
Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico. Informe del 
Comite Nacional, 1936-1937, Mexico, n.p. 1938.
— — -C.T.M., 1936-1941, Mexico, Tallers Tipograficos
Modelos, n.d.
 La CTM y la carestia de la vida, Mexico, n.p., 1937.
Contreras, Ariel Jose. Mexico 1940:
industrializacion y crisis politica. Estado y 
sociedad en las elecciones|presidenciales, Mexico, 
Siglo XXI, 1977.
Cordova, Arnaldo. La politica de masas del cardenismo,
Mexico, Ediciones Era, 1974.
Correa, eduardo J. El balance del cardenismo, Mexico, 
Talleres Linotipograficos Accibn, 1941.
Cosio Villegas, Daniel. Extremos de America. Mexico, 
Tezontle, 1949.
Degollado Guizar, Jesus. Memorias de...,ultimo General en 
Jefe del Ejercito Cristero, Mexico, Editorial Jus, 
1957.
Diaz Escobar, Alfredo F. Como combatir al Nazifacismo en
Mexico, Mbxico, Imprenta de la Cbmara de Deputados, 
1942.
Dulles, John W.F. Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the 
Revolution, 1919-1936, Austin, University of Texas 
Press, 1961.
Encyclopaedia Universalis, Paris, 1984.
New Catholic Encyclopedia, McGraw Hill, 1967.
Falcon, Romana y Garcia M, Soledad. La semilla en el 
surco. Adalberto Tejeda y el radicalismo en Veracruz, 
1883-1960, Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1986.
Fernandez Boyoli, Manuel y Marron de Angelis, Eustaquio. 
Lo que no se sabe de la rebelion cedillista. Mexico,
1938.
Fuentes, Gloria. El ejercito mexicano, Mexico, Editorial 
Grijalbo, 1983.
Fuentes Diaz, Vicente. Los partidos politicos en Mexico, 
Mbxico, Vol.II, Ediciones del Autor, 1956.
Gaceta Oficial del Arzobispo de Mexico, April 1941.
Gaceta Oficial del Arzobispo de Mexico, July 1942.
536
Garcia Cantu, Caston. El pensamiento de la reaccion
mexicana. Historia documental, 1810-1962, Mexico, 
Empresas Editoriales, 1965.
Garcia Gutierrez, Jesus, Pbro. Accidn Anticatolica en 
Mejico, Mejico, Ed. Helios, 1939.
Garcia Gutierrez, Jesus. La Lucha del Estado contra la
Iglesia, Mexico, Editorial Tradicion, 1979.
Garcia Ibarra, Abraham. Apogeo y crisis de la Derecha en 
Mexico, Mexico, El Dia, Sociedad Cooperativa 
Publicatciones Mexicanas, S.C.L., 1985.
Carrido, Luis Javier. El Partido de la Revolucion 
Institucional, 1928-1945, Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores, 1982.
Gaxiola, Francisco Javier. El Presidente Rodriguez (1932-
1934), Mexico, Editorial Cultura, 1938.
Gill, Mario. Sinarquismo: su origan, su esencia, su
mision, Mexico, 3* edicion, 1962.
 La decada barbara, Mexico, n.p., 1970
Glantz, Susana. El ejido colectivo de Nueva Italia,
Mexico, SEP-INAH, 1974.
G6mez Jara, Francisco. El movimiento campesino en Mexico, 
Mexico, Editorial Campesino, 1970.
Gomez Robledo, Antonio. Anacleto Gonzalez Flores, el 
Maestro, Guadalajara, Editorial Xalisco, 1937.
Gonzalez Calzada, Manuel. Tomas Garrido, al derecho y al 
reves, Mexico, n.p., November 1940.
Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo. La democracia en Mexico, 
Ediciones Era, 1976.
Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo (ed.). America Latina en los anos 
treinta, Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones 
Sociales, U.N.A.M., 1977.
Gonzalez y Gonzalez, Luis. Fuentes de la Historia 
Contemporanea de Mexico, Mexico, Colegio de Mexico, 
3 vols., 1962.
 Pueblo en vilo. Microhistoria de San Josd de Gracia,
Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1972.
 Los artifices del cardenismo, Mexico, El Colegio de
Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, periodo 
1934-1940), 1979.
537
 Los dias del Presidente Cardenas, Mexico, Colegio de
Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, periodo 
1934-1940), 1981.
Gonzalez Luna, Efrain. Los Catolicos y la Politica en 
Mexico, Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1988.
Gonzalez Navarro, Moises. La Confederacion Nacional 
Campesina Mexico, Costa-Amic, 1967.
 La C.N.C. en la Reforma Agraria, Mexico, El Dia en
Libros, 3a edicion, 1985.
Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and its Heritage, New York, 
Greenwood, 1968.
Guizar Oceguera, Jose. Episodios de la Guerra Cristera. 
Recuerdos de un combatiente. Mexico, Costa-Amic, 
1976.
Gunther, John. Inside Latin America, London, Hamish, 
Hamilton, 1942.
Hanson, Simon G. Economic development in Latin America,
Washington, D.C., The Inter-American Affairs Press, 
1951.
Hernandez Chavez, Alicia, La mecanica cardenista, Mexico, 
El Colegio de Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, periodo 1934-1940), 1979.
Hernandez Enriquez, Gustavo, y Rojas Trujillo, Armando. 
Manuel Avila Camacho: Biografia de un revolucionario 
con historia, Mexico, Ediciones del Estado de Puebla, 
2 vols., 1986.
Hodges, Donald C. Mexico 1910-1982: Reform or
Revolution?, London, 1983.
Humphreys, R.A. Latin America in the Second World War,
London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Vol.II, 
1982.
Instituto Panamericano de Alta Empresa. "El movimiento 
obrero mexicano: el sindicalismo mexicano: los
inicios", unpublished paper, (P) DPN-40, IPADE,
Mexico, November 1977.
Institute of International Affairs. The International 
Repercussions of the War in Spain (1936-1937),
London, Survey of International Affairs, Vol.II, 
1937.
Jauffret, Eric. Revolution et Sacrifice au Mexique,
Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1986.
Katz, Fredrich. Der Deutsche Faschismus in Lateinamerika, 
1933-1943, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, 1966.
538
Katz, Friedrich et al. Hitler sobre America Latina (1933-
1943), Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1968.
Kelley, Francis C. Blood Drenched Altars, Milwaukee, Bruce 
Publishing Co., 1935.
Kiek, Betty. Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of 
Europe versus America. Norman, Okla., University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1942.
Kirschner, Alan M. Tomas Garrido Canabal y el movimiento 
de las Camisas Rojas, Mexico, SepSetentas, 1976.
Kluckhohn, Frank, L. The Mexican Challenge, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1951.
Krauze, Enrique. Plutarco Elias Calles, Mexico, Fondo de 
Cultura Economica (Biografia del poder no.7), 1987.
 Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica
(Biografia del poder no.8), 1987.
Labra, Armando. Narciso Bassols, Mexico, Editorial Terra 
Nova, 1985.
Lara y Torres, Leopoldo, Mons. Documentos para la 
historia de la persecucion religiosa en Mexico,
Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1954.
Lagarde, Ernest. "M. Ernest Lagarde, charge d'affaires de 
la Republique frangaise au Mexique a son Excellence, 
M. Aristide Briand, ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres", 18 September 1926, volume 18 (folios 180 
A 242), de la serie Amerique, sous-serie Mexique
(affaires religieuses).
Laqueur, Walter, ed. Fascism: A Reader's Guide, London,
Penguin, 1976.
Larin, Nicolas. La rebelion de los Cristeros (1926-1929),
Mexico, Editorial Era, 1965.
Lajous, Alejandra. Los partidos politicos en Mexico,
Mexico, Premia editora, 1985.
von Lazar, A., and Kaufman, R. (eds) . Reform and
Revolution, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1969.
Ledit, Joseph, S.J. Le front des pauvres, Montreal, Fides,
1954.
Lerner, Victoria. La educacion socialista, Mexico, 
Colegio de Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion
Mexicana, periodo 1934-1940), 1979.
Liewen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America, New
York Praeger, 1961.
539
 Mexican militarism: the political rise and fall of
the revolutionary army, 1910-1940, Albuquerque, 
University of New Mexico Press, 1968.
Lombardo Toledano, Vicente. La Constitucidn de los
Cristeros Mexico, Libreria Popular, 1963.
Ldpez Aparicio, Alfonso. El movimiento obrero en Mexico. 
Antecedentes, desarrollo y tendencias, Mexico,
Editoial Jus, 1952.
Lozoya, Jorge A. El ejercito mexicano (1911-1965),
Mdxico, El Colegio de Mexico (Jornadas 65) , 2a
edicion, 1976.
MacDonald, N.P. Hitler over Latin America, London,
Jarrolds, 1940.
MacFarland, Charles S. Chaos in Mexico: the Conflict of 
Church and State, New York, Harper, 1935.
Maeztu, Ramiro de. Defensa de la Hispanidad, Madrid, 
n.p., 1934.
Magana, Manuel C. Poder laico. Mexico, Ediciones Foro 
Politico, 1970.
Manero, Antonia. La revolucidn bancaria en Mdxico,
Mexico, Talleres Graficos de la Nacion, 1957.
Marquez Montes, Joaquin. La Iglesia y el Estado en 
Mexico: la Iglesia y la Constitucion Mexicana,
Chihuahua, Editorial Regional, 1950.
Martinez Assad, Carlos. El laboratorio de la Revolucion: 
el Tabasco garridista, Mexico, Sigo XXI editores,
1979.
Maurras, Charles. La contre-revolution spontanee, Paris, 
H. Lardanchet, 1943.
 De la politique naturelle au nationalisme integral
(Textes choisis par F. Natter et C. Rousseau), Paris, 
Vrin, 1972.
McCullagh, Francis. Red Mexico, London, Brentano's, 1928.
Meehan, J. Lloyd. Church and State in Latin America, a 
History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations, Chapel 
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1966.
Medin, Tzvi. El minimato presidencial: Historia politica 
del maximato (1928-1935), Mexico, Ediciones Era, 
1982.
540
Medina, Luis. Del cardenismo al avilacamachismo, Mexico, 
El Colegio de Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, 1940-1952), 1978.
 Civilismo y modernizacion del autoritarismo, Mexico,
El Colegio de Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion 
Mexicana, periodo 1946-1952), 1979.
Medina, Luis. "Origen y circunstancia de la unidad 
nacional”, in Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 
Lecturas de Politica Mexicana, Colegio de Mexico, 
1977.
Mena brito, Bernardino. Hablando Claro. Mis Trabajos por 
el Partido Nacional de Salvacion Publica, Mexico, 
n.p, 1939.
 El P.R.U.N., Almazan y el desastre final, Mexico,
Ediciones Botas, 1941.
Mentz, Brigitte von, et al. Fascismo y antifascismo en 
America Latina y Mexico, Mexico, Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia 
Social, 1984.
 Los empresarios alemanes, el Tercer Reich y la
oposicion de derecha a Cardenas,(I), Mexico, 
Coleccion Miguel Oton de Mendizabal, No, 11, SEP, 
1988.
Mexico. Departamento del Trabajo. La obra social de la 
actual administracion que preside Lazaro Cardenas, 
Mexico, D.A.A.P., 1936.
Mexico. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Mexican 
Government in the presence of social and economic 
problems. Tour of the President of the Republic 
(Monterrey-Tampico-Guadalajara), Mexico, Press of the 
Minstery of Foreign Affairs, 1936, No.l.
Mexico. Secretaria de la Economia Nacional. Compendio 
Estadistico, Mexico, Direccion General de
Estadistica, 1947.
Mexico. Secretaria de Gobernacion. Seis anos de gobierno 
al servicio de Mexico, 1934-1940, Mexico, 1940
Mexico. Congreso de la Union, Los Presidentes de Mexico 
ante la Nacion. Informes, manifiestos y documentos.
Mexico, Imprenta de la Camara de Diputados, 1966, 5 
vols.
Mexico. Los Presidentes de Mexico, Discursos Politicos, 
1910-1988, Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica El 
Colegio de Mexico, Vol. Ill, 1988.
Meyer, Eugenia. Luis Cabrera, teorico y critico de la 
Revolucion, Mexico, SepSetentas, 1972.
541
Meyer, Jean. La Revolution Mexicaine. Paris, Calmann- 
Levy, 1973.
 La Cristiada. Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, 3 vols.,
1973-1974.
 Apocalypse et Revolution au Mexique. La guerre des
criteros (1926-1929), Paris, Gallimard, 1974.
 La Christiade. L'Eglise, l'Etat et le peuple dans la
Revolution Mexicaine, Paris, Payot, 1975.
 Le synarquisme: un fascisme mexicain? 1937-1947,
Paris, Hachette, 1977.
 Estado y sociedad con Calles, Mexico, El Colegio de
Mexico (Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, periodo 
1924-1928), 1977.
Meyer, Lorenzo. Mexico y los Estados Unidos en el
conflicto petrolero (1917-1942), Mexico, Colegio de 
Mexico,1972.
 El conflicto social y los gobiernos del Maximato,
Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, (Historia de la 
Revolucion Mexicana, periodo 1928-1934), 1978.
 , et al. Los inicios de la institucionalizacion. La
politica del Maximato. Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 
(Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, periodo 1928- 
1934), 1972.
Meyer, M.C., Sherman, W.L. The Course of Mexican History, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 1979.
Millan, Verna Carlton, Mexico Reborn, Boston, Houghton, 
1939.
Milza, Pierre. Le fascisme, Paris, MA Editions, 1986.
 Le Fascisme frangais. Pase et present, Paris,
Flammarion, 1987.
Montavon, William, F. The Facts Concerning the Mexican 
Problem, Washington, D.C., National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, 1966.
Mouchet, Carlos. La Legalidad del Municipio, Buenos Aires, 
Talleres El Grafico, 1965.
Munoz, Hilda. Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico, Fodo de Cultura 
Economica, 1975.
Novo, Salvador. La vida en Mexico en el periodo 
presidencial de Lazaro Cardenas, Mexico, Empresas 
Editoriales, 1964.
542
Nunes, Amerigo. La Revolution du Mexique, Paris, 
Flammarion, 1975.
O'Gorman, Edmundo. Mexico. El Trauma de su Historia, 
Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 
1977.
Olivera Sedano, Alicia. Aspectos del conflicto religioso 
de 1926 a 1929, Mexico, Instituto Nacional de 
Antropologia e Historia, 1966.
Olivera de Bonfil, Alicia. Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra y su 
interpretacion del conflicto religioso de 1926,
Mexico, Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e 
Historia, Archivo Sonoro No.2, 1970.
Osorio Marban, Miguel. El Partido de la Revolucion 
Mexicana (Ensayo). Mexico, n.p., 1977.
Padgett, L. Vincent. The Mexican Political System, Boston, 
Houghton, 1976.
Padilla, Juan Ignacio. Sinarquismo: contrarrevolucion,
Mexico, Editorial Polis, 1948.
Palomar y Vizcarra, Miguel. La Accion Catolica y la Accion 
Civica, Mexico, Editorial Ara, 3a edicibn, 1963.
 El caso ejemplar de Mbxico, Mbxico, Editorial Jus,
1966.
Parkes, Henry Bamford. A History of Mexico, London, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1960.
Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana, 33 meses al servicio de 
la Nacion. Ciclo Historico del Presidente Avila 
Camacho y del P.R.M., 1940-1943, Mexico, P.R.M.,
Departametno de Prensa y Propaganda, 1943.
Partido Nacional Revolucionario. Plan Sexenal, 1934-1940, 
Mexico.P.N.R., 1934.
 La gira del general Lazaro Cardenas. Sintesis
idelologica, Mexico, P.N.R., 1934.
 La gira del general Lazaro Cardenas. Sintesis
ideologies, Mexico, Editorial Jus, 1961.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Historia Documental, 
tomo IV: P.R.M., Mexico, P.R.I., 1985.
Pereyra, Carlos. Breve Historia de America, Madrid, n.p., 
1941.
Perez Lugo, J. [pseud, of Joaquin Ramirez Cabanas]. La
cuestion religiose en Mexico, Mexico, Centro Cultural 
"Cuauhtemoc", 1927.
543
Pike, Frederick, (ed.) The conflict between Church and 
State in Latin America, New York, Knopf, 1964.
 Hispanismo, 1898-1936. Spanish Conservatives an
Liberals and their relations with Spanish America,
Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1971.
Pineyro, Jose Luis. Ejercito y sociedad en Mexico: pasado 
y presente, Puebla, Universidad Autonoma de Puebla, 
1985.
Pius XI. On the Religious Situation in Mexico,
Washington, D.C., National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, 1937.
Portes Gil, Emilio. La lucha entre el poder civil y el 
clero, Mexico, 1934.
 Quince aiios de politica mexicana, Mexico, Instituto
Mexicano de Cultura, 1964.
 Autobiografia de la Revolucidn Mexicana, Mexico.
Instituto Mexicano de Cultura, 1964.
Powell, T.G. Mexico and the Spanish Civil War,
Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1981.
Los Presidentes de Mexico, Discursos Politcos, 1910-1988,
Mexico, Presidencia de la Reptiblica - Colegio de 
Mexico, 1988
Prewett, Virginia. Reportage on Mexico, New York, E.P. 
Dutton, 1941.
Quirk, Robert E. The Mexican Revolution and the Catholic 
Church (1910-1929), Bloomingtion, Indiana University 
Press, 1973.
Ramos, Samuel, El perfil del hombre y la cultura en 
Mexico, Mexico, Espasa Calpe, Coleccion Austral, 
1951.
Reich, Wilhem. The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New York, 
Touchstone, 1970.
Reyna, Jose Luis, and Weinert, Richard S. Authoritarianism 
in Mexico, Philadelphia, Institue for the Study of 
Human Issues, 1977.
Reynolds, Clark W. The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century 
Structure and Growth, New Haven, Conn., Yale 
University Press, 1970.
Rius Facius, Antonio. La juventud catolica y la Revolucion 
Mejicana, Mejico, Jus, 1963.
 Mejico cristero. Historia de la ACJM (1925-1931),
Mejio, Editorial Patria, 1966.
544
Robles, Fernando. Un surco en el ague, Mexico, 1970.
Rodriguez, Abelardo. Autobiografia, Mexico, Novaro, 1962.
Rodriguez Araujo, Octavio. La reforma politica y los 
partidos en Mexico, Mexico, Siglo XXI editores, 3a 
edicibn, 1980.
de la Rosa, Martin, y Reilly, Charles A. (coords.). 
Religion y Politica en Mexico, Mexico, Siglo XXI 
editores, 1985.
Ross, Stanley. Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?, New York, 
Alfred Knopf, 1966.
Rudel, Christian. Mexique. Des mayas au petrole, Paris, 
Karthala, 1983.
Salazar, Rosendo. Historia de las luchas proletarias en 
Mexico, Mexico, Talleres Graficos de la Nacion, 1956.
Sanchez, Jose M. The Spanish Civil War as a Religious 
Tragedy, Notre Dame, Indiana, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1987.
von Sauer, Franz. The Alienated "Loyal" Opposition: 
Mexico's Partido Accion Nacional, Albuquerque, 
University of New Mexico Press, 1974.
Scott, Robert E. Mexican Government in Transition, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, 1964.
Shulgovski, Anatoli. Mexico en la encrucijada de su 
historia. Mexico, Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 2a 
edicion, 1972.
Silva Herzog, Jesus. L&zaro C&rdenas. Su pensamiento 
economico, social y politico, Mexico, Editorial 
Nuestro Tiempo, 1975.
Simpson, Eyler N. The Ejido: Mexico's way out, Chapel Hill 
University of North Carolina Press, 1937.
Simpson, Lesley Byrd. Many Mexicos, Berkeley, University 
of California Press, 1952.
Sinarquia Nacional. El Sinarquismo. Su Ruta Historica. 
Ideario y Postulados. Documentos, Mexico, Ediciones 
U.N.S., 2a edicion [1953?].
Smith, Lois E. Mexico and the Spanish Republicans,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1955.
Spiazzi, Raimondo, o.p. I documeti social! della Chiesa. 
Da Pio IX a Giovanni Paolo II (1864-1987), Milano, 
Massimo 1983.
545
Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and
Bread, London, Jonathan Cape, 1965.
Taracena, Alfonso. La vida en Mexico bajo Avila Camacho,
Mdxico, Editorial Jus, 1976.
Toro, Alfonso L. Iglesia y el Estado en Mexico (estudios 
sobre los conflictos entre el clero catolico y los 
gobiernos mexicanos, desde la Independencia hasta 
nuestros dias, Mexico, Ediciones El Caballito, 1927.
Torres, Blanca. Mexico en la Segunda Guerra Mundial,
Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico (Historia de la 
Revolucion Mexico, periodo 1940-1952), 1984.
Townsend, William C. Lazaro Cardenas: democrats mexicano,
Mexico, Grijalvo, 1976.
Tuck, Jim. The Holy War in Los Altos: A Regional Analysis 
of Mexico's Cristero Rebellion, Tucson, University of 
Arizona Press, 1982.
Tucker, William P. The Mexican Government Today,
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
Unidn Nacional Sinarquista. Hechos y causas que motivaron 
un cambio en la Jerarquia Secreta de la O.C.A.,
Mexico, December 1944.
 Instrucciones Generales para Jefes Sinarquistas,
Mexico, n.p., July 1941.
 [Alfonso Trueba]., Mexico-1960, n.p., 1941.
 Instrucciones para mobilizaciones y asambleas
publicas, Mexico, n.p., 1941.
 Programs Sinarquista, Mexico, Secretaria de
Propaganda de la U.N.S., 1942.
 Dinamica del Sinarquismo, Mexico Ediciones UNS,
1955.
 Estatutos, Mdxico, n.p., 1958.
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. Cincuenta anos de 
oposicion en Mexico, Mexico, U.N.A.M., 1979.
Uroz, Antonio. La cuestion religiosa en Mexico, 
Mexico,n.p. 1926.
Vasconcelos, Jose. Breve Historia de Mexico, Mexico, 
Compania Editorial Continental, 1956.
 Memorias, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 2
vols., 1982.
546
Vejar Vazquez, Octavio, y Bermudez, Antonio J. No dejes 
crecer la hierba.•.(El gobierno avilacamachista),
Mexico, Costa Amic, 1965.
Vera Estanol, Jorge. La Revolucion Mexicana, origen y
resultados, Mexico, Editorial Porrua, 1957.
Vidarte, Juan Simeon. Todos fuimos culpables, Mexico, 
1973.
Weber, Eugen. Action Francaise: Royalism and Reaction in 
Twentieth-Century France. Standford: STandford
University Press, 1962.
Weyl, Nathaniel and Sylvia. The reconquest of Mexico: The 
Years of Lazaro Cardenas, London, Oxford University 
Press, 1939.
Whetten, Nathan L. Rural Mexico, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1948.
Whitaker, Arthur P., ed. Mexico today, Philadephia, the 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences, vol.208, March 1940.
 (ed.) Inter-American Affairs, 1942, Annual Survey
No.2, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943.
 Inter-American Affairs, 1944, Annual Survey No.4, New
York, Columbia University Press, 1945.
Whitaker, A.P. and Jordan, David C. Nationalism in 
Contemporary Latin America, New York, the Free Press, 
1968.
Wilkie, James W. The Mexican Revolution: Federal
Expenditure and Social Change since 1910, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1976.
 and Michaels, Albert L., (eds.) Revolution in Mexico:
Years of Upheaval, 1910-1940, New York, Knopf, 1969.
 and Monzon de Wilkie, Edna. Mexico visto en el siglo
veinte. Entrevistas de historia oral, Mexico, 
Instituto de investigaciones Economicas, 1969.
Zevada, Ricardo J. Calles el Presidente, Mexico, Editorial 
Nuestro Tiempo, 1971.
547
SECONDARY SOURCES: ARTICLES
Abascal, Salvador. "La Historia del Sinarquismo y Apuntes 
sobre la fundacion de Maria Auxiliadora en la Baja 
California"? 21 articles in Manana, Nos. 38 to 60, 27 
May 1943 to 28 October, 1944.
 "Las primeras andanzas", Abside, Vol. XXIX (1965),
pp.27-44.
 "En la punta de la calzada", Abside, Vol. XXIX
(1965), pp.310-327.
 "Lazaro Cardenas. Presidente Comunista. 1934-1940".
3 articles in La Hoja de Combate, Nos. 239-241, 
August to October 1987.
Alvarez, Jose Rogelio. "El Orden Social Cristiano, un 
nuevo Fascismo", Tiempo, 4 July 1947, p.8.
Bailey, David. "Alvaro Obregon and Anticlericalism in the 
1910 Revolution", The Americas, Vol. XXVI, October 
1969, No.2, pp.183-198.
Beals, Carlton. "Burning Saints in Mexico", The Nation, 
Vol.CXXXIX, No.3625, December 26, 1934, pp. 733-735.
Block, Harry. "War Divides Mexico", The Nation, Vol. 
CXLIX, pp.490-492.
Boletin del Archivo General de la Nacion, No.14, 3a Serie, 
Vol.VI, October-December, Mexico, 1980.
Bristol, William B. "Hispanidad in South America", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. XXI, No.2, January 1943, pp.312-321.
Brown, Lyle C. "Mexico Church-State Relations, 1933-1940", 
A Journal of Church and State, VI, spring 1964,
pp.202-222.
Capistran Garza, Rene. "La Iglesia Catolica y la 
Revolucion Mexicana", 3 articles in Manana, 1, 7 and 
15 April 1950.
Carmona Nenclares, F. "Hispanismo e Hispanidad", Cuadernos 
Americanos, Vol. Ill, No.3, May-June 1942, pp.43-55.
Cervantes, Federico. "Un Sinarquismo especial", El 
Universal Grafico, 1 July 1938.
 "Sinarquismo Capitalista", El Universal Grafico, 15
July 1938.
Cline, Howard F. "Mexico: A Maturing Democracy," Current 
History, March, 1953, 136-142.
Davis, Harold. "The Enigma of Mexican Sinarquism", Free 
World, 5 May 1943, pp.410-416.
548
Dearing, Paul. "Synarchism in Mexico", Current History, 
November 1943, p.247.
Diaz Escobar, Alfredo F. "The Spread of Sinarquismo", The 
Nation, 3 April 1943, Vol.CLVI, p.487.
Diffie, B.W. "The Idelolgy of Hispanidad, Hispanic 
American Historical Review, Vol. XXIII, No.3, August 
1943, pp.457-482.
Ellis, Ethan L. "Dwight Morrow and the Church-State 
Controversy in Mexico", Hispanic American Historical 
Review, November 1958, pp.482-505.
Empire Parliament Association, "Activities of the Falange 
Exterior", Report on Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXI, No.5, 
1940, pp.675-677.
Fuentes Diaz, Vicente. "El Sinarquismo, edicion chichimeca 
del Fascismo", El Popular, 15 September 1942.
 "Sinarquismo: La careta anticomunista", El Popular,
3 November 1943.
 "La aparicion del Sinarquismo y de Accion Nacional",
El Popular, 24 December 1943.
 "Los conservadores cambian de tactica", El Popular,
17 January 1944.
 "Un pretexto para encender la guerra civil", El
Popular, 1 March 1944.
 "Que ocurre con el Sinarquismo", El Popular, 10
January 1945.
Gunther, John. "Avia Camacho of Mexico," Harper's 
Magazine, October 1941, pp.480-489.
Hackett, Charles W. and Mecham, J. Lloyd. "The 
Assassination of President-elect Obregon", Current 
History, September 1928, pp.1026-1028.
Halperin, Maurice. "Under the lid in Mexico", Current 
History, November 1934, pp.166-171.
 "Inside Mexico", Current History, Vol. XLV, February
1937, pp.83-87.
Hamilton, Thomas I. "Spanish DReams of Empire", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol.XXII, No.3, April 1944, pp.458-468.
Hanighen, Frank C. "Foreign Political Movements in the 
United States", Foreign Affairs, Vol XVI, No.l, 
October 1937, pp.1-20.
James, Earle W. "Church and State in Mexico", The Annals, 
Vol. CCVIII, March 1940, pp.112-120.
549
Jellinek, Frank. "Watch Mexico", The Nation, 5 March 1944, 
Vol. CLVIII, pp.364-366.
Johnson. Kenneth F. "Ideological Correlates of Right wing 
iPoliticalL Alienation", American Political Science 
Review Vol. LIX, September 1965, pp.656-664.
Jrade, Ramon. "Inquiries into the Cristero Insurrection 
against the Mexican Revolution". Latin American 
Research Review, Vol. XX, No.2, 1985, pp.53-70.
Kirk, Betty. "Mexico*s *Social Justice Party'". The 
Nation, 12 June 1943, Vol. CLIV, pp.827-831.
Kirschner, Alan M. "Setback to Tomas Garrido Canabal's 
Desire to Eliminate the Church in Mexico", A Journal 
of Church and State, vol.13, pp.479-492.
Knigth, Allan. "The Mexican Revolution: Bourgeois?
Nationalist? Or just a 'Great Rebellion?" Bulletin 
of Latin American Research, Vol. IV, No.2, 1985,
pp.1-37.
Leon, Ignacio. "El Sinarquismo y su lider", Hoy, 22 
November 1941, p.49.
Lippmann, Walter. "Church and State in Mexico: The
American Mediation", Foreign Affairs, Vol.VIII, No.2 
January 1930, pp.186-207.
Llamas Suarez, Alejo. "Dato para la Historia de Estos 
Dias. Origen del Sinarquismo", Hoy, 15 November 1941,
pp.66, 82.
Lugan, Abbe Alphonse. "Church and State in Mexico", 
Current History, February 1931, pp.272-276.
Mabry, Donald J. "Mexican Anticlerics, Bishops, Cristero, 
and the Devout During the 1920s: A Scholarly Debate", 
A Journal of Church and State, Vol. XX, 1978, pp.81- 
92.
Malian, Lloyd. "Axis Propaganda in Latin America", Current 
History, September 1943, pp.35-39.
Martino, Cesar. "El Sinarquismo", Mexico Agrario, Vol. 
Ill, July-September 1941, pp.323-333.
Mecham, J. Lloyd. "The Assassination of President-Elect 
Obregon", Current History, September 1928, pp.1026- 
1028.
 "Latin America's Fight Against Clerical Domination",
Current History, January 1929, Vol.XXIX, No. 4, 
PP.566-570.
Meyer, Jean. "Los obreros de la Revolucion Mexicana: los 
batallones rojos", Historia Mexicana, Vol. XXI, No.l, 
July-September, 1971, PP.1-37.
550
Michaels, Albert, "Fascism and Sinarquismo: Popular
Nationalisms Against the Mexican Revolution”, A 
Journal of Church and State, Vol. VII, No.2, 1966, 
pp.234-250.
 "The Modification of the Anti-Clerical Nationalism of
the Mexican Revolution by General Lazaro Cardenas and 
Its Relationship to the Church-State Ddtente in 
Mexico", The Americas, vol,XXVI, October 1969, No.l, 
pp.35-53.
 "Las eleccioness de 1940", Historia Mexicanna, Vol.
XXI, No.l (July-September), 1977, pp.80-134.
Murillo, Gerardo (pseud. Dr. ATI), A los pueblos de 
America, Mejico, Coleccion Mundial, 1941.
 La victoria de Alemania y la situacion de la America
Latina. Mejico: Coleccion Mundial, 1941.
Pattee, Richard, "Sinarquism. A Threat or a Promise?", 
Columbia, January 1945, pp.3-4, 13-14.
Pike, Fredrick, B. "Hispanismo and the Non-Revolutionary 
Spanish Immigrant in Spanish America, 1900-1930", 
Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XXV, 1971, 
pp.3-30.
Popper, David H. "Hemisphere Solidarity in the War 
Crisis",(Foreign Policy Reports,15 May, 1942, Vol. 
XVIII, No.5, pp.50-64.
Prado, Enrique. "Sinarquism in the United States", The New 
Republic, 26 July, 1943, pp.97-102.
Prewett, Virginia. "The Mexican Army", Foreign Affairs", 
Vol.XIX, No.3, April 1941, pp.616-617.
Prince, A.P. "La question religieuse du Mexique et le 
president Lazaro Cardenas", La Vie Intellectuelle, 25 
October, 1936, pp.181-198.
Raby, David L. "Los maestros rurales y los conflictos 
sociales en Mexico (1931-1940)", Historia Mexicana, 
Vol. XVIII:2 (October-December), 1968, pp.190-226.
Roitman Rosenmann, Marcos y, Mate, Victor. "Las Relaciones 
de Espana con America Latina", Cuadernos Americanos, 
Vol. CCLIV No.3, May-June 1984, pp.39-51.
Rojas-Mix, Miguel. "El Hispanismo: Ideologia de la
dictadura en Hispanoamerica•", Araucaria de Chile, 
No.2, 1978, pp.47-59.
Ross, Stanley. "Dwight Morrow and the Mexican Revolution", 
Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XXXVIII, 
November 1958, pp.509-515.
551
Roman, Richard. "Church-State Relations and the Mexican 
Constitutional Congress, 1916-1917", A Journal of 
Church and State, Vol. XX, Winter 1978, no.l, pp.72- 
80.
Sanders, Thomas G. "The Church in Latin America", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. XLVIII, No.2, January 1970, pp.285-299.
Shedd, Margaret. "Thunder on the Right in Mexico. The 
Sinarquistas in Action", Harper's Magazine, Vol. CXC, 
April 1945, pp.414-425.
Southworth, H. Rutledge. "The Spanish Phalanx and Latin 
America", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No.l, October 
1939, PP.148-152.
Tannenbaum, Frank. "Lazaro Cardenas", Historia Mexicana, 
Vol. X, October-December 1960, No.2.
Trueba Olivares, Jose, "Historia, ideales y crisis del 
Sinarquismo", Orden, 27 May 1951.
Vazquez, Veronica. "Seleccion bibliografica sobre los 
principales partidos politicos mexicanos, 1906-1979", 
Revista Mexicana de Sociologia, Vol. XXXIX, No.2 
(April-June 1977), pp.677-715.
Velasco Gil, Carlos. "El nuevo Moises. La colonia 
sinarquista en Baja California", Manana, No. 31, 1 
April 1944, pp.38-41.
Vila, Vicente. "Abascal : cabeza sinarquista", 4 articles 
in Asi, Nos. 33-36, 28 June, 5, 12 and 19 July 1941.
Weber, Eugen. "The Men of the Archangel", Journal of 
Contemporary History, No.l, 1966, pp.101-126.
Wilkie, James W. "The Meaning of the Cristero Religious 
War Against the Mexican Revolution", A Journal of 
Church and State, Vol. VIII, Spring 1966, pp.241-231.
Williman, John B. "Adalberto Tejeda and the Third Phase of 
the Anticlerical Conflict in Twentieth Century 
Mexico", A Journal of Church and State, Vol. XV, 
Autumn 1973, No.3, pp.437-454.
Zermeno y Perez, Manuel. "Sinarquismo unico", El Universal 
Grafico, 9 July 1938.
NEWSPAPERS
Mexican and American quoted in the notes.
552
